German Chancellor Angela Merkel walks with Saudi Arabian King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud during a four-day trip to Saudi Arabia in May 2010. The deal involves a mountain of money: The German deal to sell Saudi Arabia 200 "Leopard" battle tanks is worth some €2 billion. Chancellor Angela Merkel's government has yet to directly confirm the deal -- and the opposition is furious . Given the pro-democracy movements in the region, it has demanded that Germany cease making arms deals with authoritarian regimes such as that in power in Saudi Arabia. The training deal also involves a lot of money. According to Stern, Saudi Arabia awarded a €2 billion contract to EADS in 2008 to set up a state-of-the-art surveillance system along its 9,000 kilometer (5,600 miles) border. More precisely, the contract went to Cassidian, a Munich-based defense company that is an offshoot of EADS. The report claims that senior members of Chancellor Merkel's government -- then a coalition between her conservatives and the center-left Social Democrats (SPD) -- had a hand in closing the deal. The report mentions then-Interior Minister (and now Finance Minister) Wolfgang Schäuble, his state secretary August Hanning and then-Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier of the SPD. The EADS deal is consistent with the desire to cooperate closely with Saudi Arabia on security issues. In return for helping with the border security project, German officials hoped the Saudis would feed them intelligence on terror-related issues. In the view of the deal's backers, the collaboration paid off recently when the Saudis warned German officials about parcel bombs being sent from Yemen in cargo airplanes. In addition, they say, the Saudis assisted in the case involving the 2009 abduction of a German family in Yemen. Unanswered Questions But the Stern report mentions a number of still-unanswered questions relating to the nature of the deployment, the payments involved and, most importantly, who is calling the shots: Calls for Action from Opposition Parties The opposition is livid. The parliamentary groups of the SPD, the Left Party and the Green Party feel that their rights as members of parliament have been violated. The May 17, 2009 agreement between Germany and Saudi Arabia that formed the basis of the EADS deal was never submitted to parliament for ratification, they say. In response, Interior Ministry officials now say it "will be brought before the Bundestag in the near future." The Greens are particularly irked by the affair. Last week, the party presented a motion in parliament calling for an end to "federal police training activities in Saudi Arabia." The motion argues that the mission of the German public servants on the Arabian Peninsula is "questionable in several regards" and that "taken as a whole, these considerations make it urgently necessary to end the deployment of federal police officers." Volker Beck, the Greens' human rights spokesman in parliament, argues that the same reasons for opposing the tank deal -- the fact that Saudi Arabia lies in a region facing ongoing pro-democracy protests -- also apply to the police mission. "It is our job to support the democratic movement in the Arab world," Beck told SPIEGEL ONLINE. "We can't allow German federal police officers to be directly involved in combating this movement." It was, however, the Left Party which set the issue in motion with its parliamentary inquiry. For weeks now, they have been criticizing the fact that the service of the federal police officers was "really only benefiting EADS." Claims of Transparency and Legality Interior Ministry officials appear to be surprised by the political stir the issue has caused, according to Stern. The magazine quotes a ministry spokesman as pointing out that it issued a press release on the security agreement between Germany and Saudi Arabia only a day after it was signed in Riyadh, making accusations of secretiveness difficult to sustain. The spokesman also told Stern that the same press release mentioned the plan to have German police officers train their Saudi counterparts. Why the deal was never ratified by parliament or even presented to the Committee on Internal Affairs, however, remains open. Government sources say it is regrettable that neither has yet to occur. Nevertheless, the government still considers the training to be permitted by Germany's Police Act, which expressly allows German police officers to engage in training activities abroad.
Berlin Opposition Livid about Saudi Border Deal
As part of the deal, members of Germany's federal police force were to work together with EADS employees to train Saudi border police in the operation of the new surveillance system. In response to an official inquiry by the far-left Left Party, the government said that since 2009, 77 German police have been deployed in Saudi Arabia.
Thursday, July 14, 2011
[ALOCHONA] Germany sells 200 tanks to Saudi Arabia
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[ALOCHONA] Rice diplomacy with Bangladesh
Rice diplomacy with Bangladesh
After a diplomatic gaffe, the government has initiated rice diplomacy with Bangladesh days before Congress president Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh are scheduled to visit the country. Price of rice, country's staple diet, had increased by 42 % in March 2011 as compared to the previous year. India had promised to supply rice at price lower than international prices.
On Monday, an Empowered Group of Ministers headed by finance minister Pranab Mukerjee decided to export three lakh tonnes of non basmati rice to Bangladesh at a price of Rs 20,000 for a tonne.
The decision was taken after the Food ministry reported shortage of storage facility for rice because of a bumper crop and said most of the godowns were overflowing.
In all, the EGoM decided to allocate eight lakh tonnes of non-basmati rice for diplomatic purposes. It means the rice will be exported to countries at less than international price as a goodwill gesture, said a senior government official.
This also means lifting of a ban of export of rice, which was imposed in April 2008 when domestic prices of food started to increase because of high inflation. While food inflation has remained at a high of 7.61 %, the prices of food had been stable.
A formal announcement is likely to be made before Sonia Gandhi's slated visit to Bangladesh on July 25. Bangladesh is honouring former prime minister Indira Gandhi for providing military assistance in independence struggle of the country. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be visiting Bangladesh in September. Earlier this month, the off the record comments of Singh with media on Bangladesh were put on a government website causing a minor diplomatic row.
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Rice-diplomacy-with-Bangladesh/Article1-719925.aspx
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[ALOCHONA] Communications between US Embassy in Dhaka and Washington,1973-1976
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8,
Documents on Bangladesh, 1973-1976:
Document 30: Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), February 5, 1973.
February 5, 1973.
Saunders and Hoskinson asked Kissinger for a decision on whether to release a $30 million grant for Bangladesh, or wait to signal U.S. concerns regarding events in Bangladesh. Kissinger elected to wait.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh, Volume 1. Limited Official Use. Sent for Action. Kissinger checked the "wait" option. On an undated attached note to Kissinger, Scowcroft wrote: "Henry, I think we should wait."
Document 31: Telegram 87646 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh, May 8, 1973, 2305Z.
Bangladesh, May 8, 1973, 2305Z.
The Department summarized a conversation between Assistant Secretary Sisco and Ambassador HOSSAIN ALI on the negotiations stemming from the Simla agreement, including Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh, the repatriation of Bengalis and Biharis, and war crimes trials.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970—73, POL Bangladesh—U.S. Confidential. It was drafted by Peck, NEA/PAB; cleared by NEA/PAB, NEA/IRN, and NEA; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to London, New Delhi, Tehran, Islamabad, and USUN.
Document 32: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), June 20, 1973.
June 20, 1973.
The memorandum discussed the relationship between stability and the provision of food aid. The tight U.S. grain supply posed a problem for the fulfillment of U.S. aid pledges for fiscal 1973—74.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (U.S.) 15-8 Bangladesh. Limited Official Use. It was drafted by Lawrence Lesser (NEA/PAB); and cleared by NEA, NEA/PAB, EB/OFP, and AID/ASIA/DP. R. H. Miller signed his name above Theodore Eliot's typed signature.
Document 33: Official-Informal Letter From the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy in Bangladesh (Newberry) to the Director of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs (Constable), August 27, 1973.
August 27, 1973
Chargé d'Affaires Newberry argued that the United States should not undertake to create a military supply relationship with Bangladesh.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Dhaka Embassy Files: Lot 76 F 62, DEF 1, General, 1973. Confidential. The letter is an unsigned copy. A copy was sent to Sidney Sober in Islamabad and to the Minister Counselor in New Delhi. The letter from Newberry was a response to Constable's request for information in a letter of August 13. This followed a semi-official inquiry by Bangladeshi army officers into the possibility of purchasing arms and spare parts from the United States, discussed in a memorandum of conversation dated July 18, submitted by Economic and Commercial Officer Jay Freres. (Ibid.)
Document 34: Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Regional Staff Meeting, Washington, February 14, 1974
Washington, February 14, 1974
In the regional staff meeting, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Sisco and Secretary of State Kissinger discussed a specific message to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India commending the recent agreement to reopen the questions of prisoners of war and recognition of Bangladesh. The participants also discussed how to facilitate communication between the interested states.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973-77, Entry 5177, Box 2, Secretary's Analytical Staff Meetings. Secret; Nodis. In telegram 32493, February 17, the Department transmitted the text of a "pat on the back message." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sober congratulated the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Governments on February 22 for settling the recognition issue. (Ibid.)
Document 35: Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Regional Staff Meeting, Washington, April 10, 1974, 3:10 p.m.
Washington, April 10, 1974, 3:10 p.m.
Secretary of State Kissinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Rodger Davies, and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Sisco discussed the prospects for improved relations on the subcontinent in the wake of the agreement on POWs and the recognition of Bangladesh.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973-77, Entry 5177, Box 2, Secretary's Analytical Staff Meetings. Secret.
Document 36: Memorandum of Conversation, New York, September 30, 1974, 10:30 a.m.
New York, September 30, 1974, 10:30 a.m.
Secretary of State Kissinger and Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman met the day before Mujib was to meet President Ford in Washington. They discussed the Simla negotiations and the normalization of relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan; other topics included development, the state of U.S. foreign policy, and the events of the 1971 crisis.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Exdis. It was drafted by Constable and approved in S on October 15. Kissinger was in New York for the UN General Assembly.
Document 37: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 1, 1974, 3 p.m.
Washington, October 1, 1974, 3 p.m.
Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman and President Gerald Ford discussed U.S.-Bangladeshi relations.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Files, Memoranda of Conversations, Ford Administration, Box 6, October-December 1974. Secret; Nodis. Secretary of State ROGERS had recommended inviting Mujib the previous June, but Kissinger and Scowcroft delayed until after Pakistani President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's meeting with Nixon that September. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh, Volume 1)
Document 38: Telegram 220125 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh, October 5, 1974, 0054Z.
Bangladesh, October 5, 1974, 0054Z.
The Department commented on the visit of Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman and the likely consequences for Bangladesh.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Islamabad Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 114, Decentralized Subject Files, 1973-74, Pakistan/Bangladesh. Confidential. It was repeated to Islamabad, London, and New Delhi.
Document 39: Memorandum of Conversation, Dhaka, October 30, 1974, 5:30p.m.
Dhaka, October 30, 1974, 5:30p.m.
Secretary of State Kissinger and Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman discussed the economic and political state of Bangladesh and its relations with Pakistan.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973-77, Entry 5407, Box 5, Nodis Memoranda of Conversation, November 1974. Confidential. It was drafted by Laingen
Document 40: Telegram 26227 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Bangladesh and Pakistan, February 5, 1975, 1739Z.
Bangladesh and Pakistan, February 5, 1975, 1739Z.
Bangladeshi Ambassador HOSSAIN ALI met with Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco to ask that Secretary of State Kissinger convey a message to Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 2, Bangladesh-State Department Telegrams, From Secretary of State Exdis. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. It was drafted by Griffin (NEA/PAB); cleared by NEA; and approved by Sisco. It was repeated to New Delhi. In Telegram 177 from Dhaka, January 10, Boster reported on Hossain's request. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Document 41: Telegram 29604 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh, February 9, 1975, 0447Z.
Bangladesh, February 9, 1975, 0447Z.
The Department transmitted Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's reply to the Bangladeshi feeler about negotiations.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 2, Bangladesh-State Department Telegrams, From Secretary of State, Exdis. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. It was drafted by Griffin; cleared by NEA; and approved by Kissinger. It was repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi.
Document 42: Minutes of the Secretary of State's Regional Staff Meeting, Washington, August 15, 1975, 8 a.m.
Washington, August 15, 1975, 8 a.m.
Assistant Secretary Atherton briefed Secretary of State Kissinger on the unfolding coup in Bangladesh.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973-77, Entry 5177, Box 3, Secretary's Analytical Staff Meetings. Secret.
Document 43: Telegram 3964 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, August 16, 1975, 1135Z.
August 16, 1975, 1135Z.
The Embassy provided for the Department early analysis of the August 15 coup against President Mujibur Rahman. It tentatively predicted that the United States would enjoy greater influence under the government of new president Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to Islamabad, Katmandu, New Delhi, Calcutta, and CINCPAC.
Document 44: Telegram 197340 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh, August 19, 1975, 2333Z.
Bangladesh, August 19, 1975, 2333Z.
The Department informed the Embassy of the conversation between Assistant Secretary Atherton and Ambassador Ali. Both Atherton and Ali emphasized the importance of continuing normal relations, despite the coup.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Dhaka Embassy Files: Lot 80 F 185, Subject Files, 1974-78, POL 23-9 Coup, August-September 1975. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to New Delhi and Islamabad.
Document 45: Telegram 5470 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, November 10, 1975, 1010Z.
November 10, 1975, 1010Z.
The Embassy provided a narrative account and analysis of the military unrest and resulting coup of November 3-10.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. It was repeated priority to Bangkok, Colombo, Islamabad, Kabul, Katmandu, Moscow, New Delhi, Rangoon, Beijing, Calcutta, and CINCPAC. The Embassy warned of a possible coup against the Ahmed Government repeatedly in a series of analytical telegrams, including 5088, October 21 and 5300, November 3. (Both ibid.) In telegram 5398, November 7, the Embassy reported meeting with representatives of Major General Ziaur Rahman, who emerged as the center of the post-November 10 government. (Ibid.)
Document 46: Telegram 325 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, January 19, 1976, 0950Z.
January 19, 1976, 0950Z.
The ambassador dined with General ZIA and discussed U.S. aid to Bangladesh, population control, the training of police and military personnel, and Bangladeshi relations with India.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Dhaka Embassy Files: Lot 79 F 54, Dhaka Decentralized Subject Files, 1976, POL 15 Bangladesh-United States, 1976. Confidential; Limdis. It was drafted by Boster; cleared by Cheslaw (DCM) and POL; and approved by Boster. It was repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi.
Document 47: Telegram 1532 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, March 29, 1976, 0915Z.
March 29, 1976, 0915Z.
The Embassy reported on the lack of institutional human rights protections in Bangladesh under the State of Emergency imposed during the November 1975 coup. While there was no constitution, it noted that the Martial Law Administration (MLA) did not suppress the rule of law and cited the steady release of political prisoners by the post-August governments.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Dhaka Embassy Files: Lot 79 F 54, Decentralized Subject Files 1976, SOC 14, Human Rights. Confidential; Priority. It was drafted by Sheila Kaye O'Connell (POL); cleared by POL and Cheslaw (DCM); and approved by Boster. The report responded to Department telegram 45319, February 26, which requested the yearly human rights report from all posts. (Ibid.)
Document 48: Aide-Mémoire, Dhaka, June 16, 1976.
Dhaka, June 16, 1976.
The Embassy pointed out to the Bangladeshi Ministry of Foreign Affairs that compensation for the USIS centers damaged in the December 1972 and January 1973 attacks had not yet been made.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Dhaka Embassy Files: Lot 79 F 54, Decentralized Subject Files, 1976, POL 15, Bangladesh-United States, 1976. No classification marking. It was cleared by Cochran and Fawcett; and approved by Boster. For background on the January 5, 1973 student attack on the USIS center in Dhaka see Document 29.
Document 49: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 2, 1976, noon.
Washington, July 2, 1976, noon.
Secretary of State Kissinger met with Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator Rear Admiral Mossharaf Hossain Khan to discuss the possible sale of U.S. military equipment to Bangladesh, as well as the problem of Indian military incursions into Bangladesh.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 105, Geopolitical File, Bangladesh 1975-77. Confidential; Nodis. It was drafted by Peck; and approved on July 22 in S. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Office. Khan wished to follow this meeting with another in October on the mistaken assumption they tacitly agreed to negotiate an arms supply agreement. Atherton disabused Bangladeshi misconceptions. See Document 52, and Telegram 233901 to Kissinger, September 21, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.
Document 50: Telegram 170354 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh, July 10, 1976, 1838Z.
Bangladesh, July 10, 1976, 1838Z.
The Department summarized the July 1 meeting between Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator Rear Admiral Khan and USAID Administrator Daniel Parker, on Bangladesh's need for helicopters, military equipment, increased PL-480 aid, and questions of trade and development. PARKER indicated the constraints limiting additional U.S. aid to Bangladesh, particularly military aid.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Dhaka Embassy Files: Lot 79 F 54, Decentralized Subject Files 1976, POL 15 Bangladesh-United States 1976. Limited Official Use.
Document 51: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, September 3, 1976.
Washington, September 3, 1976.
Ambassador Davis Boster reported a conversation he had with Bangladeshi Ambassador M. R. Siddiqi in Washington on August 30. Boster noted the positive effects of Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator Khan's visit, the general improvement in relations since 1973, and Bangladeshi domestic politics.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Dhaka Embassy Files: Lot 80 F 185, Subject Files, 1974-78, E 19, Political Views 1976. Confidential; Limdis. It was drafted by Boster. A copy was sent to DCM, POL, ECON, and NEA/PAB.
Document 52: Telegram 252346 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh, October 12, 1976, 2013Z.
Bangladesh, October 12, 1976, 2013Z.
The Department reported on the meeting between Rear Admiral Khan and Assistant Secretary Atherton and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Philip Habib regarding military assistance for Bangladesh. Atherton and Habib clarified the limitations of U.S. policy regarding military sales to countries receiving significant food and development aid and offered to establish a military training program for Bangladeshi officers.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Dhaka Embassy Files: Lot 80 F 185, 1974-78 Subject Files, DEF 17 Armaments Procurement 1976. Secret; Limdis. It was repeated to New Delhi and Islamabad. Deputy Dubs followed this meeting on October 15 with a conversation with Siddiqi, repeated to the Embassy on October 19 in telegram 258148. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) A MAP was instituted for fiscal 1977. (Ford Library, National Security Advisor, NSC Staff for Middle East and South Asia Affairs, Convenience Files, 1974-77, Box 1, Bangladesh (2), Mirror File)
Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/comp1
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