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Sunday, February 14, 2010

[ALOCHONA] Non-students in student organizations



Non-students in student organizations
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


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[ALOCHONA] BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONSHIP: WHEELS WITHIN WHEELS



BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONSHIP: WHEELS WITHIN WHEELS
 
BADRUL ISLAM

The idea of Swadeshi or "one´s own country" is one of the noblest conceptions that have stirred the heart of humanity and was the quintessential factor, that influenced two partitions ,within the sub-continent; first partition, 1947 created India and Pakistan, the second partition, 1971 confirmed birth of Bangladesh . Why did this happen? Freedom is the birth right of every Nation; secondly, the country´s interests were made subservient to the interest of the "Rulers".

In his book, "The Saga of Struggle and Sacrifice" Pranab Mukherjee wrote,"Much had been done by Great Britain for the benefit of India, and the whole country was truly grateful for it. She had given them order, railways and above all the inestimable blessings of Western education. The more progress the people made in education and material prosperity, the greater would be the insight into political matters and the keener their desire for political advancement." Precisely with this view in mind, I expressed my opinion, that determining public opinion and reaching a national consensus are a must before the government signs any agreement with India, (Financial Express, Nov7, 2009). This basic exercise would have generated a debate within the Parliament and the 0pposition( being the next representative component) and obtaining national consensus would have given the Prime Minister more leverage to strongly bargain the" issues " with India.

The visit of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her entourage to New Delhi, India (January10-13, 2010) was laudable as she was honored with the Indira Gandhi Award for Peace, Disarmament and Development, for 2009. Bangladesh feels proud of this achievement. Success of this visit lies in mutual trust and implementations. However, the visit also has generated controversial opinions causing polarizations and confusions among Citizens detailed herein for readers to judge: (1) Taj Hashmi writes, (New Age, Jan 23, 2010) "At times rabidly loyal Awami supporters convey the wrong message to the detriment of their country, party and leader.
 
Not only anti-Awami leaguers consider the party ´pro-Indian´ but some immoderate supporters of the party unwittingly also give similar impression about their party. BNP supporters, on the other hand, knowingly or unknowingly, give the impression that they prefer Pakistan to India, if not to Bangladesh. (2)Professor M.Maniruzzaman Mia writes, (New Age,Feb9,2010) "We have conceded everything that India wanted but we have not managed to receive anything in return except the warmth of India´s friendship.0ne wonders whether this friendship is between the peoples of two neighboring countries or between the two parties that have come to power here and in India.(3)Mahfuz Anam writes(Daily Star,Feb9,2010)"The history of mutual suspicion, petty bickering on trade negotiations, cavalier attitude on border killings, dangerous gamesmanship with arms smuggling, etc of the last three decades of Bangladesh-India relations would not normally justify the agreements that Sheikh Hasina penned two weeks ago. Only a vision would. (4) Predictably the Bangladesh 0pposition led by Khaleda Zia´s Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and supported by Jamaat-e-Islami(JI) have called the agreements a total surrender of Bangladesh´s interest to India(Daily Star,Feb9,2010).

As Bangladeshi Citizen, my concern is, (1) whether the visit, actually enhances good friendship and cooperation for economic benefit, and (2) whether adequate measures have been ensured to improve respectability, integrity and security of Bangladesh.

For the benefit of the readers, to understand the economic benefits, let me explain first, the $1Billion line of credit, offered by India, is not free and 1.7 percent charge is to be made, 5 years grace period and to be repaid back by twenty years (bangladeshinfo.com). Calculation on this basis indicates, at end of 20years, we have to return $1billion plus interest amount $225, 000000. The principal amount to be used for development of roads, railway tracks, bridges, railway lines, purchases of locomotives and coaches, buses, dredgers for dredgers for river, all this for India to develop its North-East States(earlier this type of credit was not offered). However, clarification is needed on the methods of purchase and whether source of purchase, from this credit is restricted to India or open to competitive purchase from other international countries.
 
The joint communiqué indicates that Nepal, Bhutan, India and its N-east states will use the Ashuganj, Chittagong and Mongla ports but terms and conditions for use of ports, cargo type and its taxation plus customs security procedure are not indicated for analysis. It is imperative that a transparent method be used for its finalization, as Indian Government has its Army stationed in these States to contain the high level of insurgency. The predicaments of both areas, West Bengal and North-East States, are a result of financial disparity and mismanagement by the central Government.

Now on integrity and security of Bangladesh .New Age report dated February07, 2010 "BSF Kills Bangladeshi (a farmer) on Tentulia border. This killing totals 898 unarmed Bangadeshis since January 1, 2000 i.e 89.8 a year. A more gruesome case reported February 05, 2010 "BSF, BDR trade gunshots; BSF kidnaps BDR soldier, returns after 10hours. The soldier was shot at close range without any provocation and at gunpoint kidnapped into India. Instead of responding to a Flag meeting by BDR 0fficials, BSF resorted to firing into Bangladesh territory late evening. This prompted BDR to fire back and guards of both countries exchanged about 100 gunshots. Finally, flag meeting was held and soldier returned.

The above cited incidents are repulsive and such trends are dangerous, therefore requires immediate attention and action from Indian Army Authorities, under supervision of Indian Senior most Politician. "India will not take any step that would hurt Bangladesh", this oft repeated vague jargon should not be accepted by Bangladesh any more particularly, in view of the recently signed three agreements on cross-border terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking. Indians failing to control their armed personnel tantamount to Terrorist act, deplored by the International Community, with which India wishes to become a partner on security affairs of the region. India is fully aware that in normal peace time the internationally accepted rule is to" arrest" only, illegal persons crossing into the territory, intelligence surveillance, and support to immigration and customs 0fficials. Additionally, India has plans to contain insurgents in the North-East States and also the Maoist/Marxist insurgency in West Bengal, declared as "Red Corridor Zone". Myanmar had given a "cold shoulder" attitude in response to India´s proposal for cooperation in this exercise.

The five principles, of Non-Aligned Movement and the Gujral Doctrine are known to both Bangladesh and India, and one fails to understand why these are not followed as the basic intentions to enhance Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, between both Countries are there. So, what can India Do? The good intention should be augmented by prompt solutions to pending issues and recent Joint Communiqué. Late J.N.Dixit former Foreign Secretary in his book "Liberation and Beyond", advocated that outstanding issues like the Ganges Water sharing issues, delineation of maritime boundary, transfer of enclaves, offering transit facilities to Bangladesh to trade with Bhutan and Nepal etc be solved soon. He also mentioned that while late Sheikh Mujibur Rahman reaffirmed his gratitude to India for supporting the liberation struggle he desired that India-Bangladesh relationship be imbued with a spirit of equality. Late Mujib was clear in his mind that he did not wish to be over-dependent on India. He did not wish that Bangladesh to be clubbed a client State of India, as was being anticipated by many political observers and analysts from different parts of the world. Will Sheikh Hasina follow the visions of her late father?

Ms.Smruti S. Patel, Research Fellow, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, offers her personal, but valuable opinion. India needs to walk the extra mile and, if necessary, provide unilateral trade concessions already hinted by the finance minister. But any concession or policy announcements must not be allowed to get tangled in bureaucratic red tapes leading to broken promises; India´s offer of half a million tons of rice during Sidr being a case in point. Appreciating her opinion, let me highlight another case in point, that of the issue of Tipaimukh Dam which in tandem with the Farakka Barrage water sharing problems, deserves immediate attention. River waters of Padma are already drying.

"As the foundation is laid, so the walls of the house will rise." Bangladesh and India should follow this old adage given the fact that there is a wave of gratitude and confusions all around them. Leaders, bureaucrats, citizens and media have to work unitedly with positive attitude, and adopt a transparent system for its success.
 


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[ALOCHONA] Diversion of Yarlung Tsangpo: A Probability Analysis



Diversion of Yarlung Tsangpo: A Probability Analysis

Rational choice is considered to be one of the key determinants in shaping state response. A key assumption underlying this approach is that state interest is shaped by perceptions that are constantly fed by imperfect information. A case in point is the current media coverage in India about the diversion of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra River) by China to meet its water needs in its Northern areas.

The debate on diversion of Brahmaputra waters resurfaced recently in the wake of talks between Indian and Chinese diplomats on the issue of China diverting the Brahmaputra waters as part of its Great South-North water transfer scheme. Some media commentaries stated that China has already started the diversion. But the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement that no such scheme was underway and that the Indian media was confusing the "great Western project" with the "smaller Western project".

Even before this Chinese statement, on October 29, 2009, a report had stated that India has no objections to the project being envisaged by China since it is a run of the river project and that it would do no actual harm to India. In addition, on November 5, Pawan Kumar Bansal, the Union Water Resource Minister noted that there is no evidence of China diverting the Brahmaputra waters. He, however, confirmed that a small dam is being constructed upstream about 1,100 kilometres inside Chinese territory and that it was meant for 'local use'. He also reiterated the importance of remaining alert on the issue.

The issue of water diversion from the Brahmaputra River first came to public attention in 1999, when Jiang Zemin announced the "Great Western Extraction" which potentially involved the massive transfer of water from Tibet into the Yellow River. In 2003, Li Guoying, Director of the Yellow River Conservancy Committee, stated that the project was essential because the Yellow river's flow was being exhausted by developmental demands in Western China. But in November 2006 Li Guoying added the caveat that though the project was essential, the route could be technologically challenging and it would have to overcome huge environmental and engineering impediments. And he further stated that the project would be launched once the economic and social development of the North Western areas reaches a certain level and the potential of water saving measures is exhausted.

The backdrop against which such schemes for river water diversion has to be seen is the water problem that China has been confronting. While South East China receives around 1,800 millimetres of rainfall, the North West receives around 200 millimetres. Approximately, sixty million people predominantly in rural areas have difficulty getting enough water for their daily needs and twenty-five per cent of China's total population is without access to drinking water. China has increasingly been tapping ground water resources, and over the years this extraction has greatly depleted the water table.

According to one study, ground water near the Northern cities fell between ten and thirty metres in the 1980s, while ground water levels across North China's plains has been dropping by 1.5 metres a year over the last few years.1 Precipitation and ground water resources no longer meet demands in the Huai and Yellow River basins, which is considered to be one of the most fertile wheat growing areas. The same study notes that Northern China's water shortages were so severe in 1997 that the overdrawn water does not reach the Yellow Sea almost 200 days a year.

China essentially has three routes (Eastern, Western and Central) for water diversion schemes in mind. The controversy around Yarlung Tsangpo revolves around the Western route geared towards diverting waters to the Xinjiang and Gansu provinces which fall in the Gobi Desert region. Here, there are two projects being envisaged. One is the smaller "Western" project which intends to tap the Yalong, Dadu and the Jinsha rivers that flow into South West China and are tributaries of the Yangtse River. This project involves the construction of a 300 kilometre long tunnel that has official backing. But the project does not interfere with the Brahmaputra waters. It is unfortunate that some of the writings in the media confuse 'Yalong' as 'Yarlung', and cite the former as the great diversion project.

The second, the Greater "Western Project" which pertains to the Brahmaputra river diversion would link the Brahmaputra to the Yellow River through a tunnel. Some reports say that China may have contemplated cutting such a tunnel through the mountains with peaceful nuclear explosions and that is why China may have sought to gain exemptions for peaceful nuclear explosions from the ambit of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Another way through which Beijing can divert waters is through a link canal that would pass through the Salween, Mekong and the Yangtse, thus joining the Yellow River. But this would impact the lives of millions inhabiting countries downstream – India, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Thailand. Moreover, within China, there has been opposition to the massive Three Gorges Dam, which, apart from its exorbitant social and ecological costs, is also considered to be one of the main reasons for the depletion of water levels in the Yangtse. China would thus have to take domestic and regional sensitivities into account before undertaking any large projects.

Given domestic demands and regional constraints, three probability scenarios on the issue of Brahmaputra river diversion can be drawn. The first is based on an understanding of past Chinese behaviour and the situational constraints that confront China. Given China's proclivity towards dam building, a river diversion scheme could very well be on its mind. This is all the more probable considering that the current leadership is convinced about the benefits of dams and construction activities in Tibet. The success of the smaller diversion projects could be the main determinant in shaping support for the bigger ones that might follow. It is no conjecture that China would face food and water shortages by 2050 and industrialisation, demographic factors, urbanisation and climate change are going to be the critical drivers in shaping the country's depleting water levels. Diversion of river waters could therefore definitely be in the long term policy perspective of China and it would move along despite protests from lower riparian states.

The second scenario would reflect Indian sensitivities on Chinese river diversion schemes and the issue would be played out at the political level. Debates in India would be fed by the oft raised public cry on the issue of Brahmaputra river diversion and the costs it could impose on lower riparian states. This fear psychosis of a typical lower riparian could complicate Sino-Indian relations. Further, water would often be used and perceived as a tool of political leverage. India could well attempt to counter China by playing the Tibet card differently. Alternately, India could go on a dam building spree in Arunachal Pradesh to justify its water requirements. Thus, water could indeed become the defining issue for bilateral relations.

The third scenario could pave the way for a cooperative approach on water sharing between India and China. A need based assessment could be the starting point for such a cooperative relationship. India has already stated that it has no objection to a run of the river project. In fact, this would regulate water flows and in coming years could also give rise to an emerging buyer-seller relationship between India and China. Holistic development of the Brahmaputra River could be explored by China, India and Bangladesh and frameworks could be worked upon to arrive at solutions that meet the needs and interests of all three countries. India also needs to make a realistic assessment of its water demands to meet its industrial and domestic needs. It needs to be noted that tributaries originating on Indian territory and high precipitation rates form a major part of the Brahmaputra flow in India. Thus effective measures (local and community) and realistic assessments would be needed to tap these resources efficiently before any overtures on water sharing solutions are made towards Bangladesh and China. Overall, the issue of water allocation and water rights of Bangladesh, India and China could form the basis of a framework on which joint cooperation among the three countries can be formulated.

In October 2007, General Zhao Nanqi, former Director of the People's Liberation Army, stated that "even if we do not build this water diversion project, the next generation will… sooner or later it would be done." An appropriate strategy for India to adopt under such a circumstance is to draw China into a regional framework on trans-boundary river waters. None of the South Asian countries are part to the UN Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses signed in 1997. In the absence of a reference point combined with a lack of a common framework, interpretations and understanding based on precedents can aggravate the situation further. Bangladesh has already started voicing concerns on its water security needs and has been seeking support for a regional multilateral understanding on water issues for quite some time now. India perhaps needs to revisit some norms that govern the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. This would mean that India engages Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan in order to generate a consensus on conflict-laden issues. It could be done by increasing the basket of mutual benefits to the concerned countries.

The evolving situation indicates that India, sooner or later, will have to tackle the issue of water sharing in a more serious and holistic manner. Absence of such an approach would not only aggravate tensions between India and China but would also affect the availability of water in Bangladesh during the lean season, which could be detrimental to India-Bangladesh relations in the coming years. Keeping these factors in mind it is perhaps time for Indian and Chinese policy makers to think of a long term solution, and forge an agreement that would prove beneficial for the region as a whole.

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/DiversionofYarlungTsangpo_MBisht_111109



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[ALOCHONA] Chhatra League anarchy



Admission halts again on' Bangladesh Chhatra League ('BCL) quota' demand

The authorities of Kushtia Government College were yesterday forced to stop the first year honours admission process once again as they turned down a demand of Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) to enrol 200 students illegally.(The Daily Star)

The BCL men also severely beat up two journalists --Touhidi Hasan, district correspondent of Prothom Alo, and Sharif Biswas of satellite Desh TV--who went to the principal's room for collecting information on the outrageous demand for 'political quota.'

Campus sources said a group of BCL activists confined the principal of the college to his room around 11:30am and asked him to stop the admission process that resumed yesterday without meeting the BCL demand. BCL college unit president Enamul Bari Sumon and general secretary Abdullah Al-Mamun accompanied by some outsiders allegedly led the incident.

Seeing the journalists at the principal's room, BCL cadres got angry and caught them. The cadres then took them to a room of the college library and assaulted them by locking the door from outside.

On information, police rushed to the spot and rescued the journalists sometime later. They were undergoing treatment at Kushtia general hospital.Kushtia Sadar thana Sub-inspector Obaidul Quader was suspended for not taking immediate step to rescue the journalists. Police later arrested two BCL outsiders--Babu and Sohag--on charge of beating up the journalists.

On February 1, the college authorities were first forced to stop the process for the same reason. They resumed viva of the students on the merit lists yesterday for admission in 18 disciplines.

The BCL activists locked the entrances to the college to realise their demand on February 1. The Daily Star carried a story on the incident on February 2.

Preferring anonymity, a teacher of the college told The Daily Star that the BCL leaders had threatened the principal by saying "anything can happen if the admission process is not stopped without meeting the demand."

 
Chhatra League (BCL) cadres snatch tender schedules for Tk 1.6cr
 
 
 
Bangladesh Chhatra League cadres snatched schedules for a tender worth Tk 1.6 crore from several printing press owners at National Nutrition Programme office in city's Dhanmondi area yesterday.

Several victims seeking anonymity said the ruling party cadres, identifying themselves as BCL leader of Dhanmondi thana unit, halted them in front of the NNP office gate, snatched tender schedules and took them to the second floor of the office at around 11:30am.

Yesterday was the last date for submitting tender schedules for printing different documents of NNP.A printing press owner of Arambagh area said two youths at the NNP gate halted his motorbike while two others snatched the tender schedule from his co-rider.They were taken to the second floor of the NNP building where around 20-25 were confined till 12:00noon.

When the deadline was over at 12:00noon, the snatchers returned the torn up tender schedules to the victims.Some victims said all these things happened in presence of police who had turned a blind eye.Officer-in-Charge (OC) Shah Alam of Dhanmondi Police Station said he and other policemen were present at NNP office but no untoward situations took place there.

 http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=126386

 
 
 


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RE: [ALOCHONA] FW: Blow to Religion-based Politics in Bangladesh



   This tiresome practice of first citing the West for a model to look UP to, and then looking DOWN upon the West as Godless because they are SECULAR seems pointless. Actually, it points to an "inferiority complex" of both the deshi Islamists and the secularists who never understood the complex historical development of Secularism in the West. European secularism is a relatively recent phenonmenon, and American secularim is only Constitutional.
 
Secularism in the Constitution of Bangladesh is more appropriate, and naturally more fitting to its cultural and civilizational heritage than it is to the Constitution of the United States of America.
 
         It is us, nurtured in the great Indian Civilization, who enjoyed secularism for all those gloriously prosperous centuries while Europe was mired in religious strife and bigotry.
 
         Finally, please stop citing Christian Democratic Party of Germany as an IDEAL of religion-based political party.  In the European political party the name indicates 'democrats' who happen to be Christians as opposed to being communists or something else. But BD-Jamaat claims to be the SOLE purveyor of Allah'r Ain and resorts to killing other Muslims if they don't agree with their political agenda.
 
          Farida Majid
=========================


To: alochona@yahoogroups.com
From: azizhuq@hotmail.com
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 13:08:30 +0000
Subject: RE: [ALOCHONA] FW: Blow to Religion-based Politics in Bangladesh

 
Most European countries have religion based political parties (Christan Democratic) yet Europe is most secular. While America has no major religion based political parties (at least by name) still religion plays a great role in America. 
 
There are three Jamaths (Islamic groups) in Bangladesh (JMB, JIB and the TJ). One is, most probably, banned. So, when one goes down the other will come up.
 
It will be interesting to see the direction Bangladesh takes.
 
 
 
farida_majid@hotmail.com
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 17:30:03 -0500
Subject: [ALOCHONA] FW: Blow to Religion-based Politics in Bangladesh

 

       A very good summing-up without any frills. 
 
       I would clarify only one thing.  The notorious Fifth Amendment did not include the placement of "Bismillah" in the Preamble of the Consitution.  Therefore the repeal of the Amendment does not by itself remove "Bismillah".  There has to be another Parliamentary gesture to clean up the Constitution of any sign of preference for a particular religion.
 
             Farida Majid 



Blow to Religion-Based Politics in Bangladesh

Friday 05 February 2010

by: J. Sri Raman, t r u t h o u t | Op-Ed




Here is some disconcerting news for all disciples of neocon gurus, who had discovered Islam as the enemy of democracy and the successor to the "evil empire" of the cold war era. An Islamic country of 160 million people, under an elected government, is witnessing important but ill-noticed moves to abolish religion-based politics.


On February 2, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh struck down a nearly 11-year-old constitutional amendment that had allowed religion-based political parities to function and flourish in the country. The ruling had the effect of restoring the statutory secularism, which Bangladesh adopted in 1972 after liberation from Pakistan and lost five years later following a series of military coups.


It may also have the effect of inspiring at least a debate on the issues in Pakistan, the other Islamic country of South Asia. It may also have a ripple effect, helping to raise the issues subsequently in sections of the rest of the Islamic world.


This only carries forward an old battle. The logic of Bangladesh's liberation war itself led the nation's founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, to place its linguistic identity above the religious. The reverse of the same logic drove religion-based groups in the the pre-liberation East Pakistan to side with Islamabad in the war.


The first constitution of Bangladesh, under Article 38, placed a bar on religion-based parties and politics. Mujib, as he was popularly known, and most of his family were assassinated in a coup on August 25, 1975. A series of coups since then culminated in the country's takeover by Maj.-Gen. Ziaur Rahman in 1977. In April 1979, the Zia regime enacted the infamous Fifth Amendment to the constitution, paving the way for the return of religion-based parties and politics.


Article 38 of the original constitution proclaimed: "Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of morality or public order." But it clearly added: "Provided that no person shall have the right to form, or be a member or otherwise take part in the activities of, any communal or other association or union which in the name or on the basis of any religion has for its object, or pursues, a political purpose."


As revised under the Fifth Amendment, the Article said: "Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of public order or public health." The amendment scrapped the original Article 12, which enshrined "secularism" and "freedom of religion" in the supreme law of the land.


Earlier, by a proclamation, the martial law regime made other major changes in the constitution as well. The Preamble to the constitution was preceded by the religious invocation, "Bismillah-ar-Rahman-ar-Rahim" (in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful). In the text of the Preamble, the words "a historic struggle for national liberation" were replaced with "a historic war for national independence." The phrase mentioning "nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism" as the "high ideals" in the second paragraph was replaced with "absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice."


Article 8 of the original constitution - laying down nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism as the four fundamental principles of state policy - was amended to omit "secularism" and replace it with "absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah." In repeated pronouncements, Zia also substituted "Bangladeshi nationalism" for the "Bengali nationalism" of the Mujib days that stressed a non-religious identity.


Lt.-Gen. Hussain Muhammad Ershad, who staged yet another coup and ruled Bangladesh during 1982-86, carried Zia's initiative forward by making Islam the "state religion" through the Eighth Amendment.


The battle between the secular and anti-secular camps continued through all this, and became more open after the country's return to democracy in 1991. The Awami League (AL), headed by Mujib's daughter Sheikh Hasina Wajed, has always fought for abrogation of the Fifth Amendment. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), founded by Zia and now led by his widow Begum Khaleda Zia, and its allies pursuing religion-based politics have remained uncompromising supporters of the amendment.


The AL and its allies scored a legal victory in August 2005, when the country's High Court held the amendment unconstitutional. The court said: "These changes (made by the Fifth Amendment) were fundamental in nature and changed the very basis of our war for liberation and also defaced the constitution altogether." It added that the amendment transformed secular Bangladesh into a "theocratic state" and "betrayed one of the dominant causes for the war of liberation."


The government in Dhaka, then a coalition of the BNP and the religion-based Jamaat-i-Islami (JeI), moved a petition in the Supreme Court against the ruling. The order was stayed and the issue of the amendment was put on the back burner, where it stayed for four years.


Then came a major political change. A year ago, on January 6, 2009, Hasina returned as prime minister after a landslide electoral victory. In early May 2009, the AL government withdrew the old, official petition for staying the 2005 court ruling. The BNP-JeI alliance was quick to react. BNP Secretary General Khondker Delwar Hossain and three lawyers from the JeI rushed to the Supreme Court with petitions seeking to protect the amendment. Their petitions have been thrown out.


The JeI and other religion-based groups did not endear themselves to the country, as the results of the last general election showed, with their violent activities. The serial bombing they carried out across Bangladesh in 2005, taking a heavy toll of human lives, did not help the BNP return to power through the ballot box. The period 2001-06, when the BNP-led alliance wielded power, witnessed "unprecedented" atrocities against religious and ethnic minorities, according to Bangladeshi rights activist Shahriar Kabir. The victims included Hindus, Ahmediyas and other communities and the atrocities ranged from killings and rapes to destruction and desecration of places of worship.


After the Supreme Court's verdict, Law Minister Shafique Ahmed has said that all religion-based parties should "drop the name of Islam from their name and stop using religion during campaigning." He has also announced that religion-based parties are going to be "banned." The government, however, has disavowed any intention to remove the Islamic invocation from the Preamble of the constitution.


All this has already drawn attention in Pakistan, which has continued to suffer from religion-based politics despite its popular rejection in successive elections. Veteran Pakistani columnist Babar Ayaz, in an article captioned "Amendments for a secular constitution" in the Lahore-based Daily Times, talks of the clauses in Pakistan's constitution, introduced by former dictator Zia ul-Haq "who considered himself a kind of religious guardian of the country."


Noting the moves in Bangladesh, Ayaz adds: "Pakistan may not be able to ban religion-based political parties in the near future, but it should move towards expunging the ridiculous constitutional clauses mentioned above ... It would be a long and hard struggle, but it is doable."


Bangladesh is in for a long and hard struggle, too. The BNP has threatened an agitation against the changes. It is likely to combine this with a campaign against India (under whose pressure Hasina is alleged to be acting), and New Delhi can be counted upon to keep providing grist to Khaleda's political mill with Big Brother-like actions widely resented in Bangladesh.


There are also limits to which a constitution alone can counter religion-based politics. The far right's activities in India, proud of its staunchly secular constitution, furnishes just one example.


The significance of what is happening in Bangladesh, however, cannot be belittled either. It demonstrates the far greater role popular will can play in combating religion-based politics than cluster bombs and drones.





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[ALOCHONA] BIG TIME CONSPIRACY !!!!!



Dear Readers,
BNP was determined not to join the current session of parliament until their demands were fulfilled. All on a sudden they joined the session and we have witnessed the barbery killings of innocent students & others all over the country.
Same thing happened during BDR carnage , BNP joined the session after a long term boycottment!!! These anarchy in parliament and educational institutions are all PREPLANNED!! Please read the article below for details:
 
 
M. Ali



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[ALOCHONA] GLOBALIZATION AND WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT




 
Page 1
GLOBALIZATION AND WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT:
THE CHANGING VALUE OF WATER
AUGUST 6 -8 AWRA/IWLRI-UNIVERSITY OF DUNDEE INTERNATIONAL S PECIALTY CONFERENCE 2001
A REVIEW OF THE GANGES TREATY OF 1996
A. Nishat1 and M. F. K. Pasha2
ABSTRACT: The critical review of the Ganges Treaty of 1996 (Treaty ’96) between Bangladesh and India
regarding the water flow in the dry season (January to May) through the river Ganges has been made using an
analytical approach based on an hydrological frequency analysis of flows released to Bangladesh at Farakka (West
Bengal of India) and the Gumbel’s extreme-value distribution. It also includes a simple analysis of flow data at this
point. First, two years of data (1997 and 1998) were studied just after the Treaty’96 was signed. After an analysis of
the treaty, it is observed that the treaty was followed more effectively in 1998 than in 1997. Since it is concluded
that the sharing of flows fully depends on the availability of water at Farakka, the upstream reach of the Ganges,
both countries (Bangladesh and India) would do better to augment the flows upstream for their own interests though
compliance with the terms of the treaty. A copy of the Ganges 1996 treaty is attached herewith for a clearer
understanding of this paper.
KEY TERMS: Ganges River, international water law, treaties, international rivers, water allocation.
INTRODUCTION
The Ganges is an international river with its basin spread over China, Nepal, India, and Bangladesh; it
originates at an elevation of about 23,000 feet in Gangotri on the southern slope of the Himalayan range. From there
the river traverses south and southeastward in India for about 1,400 miles. About 11 miles below Farakka, India, it
forms the common boundary between India and Bangladesh and continues about 63 miles before finally entering
Bangladesh near Rajshahi. The total course of Ganges before discharging into the Bay of Bengal is about 16,000
miles (2,500 km) (Abbas, 1984). Since water is a scarce resource and the Ganges is an international river, there
needs to be a treaty or agreement to assure the proper utilisation of water.
When there was no barrage on Ganges at Farakka, India, there was no question about sharing the water. At
that time water flowed naturally through the Ganges and its distributories. After constructing ) the Farakka Barrage
(in India) in 1975, vital questions arose as to who would control the gate of the barrage, and for what purposes and
how much water would be used, and how water would be shared between Bangladesh and India. To get answers to
these questions, the need for a treaty or agreement was felt by each basin state and so the agreement 77, MOU 82,
MOU85 and lately the Treaty’96 are made to share the water between Bangladesh and India.
1Professor, Department of Water Resources Engineering, BUET, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Country Representative,
IUCN, Bangladesh.
2Department of Environmental Engineering and Pollution Control, Shahjalal University of Science and Technology,
Sylhet, Bangladesh.
BRIEF HISTORY OF DIFFERENT AGREEMENTS, MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING,
AND THE TREATY OF 1996
The Ganges dispute was recognised in 1951 when Pakistan protested to India about the proposed Farakka
Barrage. Negotiations had been pursued between India and Bangladesh, and prior to 1971 with Pakistan, on this
issue for the last 40 years. Instead of converging towards an acceptable sharing arrangement, the issue had become
more complex with many other issues related to a sharing arrangement. There have been several short-terms sharing
agreements: the first Ganges Water Treaty was worked out in 1977. Subsequently, the Memorandum of
Understanding of 1982 (MOU82), and MOU85 were developed. The most recent agreement is Treaty’96. Since the
proposal for diversion of Ganges water was first disputed in 1951, discussions and negotiations can be divided up
into the following seven phases (Nishat, 1996).
Table 1: Different phases of discussions and negotiations
Phase (Period)
Focus
Phase 1
(1951-74)
How to finalise respective shares before commissioning the barrage. Discussions
on respective claims and their justifications.
Phase II
(1974-76)
Issue of flow augmentation raised. Failure in bilateral negotiations. Barrage
operation begins in 1975 with concurrence of Bangladesh. Unilateral withdrawal
of waters by India in 1976. Issue taken to UN by Bangladesh
Phase III
(1977-82)
Ganges Water Agreement (1977-82) signed and implemented Discussion on
augmentation fails. Treaty not renewed despite provisions to do so.
Phase IV
(1982-88)
Memoranda of 1982 and 1985 implemented. Provisions similar to
1977 Agreement except it contains a guaranty clause. All regional rivers brought
to the discussion table. Both sharing and augmentation
options discussed. Both sides review augmentation proposal.
Phase V
(1988-92)
Negotiations continue but without success. Divergence in approach. Relationship
between sharing arrangements and augmentation proposal becomes a very critical
issue.
Phase VI
(1993-1995)
No dialogue and India has unilateral control over the Ganges.
Phase VII
(1996- Present)
Treaty is signed to share water resources according to the terms of the treaty.
Before the commissioning of the Farakka Barrage, an interim arrangement was made for a test run to
release a flow of 11,000 to 16,000 cusecs through the Feeder Canal from 21 April to 31 May 1975 and releasing the
remainder for Bangladesh. After 1975, there was no renewal of this arrangement and unilateral withdrawal by India
continued causing disastrous effects on the Ganges-dependent areas of Bangladesh, mainly in the south-west region.
Repeated protests against the continued unilateral withdrawals were of no avail, and Bangladesh took the matter to
the United Nations. Through intensive efforts of the Non-aligned countries at the United Nations, the General
Assembly adopted a consensus statement on 24 November 1976, in which the parties decided inter alia, to have an
urgent ministerial level meeting to negotiate a fair and expeditious settlement.
Pursuant to the General Assembly’s consensus statement, negotiations continued between the two
countries, and the Ganges Waters Agreement was signed on 5 November 1977 for sharing the Ganges water during
the dry months from January to May each year for a period of five years (1978-1982). The Agreement provided
34,500 cusecs for Bangladesh and 20,500 cusecs for Calcutta port in India and guaranteed a minimum flow of
27,600 cusecs for Bangladesh during the lowest 10-day average flow period between 21-30 April. The Agreement
specified inter alia, a schedule for sharing of the flow on a 10 day basis; the guarantee of a minimum of 80 percent
of the amounts mentioned in the schedule for Bangladesh to protect against withdrawals from upstream reaches; the
formation of a joint Committee comprising representatives of both the governments who would implement sharing
arrangements; the carrying out investigations leading to augmentation of the Ganges flow at Farakka within three
years by the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) created in 1972; and a review of the Agreement by the two
Governments at the end of the third year. During the Agreement period, Bangladesh and India exchanged their
proposals for the augmentation of the Ganges flow, which were reviewed jointly by both parties. The Bangladesh
proposal envisaged optimum utilisation of the water sources of the Ganges basin by the construction of storage dams
in the upper reaches of the Ganges in India and its tributaries in Nepal to conserve the monsoon flows for
augmenting dry season flows. India’s proposal was to transfer water from the Brahmaputra through a link canal
across Bangladesh to the Ganges above Farkka. The proposal of each country was not acceptable to the other, and
on the grounds that the obligation under the Agreement was not fulfilled, the Agreement was not renewed in
November 1982. However, the governments of Bangladesh and India did sign a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on 7 October 1982.
The MOU of 1982 included provisions for burden sharing instead of achieving a guaranteed minimum
flow. Besides sharing, the MOU asked for submission of pre-feasibility studies of the augmentation schemes
proposed by both parties. Accordingly in 1983, the countries exchanged their updated proposals for augmentation,
based on the “Report on Pre-feasibility Study of the India and Bangladesh Proposals for Augmenting the Dry Season
Flows of the Ganges at Farakka” that was completed in 1984. In view of the differences of opinion, it was not
possible to make any recommendation acceptable to both countries with regard to the optimum solution for
augmentation of the dry season flows of the Ganges at Farakka, which could be rapidly implemented. Thus, the two
sides rejected the proposals in March 1984. The MOU expired in 1984 and as no formal arrangements for sharing
the flows in future years were made, Bangladesh made serious efforts to reach a formal agreement but without
success.
In the absence of the agreement, there was no sharing during the dry season of 1985. After painstaking
efforts, the two countries signed another MOU on 22 November 1985 for sharing the waters of the Ganges at
Farakka for three dry seasons commencing in 1986. Like its predecessor, the MOU of 1985 included provision for
burden sharing instead of guaranteed flows. It also provided for negotiation on the flows of all common border
rivers between the two-country including the Ganges. The sharing of the Ganges flows under the MOU of 1985
ended in May 1988. Between 1988 to 1996, in the absence of any sharing arrangement, Indian’s unilateral
withdrawal of the Ganges waters during the dry season at Farkka continued at an alarming rate which was evident
from the dry season flows of the Ganges at Hardinge Bridge. The Gorai, which is the main tributary carrying water
to the south-west region of Bangladesh, became totally dry at the beginning of the lean period. The progressive
utilisation of the waters upstream in India, coupled with the massive unilateral withdrawal of Farakka Barrage,
culminated in the lowest recorded flow a Hardinge Bridge of 13,521 cusecs in 1992, compared with historical
average flows of 75,000 cusecs during the last ten-day period of March.
During the New Delhi summit, held on 29 September 1988 between the heads of governments of
Bangladesh and India, the Bangladesh Secretary of Irrigation and the India Secretary of Water Resources were
assigned to work out an integrated formula for the permanent, long-term sharing of the flows of common rivers
between Bangladesh and India. In order to break the stalemate in the sharing arrangement, the Secretaries
Committee held six meetings alternately at Dhaka and New Delhi over three years from April 1990 to February
1992. They emphasized the need for immediate allocation of the Ganges and Teesta (another common river of
Bangladesh and India) waters on a priority basis, including the sharing of waters from other common rivers as
mandated. However, they could not decide on a general principle for the sharing of the waters at any of the common
rivers, including the Ganges (Nishat, 1996).
BASIS OF THE TREATY OF 1996
Treaty ‘96 is based on the principle of reasonable and equitable sharing of water and the river basin approach.
Non-Navigational Laws and the Helsinki Rules of 1966 are followed accordingly to formulate the treaty. Treaty’96
adopts Article IV of the Helsinki Rules: “Each Basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and
equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.” According to the treaty, the
total availability of water will be measured and shared at Farakka (India) on the basis of the previous 40 years of
historical 10-day average flows. There are also some provisions in the treaty for both parties to discuss options for
the augmentation of the Ganges flow during the dry period and the way in which optimum allocation of waters of
other common rivers between Bangladesh and India is possible These are guided by the principles of equity,
fairness, and no harm to either party.
METHODOLOGY
In this study, hydrological analysis has been done using some control curves at Farakka to analyse and
compare the flows of different years. A control curve is a line of some availability of flow plotted against a
particular duration. Control curves for 10, 50, 75 and 90 percent flow duration were drawn based on Gumbel’s
method. Gumbel (1941) introduced the extreme value distribution, and it is commonly known as Gumbel's
distribution (Gumbel’s method). It is one of the most widely used probability-distribution functions for extreme
values in hydrologic and meteorological studies and is used to estimate the magnitudes of probably flood peaks,
maximum rainfalls, maximum wind speed, and other exteme events.
According to his theory of extreme event, the probability of occurrence of an event equal to or larger than a
value is
0
x
y
e
e
x
XP
=
≥ 1)
(
0
y
in which is a dimensionless variable given by
)
(ax
y
= α
)
(ax
y
= α
where
x
xa
σ
45005
.0
=
and
x
σ
α
/
2825
.1
=
.
Noting that the return period T = 1/P and the value of the variate X with a return period T is
x
T
Kx
x
σ
+
=
where
n
n
T
sy
y
K
)
(
=
in which, T
y
= reduced variate, a function of T and is given by
)]1
/(
ln.[ln
=
TT
yT
or
)],1
/
log(
log
303.2
834.0[
+
=
TT
yT
n
y
= reduced mean, a function of sample size N, for N (( n
y
(0.577, n
s
=reduced standard deviation, a function of
sample size N for N (( (1.2825. In practice the value of the variate X with a recurrence interval T is used as
n
s
1
+
=
n
T
Kx
x
σ
where
1
n
σ
= standard deviation of the sample (Subramanya,1994)
ANALYSIS AND RESULT
Control curves of 10, 50, 75 and 90 percent available flow have been drawn and the discharges of 1978, 1983,
1986, 1997 and 1998 at Farakka to Bangladesh are compared with these curves in figure 1. The top most control
curve is for the flows available 10 percent of the time and the bottom one is for flows available 90 percent of the
time. The figure shows that flows in 1978 and 1986 are above the 75 percent availability line whereas in 1983 and
1997 flow lines are below the average available 75 percent of the time, and at times below the 90 percent available
flow. The 1998 flow line is partially above and below than 75 percent available flow.
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
JA
N
I
JA
N
II
JA
N
III
FEB
I
FEB
II
FEB
III
MA
R
I
MA
R
II
M
A
R
III
APR
I
APR
II
A
PR
III
MA
Y
I
MA
Y
II
MA
Y
III
Periods: 10 days interval
Flow
in cusecs
10% available flow
50% available flow
75% available flow
90% available flow
Flow line 1978
Flow line 1983
Flow line 1986
Flow line 1997
Flow line 1998
Figure 1: Comparing the flow line with control curves at Farakka
The Agreement in 1977 was made based on 75 percent availability of flow, which was followed by MOU82
and MOU85. So accordingly, the Agreement of 1977 is well implemented in the year of 1978 but not in 1983. The
flows in 1997 and in 1998 are somewhat less than 75 percent availability of flow, but it can not be concluded that
the Treaty’96 is not well implemented because it is based on the historical average flow of the Ganges at Farakka
from 1949 to 1988. But it is true that in these years the flows are sometimes less than that of 1978, just considering
this point it can’t be said that the Treaty’96 is not well implemented in these two years as the share of both countries
Table2: Flow at Farakka in 1997 and 1998
PERIOD
Actual flow
release to
Bangladesh
in 1997
(cusecs)
Share
of
Bangladesh as
per
formula
given
in
Annexure-I of
1996 Treaty in
1997
(cusecs)
Difference in
flow between
actual and
share
of
Bangladesh
in 1997
(cusecs)
Actual flow
release
to
Bangladesh in
1998
(cusecs)
Share
of
Bangladesh as
per
formula
given
in
Annexure-I of
1996 Treaty in
1998
(cusecs)
Difference in
flow between
actual and
share
of
Bangladesh
(cusecs)
1
2
3
4=2-3
5
6
7=5-6
January 01-10
62019
62180
-161
164763
164797
-34
January 11-20
49556
49635
-79
135591
135566
25
January 21-31
48884
48672
212
105881
105866
15
February 01-10
45604
45604
0
88181
88186
-5
February 11-20
41029
41015
14
61831
61841
-10
February 21-28
38387
37399
988
54711
54738
-27
March 01-10
33489
33085
404
45322
45323
-1
March 11-20
35028
35000
28
37323
35967
1356
March 21-31
16528
13487
3041
36557
35000
1557
April 01-10
30137
35000
-4863
40474
38588
1886
April 11-20
25613
19526
6087
55952
50955
4997
April 21-30
35065
35000
65
47876
47901
-25
May 01-10
31722
31728
-6
72185
62203
9982
May 11-20
33021
33028
-7
82062
82062
0
May 21-31
31643
31654
-11
81218
81220
-2
Total flow
557725
552013
5712
1109927
1090213
19714
(Bangladesh and India) depends on the total available flow at Farakka and the basis of this treaty is different from
the agreement of 1978 . To comment about the degree of implementation of the treaty it would be a fair comparison
if a table which can directly compare between the shared value and released value of flow is drawn herewith.
Presentation of such a table (table2) of flows could provide a clear understanding about the flow condition in 1997
and 1998.
Table 2 clearly shows that in 1997 the total flows released to Bangladesh exceed that required by the treaty
by 5712 cusecs, although in January I, II, April I and in all of May releases were less than the quantity fixed by the
treaty. The same situation occurred in 1998. So the study shows that during the first two years after the treaty,
Bangladesh received an excess amount of water on the whole according to the Treaty’96 based upon the total
available water at Farakka. Since the share of both countries depends upon the water available at Farakka flows need
to be augmented upstream as the released amounts of water are not sufficient during dry periods for some specific
uses. It is also inadequate to restore the environment and other conditions and to mitigate the harmful effects of
reduced flows for a long time.
CONCLUSION
Water is a sensitive and scare resource in the 21st century, and the distribution of it among the co riparian
states is a complicated and difficult task. A river system has to be considered as a whole from its source to its mouth
for the optimum development of its water resources to get the best results. There has to be a broad outline of a plan
covering the entire drainage basin to ensure the coordinated and harmonious development of the various works in
relation to all the reasonable possibilities of the basin. Concisely, it can be concluded that theTreaty’96 has
performed well during the first two years, though the flow reaches a very low level in March and April because of
the inadequate available flow at Farakka. After reviewing the treaty 96’, it is obviously that there is no way but to
consider the entire drainage basin as a whole to ensure the optimum allocation of water for the benefit of each co-
riparian state. Doing so, can mitigate the problems that have become increasingly serious over the years as a result
of reduced flow and can guarantee a healthy economy of the co riparian states.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors thank the Joint River Commission for providing the 10-day average flow data for the Ganges at Farakka
and at Hardinge Bridge
REFERENCES
Abbas, B. M. A. T., 1984. The Ganges Water Dispute. University Press Limited, Dhaka.
Crow, B., 1995. Sharing the Ganges; the Politics and Technology of River Development. University Press Limited,
Dhaka.
Nishat. A., 1996. From Ganges- Brahmaputra to Mekong, pp. 60-80. In Hashimoto, T., and A. K. Biswas, editors,
Asian International Waters. Water Resources Management, Series: 4, Oxford University Press: Bombay, Delhi,
Calcutta, Madras. ,
Subramanya, K., 1994. Engineering Hydrology, Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Limited, New Delhi,
APPENDIX
THE TREATY OF 1996
TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA ON SHARING OF THE GANGA / GANGES VATECS AT
FARAKKA.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF INDIA.
DETERNNED to promote and strengthen their relations of friendship and good neighbourliness.
INSPIRED by the common desire of promoting the well being of their peoples.
BEING desirous of sharing by mutual agreement the waters of the international rivers flowing through the territories
or the two countries and of making the optimum utilisation of the water resources of their region in the fields of
flood management irrigation, river basin development, and generation of hydro-power for the mutual interests of the
peoples of the two countries.
BEING desirous of finding a fair and just solution without affecting the rights and entitlement of either country
other than those covered by this Treaty, or establishing any general principles of law or precedent.
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE-I
The quantum of waters agreed to be released by India to Bangladesh will be at Farakka.
ARTICLE-II
(i) The sharing between India and Bangladesh or the Ganga / Ganges waters at Farraka by ten day periods from the
1st January to the 31st May every year will be with reference to the formula at Annexure I and an indicative schedule
giving the implications of the sharing arrangement under Annexure I is at Annexure II.
(ii) The indicative schedule at Annexure II as refereed to in sub Para (i) above is based on 40 years (1949-1988) 10-
day period average availability of water at Farakka. Every effort would be made by the upper riparian to protect
flows of water at Farakka as in the 10 years average availability as mentioned above.
(iii) In the event flow at Farakka falls below 50,000 cusecs in any 10-day period, the two governments will enter
into immediate consultations to make adjustments on an emergency basis, in accordance with the principles of
equity, fair play and no harm to either party
ARTICLE-III
The waters released to Bangladesh at Farakka under Article I shall not be reduced below Farakka except for
reasonable uses of waters, not exceeding 200 cuseces, by India between Farakka and the point on the Ganga/Ganges
where both its banks are in Bangladesh.
ARTICLE-IV
A committee consisting of representatives nominated by the two Governments in equal numbers (hereinafter called
the joint Committee) shall be constituted following the signing of this treaty. The joint committee shall set up
suitable teams at Farakka and Hardinge Bridge to observe and record at Farakka the daily flows below Farakka
Barrage, in the Feeder Canal, and at the Navigation Lock, as well as at the Hardinge Bridge.
ARTICLE-V
The joint Committee shall decide its own procedure and method of functioning.
ARTICLE-VI
The joint Committee shall submit to the two Governments all data collected by it and shall submit a yearly report to
both the Governments. Following submission of the reports the two Governments will meet at appropriate levels to
decide upon such further actions as may be needed.
ARTICLE-VII
The joint Committee shall be responsible for implementing the arrangements contained in this Treaty and examining
any difficulty arising out of the implementation of the above arrangements and of the operation of Farakka Barrage.
Any difference or dispute arising in this regard, if not resolved by the joint Committee, shall be referred to the Indo-
Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission. If the difference or dispute remains unresolved, it shall be referred to the two
Governments, which shall meet urgently at the appropriate level to resolve it by mutual discussion.
ARTICLE- VIII
The two Governments recognize the need to cooperate with each other in finding a solution to the long-term
problem of augmenting the flows of the Ganga/Ganges during the dry season.
ARTICLE-IX
Guided by the principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party, both the Governments agree to conclude
water sharing Treaties / Agreements with regard to other common rivers.
ARTICLE-X
The sharing arrangement under this Treaty shall be reviewed by the two Governments at five years interval or
earlier, as required by either party and needed adjustments, based on principles of equally, fairness, and no harm to
either party made thereto, if necessary .It would be open to either party seek the first review after two years to assess
the impact and working of the sharing arrangement as contained in this Treaty.
ARTICLE- XI
For the period of this Treaty, in the absence of mutual agreement on adjustments following reviews as mentioned in
Article X, India shall release downstream of Farakka Barrage, water at a rate not less than 90 percent (ninety
percent) of Bangladesh’s share according to the formula referred to in Article II, until such time mutually agreed
flows are decided upon.
ARTICLE - XII
This Treaty shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for a period of thirty years and it shall be
renewable on the basis of mutual consent.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorised their to by the respective Governments, have
signed this Treaty.
DONE at New Delhi 12th December, 1996 in Hindi, Bangla and English languages. In the event of any conflict
between the texts, the English text shall prevail.
(SHEIKH HASINA)
(H.D. DEVE GOWDA)
PRIME MINISTER,
PRIME MINISTER,
PEOPLE'S REPUBILIC OF
REPUBLIC OF INDIA.
BANGLADESH.
ANNEXURE - 1
Availability at Farakka
Share of India
Share of Bangladesh
70,000 cusecs or less
50%
50%
70,000- 75,000 cusecs
Balance of flow
35,000 cuscs
75,000 cusces or more
40,000 cusecs
Balance of flow
Subject in the condition that India and Bangladesh each shall receive guaranteed 35,000 cusecs of water in
alternative three 10-day periods during the period March 1 to May 10
ANNEXURE – II
Schedule
(Sharing of waters at Farakka between January 1 and May 31 every year)
If actual availability corresponds to average flows of the period 1949 to 1988, the implication of the formula in
Annex -I for the share of each side is:
Period
Average of total flow
1949-88 (cusecs)
India's share (cusecs) Bangladesh share
(cusecs)
Jan
1-10
11-20
21-31
107,516
97,673
90,154
40,000
40,000
40,000
67,516
57,673
50,154
Feb
1-10
11-20
21-28
86,323
82,859
79,106
40,000
40,000
40,000
46,323
42,859
39,106
March
1-10
11-20
21-31
74,419
68,931
64,688
39,419
33,931
35,000*
35,000
35,000*
29,688
April
1-10
11-20
21-30
63,180
62,633
60,992
28,180
35,000*
25,992
35,000*
27,633
35,000*
May
1-10
11-20
21-31
67,351
73,590
81,854
35,000*
38,590
40,000
32,351
35,000
41,854
(* Three ten day periods during which 35,000 cusecs shall be provided)


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