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Tuesday, August 9, 2011

[ALOCHONA] Re: Police brutality





http://jugantor.us/enews/issue/2011/08/10/news0957.htm
http://www.bd-pratidin.com/?view=details&type=gold&data=Islam&pub_no=464&cat_id=1&menu_id=1&news_type_id=1&index=0
http://www.bd-pratidin.com/?view=details&type=gold&data=Islam&pub_no=464&cat_id=1&menu_id=1&news_type_id=1&index=5


http://www.samakal.com.bd/details.php?news=13&action=main&option=single&news_id=181106&pub_no=778

On Tue, Aug 9, 2011 at 10:49 AM, Isha Khan <bdmailer@gmail.com> wrote:
http://www.amadershomoy1.com/content/2011/08/09/news0628.htm

Police helped mob in killing

Finds departmental probe into Noakhali incident; OC closed



Kohinoor Begum mourns for her son Milon, inset, killed in a mob beating by his grave in Noakhali yesterday. Photo: STAR

A police enquiry has found that law enforcers helped a mob beat dead 16-year-old Shamsuddin Milon in Noakhali on July 27.

A three-member probe body headed by Additional Superintendent of Police Mahbubur Rashid submitted its report yesterday, said Assistant Superintendent of Police Billal Hossain.

The killing took place due to negligence of Akram Sheikh, sub-inspector of Companyganj Police Station, and constables Abdur Rahim and Hema Ranjan Chakma, said Billal, also a member of the committee.

The trio was suspended on Saturday.

Meanwhile, the officer-in-charge of the station was suspended yesterday for negligence in duty during the incident that left six people including Milon dead.

Locals caught Milon around 9:30am at Tekerhat in the district taking him for a robber and handed him over to police.

But the police on their way to the station forced him off their van and let a mob beat him dead, according to a video footage aired on Somoy TV on Sunday night.

Md Rafiqullah, the OC, was closed to Noakhali Police Lines, said Harunur Rashid Hazari, Noakhali superintendent of police.

Family members said Milon studied up to class X. His father Gias Uddin is a migrant worker in Saudi Arabia. After taking some training at a welding factory, the boy was waiting for a visa to the kingdom to be sent by his father.

Following the incident, his mother Kohinoor Begum filed a case with the Judicial Magistrate's Court on Wednesday, saying that villagers beat her son dead in police presence.

She said Milon was going to his grandparent's house with Tk 14,000 for land registration on that morning. On the way, he was waiting to meet his cousin, a class VI student at Char Kakra Academy School.

A group of people caught him and started beating him. At one stage, local UP member Jamal Uddin handed him over to police.

Instead of saving him, police let the mob kill him, the case statement said. After beating him severely, locals left him on the road where he succumbed to his injuries. Police later took his body to the police station.

Contacted, Jamal Uddin said he rescued Milon from the mob and gave him to a police team led by Sub-inspector Akram. Later, he heard that police forced the boy off their van and let the locals kill him.Nizam Uddin, another witness, supported Jamal.

http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=197873

Sangbad post:

http://www.thedailysangbad.com/?view=details&type=gold&data=Hotel&pub_no=798&menu_id=13&news_type_id=1&val=74829

More reports:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gexxxfZsM1c&feature=youtu.be
http://www.samakal.com.bd/details.php?news=13&action=main&option=single&news_id=180826&pub_no=777
http://www.prothom-alo.com/detail/date/2011-08-09/news/176745

http://sonarbangladesh.com/blog/durvin/55916

On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 11:00 AM, Isha Khan <bdmailer@gmail.com> wrote:
Police brutality



http://www.prothom-alo.com/detail/date/2011-08-08/news/176504




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[ALOCHONA] Re: Ethnic minority, not indigenous people: FM



General Ibrahim's comment:

http://amardeshonline.com/pages/details/2011/08/09/98178

On Mon, Aug 1, 2011 at 7:32 AM, Isha Khan <bdmailer@gmail.com> wrote:
Indigenous People:UN rejects govt's view

The general segment of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) session rejected the official position of Bangladesh
government on the non-Bangalee people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts
(CHT), and adopted the report of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues.

The Bangladesh government, represented by Abul Kalam Abdul Momen,
raised its concern over the United Nations Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) going beyond its mandate in dealing with
the issue of implementing the CHT Peace Accord, on the ground that
there are no indigenous people in CHT.

The government also pleaded ECOSOC to delete some paragraphs of
its10th session report.

But the request was not accepted following negotiations over the last
three days of the weeklong session that ended on Friday in Geneva,
Switzerland, said a press release of the International Council for the
Indigenous Peoples of CHT (ICIP-CHT).

ECOSOC will not distinguish between indigenous and tribal groups, the
release said.
ECOSOC is the parent organisation of UNPFII.

UNPFII assigned a special rapporteur, Lars-Anders Baer, who visited
Bangladesh and independently undertook a study on the status of the
implementation of the CHT Peace Accord 1997, and submitted a report to
UNPFII during the 10th session of the forum in May this year.

In June, UNPFII called on the Bangladesh government to undertake a
phased withdrawal of all temporary army camps from CHT, urged it to
declare a timeframe for implementation of the CHT Peace Accord, and to
establish an independent commission to inquire into human rights
violations perpetrated against "indigenous peoples".

UNPFII further recommended that the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (UNPKO) review the military personnel and units who are
being sent on UN missions, to make sure no personnel or unit is taken
from any that are accused by "indigenous Jumma people" of violating
human rights in CHT.

At the ECOSOC session Bangladesh had to accept a "compromise" due to
lacking solidarity from other 53 member-states. However the concerns
of Bangladesh raised at the meeting were included as "noted" in the
nature of "footnotes", the release said.

The US, Bolivia, Australia, Mexico, and Morocco welcomed the report's
adoption while only China, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia provided some
support to the concerns raised by Bangladesh, the release added.

The Russian Federation supported the proposed draft amendment to the
resolution, and stressed the importance of careful consideration of
the definition of indigenous people, and careful interpretation of the
UNPFII mandate.

The US said it believes the resolution is consistent with the mandate
of the UNPFII.

http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=196646

On 7/27/11, Isha Khan <bdmailer@gmail.com> wrote:
>  *Chittagong Hill Tracts tribes are not 'Adivashis' in Bangladesh*
>
> Mohammad Zainal Abedin
>
> The interview of Barrister Debasis Roy, an ornamental King of the Chakama
> tribe living in CHT (Chittagong Hill Tracts) of Bangladesh in which he
> claimed that tribal people of region are the 'adivashsi' created confusions
> among the people concerned and his claim is contrary to historical
> evidence.
>
>
> The interview was published in a number of dailies, including 'Amar Desh'
> on
> May 13, 2006. He claimed, "We are 'Adivashis' (indigenous/aborigine) of CHT
> according to the prevailing/current law of Bangladesh." To justify his
> claim
> Debashis Roy referred to Hill Tracts Manual of 1900, in which, according to
> him, the hill people were termed as 'adivashis.' His claim is far beyond
> true. The manual even did not recognise the tribals of CHT as the first
> human being settled in CHT. The manual rather used the term tribals to
> refer
> to the tribes of CHT.
>
> Debashis should know that the history of Bangladesh was not started in 1900
> or after the advent of the British or European or settlement of the alien
> tribes in this country. Moreover, it is irrelevant and unquotable what the
> occupied and imperialist alien power termed the alien tribal of CHT in the
> so-called manual that they framed to suit their exploitative and
> imperialist
> interest against the hopes and aspiration of the people. The manual was
> framed to deter the anti-British freedom to enter CHT.
>
> Besides, the manual was voided during the Pakistan period and the tribal
> people did not objected when it was repealed. It was not framed to save the
> interest of the tribal people, but to keep them isolated from the rest of
> people and civilised people.
>
> There is no trace of development in CHT in the 190-year rule of the British
> in CHT. So there is no justifiable room of quoting the colonial repealed
> manual to justify that the tribes of CHT have sole rights in CHT. Besides,
> the manual framed 106 years back, when the country was under foreign
> occupation and domination. So it cannot be acceptable in an independent
> sovereign country. He even did not mention that the special status of CHT
> mentioned in the manual was also nullified during Pakistan period.
>
> Debasis also tries to bury the history and reality quoting memo No. 143 of
> Establishment Division 1991, paripartra (circular) of Prime Minister's
> office February 20, 2002; speeches of different personalities and income
> tax
> ordinance, where the hill people were termed as 'Advashi.' All these
> documents cannot bury the historical documents and realities of hundreds of
> thousands of years. Whatever was mentioned about the tribes of CHT that
> Debashsis mentioned couldn't be accepted as law and might have been used
> subconsciously, which is very natural.
>
> Debasis tried to establish that the tribes of CHT are 'adivashis.' The
> English version of the term 'adivashis' is 'aborigine' or 'aboriginal.' Let
> us see what does the term 'aboriginal' refers to. According to 'Bangla
> Academy English-Bengali' Dictionary' edited by Dr. Zillur Rahman Siddiqui,
> 'aboriginal' means such a nation or group of people or animals that live in
> a region till date from the ancient age or the area got kwon. (First
> Edition
> 1993: p. 2). According to the 'OXFORD Advanced Learner's Dictionary'
> 'aboriginal' means "a member of race of people who are the original people
> living in a country, especially in Australia/Canada." (Sixth Edition,
> Edited
> by Salley Wehmeier: OXFORD University Press: 2001-2003).
>
> According to the ' Webster' New World Dictionary' 'aborigines' mean "The
> first people known to have lived in a certain place." (p. 3: Webster' New
> World Dictionary: Basic School Edition: 1983). That is those who first
> started to live in a region which, was not under anybody's control or
> possession before the arrival of first people, are to be termed as
> aborigines or 'adivashis.' Red Indians in America, aborigines of Australia
> are recognised as 'Adivashis' as they were the first people living in
> America and Australia respectively before the arrival of the Europeans in
> their soil. Tribes of CHT took shelter while it was a part of Bengal and
> they were not the first people in CHT. As CHT was part of Chittagong
> district of Bangladesh since prehistoric age, so the Bengalees were the
> first people there.
>
> In accordance with the 'Webster Dictionary' an 'aboriginal' refers to "An
> indigenous inhabitant especially as contrasted with an invading or
> colonizing people." (p. 3: Webster's Dictionary: American Book Company:
> 1980.). Bangladesh or its nationals were or are not "invading or colonizing
> people" in CHT. So there was no room of 'contrast' with the tribal
> settlers,
> rather CHT it is part of Bangladesh since prehistoric age. It was a part of
> Bangladesh even during the Maurya and Gupta dynasties.
>
> In the ancient age it was a part of 'Horical Region' of Bangladesh.
> Chittagong and Tripuar belonged to 'Horical' region. It was a part of
> Bengal
> during the Muslim rule that started in year 1204. Did the Chakma or other
> tribes reach CHT before 1204, not to speak of Maurya dynasty of 320 B.C. or
> prehistoric stone age? There was no sovereign tribal kingship or
> independent
> feudal state in CHT ever. The zamindars, who styled them as 'Raja,' were
> kings in name. They had no capital even like the capital of Isha Khan of
> Sonargoan or other zamindars of Bengal who are popularly known as 'Baro
> Bhuiyans' in history.
>
> All the Chakma kings showed their total allegiance to the Muslim rulers of
> Delhi and later Bengal and these 'Raja's even took the Muslim names in
> order
> to get their blessings and justify their total loyalty and allegiance to
> the
> Muslim rulers. They even voluntarily inscribed the Arabic term 'Allah-hu
> Rabbi' in their coins. What more examples should I cite to prove that the
> so-called Raja's during the Muslim period were their (Muslim ruler) tenants
> and subordinates.
>
> There is no record that these Chakma or Marma or Mong kings ever revolted
> against the Muslim rules. They did not do so, as the Muslims did not
> capture
> the region from the tribals, rather the region was a part of Bengal from
> time immemorial and the Muslims inherited it when they captured Bengal in
> 1204, much before the intrusion of the tribal people in CHT. For this
> reason
> the tribal kings were psychologically weak, as they were intruders and
> aliens and not the sons of the soil.
>
> Mir Kashem, who replaced Mir Jafar Ali Khan the Nawab of Bengal, handed
> over
> Chittagong to the East India Company in 1760. The British got it from the
> Nawab of Bengal. So how the tribals of CHT claim that they were the
> 'advashis' (first settlers) in CHT. The British for administrative and
> imperialist reasons made CHT a separate district on hundred years later in
> 1860.
>
> So in pursuance of any standard or universally acceptable document neither
> of the tribes that now live in CHT are the descendents of the original sons
> of CHT. According to their history all of the 13 tribes that now live in
> CHT
> came from foreign soils — Myanmar, India, Thailand, China etc. Chakmas
> themselves claim that they came to CHT from an alien unknown place named
> Champukpuri', or 'Champuknagar', etc. Chakma's has no acceptable history
> about their ancient abode (to be discussed later.).
>
> Encyclopaedia Britannica mentions another characteristic of the Australian
> aborigines by way of explaining who should be called aborigines. This
> characteristic is also absent in case of the 13 tribes of CHT. It says, "At
> the time of European colonization in he late 18 th century" Australia "is
> thought to have --- 3000,000" local people who "have been divided into some
> 500 tribes, each with its recognised territory and its distinct language or
> dialect." (New Encyclopaedia Britannica: Vol. 1: 15 th Edition: 1991: p.
> 714.) I think Mr. Debashis Roy now realsies the reality that the tribes of
> CHT, including his own tribe Chakma, are not the aborigines in CHT in the
> truest sense of the term, as neither of the tribes ever had or still have
> its recognised territory. Each tribe is scattered in several parts of CHT.
>
> Out of the 13 tribes of CHT very few have their distinct language or
> dialect. Even the Chakma dialect is the combination of Bengali dialect of
> Chittagong region, as CHT was a part of Chittagong up to 1860. It needs to
> be mentioned that the Chakma is the latest tribe that took shelter from
> unknown abode, named Champuknagar or Champapuri. Recently the Chakmas named
> a place of Rangmati as 'Chamkpuri' in remembrance of their imaginary
> homeland. So the argument of Mr. Debasis to establish the tribes of CHT as
> the 'adivashis' (first people) of CHT is totally fallacious and erroneous
> and contrary to historical evidence.
>
> It is not enough and justifiable claim to brand the sheltered tribes of CHT
> by merely mentioning or quoting some persons or bodies. If the Prime
> Minister's office or other official bodies or ministries used the term
> 'adivashis' to mean the people of CHT, those cannot bury the historical
> truth that the tribes of CHT are not the first people in CHT. If they claim
> that there was no Bengalees in CHT before their arrival, that is also
> fallacious and lame excuse. Any region of any country may remain devoid of
> habitation for many reasons. It does not mean that desolate region is not a
> part of that country or it can be reserved for only those intruders who got
> shelter there. There is no habitation in our Sundarbans and many offshore
> islands still today.
>
> Does it mean, if any foreigner, who may be the first comer, takes shelter
> in
> Sundarbans, or other islands, will become the 'so-called 'adivashi' of
> Sundarbans or islands? The answer is very easy, the intruders must not
> claim
> as the 'adivashis', because the territory where they took shelter is a part
> of Bangladesh. So the tribes of CHT cannot be the 'adivashis' as they
> settled in Bangladesh territory, and CHT was not a 'no man's land.' I would
> request Mr. Debashis not to mislead the people in home and abroad
> mentioning
> baseless and utopian arguments to prove them as 'adivashis'. For Bangladesh
> they are sheltered tribes not 'adivashis.'
>
> Now let me look into the history to prove that all the 13 tribes now live
> in
> CHT are not the 'adivashis' as they took shelter in CHT, a region of
> Bangladesh since prehistoric age. B G Verghese says, "The CHT tribes
> migrated into the area between the 16 th and 19th centuries with the
> Bengali
> settlements along the Chittagong coastal land. (B G Verghese: North East
> Resurgent: Konark Publishers: New Delhi: India: 1996, p. 374.). They came
> from different places in different phases of time and took shelter in CHT.
> Let us see their migration to CHT.
>
> Moghs or Marmas were the inhabitants of Burma, i.e., Myanmar. During the
> Moghal period, the Arakanese pirates (Moghs) often used to attack the
> coastal area of Bangladesh. To stop their heinous deeds, the Moghul rulers
> launched military operation against the Moghs. Quoting R.H.S. Hutchinson,
> Sugata Chakma wrote: "The Moghs being repulsed and driven by the Moghals
> took shelter in Arakan."
>
> In his book Sugata Chakma mentioned, "In 1784 Burmese soldiers sent by king
> Bhodafra invaded and captured Arakan. During that time thousands of Marma
> refugees fled away to Cox's Bazar, CHT, and Patuakhali from Arakan and
> settled down in those places permanently. (Sugata Chakma: The Tribes and
> Culture of Chittagong Hill Tracts: Rangamati: 1993, p. 40.) If the Marmas,
> who are now known as 'Rahkains; cannot claim them as 'advashis' of
> Patuakhali of Bangladesh, how Debashis could claim the Marmas and other
> tribes of CHT as 'advashis.'
>
> The Murongs came from Arakan of today's Myanmar a few hundred years ago and
> concentrated mainly in and around Bandarban district. (Dr. Mizanur Rahman
> Shelly:
>
> The Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: The Untold Story: Centre for
> Development Research: Dhaka: 1992, p. 53.). They have been living in the
> Arakan region of Burma from the time immemorial. They migrated from North
> Myanmar to CHT in the earlier part of the 18 th century. (Sugata Chakma:
> Ibid: p. 53.)
>
> The Tripura state of today's India is the original home of the Bangladeshi
> Tripuras. Their ancestors migrated to CHT for secured life when their
> opponents routed them out from Tripura. However, some of them entered CHT
> in
> search of food. (Sugata Chakma: Ibid: p. 57.)
>
> The people of Lusai tribe living in Bangladesh once lived in the Lusai hill
> of today's Mizoram State of India. (Sugata Chakma: Ibid: p. 81.) They
> entered Bangladesh around 150 years back (Dr. Mizanur Rahman Shelly: Ibid:
> p. 57.)
>
> The Khumis used to live in Arakan region of Myanmar and entered CHT in the
> later part of the 17th century. (Dr. Mizanur Rahman Shelly: Ibid: p. 58)
>
> According to Sugata Chakma, the Bhoms entered in the Southern part of CHT
> sometime in 1838-39 under the leadership of their chief Liankung and
> settled
> in Barndarban.
>
> In the earlier part of the 18th century, the Khyangs used to live in the
> Umatang hill of Arakan. (Dr. Mizanur Rahman Shelly: Ibid: p. 62.)
>
> The original abode of the Chak was in the Unan province of China bordering
> Myanmar. They first took shelter in Arakan and some of them came to CHT. No
> documents are available when they entered Arakan from China and later from
> Arakan to CHT.
>
> The Pankho came to CHT from a village named Pankhoya situated in Lushai
> Hills of Mizoram. (Sugata Chakma: Ibid: p. 85.)
>
> The Tanchangyas are a sect of the Chakmas though they claim and are now
> recognised as a separate tribe.
>
> Chakma historian Satish Chandra Gosh and his subsequent followers though
> presented incredible fantasies to justify the imaginary glory of the
> Chakmas, yet failed to prove that CHT was their original abode. Mr. Biraj
> Mohon Dewan, one of the ardent followers of Satish Gosh, in his book 'The
> Chronicle of the Chakma Nation' presenting a research-based document
> concluded, " It is crystally clear that the Chakmas are not the sons of the
> soil of CHT." ('The Chronicle of the Chakma Nation: New Rangamati: CHT:
> 1969: p. 94'). Chakmas endeavour to prove that their ancestral homeland is
> 'Champaknagar' or 'Chmpapuri' as there is a bit similarity between the
> terms
> 'Chakma' and 'Champa' or Champak.' But where is that 'Champapuri' or
> 'Champaknagar' that the 'Chakmas' claim as their historical abode. On the
> other hand, if they are originated from 'Champaknagar' or 'Champapuri' how
> they claim that they are the 'adivashis' of CHT.
>
> In his book Biraj Mohon Dewan claimed that there are at least five places
> in
> and outside India named Champaknagar or Champakpuri. He mentioned their
> existence in North Burma, (Shan), ancient Magad (Bihar, India), Kalabaga
> (Assam), Mallakka (Malaysia) Cochin (India) and on the bank of the Shangupa
> River (Brahmaputra). Biraj Mohan's open admission, "The writers of those
> notable books that were written on various aborigines recorded the places
> from which places they came and which were their original abodes. But it
> was
> not possible on their part to ascertain our (Chakma's) real identity
> firmly." (Biraj Mohon: Ibid. p. 2). He categorically accepted, "The Chakmas
> have no documentary book." "There is no documentary history on Chakmas
> other
> than some popular legends and folklore." (Devajani Dutta and Anusuya Bosu
> Roy Chowdhury: The Politics and the Struggle of Chittagong Hill Tracts
> Border: Calcutta Research Group and South Asian Forum for Human Rights:
> Calcutta: India: 1990: p. 11.)
>
> Depending on a narrative opera, the Chakmas claim that they entered Burma
> under the leadership of an imaginary prince named Bijoygiri. But they
> cannot
> say from which country this imaginary prince went to Burma. No other
> historians, other than a group of modern Chakma intellectuals, ever
> mentioned anywhere regarding the existence of
> any price named Bijoygiri. Ashok Kumar Dewan, another Chakma historian,
> sincerely acknowledged, "There is no dearth of gossips and chats among the
> educated Chakmas whether Bijoygiria was an imaginary hero or legend or
> really a historical personality." (Ashok Kumar Dewan: An Investigation into
> the History of the Chakma Nation: Khagrachhari: 1991: p. 35.)
>
> Biraj Mohon acknowledged, "Being attacked by the Burmese imperial power,
> the
> Chakmas became weak and achieved the approval and assistance of the Subadar
> of Bengal on humanitarian ground to be settled down for the first time on
> the bank of river Toinchhari to protect their mere existence." How Debashis
> could deny the above acknowledgement and claim his ancestors as the
> 'adivashis' of CHT?
>
> The dialect or spoken language that the Chakmas of the CHT use evidently
> justifies that it can be termed as the 'deformed style of Bengali.' It
> means
> Chakmas settled in such an area, which was inhabited by the Bengalees,
> i.e.,
> it was originally the abode of the Bengalees. Biraj Mohon Dewan says that
> Chakma dialect has such a close similarity to Bengali that it can easily be
> termed as the dialect descended from Bengali. "---- about 80% words of
> Chakma dialects have the mixture of Bengali and Sanskrit languges. In the
> last ( i.e., 1961) census Chakma dialect was recorded as 'Chakma-Bangla
> language." (Biraj Mohon Dewan: Ibid: p. 6.)
>
> All these and many other documents evidently prove that the Chakmas are not
> the original people of CHT. Rather the Chakma is such tribe, which is
> totally rootless. The Chakmas and all other are refugees who got shelter in
> Bangladesh. So they are not the first inhabitants of CHT to claim them as
> 'adivashis." If they are aborigines or 'adivashis, they were so in other
> lands or countries, but not, in fact, in Bangladesh. For Bangladesh they
> are
> settlers and we are ready to accept them as tribes, not as 'adivashis.'
>
> Debashis Roy mentioned that the 'adivashis' must have two essential
> characteristics or preconditions. Firstly, they are to settle themselves
> earlier (first) in a place than others and secondly, they remained outside
> the process of forming imperialist colony or state or modern state. The
> tribes of CHT do have neither of these preconditions. They were not the
> first inhabitants of CHT and so they were not required to remain involved
> with the process of forming a state, as CHT was always a part of
> country/state named Bengal. In 1971, most of them, including the father of
> Debasis Roy sided with Pakistan and we achieved our independence despite
> the
> opposition of the Chakmas. We did not need their support to liberate our
> motherland. Most of them remained outside the process of the formation of a
> new state where they reside today.
>
> Debashis Roy cannot bury the real history and truth in his bid to establish
> the tribes of CHT as 'adivashis' by quoting or referring those words that
> were used by official notifications or speeches. These are only lame
> excuses. When the government realises the misuse of the terms that they
> used, its foreign ministry asked all to use the term 'upajati' when they
> refer to the tribal people of CHT. A government might have committed
> mistakes and it reserves the sovereign rights to amend them, whenever it
> realises the mistakes and it can even change name of a place whenever it
> wants.
>
> Debashis Roy should restudy the history of CHT. He would not be allowed to
> mislead the people in home and abroad. Despite the evidences and arguments
> that I mentioned above, some people, who are hired or lacked of historical
> facts and evidences, may tune to Debashis Roy.
>
> Debasis and associates deliberately try to establish that they are the
> 'adivashis' in CTH to implement their ulterior design of expelling the
> Bengalees from the region, an illegal demand that they have already raised.
> The inner goal of such demand and its implementation is to secede CHT from
> Bangladesh for which they waged armed battle for years. Bangladesh can not
> afford such demand, or accept the self-prepared arguments of Debashis.
>
> It is alleged that Debashis Roy clandestinely works to implement the design
> of forming so-called tribal independent 'Jhummaland.' Using his ornamental
> portfolio, he maintains liaison with the adversaries of Bangladesh in home
> and abroad. There is no logic to maintain such kingship in an independent
> country. India abolished the system far ago.
>
> In this regard I should suggest the government to frame required law to
> remove all the contradictions, anomalies, faults, limitations,
> perforations,
> etc. that the adversaries of the country use to implement their ulterior
> designs. The BNP-led alliance government is committed to review, even
> repeal, the controversial CHT treaty that not only violates the
> constitution, but also undermines and challenges the authority of our
> Parliament, government established in the capital and sovereignty of the of
> the country. It is contrary to our unitary system of State. Government
> should fulfill its commitment immediately. It has ample time still to
> review
> and remove the anti-Bangladesh clauses from the treaty.
>
> I would also urge all concerned to follow the instruction of the Ministry
> of
> Foreign Affairs. Mandatory law should be made immediately declaring all the
> 13 tribes of CHT as sheltered tribes. Their claim to use the term 'advashi'
> to refer to the tribal people of CHT should be immediately prohibited.
> Government should immediately issue an ordinance in this regard untill a
> new
> law is framed and enacted.
>
> http://www.bangladesh-web.com/view.php?hidRecord=117268
>
>
> On Wed, Jul 27, 2011 at 2:36 PM, Isha Khan <bdmailer@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Ethnic minority, not indigenous people
>>
>> FM tells diplomats, editors
>>
>> The tribal people living in Chittagong Hill Tracts are "ethnic
>> minorities"
>> and they should not be called "indigenous" in the region, the government
>> said yesterday in clearing what it said some recent misconceptions about
>> their identity.
>>
>> Briefing foreign diplomats and UN agencies in Dhaka, Foreign Minister
>> Dipu
>> Moni said Bangladesh is concerned over attempts by some quarters at home
>> and
>> abroad to identify the ethnic minority groups as indigenous people in the
>> CHT region.
>>
>> Neither Bangladesh constitution nor any international laws recognise
>> these
>> people as indigenous, she said.
>>
>> Dipu Moni also explained the issue to editors and senior journalists from
>> print and electronic media in a separate briefing yesterday and urged
>> them
>> to take note of it.
>>
>> She told the diplomats that the tribal people most certainly did not
>> reside
>> or exist in the CHT before 16th century and were not considered
>> "indigenous
>> people'' in any historical reference books, memoirs or legal documents.
>>
>> Quoting the Oxford dictionary, the foreign minister said indigenous
>> people
>> are those who "belong to a particular place rather than coming to it from
>> somewhere else".
>>
>> Rather, the CHT people were the late settlers on the Bengal soil and the
>> CHT region compared to the Bangalee native ethnic vast majority residing
>> here for more than 4,000 years, she pointed out.
>>
>> Emerging from the briefing with diplomats, Dipu Moni told journalists
>> there
>> is a move to distract attention from the government's effort to implement
>> the 1997 CHT peace accord by raising the issue that the tribal people are
>> indigenous.
>>
>> She said implementation of the peace accord is top priority of the
>> government. But the process will be hampered if controversies are created
>> over the tribal people's identity.
>>
>> Dipu Moni told the diplomats, "We have noted with concern that the
>> "tribal"
>> people or ethnic minorities in the CHT region have been termed
>> "indigenous
>> peoples" of Bangladesh in two paras of the 2011 Report of the Permanent
>> Forum on Indigenous Issues-PFII, in the context of the Chittagong Hill
>> Tracts Peace Accord."
>>
>> She asserted that there is no internationally accepted definition of
>> "indigenous peoples", and there is no definition of indigenous at all in
>> the
>> UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the PFII in
>> 2006.
>>
>> Claiming that the CHT people are tribal and not indigenous, the foreign
>> minister said it is well recorded, and recent history of the Indian
>> subcontinent and the CHT region reaffirms that the tribal people of CHT
>> migrated to Bangladesh between 16th and 19th centuries from neighboring
>> countries and Mongoloid nations during the Mughal rule in Bengal, mostly
>> as
>> asylum seekers and economic migrants.
>>
>> She said in all acts and laws on the CHT, including the Hill Tracts Act
>> of
>> 1900 and the Hill Districts Council Act of 1989, the CHT ethnic
>> minorities
>> have been identified as "Tribal" population.
>>
>> Most significantly, in the CHT Peace Accord itself the CHT ethnic
>> minorities have been categorised as "Tribal" and not "indigenous
>> peoples."
>>
>> As per the census of 2001, the people of CHT account for less than 1.8
>> percent of the total population of Bangladesh.
>>
>> Giving a special and elevated identity to enfranchise only 1.2 percent of
>> the total population of 150 million by disentitling the 98.8persent
>> cannot
>> be in the national interest of Bangladesh, Dipu Moni said.
>>
>> Reaction of the diplomats was not immediately known.
>>
>> However, Chakma Raja Devasish Roy told The Daily Star, "The government
>> probably is under the impression that recognising indigenous people might
>> mean extra responsibility to bear."
>>
>> He went on, "The constitution does not say that there are no indigenous
>> people in the country. It has not used the word indigenous, but it has
>> not
>> used the word minority either to identify anybody."
>>
>> Devasish Roy also referred to the small ethnic group cultural
>> institutions
>> act made in 2010 by the present government where the law itself stated in
>> its definition part that small ethnic group would mean indigenous people.
>> http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=195963
>> http://www.prothom-alo.com/detail/date/2011-07-27/news/173388
>>
>



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[ALOCHONA] Awami League helped by bags of Indian cash triumphed in e lections



Sir,
Could you tell me, how Bangladesh or Bangladeshis have suffered because of Pro India Regimes and how have they benefited because of Anti India Regimes because I want what's good for people on the street and poor of on of the poorest countries of the world ...?
In my opinion, both kind of regimes have failed to advance B.D. in last 39 years. I have been trying to know details about a Sanitary-ware Factory in Mirpur, Dkhaka this regime has been trying to sell to Foreign or Local Investors for a year and has not gotten any bids. I thought I should buy it to start manufacturing my one of my inventions, a US Patented 21st Century version of W.C. but I have not received any response from BD Embassy in Washington here that claims to be working hard to attract Foreign Investor like me. Actually its one god, the Commercial Attache got mad at me for pushing him too much for the information. He knows nobody can get him dismissed from his job because probably he has gotten it because he or his family knows someone in Awami League or Army.
So, I contacted Finance, Commerce and Foreign Ministries but I have not received any response for a month from their so very patriotic Ministers, either.
I guess, nobody wants to work or they do not do what they say. I guess, the factory in question would be sold at throw-away price to one of their own people for not receiving any Bids. Great prize for maliciously blocking all the Bids and hurting B.D. I guess.
Loot, loot, loot ...!
Loot poor Bengalis and live off them rich ...!
Bangladesh JinDaabaaD ...!


From: Mohiuddin Anwar <mohiuddin@netzero.net>

Mr. Turkman,
 
Not only  during the past general election pro_indian Awami League received bags of money during 3rd November 1975 too. But at that time money didnot work because of steadfastness of Bangladesh's Defense Force. During the past general election pro-Indian military Chief Gen. Moin betrayed Bangladesh's national interest and worked for India as well as for Awami League. Defintely Gen Moiu will bev tried and prosecuted in coming days when pro-Indian government won rule Bangladesh. Moin might had secret agreement with RAW to help the pro-Indian Awami League. In return Moin received non-prosecution agreement from Hasina regime. Hasina regime won't prosecute a single wongdoers of 1/11 rather kept one of the real player of 1/11 as Bangladeshi High Commissioner to Australia for almost three years.
All who  betraying Bangladesh's national interest will pay heavyiest price in coming years, make no doubt about it.
Bangladeshis knew it very well how to punish the betrayers.
 

---------- Original Message ----------
From: "Turkman" <turkman@sbcglobal.net>

 

But who had stopped you from getting Bags of Money from ISI that you lost Elections, Mr. Munshi?
-----

--- In khabor@yahoogroups.com, Isha Khan <bdmailer@...> wrote:
>
> Mohammad Munshi in FaceBook:
>
> If bags of Indian money and advice were given they all went to Gen. Moin U.
> Ahmed who manipulated the election process in 2008. He should be brought
> back to Bangladesh and questioned for his role during 1/11 and how he
> engineered the 2008 elections against the BNP alliance parties. He had an
> obvious motive in manipulating the elections as a BNP victory would have
> seen him brought to trial for treachery and his links to India would have
> been exposed. The Economist has only revealed part of the story and a more
> thorough investigation into the period from 2007-2008 would reveal the rest
> of the conspiracy to hijack Bangladesh democracy. Since it was the British,
> the Americans and India who were behind the 1/11 plan the international
> community could be said to be in direct collusion in all this and their
> declarations about the 2008 elections hold no water.
>
> India's objective in closer relations with Bangladesh is merely to treat the
> country as a captive market and obtain a strategic advantage over China.
> India's ambition is to be the dominating and hegemonic power in South Asia
> and Bangladesh will have a subservient and servile role and find its
> independence and sovereignty increasingly diminished. These are not the
> goals upon which the Liberation War of 1971 was fought. The territory that
> now constitutes Bangladesh has never accepted subjugation and this has been
> the case from the Mughal period to the British Raj and then during the short
> period of Pakistan but that attitude of fierce resistance has now utterly
> changed.
>
> On Sat, Aug 6, 2011 at 11:44 AM, Isha Khan <bdmailer@...> wrote:
>
> > *Bags of Indian cash*: Economist report may be true
> >
> >
> >
> > http://amardeshonline.com/pages/details/2011/08/06/97556
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Aug 6, 2011 at 10:36 AM, Isha Khan <bdmailer@...> wrote:
> >
> >> *Elephant Embrace*
> >>
> >> This week's *Economist* has a rather intriguing article on Indo-Bangla
> >> relations. Full article over the fold. I'm not sure whether posting this
> >> makes me a dalal or part of the dreaded 25%<http://unheardvoice.net/blog/2011/07/03/from-manmohan-to-lalmohan/>in your eyes, but as I won't be making any further comments on this thread,
> >> please feel free to share your thoughts on my ulterior motives.
> >>
> >> Some interesting excerpts:
> >>
> >> *"Ever since 2008, when the Awami League, helped by bags of Indian cashand advice, triumphed in general elections in Bangladesh, relations with
> >> India have blossomed."*
> >>
> >> I know Bangladesh is little more than a banana-republic when viewed from
> >> the pinnacle of straight-dealing that is British journalism at the moment,
> >> but that "bags of cash" thing is a serious allegation. What is the basis for
> >> it?
> >>
> >> As a result, officials this week chirped that relations are now "very
> >> excellent". They should get better yet. India's prime minister, Manmohan
> >> Singh, will visit early in September to sign deals �
> >>
> >> Manmohan Singh's gaffe is not mentioned even once in this article. Which
> >> indicates to me that the writer possibly spends more time in Delhi than
> >> Dhaka, though I have no way of confirming that.
> >>
> >> Some Bangladeshis fret that if India tries to overcome its own logistical
> >> problems by, in effect, using Bangladesh as a huge military marshalling
> >> yard, reprisals from China would follow.
> >>
> >> Who are these Bangladeshis and when can I take them out for a drink/dinner
> >> to express my gratitude for Realist thinking? Stand up and identify yourself
> >> good ladies or gentlemen!
> >>
> >> Mrs Zia's family dynasty, *also corrupt*, is as against India as Sheikh
> >> Hasina's is for it.
> >>
> >> A bit of reading between the lines: note that "also". Earlier in the
> >> article, the author says, "Corruption flourishes at levels astonishing even
> >> by South Asian standards". The allegation of corruption against the Awami
> >> League is in the passive voice, without a subject. Yet, the Zia "family
> >> dynasty" is corrupt "also". Who exactly is the author trying to point to and
> >> has s/he been hanging out with Mahmudur Rahman too long?
> >>
> >> All in all: *very* intriguing. One does not really know what to make of
> >> these haphazard allegations and the glaring lacunae about Indian attitudes
> >> to Bangladesh, as highlighted by Manmohan Singh's comments. The only part
> >> which I dispute without reservation is its characterisation of the claim,
> >> that Sheikh Shaheb is the "greatest Bengali (sic) of the millenium", as
> >> "propaganda".
> >>
> >> That's actually the closest this Awami League government gets to fact.
> >>
> >> http://unheardvoice.net/blog/2011/07/29/elephant-embrace/
> >>
> >> -------------
> >> <http://www.economist.com/node/21524917/print>
> >>
> >> *Embraceable you*
> >>
> >> *Growing geopolitical interests push India to seek better relations
> >> nearer home*
> >>
> >> Jul 30th 2011 | DHAKA | from the print edition
> >>
> >> NOT much noticed by outsiders, long-troubled ties between two neighbours
> >> sharing a long border have taken a substantial lurch for the better. Ever
> >> since 2008, when the Awami League, helped by bags of Indian cash and advice,
> >> triumphed in general elections in Bangladesh, relations with India have
> >> blossomed. To Indian delight, Bangladesh has cracked down on extremists with
> >> ties to Pakistan or India's home-grown terrorist group, the Indian
> >> Mujahideen, as well as on vociferous Islamist (and anti-Indian) politicians
> >> in the country. India feels that bit safer.
> >>
> >> Now the dynasts who rule each country are cementing political ties. On
> >> July 25th Sonia Gandhi (pictured, above) swept into Dhaka, the capital, for
> >> the first time. Sharing a sofa with Sheikh Hasina (left), the prime minister
> >> (and old family friend), the head of India's ruling Congress Party heaped
> >> praise on her host, notably for helping the poor. A beaming Sheikh Hasina
> >> reciprocated with a golden gong, a post
> >>
> >> humous award for Mrs Gandhi's mother-in-law, Indira Gandhi. In 1971 she
> >> sent India's army to help Bangladeshis, led by Sheikh Hasina's father,
> >> Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, throw off brutal Pakistani rule.
> >>
> >> As a result, officials this week chirped that relations are now "very
> >> excellent". They should get better yet. India's prime minister, Manmohan
> >> Singh, will visit early in September to sign deals on sensitive matters like
> >> sharing rivers, sending electricity over the border, settling disputed
> >> patches of territory on the 4,095km (2,500-mile) frontier and stopping
> >> India's trigger-happy border guards from murdering migrants and
> >> cow-smugglers. Mr Singh may also deal with the topic of trade which,
> >> smuggling aside, heavily favours India, to Bangladeshi ire.
> >>
> >> Most important, however, is a deal on setting up a handful of transit
> >> routes across Bangladesh, to reach India's remote, isolated north-eastern
> >> states. These are the "seven sisters" wedged up against the border with
> >> China.
> >>
> >> On the face of it, the $10 billion project will develop poor areas cut off
> >> from India's booming economy. The Asian Development Bank and others see
> >> Bangladeshi gains too, from better roads, ports, railways and much-needed
> >> trade. In Dhaka, the capital, the central-bank governor says broader
> >> integration with India could lift economic growth by a couple of percentage
> >> points, from nearly 7% already.
> >> Our interactive map displays the various territorial claims of India,
> >> Pakistan and China from each country's perspective
> >>
> >> India has handed over half of a $1 billion soft loan for the project, and
> >> the money is being spent on new river-dredgers and rolling stock.
> >> Bangladesh's rulers are mustard-keen. The country missed out on an earlier
> >> infrastructure bonanza involving a plan to pipe gas from Myanmar to India.
> >> China got the pipeline instead.
> >>
> >> Yet the new transit project may be about more than just development. Some
> >> in Dhaka, including military types, suspect it is intended to create an
> >> Indian security corridor. It could open a way for army supplies to cross
> >> low-lying Bangladesh rather than going via dreadful mountain roads
> >> vulnerable to guerrilla attack. As a result, India could more easily put
> >> down insurgents in Nagaland and Manipur. The military types fear it might
> >> provoke reprisals by such groups in Bangladesh.
> >>
> >> More striking, India's army might try supplying its expanding divisions
> >> parked high on the border with China, in Arunachal Pradesh. China disputes
> >> India's right to Arunachal territory, calling it South Tibet. Some
> >> Bangladeshis fret that if India tries to overcome its own logistical
> >> problems by, in effect, using Bangladesh as a huge military marshalling
> >> yard, reprisals from China would follow.
> >>
> >> Such fears are not yet widespread. Indeed, India has been doing some
> >> things right in countering longstanding anti-Indian suspicion and resentment
> >> among ordinary Bangladeshis. Recent polling by an American university among
> >> students found a minority hostile to India, whereas around half broadly
> >> welcomed its rise. A straw poll at a seminar of young researchers at a
> >> think-tank in Dhaka this week suggested a similar mood�though anger remained
> >> over Indian border shootings.
> >>
> >> For India, however, the risk is that it is betting too heavily on Sheikh
> >> Hasina, who is becoming increasingly autocratic. Opposition boycotts of
> >> parliament and general strikes are run-of-the-mill. Corruption flourishes at
> >> levels astonishing even by South Asian standards. A June decision to rewrite
> >> the constitution looks to be a blunt power grab, letting the government run
> >> the next general election by scrapping a "caretaker" arrangement. Sheikh
> >> Hasina is building a personality cult around her murdered father, "the
> >> greatest Bengali of the millennium", says the propaganda.
> >>
> >> Elsewhere, the hounding of Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel laureate and founder of
> >> the Grameen Bank who briefly flirted with politics, was vindictive.
> >> Similarly, war-crimes trials over the events of 1971 are to start in a few
> >> weeks. They are being used less as a path to justice than to crush an
> >> opposition Islamic party, Jamaat-e-Islami.
> >>
> >> It hardly suggests that India's ally has a wholly secure grasp on power. A
> >> tendency to vote incumbents out may yet unseat Sheikh Hasina in 2013, or
> >> street violence might achieve the same. She would then be replaced by her
> >> nemesis, Khaleda Zia, of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Mrs
> >> Zia's family dynasty, also corrupt, is as against India as Sheikh Hasina's
> >> is for it. But India's habit of shunning meetings with Mrs Zia and her
> >> followers may come to look short-sighted. When he visits Bangladesh in
> >> September, Mr Singh, the Gandhi family retainer, would do well to make wider
> >> contact if India's newly improving relations are not one day to take another
> >> big dive for the worse.
> >>
> >> http://www.economist.com/node/21524917/print
> >>
> >
> >
>



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[ALOCHONA] Worth a read: Crisis in London



Monday, August 08, 2011

London Riots - A crisis of ideology and political leadership

LENIN'S TOMB BLOGPOST

http://leninology.blogspot.com/2011/08/crisis-of-ideology-and-political.html

 

You've probably heard it said a dozen times today: "It's like 28 Days Later out there."  Every thirty seconds, there's a new riot zone.  I've rarely known the capital to be this wound up.  It's kicked off in East Ham, then Whitechapel, then Ealing Broadway (really?), then Waltham Forest...  It's kicked off in Croydon, then Birmingham, then (just a rumour so far) Bradford...  The banlieues of Britain are erupting in mass civil unrest.  Until now, the claim has been that this is merely a criminal enterprise.  At a stretch, it was orchestrated criminality, using Twitter and Blackberry messenger.  If you're following what's happening in the UK, that's an impossible position to sustain.  A few looters here and there might be evidence of little more than opportunism.  But clashes with police in several major cities, including the two largest cities, doesn't look like mere entrepreneurialism to me.  And as it spreads to hitherto unexpected places, it certainly doesn't look orchestrated.

 

Part of the reason for the spread is probably that the aura of invincibility on the part of UK riot police has been seriously damaged by these riots.  Protesters in the UK are used to being contained and out-manouevered by police.  That makes it seem as if the police are omnipotent.  This situation has underlined very clearly that law and order is generally maintained by consent, not coercion.  The police are not all powerful, despite their technological and organizational advantages, which is why they rely on good 'community relations'.  In those areas where there are long-standing grievances and sources of resentment, it seems, that consent has been withdrawn.  As a result of the unpredictable way in which this unrest has unfolded, the police have ended up being out-played, and sometimes out-numbered.

 

Yet, as important, there is also an underlying crisis of ideology and political leadership for the police.  Amid the Hackgate scandal, which has shattered their credibility, and following the killing of a suspect under circumstances that were only ineffectually and temporarily concealed, they are [potentially facing a complete collapse in relations with black British communities.  Cameron and the police leadership will be evacuating themselves over this prospect.  The painstaking attempts to overcome the complete mutual hatred and distrust that characterised such relations in the 1980s made some headway.  Of course, police harrassment, brutality, killing in custody, and so on, did not come to an end.  Institutional racism proved durable.  But there was definitely an amelioration between Broadwater Farm and the Lawrence Inquiry.  And that  is one advance which, I believe, they don't want to put through the historical shredder.

 

So, despite politicians like the Liberal Simon Hughes ranting and demanding that the police use the water cannon, and despite the ritual denunciations and tough talk about the law from (another Liberal) Lynne Featherstone, I suspect the police are quite unsure as to how they're supposed to be handling this.  The fact that Cameron has, with remarkable arrogance, hitherto refused to shift from his Tuscany villa and arouse parliament from its recess, cannot have helped here.  (Boris Johnson's absence has merely allowed Ken Livingstone to start his re-election campaign early.)  One doesn't expect this disorientation, if that's what it is, to last long.  The police and the executive will coordinate some sort of policy response that seeks to isolate the 'troublemakers' while making reassuring noises about 'understanding' that 'people have many valid questions' etc.  But for now, the crisis is sufficient to allow these openings and, as a result, riots are breaking out in new places with stunning frequency.  (Just as I write, I've learned that Woolwich has joined the riot zones).

 

Though the media is putting a lot of labour into the effort of racialising this issue, the underlying class dimension is just as obvious.  The US press seems to get it.  The New York Times' report ascribes the riots to a combination of spending cuts and anti-police sentiment amid a generalised ideological crisis for the cops:

 

Frustration in this impoverished neighborhood, as in many others in Britain, has mounted as the government's austerity budget has forced deep cuts in social services. At the same time, a widely held disdain for law enforcement here, where a large Afro-Caribbean population has felt singled out by the police for abuse, has only intensified through the drumbeat of scandal that has racked Scotland Yard in recent weeks and led to the resignation of the force's two top commanders. 

 

They also quote a rioter saying they're taking on "the ruling class".  And of course, the ruling class press is deeply attuned to this sort of scenario.  Only a month ago, the Wall Street Journal wrote of how the global rich fear the coming violence of the poor:

 

A new survey from Insite Security and IBOPE Zogby International of those with liquid assets of $1 million or more found that 94% of respondents are concerned about the global unrest around the world today. ... the numbers are backed up by other trends seen throughout the world of wealth today: the rich keeping a lower profile, hiring $230,000 guard dogs, and arming their yachts, planes and cars with military-style security features.

 

So, even if politicians are in denial, the rich aren't.  You may well say, "bollocks, they're not taking on the ruling class, they're just destroying their own nest, hurting working class people and small businesses".  I can hear this, just as I can hear the sanctimony in its enunciation.  The truth is that riots almost always hurt poor, working class people.  There's no riot that embodies a pure struggle for justice, that is not also partly a self-inflicted wound.  There is no riot without looting, without anti-social behaviour, without a mixture of bad motives and bad politics.  That still doesn't mean that the riot doesn't have a certain political focus; that it doesn't have consequences for the ability of the ruling class to keep control; that the contest with the police is somehow taking place outside of its usual context of suspicion borne of institutional racism and brutality.  The rioters here, whenever they've been asked, have made it more than abundantly clear what their motives are - most basically, repaying years of police mistreatment.

 

Somewhat less on your high horse, you may go on: "but even if there is some sort of mediated logic of political class struggle unfolding here, the rich have nothing to fear as this sort of destruction is at best counterproductive".  That may be correct, though it's the sort of thing people tend to assume rather than argue for.  Major riots in the twentieth century included Soweto, in South Africa, and in US inner cities in the 1960s up to and including the Watts rebellion.  Major riots in recent British history have included those in Brixton in 1981, and Broadwater Farm in 1986, as well as the poll tax riots in 1990.  It would be foolish to claim that these made no contribution to achieving the objectives of their participants.  The fact is that whatever problems riots bring to the communities affected by them - and they're real, no question - it can't just be assumed that they're stupid.  The participants may not be glibly articulate, and some of them may be engaging in indefensible behaviour, but they shouldn't just be written off as mindless, apolitical thugs.

 

A more sensible assumption, perhaps, is that you have a lot of young people with complex motives - avarice and adventure, sure, but also anger and defiance - some of whom are educated in certain traditions of resistance.  For example, The Guardian reporter Paul Lewis (who is worth following on Twitter, by the way) was surprised that Tottenham residents all knew of the IPCC and were very critical of it.  This surprise was misplaced.  Those who are most likely to suffer police repression, and thus have to make use of complaints procedures, are of course going to be in possession of certain repertoires of knowledge concerning policing and the criminal justice system.  They would make it their business to be informed, out of self-defence.  I don't buy the idea that these kids are just clueless about the political background of their oppression.  And I think they're most likely on a learning curve now, as yet undecided as to what wider political conclusions they will draw from all of this.  Like it or not, they are now part of the wider ideological crisis, now a key ingredient in the slow-motion collapse of the political leadership.  How they see their involvement here, and how their perception changes, long after the smoke has cleared and the empty rhetoric has stopped, should be of some interest.



--
Manzoor Ahmed
Managing Director
Delca Bangladesh Limited
128 Motijheel C/A
Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh

Tel: +880 2 9558261
Fax: +880 2 9558130
Mobile: 01711535245
email: delcabangladesh@gmail.com


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[ALOCHONA] Re: India Bangladesh; Embraceable You



Readers know very well the differences between The Economist and Amader Shamoy, and Reporter of The Economist and Mr. Mohiuddin, writer to the Amader Shamoy. Perhaps, Mr. Far West of Georgia, USA can understand that unless he is an idiot.

 
Dear Readers,
Please read the following link:
 
 
 


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[ALOCHONA] Is the War Crimes Trial for Justice or for Political Vendetta?????



Convicting the guilty or fair trial for the accused?
 
Aug 5, 2011
 
A year on from the International Crimes Tribunal's first hearing in July 2010, there remains much to be concerned about in both the legal regime and the day-to-day operation of the tribunal. These inadequacies provide much of the ammunition for what the government terms a Jamaat 'propaganda' war to undermine the tribunal, David Bergman argues in the first of a two-part essay
 
IN THE summer of 2010, when the Bangladesh government invited the US ambassador-at-large for war-crimes issues, Stephen Rapp, to advise its ministers on the legal regime it had established to prosecute those alleged to have committed international offences during the 1971 war, the government seemed, at last, willing to live up to the many promises it had made for the trials to uphold minimum international standards.
 
It had, of course, received similar advice in the past—from the United Nations, the International Bar Association, the International Centre for Transitional Justice and Human Rights Watch.
 
While the government had happily ignored their counsel, one could reasonably have assumed that any advice from Rapp would be far more persuasive.
 
Whereas all the other advice had been unsolicited, Rapp had been specifically invited by the government to come to Bangladesh and speak to ministers.
 
Also, as Rapp had been a war crimes prosecutor, the Bangladesh government could reasonably have hoped that he would better understand the needs of a prosecuting state.
And, of course, as a representative of the US government, his support for the process would be extremely helpful in ensuring wider international approval.
 
Earlier this month, a response finally came to Rapp and the others who had given their advice but, while it did involve some changes in the rules of procedure, it nowhere near lived up to the promises made by the government.
 
Although the tribunal has made some changes to the rules of procedure, they are quite limited, failing to accommodate a number of Rapp's proposals. And, significantly, the government continues to stubbornly refuse to make important changes to the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973 and to Article 47A of the constitution (which prevents the accused from accessing constitutional rights) sought by the other groups.
 
Rapp has yet to respond. But, apart from his likely concern that many of his suggestions went ignored, he may feel particularly misled by one decision made by the government.
He was told by ministers and the tribunal that a change in the 1973 act was not practicable or realistic, and that the only changes possible were those to the tribunal's rules of procedure.
 
Yet, just a month ago, parliament passed very complex legislation amending the constitution after only a short period of consultation. In fact, rather than using the legislative opportunity to remove Article 47A—a crucial article behind a number of the problems with the tribunal—the government tightened it up even further, preventing any individual accused, whether or not they were part of 'an auxiliary group' to the Pakistan military, to seek a remedy from the High court.
 
Till now, many, quite rightly, have given the government the benefit of the doubt over the tribunal. This is the first court of this kind that this country has set up, and it is understandable that the government would need time to feel its ways towards ensuring a proper trial process.
 
But now, with key failings continuing to remain in the law—and repeated advice being rejected—it is right to ask whether the tribunal has been established for the conduct of a fair trial to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused, or whether the government sees it as a mechanism to convict those whom it has already decided are guilty of international crimes.
 
Before one considers the extent to which the legal regime remains inadequate and why the government's repeated commitments to holding trials of 'international standard' amount to very little, one should mention the positive aspects in the law.
 
The rules or procedure now clearly state that a 'person charged with crimes shall be presumed innocent until he is found guilty,' that 'no person during investigation under the Act shall be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat of any kind,' and that the accused will be 'tried without undue delay.' There are also procedures in the 1973 act to ensure that defence lawyers can cross-examine witnesses.
 
The rules also now state that an accused is 'entitled to a fair and public hearing and to engage counsel at his choice,' and that an offence must be proved 'beyond reasonable doubt'. There is also is now an improved system of regulating bail so that except in 'exceptional circumstances' the maximum detention during the process of investigation will be one year, and bail can be sought at any time.
 
Many of the attributes of a fair trial are present in the law.
 
However, despite this, extensive problems remain.
 
First, section 16 of the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973 prohibits, prior to conviction, either party from appealing against any order or decision by the tribunal including those relating to cognisance of offence, framing of charges, admissibility of evidence and of course, despite an improved regime, bail.
 
Article 47 A of the constitution bolsters this restriction by denying to those accused under this act the right to seek any remedy from the High Court, including the possibility of even challenging section 16 for being in breach of constitutional rights.
 
As a result, no decision made by the tribunal, however perverse or unwarranted, prior to conviction, can be appealed.
 
The need for these 'interlocutory appeals'—part and parcel of the process in the ordinary domestic criminal courts in Bangladesh—is, of course, necessary for all criminal prosecutions. They are, though, arguably particularly necessary in this tribunal as practically all the tribunal's ruling have so far been unreasoned and call out for appeal (see part two of this essay).
 
In its recent amendment to its rules of procedure, the tribunal has introduced a mechanism which allows the parties to apply to it for a review of one of its orders—a process effectively asking the tribunal to overturn a decision it has just made!
 
This, of course, is simply not an acceptable alternative to an appeal to another court.
The second problem concerns the wording of two of the offences in the 1973 act—the offences of genocide and of crimes against humanity,
 
The offence of genocide as set out in the 1973 act allows the offence to be committed if certain conduct is carried out 'with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, religious or political group.'
 
In 1972 the offence of genocide was not defined to include the destruction of a 'political group', and even now this is not the internationally recognised definition.
 
So in the context of the 1971 war, while the internationally recognised offence of genocide could be committed if there was, for example, an intent to destroy the Hindu population (a religious group), it cannot be committed if there was an intent to destroy those who, for example, sought the independence of Bangladesh (a political group).
 
This is important as if the prosecution decides to prosecute a person for genocide involving an alleged intention to destroy a 'political' group', this would be in breach of Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This provision only permits states to prosecute people for offences that were not recognised as crimes in the country at the time they were committed if the offence was considered criminal 'according to the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations' at that time.
 
And genocide through the destruction of a political group was not.
There are also similar difficulties with the offence of 'crime against humanity.' In 1973 international law principles required that, for the commission of the offence, the alleged criminal conduct should be 'part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population'. This wording, however, is not part of the 1973 act.
 
The additional phrase is important as it ensures that there is a clear difference, for example, between someone committing an individual murder on the one hand and a 'crime against humanity' on the other. Does the tribunal intend to incorporate these words into the meaning of the offence? It is anyone's guess?
 
The most obvious way for the government to have dealt with the concerns relating to these two offences would have been to amend the 1973 act.
 
But the government did not do that.
 
Rapp suggested another way out of the problem by amending the rules of the procedure so that a document, produced by the International Criminal Court, called 'Elements of Crimes' could became a guide to the tribunal.
 
But again the tribunal did not do this.
 
The third problem, connected to the previous point, is that it remains unclear what law will be used by the tribunal to interpret the meaning of the offences in the 1973 act.
 
It would seem obvious that the tribunal would use the international case law which has been developed over the recent years by the UN-sponsored international tribunals.
 
But, nothing is stated specifically in the 1973 act or in the rules of procedure. The judges also have not stated their position in the court hearings and, significantly, to the extent that international law has been argued at all so far in the court, the tribunal members have either ignored it or rejected its application to the tribunal.
 
Connected with this is whether or not the tribunal will use the international case law to assist it in determining the probity of particular kinds of evidence.
 
Although Rapp states that the 1973 act's broad rule on evidence was in line with other international statutes, he suggests that the tribunal should look towards 'the decision of these [international courts] that have resolved evidentiary issues regarding similar crimes sometimes many years ago after their commission.'
 
It remains unclear whether the tribunal will do as Rapp suggests. No new rule was introduced to this effect—though, to be fair, Rapp said the tribunal would not necessarily have to make a rule change. However, the tribunal's failure to make this explicit means that the basis upon which the tribunal will make decisions on the probity of the evidence remains uncertain.
 
Fourthly, the act and the rules continue to be in breach of certain provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which Bangladesh has ratified.
Article 14 (3)(b) of the covenant states that 'adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence' should be provided; however, the tribunal's amended rule allows the possibility of a trial taking place just three weeks after a not-guilty plea.
 
While the rules do say that three weeks is a 'minimum' time period given to the defence to prepare its case, the fact that the tribunal thought that it could ever be possible for a defendant to prepare his defence in three weeks seems to suggest that the tribunal will not provide 'adequate time' to the defendants as required by the ICCPR.
 
Moreover, Rapp noted that this particular provision of the ICCPR had been interpreted to mean that the accused is 'strictly required' to hand over any 'exculpatory' evidence—i.e. evidence that points to the innocence of an accused—that they have identified.
 
The tribunal had also not adopted any rule to that effect.
 
Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR states that everyone should have the right to defend themselves 'through legal assistance of his own choosing'. The ICT rules do state that there is a right to 'engage counsel of his choice' but effectively prevents foreign counsel from appearing in the tribunal.
 
It has done this by making their presence in court contingent on consent of the Bar Council, which the tribunal must have known has long taken a view that it is not legally permitted to have non-Bangladeshis to appear in a Bangladesh court.
 
In a situation where there are no Bangladesh lawyers with experience of defending international criminal offences, the failure to explicitly allow foreign counsel is a significant omission. As Rapp stated, 'The field of international crimes is highly specialised and the participation of foreign counsel, particularly those who have litigated cases in the international and hybrid courts and tribunals, is very important to ensure that uniform or generally agreed standards are observed in practice.'
 
Article 14 (2) of the ICCPR states that the accused 'shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty.' Although the tribunal has introduced a new rule that explicitly provides for the presumption of innocence, it is limited by another rule that states that if an accused relies on an alibi, the onus is on him to prove it. Rapp had proposed that that the tribunal change this, but it has not done so (though a new provision does at least say that a failure to prove his alibi cannot be the sole proof of his guilt.)
 
The fifth problem with the legal regime concerns the rights of the accused during questioning.
 
In his advice to the government, Rapp said it was normal international practice for a lawyer to be present during interrogations and for the questioning to be recorded.
 
During the ICT hearings themselves, the judges have argued that such requirements were not necessary as ordinary Bangladesh law did not allow any statement made during a police investigation to be admissible as evidence. It subsequently made a formal ruling to this effect in court.
 
It was expected that the tribunal would embed this position in the rules of procedure; however, instead of doing so, it introduced a new rule which states that while generally evidence during questioning is not admissible, any 'part of the statement' of an accused, made during the questioning, 'which leads to discovery of any incriminating material' would be admissible.
 
How this will work is very unclear, but one can see how easily it could be open to misuse, since the interrogation is not recorded and no lawyer is present during the interrogation.
 
The new rule would seem to allow investigators to claim that any aspect of the evidence that it found against a particular person had in fact been obtained following a statement made by an accused during the interrogation. They can then use this to justify making admissible prejudicial 'statements' allegedly made during the interrogation that the accused may well deny having made.
 
This clearly is problematic, and removes entirely the tribunal's justification for prohibiting the presence of lawyers during the interrogation.
 
It is also of concern that the tribunal has created a new rule of procedure which is in conflict with what it had previously stated in court to have been the legal position, and which may have retrospective effect.
 
And finally, there are concerns about the wider impact of Article 47A of the constitution which prevents any aspect of the 1973 act to be challenged as unconstitutional. So an accused person can neither challenge section 6(8) of the act which prevents the accused questioning the establishment of the tribunal or the appointment of judges nor challenge the way offences of genocide, or crimes against humanity, have been defined (mentioned earlier).
 
So there remains a long list of outstanding problems, some more significant than others, but which together mean that the tribunal remains quite a distance from meeting either international—or indeed national—standards.
 
Providing justice to the 1971 victims is an important goal. After forty years the government decision to set up a tribunal is one that every international human rights organisation has applauded.
 
Yet providing justice to the 1971 victims should not be achieved through an unfair trial process.
 
There is a very widespread and strongly held assumption in Bangladesh that those currently accused by the ICT are guilty of terrible crimes during the 1971 war.
This allegation is believed as many of the accused were involved in the leadership of the student wing of the Jamaat in 1971 which supported the cause of the Pakistan military, and by their alleged involvement in Al Badr, widely believed to have been involved in atrocities during the war.
 
The commonly held assumption that these accused men are guilty may well be correct. However, assumptions are not evidence and may, in fact, be exaggerations embellished down the years or indeed prove to be false.
 
The purpose of the tribunal is to provide a proper forum to assess the evidence provided by the prosecution and allow it to be properly tested.
 
In order to allow this to happen, one needs a tribunal that provides proper protections to the defence. And, currently, a number of important safeguards, provided by both domestic as well as international laws are absent from the existing tribunal.
 
The government accuses Jamaat-e-Islami of taking part in a 'propaganda' war to undermine the tribunal. Undoubtedly, since five of their leaders are currently accused of war crimes, the party is doing whatever it can do to undermine the trial. The party's survival is to some extent at stake.
 
But, ironically, most of the ammunition for Jamaat's 'propaganda' is given by the Bangladesh government.
 
It is not Jamaat that has brought together Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and International Centre for Transitional Justice, and Ambassador Rapp and other international lawyers to criticise the existing law.
 
It is the failure of the government to make the necessary legal changes.
 
And if the government wants to defuse the Jamaat 'propaganda', the government can easily do this, by making the changes that Rapp and others have suggested.
 
But, I think at this stage one can now be clear of one thing. It looks very likely that the government will not do that.
 
David Bergman is editor, special reports, New Age. He has a blog on the tribunal at http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com.
 


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