Banner Advertiser

Saturday, May 2, 2009

[ALOCHONA] She loves me, she loves me not



She loves me, she loves me not
 
By Misha Hussain
 
Dhaka-based journalist Misha Hussain considers the Indian elections in light of Bangladesh's love-hate relationship with the world's largest democracy.
 
The recently elected government in Bangladesh has a special relationship with the current Indian administration. It was, after all, Indira Gandhi's Congress Party that catalysed Bangladesh's liberation and secured the freedom of East Pakistan for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League. India opened up its borders, set up refugee camps, helped to train and arm the Mukti Bahini guerrillas as well as collected tax to ease the suffering of the Bengalis. Independence was India's engagement ring to Bangladesh in a marriage of convenience. Despite a prevailing sense of gratitude, there are many who continue to raise eyebrows at Indian regional hegemony and feel that Bangladeshis are still paying off the dowry.
 
The India-Bangladesh relationship began to sour in the mid-1970s with the erection of the
Farakka Barrage. The dam, which was meant to run on an experimental basis to help navigation in the Calcutta ports, created problems in irrigation and aquatic life, silted up rivers and increased salinity, thereby threatening crops further downstream in Bangladesh. Over 100 bilateral talks have taken place since then to establish provisions to guarantee water for Bangladesh, but these were never properly upheld. Thirty-five years later, the water sharing of the Ganges is still fresh in the minds of the rural population. As Nadim Shah, a Baul (mystic minstrel) from Kushtia, puts it: 'What kind of country denies its neighbour water?'

The fact is, India still regards itself as the regional breadwinner and thinks accordingly. 'Its attitude towards countries in South Asia was clearly set out in the
Indira Doctrine," says Professor Akmal Hossain from the department of International Relations at Dhaka University. This doctrine essentially argues that India can do whatever it wants, but no other country can act without the express permission of India.

This attitude was evident in the surprise visit of the Indian Foreign Minister earlier this month, which went against required protocol and shocked parliamentarians. As recently as 2007, India started constructing the Tipaimukh Dam on the Sylhet border without consulting Bangladesh. Previously, in 2002, India made an unprecedented move (anti-dumping measure) to stop the sale of acid batteries from Bangladesh. This was later overturned by the World Trade Organisation, but slapping a least developed country (LDC) like Bangladesh with an anti-dumping measure is the diplomatic equivalent of wife beating.

The fact is, India still has a long way to go.. There is a disproportionate amount of poverty (India is estimated to have one third of the world's poor) and the health and education systems outside the major population centres are as bad as anywhere else in South Asia. How can a nation call itself a democracy when an estimated 200,000 farmers have committed suicide in the last 20 years, 20 million female foetuses have been aborted in the last 10 years, and people remain unequal due to the caste system? There is a strange mix of pride and denial amongst the Indian elite, resulting in little room for criticism and a lack of recognition that India is still struggling - it's the image that is thriving.
 
That said, one cannot deny the immense progress that India has made over the past 60 years. With the exception of a 21-month period when Ms Gandhi had declared emergency, the 1.4-billion-strong population has seen a succession of elected governments. This uninterrupted political progression has helped to boost India's GDP from 3.1 per cent of the world's income to 6.8 per cent (
three trillion dollars, purchasing power parity) – and there is a lot that Bangladesh can learn from that.    

India's economy is so strong, its population so big, its military so powerful that it creates a sense of helplessness in neighbouring countries. Even in the market-leading garments sector, which pulls in over 11 billion dollars a year, Bangladesh is now beginning to lose ground. The depreciating rupee has meant that orders are increasingly being
placed in India as the Bangladeshi taka remains strong. In addition to this, India-based companies are setting up liaison offices in Dhaka. Trading from Dhaka using Bangladesh's 'most favoured nation' status means lower tariffs in the US and European markets. The shipment comes out of Bangladesh, but the money ends up in the India. For Bangladesh, there is nowhere to turn. The only platform for protest, SAARC, has been reduced to nothing more than marriage counselling for nation states due to endless bickering between Pakistan and India.
 
No doubt, there is an inferiority complex that can be associated with any smaller nation. But Bangladesh should realise that it has a lot to offer in terms of fighting terrorism (both separatist movements in Assam and religious extremism), allowing transit to the
Seven Sisters, and, of course, taking the edge off the threat posed by an increasingly unstable Pakistan. However, the lack of magnanimity shown by the current Indian government and its predecessors with regards to water sharing, the lowering of tariffs and transit to Nepal has left Bangladeshi politicians with their hands tied. To be seen as giving in to India would be tantamount to political suicide.

Indeed, there has to be a shift in attitude from both sides. 'If the Indian elite become a little more generous to their smaller neighbours, they will automatically have a spiritual leadership over this area,' says Nurul Kabir, editor of the left-leaning New Age, an English-language daily in Bangladesh. 
 
India is also increasingly being seen as America's puppet in the region and thus running the risk of isolation. 'Go to any SAARC capital and you'll find a significant number of well meaning intelligentsia who are anti-Indian,' adds Kabir.

For the most part, though, Bangladesh has mixed feelings towards India. No one here truly believes that a BJP or Congress-led coalition will do much in the way of improving the country's situation and it is clear that the government is in no position to negotiate. Still, Bangladesh remains thankful to have a thriving industry that it can tap into, both officially and unofficially. One just hopes that matrimony doesn't turn into acrimony, as is so often the case. 



__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

[ALOCHONA] Awami League- lawmaker beats up upazila chairman



Awami League- lawmaker beats up upazila chairman

The Awami League-backed Banaripara upazila chairman, Golam Faruk, was assaulted allegedly by AL lawmaker for the Barisal-2 constituency Manirul Islam Moni and his followers in Barisal Friday morning.Golam Faruk, who is also the joint convener of the divisional association of upazila chairmen and vice-chairmen, in a press conference at the Barisal Reporters Unity Saturday noon said the Banaripara police officer-in-charge had invited him to the police station Friday morning.

When he reached there at about 10:45am, local lawmaker Moni, who was waiting inside the room of the OC, chased him. Moni hurled a teacup on Faruk and ordered his men to beat and kill him, Faruk alleged in a written statement.Ziauddin Siron, Sumon Roy, Ilias Sardar, led by defeated upazila chairman candidate AL leader Suvash Shil, beat up Faruk and his associate Baishari union Juba League leader Mizanur Rahman and tore their dresses inside the police station.

Constable Md Selim became severely injured as he tried to save the victims and the OC, after rescuing them, sent them to Barisal under police escort, he alleged, adding, 'I did not go back to my area as I fell insecure.'

Azizul Huq Akkas, BNP-backed chairman of sadar upazila, Shah Alam, AL-backed chairman of Gournadi upazila, Abul Kalam Azad, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal-backed chairman of Wazirpur upazila, were also present in the press conference and condemned the attack.Principal Zakir Hossain, convener of Banaripara upazila Awami League, also condemned the assault on UZ chairman.People of Baishari, Syedkathi, Udoykathi, Iluhar and Bisharkandi unions under Banaripara upazila observed strike disrupting ferry service and closing markets on Saturday in protest at the attack.

The complaint of Golam Faruk against the MP and his men was not registered as case till Saturday afternoon as permission of higher authorities is needed in this connection, Banaripara police officer-in-charge Farukul Islam acknowledged.

Monirul Islam Moni, AL lawmaker for Barisal-2 (Banripara-Wazirpur), totally denying the allegation, said he heard that some of his party men were engaged in altercation with Banaripara upazila chairman over the lease of the ferry terminal and misbehaved with him. 'I shall try to solve the problem,' he added.

http://www.newagebd.com/2009/may/03/front.html#11



__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

[ALOCHONA] Childhood of Mr. Atiur Rahman, Governor-Bangladesh Bank



nothing unique though, there are many such, hope he will try best



__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

[ALOCHONA] Sharia Finance - The Money that Prays (London Review of Books)

The Money that Prays
Jeremy Harding
London Review of Books
Vol. 31 No. 8 •
30 April 2009
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n08/hard01_.html

Jeremy Harding is a contributing editor at the LRB. His versions of Rimbaud's poetry are published by Penguin along with John Sturrock's translation of the letters.

Last September, as dust and debris from the tellers' floors began raining onto the empty vaults below, a note of satisfaction was sounded by bankers in the Arab world. Financial institutions sticking to the tenets of Islam, they announced, were largely immune from the debt crisis. Devout Muslims may lend and borrow under certain conditions; they can even buy and sell debt in the form of 'Islamic' bonds, but most other kinds of debt trading are frowned on. Al Rajhi Bank, based in Saudi Arabia, and the Kuwait Finance House posted impressive profits in 2008. Both have come under some nervous scrutiny in 2009 but their ability to weather the recession that has set in behind the credit crunch is not at issue.

Unlike most banks in the Middle East, Al Rajhi Bank and KFH are 'sharia-compliant' businesses, which means simply that they try to abide by the evolving body of rules known as the sharia – 'the path to the headwater' – which govern the lives of Muslims. The sharia serves mostly as a guide to personal conduct, though some rules are drafted into the legal codes of majority-Muslim states. It's founded, we're always told, on revealed truth from the Koran and exemplary stories from the Hadith, the sayings and doings of the Prophet. But the real influence of the sharia lies in the way this material is constantly read and recast by modern Islamic scholars, reinventing old traditions or asserting new ones. Whatever they take it to be, growing numbers of Muslims are keen to stay on the path when it comes to banking and finance. The global Muslim population is upwards of 1.3 billion – roughly one in every five people on earth – and, with a religious revival of twenty or thirty years' standing, the way of Islam is now a crowded thoroughfare. It is plied by a great diversity of travellers from different parts of the world; some have money to burn, others next to none, but anybody with a modicum of wealth is nowadays a potential opportunity for banks offering sharia-compliant retail services: current accounts, straightforward financing schemes and home-ownership plans.

The term 'Islamic finance' wrests a lot of activities down to a catch-all definition. The same is true, in the financial universe, of the words 'sharia' and 'Islam' itself. Sharia is not a single, coherent jurisprudence for Muslims; there are various schools of interpretation and marked disagreements within each of them. 'Islam', a broad term of convenience for most non-Muslims, is a power-point word in the City: it tells bankers and traders that every day for a few minutes they should shut out the din of the money that merely talks and tune in to the money that prays. But why bother, given that sharia-compliant finance is probably worth less than 1 per cent of the total value of the world's stocks, bonds and bank deposits? This was reckoned at about $170 trillion in 2007; it's much less than that now of course, but even so, with a value of around $700 billion, Islamic stocks, bonds and bank deposits remain a minority affair, just as Muslims remain a minority in global terms.

What fascinates the markets about Islamic finance, however, is its dramatic growth in recent years and confident predictions that it's set to expand at 15 to 20 per cent every year. Its allure for moderately prosperous, pious Muslims – and quite a few non-Muslims recoiling from the debt crisis in anger and disgust – is different. They admire what they see as a promise to achieve stability and transparency, and a sense of proportion about money: look it in the eye, tell it you like it, but admit that you have lingering doubts about the transcendent value of paper. That's an unsophisticated position, but since the credit crunch not many people trust the sophisticated keepers of the modern money culture; in this sense the rise of sharia-compliant products is also a challenge to the unofficial, polytheist faith of offshore Britannia: the worship of markets in general and financial markets in particular.

One of the central differences between the Islamic and conventional approaches to finance is that our own cults – which may well see a revision before the end of this crisis – ascribe supernatural powers to money. Cult specialists are at great pains to understand and control how it works, but admit that it does so in magical ways that go beyond the effects of human commerce (for the markets, too, have magical attributes, including innate goodness). Whatever we want from money, we suspect, as devotees, that in the end it will always behave as it sees fit. Our awe of it is a bit like a rapt meditation on the way the shower of gold behaves – shimmering and falling – when it cascades over Danaë in her cloister in Argos. In the story, it's merely the form chosen by Zeus for her seduction, but in our meditation, there is no Olympian in disguise and no intention to seduce, just the metal shimmering and falling, in consummate self-expression, as deity and dogma. Islamic approaches – there are quite a few – are much closer to Nonconformist and Anglican traditions, where the divinity stands to the side of money, reminding the faithful that he is one thing and mammon another. Money, in this view, is an object of caution rather than superstition – and, in spite of its dangers, a useful tool for anyone who wants to build a respectable world, with God's instructions pinned to the wall above the workbench.

Maybe this is why sharia-compliant products have been gaining popularity among British Muslims, even if they differ only slightly from conventional ones. Take the home-ownership scheme offered by HSBC's sharia-compliant range, Amanah (amanah means 'trust' in the moral and legal sense). Muslims are forbidden to pay or receive interest and troubled by conventional lending, because it appears to put the burden of risk on the borrower not the lender: in the Islamic view, no transaction is ethical unless risk is fairly distributed between the parties. HSBC Amanah's scheme is based on an Islamic contract known as 'diminishing musharaka' and it's approved, like all HSBC Amanah's services, by a board of sharia scholars. A would-be home-owner must put up 40 per cent of the cost price (much less before the credit crunch); the property is registered in a trust (amanah) as a jointly owned asset, with the bank's majority ownership diminishing over an agreed period, as regular payments are made; the customer promises to buy the bank's share, and the bank promises to sell it to the client. The property is envisaged as a set of units and the customer's payments as twofold: one part is rental, for the right to live in it, another is a form of unit-acquisition. The trust keeps a tally of the bank's diminishing ownership and the growing share to the customer. At term, the trust is dissolved and the home passes to the customer.

In the meantime, no interest has been charged. But the rental payments received by HSBC Amanah for its willingness to share a risk will have been reviewed – and therefore been subject to change, much like the interest charge on a variable-rate mortgage – at regular intervals. Indeed, rental charges are likely to track changes in a conventional interest rate, for instance Libor, the London Interbank Offered Rate. In the eyes of some Muslims, the resemblance of the rental element to an interest charge casts doubt on the 'Islamic' nature of the scheme; others are happy to say that even when two things are alike, this does not make them identical. The questions of likeness and difference, and what constitutes real compliance, are hotly debated among Muslims throughout the world.

As regards risk-sharing, HSBC Amanah's scheme seems little different from those of other lenders when customers fail to keep up payments ('default' is not a sharia-compliant word). The bank will pursue a customer if it thinks the reasons for the failure were 'avoidable', because this would constitute a breach of the promise to buy. But it claims not to handle a genuine misfortune the way conventional mortgage providers deal with a default. Both parties share any losses according to the proportionate ownership at the time. The bank can seize the contents of a customer's current account to offset some of its own losses, but there the matter ends. No question of a debt-collecting agency taking up where the bank left off. Most mortgage companies in the US also draw a line under default, but among Islamic home-ownership providers in Britain this approach has encouraged prudence. Amjid Ali, who heads HSBC Amanah's UK operation, told me that in the first five years of its sharia-compliant home-ownership scheme, he had processed applications to the value of £700 million, of which, after judicious sifting, more than half had come good. He knew of only one case that hadn't worked out: the customer was given 18 months' grace, at the end of which the house was sold. Devout Muslims who think the HSBC Amanah approach is uncomfortably close to the way a conventional default is handled must surely have had their views confirmed by the government's insistence to mortgage lenders, since the recession set in, that patience with people in difficulty would put a floor under falling house prices and send out a 'caring' signal (reluctant bankers call it empathy). But perhaps the same Muslims derive a certain satisfaction from the fact that conventional mortgage lenders are beating a path to the headwater.

A home-buyer signing up to a diminishing musharaka would have to take out buildings insurance with a clause that covered the bank as well. But Islamic tradition is uneasy with conventional insurance. First, there's contractual uncertainty (the devilish detail of insurance policies); second, a risk has been bought by another party, and this is scarcely ever acceptable; third, far from looking like circumspection, conventional insurance has every appearance of a punt, with croupier and client sizing up the odds – and gambling is forbidden. An Islamic option, now available in the UK, allows devout Muslims to subscribe regular payments to a managed mutual fund and think of the process as an exercise in solidarity.

This arrangement, known as takaful, was on offer from HSBC Amanah until the end of last year, when it realised that customers found the costs too high: ethical products, like principles, are more expensive, and less profitable, than off-the-shelf alternatives. Collective underwriting was the main feature of the retired model, shared with other takaful services clinging on in a difficult market. The sharia board instructed HSBC that if the fund was underspent by more than £25 per subscriber in a given year, members could have money back or make it over to the launch of a micro-credit scheme in Pakistan. Rising costs are the reality of most insurance, but for takaful members they are mitigated by the concept of 'donation'; subscribers may be grudging or disgruntled, but tradition urges them to see the cost of mutuality as part of their obligation to share risk with their fellow members. If it seems unacceptably high, and there are enough takaful co-operatives around, they're free to chase down a better option.

Takaful cover has its origins in Arab seafaring mutuals (not unlike the whaling mutuals, centuries later, of the Quaker communities in New Bedford and Nantucket). It is a small sector of the global insurance business, already thriving in Malaysia and said by its advocates to be growing throughout the world. In Britain, which prides itself on its multiculturalism and its financial services in almost equal measure, takaful has been endorsed by the minister for trade and investment, the Chartered Insurance Institute and the lord mayor of the City of London. Like all sharia-compliant products in the UK – and everywhere, as far as I know – it's available to non-Muslims. One Muslim scholar told me that they already account for 16 to 20 per cent of the clientele for Islamic retail products in Britain. No need to recite the shahada if you want a sharia-compliant loan from the Islamic Bank of Britain, Lloyds TSB or a UK branch of the Arab Banking Corporation.

The idea of conventional insurance as a wager is taken seriously, and sometimes to extremes. Until he was denied the right to re-enter the UK in 2005, Omar Bakri Muhammad, the Syrian radical, was said to drive around uninsured on the grounds that a third-party policy with Kwik Fit or the AA was an abomination in the eyes of God. As a proselytiser for Hizb ut-Tahrir and later a star of Al-Muhajiroun, Bakri had a headstrong attachment to the sharia, even when he was a guest of the Home Office. Many British Muslims, pleased to see the back of him, thought that the danger he courted by refusing to take out cover was itself a gamble in which he wagered his faith against the laws of his host country. Perhaps, if he'd still been around, he'd have joined the first British sharia-compliant car insurance scheme, Salaam Halal Insurance, when it was launched last summer (call centres handle inquiries 'in English, Arabic, Bengali, Gujarati or Urdu').

It isn't just in Britain, and it isn't only in the retail banking sector, that sharia-compliance is catching on. The last ten years have also seen a surge in sharia-compliant securities available to corporate and institutional investors in many parts of the world who want to stick to the rules of the faith. It's a new impulse: in the 1970s, when the oil-producing states were awash with money, there weren't too many worries about petrodollars flooding into the purchase of US Treasury bonds, even though they bore interest, and there were few alternatives to conventional securities. This isn't the case any longer. Malaysia is rich with opportunities for investors in compliant bonds; in Europe, the German Land of Saxony-Anhalt issued the first 'Islamic' government bond in 2004; the British Treasury has also looked into the possibility of issuing sharia-compliant bills. Meanwhile there's no shortage of choice in equities. The Dow Jones Islamic Market (DJIM) started up in 1999: it now has dozens of indices and lists hundreds of companies whose products are approved by its board of sharia scholars.

Nation-states may decide to devalue their currencies or privatise their telecommunications, but the odds are against them adopting full sharia-compliance. A few years ago Sudan had a unitary sharia banking system, but since the peace deal between Khartoum and the non-Muslim SPLA in 2005, conventional banking has become the norm in southern Sudan. That leaves Iran as the only country that boasts a banking system operating fully on Islamic principles (the evils of interest, it argues, obtain only if the borrower and lender are wholly distinct, and since Iranian banks are nationalised, the country's interbank lending rate is regarded as a family foible). All other Muslim-majority states have conventional or dual systems; in all cases, the central banks behave conventionally.

Conversion to sharia would be ruinous for a wealthy city-state like Dubai, thriving – until the crunch – on Western finance and the 'conventional' lifestyles of expatriates. At the end of last year, the monthly retail-purchase interest on a Platinum Visa card issued by the National Bank of Dubai was 2.99 per cent, while Dubai's sovereign debt stood at 148 per cent of GDP – both well out of order for a conscientious Muslim. Dubai has been on the ropes since last September, but even in better times, the ruling family, like the government of Malaysia, had encouraged sharia-financing across a range of state-funded development projects. Gulf regimes are keenly aware of the changes in fashion that have driven demand for sharia-compliance.

So is the private sector. Many innovative sharia-compliant instruments have been theorised – and some of them applied – by companies whose interest in Islam is decidedly recent, among them Deutsche Bank as well as HSBC. Their idea is to access the large amounts of cash swilling around to no great avail in the Gulf: an ambition reciprocated by the owners of this money, who want to put it to work. The difference between now and 1973 is not one of quantity: liquidity in the Gulf has been high again, partly as a result of oil prices, partly because billions of dollars were repatriated from the West by worried owners after 9/11, but also because the Islamic revival has left many Muslims doubting the wisdom of conventional investment. The diffusion of sharia-compliant financial products has opened new routes for their money. For a while some of it headed towards Malaysia and, until the end of last year, plenty was creeping westward again. The appetite for world markets remains strong, but it now answers more closely to the will of God.

The prohibitions for Muslims are puzzling to the modern commercial mind. The first obstacle for a pious Muslim trading and banking in conventional economies is interest, the term I've been using for the Arabic riba, though its literal sense is closer to 'excess' and it is sometimes translated as 'usury'. Often, in the Hadith and even more in recent proselytising on the internet, riba is said to be 'eaten'. One of the objections to riba is its propensity to up-end the social order. A person who consumes riba bungles the proper management of need – his own and his debtor's – whereupon the grand plan of give and take, sufficiency for rich and poor alike, begins to come apart. This, as Charles Tripp explains in Islam and the Moral Economy, is also a challenge to 'the balance and proportion of God's ordering of the universe', which must be reflected in 'human relations'. Islamic tradition warns that riba is likely to lead to injustice and exploitation.

There's a categorical objection, too: that money may not be conjured up from money to generate like from like. The goods that served (we're told) as currency in Islamic tradition – gold, silver, salt, grain and dates – can only be exchanged 'hand to hand', i.e. in a spot transaction, without deferment; and only at parity, one quantity for its exact equivalent, no more, no less. It's not clear why you'd want to swap something – a gold weight, say – for its identical other, but the point here is probably that units of currency, unlike the shirt or the saddle for which they're exchanged, must be beyond any cavilling with regard to value for the system to hold up: an Islamic marker set down 14 centuries ago against arbitrage. In a story told by Abu Said al Khudri, one of Muhammad's younger companions, the Prophet describes the transaction of a greater number of low-grade dates for a smaller number of quality dates as riba.

The most famous chapter and verse on riba is in sura 2 of the Koran. It warns that dealing in riba will bring on madness or 'torment' (via 'Satan's touch'), and that if you're not prepared to waive a mark-up on a debt, war will be waged against you by God and the Prophet. One sharia-compliant banker I met last year told me that's about as bad as it gets. There is also an injunction to forgive debt in a broader sense: 'If the debtor is in difficulty, then delay things . . . Still, if you were to write it off as an act of charity, that would be better for you, if only you knew' (the rules followed by HSBC Amanah try to catch something of this). The charging of riba, it follows, is always a missed opportunity to act generously, to give where a gift is in order, a gesture highly prized in Islamic tradition. In a faith embodied by a trader prophet and espoused by an impressive trading community for which, at its height, knowledge was a key commodity, believers are admonished not to confuse riba with trade. From the second sura, again: 'God has allowed trade and forbidden usury.'

In Economics, Ethics and Religion (1997) Rodney Wilson went through the 6226 verses of the Koran and found that 1400 refer to 'economic issues'. It follows that there is a vast body of scholarly opinion dealing with money. A fatwa about charging for debt, or any financial matter, issued by a group of experts such as the Fiqh Academy in Jeddah can carry great weight for certain Muslims, and less for others. In the sharia, like any code which hasn't ossified, the element of interpretation is crucial and within each of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence, there are divergent views, especially between conservatives and modernisers and especially about money. Yet not all the source material under interpretation is stable or straightforward. In the Hadith, for instance, it's said that the Prophet warned against 70 different forms of riba. These have decayed and combined under the pressures of modernity, but there's still room for doubt. Modern nuance can be as puzzling to a non-Muslim (maybe even a Muslim) as the founding inventories: Wilson records a sharia ruling in the United Arab Emirates which found that simple interest was permissible and only compound interest forbidden.

Riba catches many non-Muslims out. After a long study of Islamic finance, the anthropologist Bill Maurer couldn't settle on 'interest' as the perfect translation: it seemed clear at first but became streaky as he looked closer. 'Usury' is the obvious alternative, but are we to rely on the older sense of the term – any charge, however small, for the use of borrowed money – or on the way it's understood today, as extortionate interest only? Wilson, a professor in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham who is intrigued by 'the influences of religious belief on economic behaviour', holds that riba is usury in the first sense. That's the view of most practising Muslims; it seems to echo the meaning of the word in Deuteronomy, where Moses instructs the people of Israel not to lend to their own kith and kin at a rate: 'Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury.' Very close to 'interest' after all then. Yet if, like Melanie Phillips, you believe Islamic banking in the UK merely hastens the day when a green flag is raised over Westminster, it's important to think of 'usury' in the later sense, in order to insist that Muslim law is either deluded or deceitful: 'The whole issue of sharia finance,' Phillips wrote last year, 'is based on a fabrication . . . sharia does not proscribe interest. It proscribes usury.' Were riba just a term for exploitative lending, however, one or two countries might have shuffled nearer to a unitary sharia banking system. But the sharia has few attractions for exchequers and central banks in a modern economy, where the interest rate is a basic tool of monetary policy. The appeal of sharia-compliant banking and investing is in essence to the individual conscience.

The emphasis on risk-sharing in HSBC Amanah's products – and all Islamic products – is related to the prohibition on interest: it's obvious to the devout Muslim that collecting interest on a debt involves no risk worth the name; all that's required, in this view, is for a creditor to sit back and wait. The exposure involved in the mere lending of money – self-evident to a non-Muslim – is an unticked box in Islamic tradition, while savings, for which non-Muslims see interest as a fair reward, give rise to worries about hoarding: money should be out there doing the work that enables trade to flourish. A Treasury expert would say Islamic tradition approves of narrow money; a historian would remember Bacon's essay 'Of Seditions and Troubles' and his famous dictum that muck is 'not good except it be spread'. (The essay goes on: 'This is done chiefly by suppressing, or at the least keeping a strait hand upon the devouring trades of usury.')

Risk-sharing, like generosity, puts human relations on an even keel in the Islamic view. A capitalist can weigh a risk but shouldn't accept a promise from a partner to eliminate it: that would be 'risk-transfer', which denies the inherent truth of risk. (In the eyes of sharia scholars it also opens up a vista of potential exploitation, especially when risk is passed on in unknowable ways, say in the form of a mortgage-backed security with a dodgy rating.) No one must guarantee investors' money, except against fraud.

Interest and risk-evasion are largely absent, Islamic investors believe, from the world of stocks and shares. To invest in a company is to sign up to joint ownership and collective risk, while ordinary shares pay dividends not interest. Even so, there are constraints. It is forbidden to invest in companies that have anything to do with gambling and you're unlikely to find a business listed in the Dow Jones Islamic Markets indexes with more than a toehold in this area of the leisure industry. In sura 2 of the Koran, the evils of drinking and gambling are deemed to outweigh their benefits – though these are granted – and maisir (the drawing of arrows, like straws, to divine a course of action or simply to bet) is condemned in sura 5. There are other exclusions for devout shareholders. Clearly breweries and distilleries are off-limits, along with pork products. Pornography offends on three overlapping counts: shame, obscenity and baghi, loosely speaking, 'transgression', 'injustice' or 'trespass', anything intrusive then, from a misunderstanding of privacy to a foreign occupation. The DJIM indexes exclude most media businesses but also hotel chains, where minibars and adult channels lower the tone (basement gaming rooms too). Critically, daily trading in debt and riba makes almost all conventional financial institutions, including banks, unacceptable.

The way companies that survive this triage are run must next be examined closely. Sharia scholars are unlikely to approve of a firm whose clients owe it large amounts of money – 'accounts receivable' – or one that depends on high returns from interest. The bigger question, though, is a company's financial structure – how much of its capital it has raised by borrowing and how much by selling its performance or potential in the form of share distributions. The DJIM board of sharia advisers screens out any company whose debt is higher than one third of its market capitalisation (a valuation based on the total number of shares issued times the prevailing share price).

Debt is a problem in its own right. Borrowing on a regular, matter-of-fact basis is open to question since sharia scholars are wary of conventional banking's dependence on interbank borrowing. The ideal Islamic bank, Rodney Wilson told me, is financed entirely by its depositors' money. In practice, there is plenty of imperfection, but a compliant bank will want to stay as close as possible to this model. Like riba, debt also raises fears about poverty and injustice (some Muslim NGOs are as evangelical about Third World debt as their Christian and secular counterparts). In the Hadith, debt presents a troubling face once the possibility of deferment arises, as it might with a debtor in difficulty. Is it a good thing or a bad thing to put off repayment? Does it matter whether the debtor is wealthy or poor? Bad faith is always threatening to break in on the relationship between a debtor and a creditor: a debtor says he can pay back a loan but how can he be sure? All this drags human relations into the realm of uncertainty – gharar – from which faith, the discourse of absolute certainty, was supposed to protect them. In commerce, gharar is best avoided. Whence the persistence of doubts about contracting for things that don't (yet) exist: tradition might allow for a joiner taking orders on furniture he hadn't yet made, but it disqualified the sale of a foal that was still in the body of the mare. Even the benign, textbook version of the forward contract – a farmer and a miller agreeing a grain price ahead of the harvest – brings a sense of uneasiness.

The concept of gharar doesn't just apply to goods whose status is in doubt, but to bargains whose terms are ambiguous and contracting parties whose liability is vague. Though it's often translated as 'hazard', it's not the same as risk, which Muslim societies understand as well as anyone. Business risk is unavoidable and begins when a cargo plane taxis towards the runway. Gharar has more to do with the commercial imagination running ahead of itself: speculation still troubles Islamic scholars; many take a dim view not just of credit derivatives, the villains of the banking crisis, but of any instrument whose value is based on a contract for an underlying asset rather than the asset itself. This is changing, slowly, as a growing number of experts wrestle with intellectual tradition till they get to a place where derivatives, some in any case, appear acceptable. But no sharia adviser would approve of an Islamic financial institution bundling toxic mortgage debts into securities and packing them off to market, still less buying them up. To a conscientious Muslim, this is the perfect storm, in which opaque liabilities, the unknown nature of the underlying debt, fair-weather forecasts by ratings agencies, plus risk transfer and riba, conspire to wreck large parts of the fleet. Is there anyone clinging to the flotsam, post-9/15, who disagrees?

Non-Muslims will recognise the process of screening companies out of a portfolio: many charities and individuals have been doing it for years. The fashion in the West for Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), which gained ground in the 1980s and 90s, has become a model for Muslims. That's the view of Mufti Barkatulla, a scholar trained in Uttar Pradesh, and now an adviser on several sharia boards in the UK, among them the Islamic Bank of Britain and Lloyds TSB. He points out that sharia scholars (including the ones who advise the DJIM) rule against investments in tobacco companies and arms manufacturers, even though Islam has no quarrel with either. The sharia is strictly speaking a matter of law, but sharia-compliance and SRI are, in Barkatulla's sense of it, largely about the intimate decisions of prosperous individuals and the grandiose 'ethical' claims of big business. Sharia-compliance doesn't have the boycott component that turns SRI from a sum of personal choices into a self-conscious movement. Opting away from a conventional current account is hardly the same as refusing to buy sugar grown by slaves, as the Quakers did in the 1790s, or divesting from companies with links to apartheid, as American universities did in the 1980s.

Even so, it's sometimes seen as a front for Islamic supremacists scheming to overrun the West. The crusader-jihadist wars are a favourable habitat for this kind of idea, which feeds off suspicion and a regular diet of incidental detail. Eccentric Islamists announce that they hope to see Britain under a caliphate; angry groupuscules and male covens dabble in jihadist ideology and scour explosives websites; the Archbishop of Canterbury thinks aloud on Radio 4 about the sharia as 'an alternative to the divorce courts as we understand them' and congratulates Muslims 'on the faithful completion of Ramadan' as though he were handing round the sherry on Easter Sunday. With all this and years of high-profile terrorist attacks, from New York to Lahore, plus two wars that have not gone well, a person in Birmingham seeking a fee-based home loan begins to look like the enemy.

Before the surge of Islamic banking, many devout Muslims shied away from banks: for the poorly educated, everything, even a non-interest-bearing current account, came under the general heading haram – 'impermissible'. Banks dealt with interest, therefore Muslims shouldn't deal with banks. Mufti Barkatulla told me he'd had to mediate in several cases where police raids had turned up large sums of money stashed in people's homes. Sometimes, he remembered, people were holding £30,000 or more. To the police, this was deeply suspicious; in fact people were hoarding their way out of riba. One of the changes that sharia-compliant banking is bringing in Britain, Barkatulla believes, is that working-class Muslims, older ones especially, are at last shifting 'from a cash-based to a cashless society', as Muslim professionals and businessmen did years ago.

If Muslims can't take part in a conventional economy without breaking the rules, at least they can compromise by keeping track of their infringements and 'purifying' the balance by charitable giving equivalent to the amounts in question. These self-administered transfusions are payable over and above the mandatory deduction, known as zakat, that devout Muslims must make and donate to charity in the space of a year. The most common zakat payment is 2.5 per cent per annum on cash, savings and investments less liabilities. (It can be a finicky piece of accounting; the 'zakat calculator' at http://www.ramadhanzone.com is worth a visit.) Unbelievers who worry that Muslims may not wish them well – a complicated piece of projection, but not wholly fantastic right now – should put a yellow highlight over the word zakat, and another over 'purification'. Successful Muslims in the West remitting to the 'poor' and 'needy', as the rules require, are the worry here. Their money may well go to families of the unemployed in Bradford, NGOs in Kuala Lumpur or prosthetics clinics in Sarajevo, but it can also be headed in the direction of people under fire in the West Bank, Gaza, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir.

At the beginning of last year the Pakistani cleric Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani was a member of the sharia supervisory board at DJIM. A scholar, judge, financial expert and prolific writer, Usmani was also involved with a sharia-compliant mutual in Illinois which Dow had allowed to manage its 'Islamic' fund. But there were internet murmurings about Usmani and in the spring, the McCormick Foundation and the ultra-con Center for Security Policy held an anti-sharia finance workshop in Illinois where his published views about jihad and the subjugation of unbelievers came under scrutiny. Media attention now turned to the Illinois mutual. In 2007, somewhere in the sprawling paperwork for a federal 'terror-funding' trial in Dallas, it had been named by the government as an 'un-indicted co-conspirator' – one of about three hundred – with alleged links to the US Muslim Brotherhood. These, apparently, were forged via the Holy Land Foundation (HLF), a US-based charity at the centre of the investigation. Usmani's thoughts on the obligations of jihad – in the CPS presentation, they were non-ecumenical to say the least – have done sharia-compliant finance in the US very few favours; he's no longer a DJIM adviser. As for the Illinois mutual, it's had to call in the American Civil Liberties Union to help it restore its damaged reputation.

Last year, after a mistrial in 2007, a jury in Dallas found the HLF and five of its members guilty of funding Hamas to the tune of $12 million or more, even though the prosecution conceded that the money was spent on medical facilities and good works. But in the US, charitable gifts, purifications and zakat simply cannot go to Palestinians without donors risking a federal investigation. As David Feige explained in Slate after the mistrial, the HLF was accused of 'aiding a terrorist organisation by helping it spread its ideology and recruit members. Translation: even those who support good works are guilty of terrorism if the good works make the terrorists look good.'

Governments may strive in their own jurisdictions to compound the hardships of the Palestinians; freedom-loving think tanks may vent their dismay (verging on disgust) about the rise of sharia-compliant mechanisms in the West; but it is too late to quarantine Islamic finance. Alongside the notional clash of civilisations and the real collisions, a very different encounter with Islam has taken place in the worlds of banking and finance. The constant exchange of money and ideas, the morphology of ingenious instruments that can accommodate a different philosophy of wealth-creation, the familiarity with Islamic tradition among conventional financiers and lawyers who draw them up – all this suggests a convergence both more real and less visible than anything that multiculturalism in the arts, the media or interfaith groups was meant to bring about. The old imperatives of trade and profit are at work here, but so is the recent radical style of the money culture itself.

The 1980s may have mourned the death of avant-gardes in the arts, but there was a thriving avant-garde in the City, which became a magnet for cadres of bright, ambitious, untried people with remote horizons, dealers sans frontières. By the end of the 1990s, this gilded bohemia had a good grasp of sharia-compliance and the breadth of modern, secular trading it could offer Muslims with qualms about the way their money had been doubled back in the 1970s. There were fortunes to be made, and an intellectual challenge in the air. The idea that Islamic finance was out to hobble Western values – 'financial jihad', as the Center for Security Policy calls it – was greeted with scepticism, even a subversive 'So what?' Radical innovation was the watchword and the search was on for complex products that could lock more and more transactions into a compliant framework. Since last September, the dangers of innovation have become clear and the ideal of reckless creativity has taken a hammering.

The world of sharia-compliant finance is largely unscathed: Islamic banks in the Middle and Far East have not followed the low collateral/high borrowing regimes favoured by their conventional competitors at home and abroad; Islamic principles have denied investors any real access to shares in the banking sector and thus any exposure to toxic debt. Yet there is still a hunger for access and experimentation – what Mufti Barkatulla describes, enthusiastially, as a willingness to take risks with interpretation itself; 'sharia risk', as he calls it – and a fascination with the sums of money that have been made on markets forbidden to Muslims. To that extent, convergence is still the order of the day, as sharia-compliancy wizards, Muslim and non-Muslim, seek to open up the trade in derivatives to the small but growing number of devout investors who can be persuaded to bid for a calf while the camel is still in labour.

------------------------------------

[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.comYahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/alochona/

<*> Your email settings:
Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/alochona/join
(Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
mailto:alochona-digest@yahoogroups.com
mailto:alochona-fullfeatured@yahoogroups.com

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
alochona-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

[ALOCHONA] Shared Web Hosting Plans - TetraHost Bangladesh



TETRAHOST BANGLADESH

 

We, TetraHost Bangladesh want to make our footstep to the world of Hosting Solutions. So we are proudly announcing our Brand TetraHost Bangladesh. Our internet Hosting Plan helps businesses and individuals get high-powered service at a fraction of the cost.

 

UP TIME: 99.9% Guarantee

99.9% Uptime Guarantee on all of our Web Hosting, Reseller Hosting, and Dedicated Server packages!

 

SUPPORT: 24 x 7 Live Phone Support

24x7 Support 365 days a year via Cell Phone, Live Chat, Instant Messenger, and Helpdesk!

 

MONEY BACK GUARANTEE: 30 Days Money Back Guarantee

30-Days Money Back Guarantee on all packages incase you're not satisfied with our service.

 

 

OUR SERVERS

 

After loads of studies and analysis TetraHost has started offering the world's best Hosting Service. We have implemented the best technologies to take high load and get it balanced at loaded situation. We are also using the world's best hardwares and networks.

 

 

[Server Specification]

 

Our basement node is using the following Specification:

 

Intel Dual Xeon Quad Core

E5430 2.40 Ghz (2 X 12 MB Cache)

2 GB DDR2 RAM

250 X 2 GB SATA II Hard Drive (10K RPM)

Premium Bandwidth Supplied By Internap (Quality Assured with Two 10G Network).

Nightly Offshore and Onsite Backup.

 

 

WEB HOSTING

 

Power your Web site with a feature-packed Web hosting plan. We offer high quality, affordable, and reliable web hosting services. Our All-Inclusive plan includes great features, fast and secure servers, multiple free tools, and high quality customer service!

 

As a starting point, we've built a solid technology foundation. We use only Dell servers, which offer exceptional performance and proven reliability. Our current config features dual core dual Xeon 2.4 GHz processors (that means each server contains two 2.4 GHz processors, each of which is dual core) with 2 GB of RAM.


Hosting Plans:

 

Package Name: Planet – 50

Space/Quota: 50 MB

Bandwidth: 1000 MB

Price: BDT 1000/Per Year

 

Package Name: Planet – 100

Space/Quota: 100 MB

Bandwidth: 2000 MB

Price: BDT 1400/Per Year

 

Package Name: Planet – 200

Space/Quota: 200 MB

Bandwidth: 4000 MB

Price: BDT 2500/Per Year

 

Package Name: Planet – 300

Space/Quota: 300 MB

Bandwidth: 6000 MB

Price: BDT 3400/Per Year

 

Package Name: Planet – 500

Space/Quota: 500 MB

Bandwidth: 10000 MB

Price: BDT 4500/Per Year

 

Package Name: Planet – 1000

Space/Quota: 1000 MB

Bandwidth: 20000 MB

Price: BDT 7000/Per Year

 

Details on plan features and pricing can be found at:

http://www.tetrahostbd.com/shared.htm

 

 

Contact Us:

 

Client Management & Product Order Area:

http://manage.tetrahostbd.com

 

There are multiple ways to contact us.

 

1. Email: sales@tetrahostbd.com

2. Support Ticket: TetraHost - Submit Ticket

3. Live Chat on TetraHostBD.Com (top right corner)

4. Hotline: +88 019 13377417

 

Thanks for your interest in TetraHost Bangladesh, we look forward to doing business.

 

 

Ashraful Insan

Sr. System Administrator

TetraHost Bangladesh




__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

[ALOCHONA] FOBANA 2009 Houston updates

Dear Parents,

FOBANA 2009 Host Committee is looking forward to welcome you and your family on July 2-4, 2009 in Houston, TX.

We have lots of activities planned for FOBANA for the whole family. We hope you will participate and enjoy most of the activities. Along with the adult programs, we also planned some very important activities for your children. Please encourage your children to participate in essay and art competition. Essay competition guidelines are as follows: Topic of the essay is "Liberation War of Bangladesh, 1971". Age 4-8 years (group A), 9-12 years (group B), and 13-16 years (group C). Time limit for the essay will be 30 minutes. Time and place will be announced during FOBANA activities. Language will be English, not exceeding 500 words.

For Art competition, the topic is "Beauty of Bangladesh". Same age groups as above will be our guidelines; time limit for the drawings will be 30 minutes. All necessary materials will be provided.

Prizes will be given to the top four participants in both the categories by a distinguish guest on the evening of Fourth of July. Please encourage your children to participate and prepare themselves for these exciting activities we have planned for them. Please visit our web sit at www.fobana2009.com for more information.

We thank you for your help in making this planned activity a great success for our future generation.

Sincerely
Special Event Committee
FOBANA 2009
www.fobana2009.com
www.myfobana.com


------------------------------------

[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.comYahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/alochona/

<*> Your email settings:
Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/alochona/join
(Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
mailto:alochona-digest@yahoogroups.com
mailto:alochona-fullfeatured@yahoogroups.com

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
alochona-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

[ALOCHONA] Re: From Bangladesh to Darfur: Racism leads to Genocide in the Muslim World

ICC Observers Exclusive Interview: William Schabas, Professor of Human Rights Law and Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National University of Ireland, Galway

March 26, 2009 by iccobservers

[Professor William A. Schabas is director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National University of Ireland, Galway, where he also holds the chair in human rights law. William Schabas is an Officer of the Order of Canada. Professor Schabas is the author of eighteen monographs dealing in whole or in part with international human rights law, including Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 3rd ed.), and Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 2ndf ed.). Schabas has often participated in international human rights missions on behalf of non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International (International Secretariat), the International Federation of Human Rights, and the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development to Rwanda, Burundi, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Cambodia and Guyana. He is legal counsel to Amnesty International Ireland. In May 2002, the President of Sierra Leone appointed Professor Schabas to the country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, upon the recommendation of Mary Robinson, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.]

Q: In a recent article, you wrote that the UN Commission of Inquiry's report on Darfur, while finding that "the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide," left room for the possibility of individual actors having committed genocidal acts. Does the ICC ruling change your opinion about this possibility? What is the distinction in customary international law between "acts of genocide" and an organized state "policy of genocide"?

A: There is case law from the Yugoslavia tribunal that holds that the crime of genocide as defined internationally doesn't require any contextual element such as a state plan or policy. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has held that an individual acting alone can commit genocide. That view was endorsed, in a sense, by the Commission of Inquiry that was presided over by Professor Cassese, but in a purely theoretical sense, because the Commission did not find any individual with a genocidal intent in Darfur on which to hang that accusation. I have personally never found this to be a particularly helpful proposition because I do not think the problem of an individual with a genocidal intent should be of any concern to international criminal law. The problem of an individual acting in isolation with a genocidal intent should be a concern for psychiatry. I have argued this position since the 1999 decision of the ICTY, I've written about this, and I reiterate my position in the second edition of my book on genocide, which is that a state policy element is essential for a determination of genocide. In the article you are referring to, I took the view that the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur had confirmed the importance of a state policy because it had in effect responded to a question from the Security Council – was genocide being committed in Darfur? –with the answer, "No, we don't see any genocide in Darfur because we do not observe a state policy of genocide." So I took the report of the Commission of Inquiry as confirmation of my position, although I have to acknowledge that the Commission says that they cannot exclude the possibility that an individual acting alone could have genocidal intent. I know this to be the view of Professor Cassese, but I don't agree with that position.
Now, in the recent decision on the Bashir arrest warrant, the majority of judges hold the view that genocide requires the policy element, in effect deriving this standard from the Elements of rimes. It is important to understand that the Elements of Crimes, which were negotiated in late 1999 and early 2000, took place in context of the ICTY and the cases involving the lone genocidal perpetrator. It is well known that the requirement of a contextual element for genocide, which is in the Elements of Crimes, was a response to the decision of the ICTY. The majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber has insisted on applying the Elements of Crimes for the purposes of applying the law of the Rome Statute. They distinguish it from the position taken by the ICTY but without making any observation as to what it might constitute for international criminal law. The judges of the ICTY would no doubt say that the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision is a particular interpretation of the provisions of the law applicable to the ICC rather than a statement of customary law; this is only because they think what they are pronouncing on is customary law. I have noticed that the judges of the ICTY refer to the Rome Statute as authority of customary law when they agree with it, and when they do not agree with it they say it is not representative of customary international law. This suggests that customary international law is what the five judges of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY think it is. I do not think that's the correct position.
I think that the Elements of Crimes, which represent a consensus of the states involved in the ICC, is more authoritative of what customary international law is than what the judges of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY think it is. However, no one can answer that question definitively – we now have a situation where we have one interpretation from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, which is based on the judges' own interpretation of treaty law, namely Article 2 of the Genocide Convention as repeated in Article 4 of the Yugoslavia Statute. The ICTY judges are relying on a literal interpretation of that provision, because they argue that there is nothing in the text that says that in order to commit genocide there needs to be a contextual element or state policy element, so they conclude that you do not need a state policy element. That is, unfortunately, the extent of their analysis. To say that this view is customary international law is pretty superficial, because there is no attempt to identify what customary international law is in this case, but rather their opinion is based only on a literal interpretation of the treaty provision.
What the ICC has in its favour is that when you combine its text - which is the same text in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, Article 4 of the ICTY Statute, and Article 6 of the Rome Statute - with the Elements of Crimes, and a dose of common sense, you end up with a contextual element to the crime of genocide. What we do not know now is whether people will look to the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision in the future and say this is a useful correction that helps us to clarify customary law or whether people are going to interpret it as a particular decision dictated by the specific terms of the Elements of Crimes.
We have to bear in mind that there is a dissenting opinion in this case that tends to dismiss the significance of the Elements of Crimes. There is also Article 10 of the Rome Statute that reminds us that the Rome Statute is not necessarily a codification of international law. Those are all the pieces of the puzzle and where things will go from here I cannot say, but I am pleased with the arrest warrant decision.

Q: How does the Pre-Trial Chamber's ruling in the Bashir case relate to the 2005 UN Commission of Inquiry's findings? Does the Court's refusal to grant the genocide charges support the findings of the Commission? Are we reaching a consensus that the violence in Darfur is not appropriately classified as genocide? How will this influence the future development of international criminal law?

A: Yes, it is clear that there is a growing authority for the view that the events of Darfur do not constitute the crime of genocide: the Commission of Inquiry, the Pre-Trial Chamber, and the major human rights NGOs – Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International – have not used the term genocide. I think it is clear that when one gives an interpretation based on the definition of the Genocide Convention, we get the result that this is not a case of genocide. When one looks at something like the document produced by Madeline Albright entitled Preventing Genocide, from her Genocide Task Force in 2008, we see it adopts a definition by which genocide means all forms of mass killings. That is not a particularly legal determination and she and her co-authors tend to dismiss objections to their view as legal pedantry. I, however, do not know that it is proper to dismiss the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute as merely legalistic pedantry. These are significant and recognized distinctions in international criminal law between genocide and other forms of mass killing, which would constitute crimes against humanity or war crimes.
The definition of genocide and the answer to the question of whether genocide is taking place in Darfur depends on whom you are talking to. If you are talking to an international lawyer, then it is not genocide. If you are talking to an American politician or sociology professor, then they might say it is genocide. It just depends how you use the word. The Oxford English Dictionary adopts the definition from the Genocide Convention. However, people are free to use words as they want. For example, sometimes people will use rape to describe violent sexual assault, while some merely use the word to describe something unpleasant. So when we debate whether `genocide' is taking place in Darfur, we need to know what people mean by genocide. There are a lot of different meanings floating around out there.
For international law, it means that there is growing support for the feeling that Darfur is best not characterized as genocide, and there is also growing authority for the view that the definition of genocide in the Convention and Rome Statute should be interpreted in a relatively strict and narrow manner. We now have a great deal of authority for this view: the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber, the ICJ ruling in Bosnia v. Serbia, and the Yugoslavia Tribunal in the Krstic ruling, and we have the report of the Commission of Inquiry. Against that, you have a few dissenting judges, and you have a few national court decisions that weigh on the other side, but on balance, the authority is clearly in favour of a narrower interpretation. That is why so many thought that the actions of the Prosecutor in attempting to get the arrest warrant for genocide given the indications of the law were not very productive. I am not talking about the demagoguery or extravagant use of the term genocide in this case. The consensus among international lawyers and from the UN Commission was that the prosecutor could not get an arrest warrant on the grounds of genocide. So in terms of international law, the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision is just further evidence of a trend towards a narrow interpretation of the crime of genocide.

Q: What do you make of the possibility that Moreno-Ocampo might appeal the judges' decision or bring future charges of genocide against Bashir and other Sudanese officials?

A: I do not see that as a serious possibility. He has filed an application for leave to appeal, and it will have to be determined by the judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber who issued the arrest warrant. There is no appeal of right of a decision denying issuance of an arrest warrant He has to demonstrate that the ruling would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial and that an immediate determination of the question by the Appeals Chamber is required. He would have an argument if the warrant itself had been denied. But he has his warrant, and he now can proceed to trial, and he lead all of the evidence he requires. If he succeeds in establishing genocide, the judges at trial can amend the charges. So all of this can be addressed according to the normal procedure. No useful purpose is served by an appeal at this point. This suggests to me that it is unlikely the Pre-Trial Chamber judges would give him leave to appeal this.
As for him producing new evidence—and people have made a lot of the fact that the judges included a paragraph to this effect—you can say that about anything. There is no need to put that in the judgment; it is obvious. If he produces new evidence, he can get a new arrest warrant. If new evidence comes to light, he does not even have to get the arrest warrant amended. The judges themselves can propose that the charges be amended to include genocide. The introduction of new evidence has always been a possibility. I do not know if it is particularly productive to insist that there is something significant about the fact that the judges reserved his right to come back with new evidence, since the prosecutor had this right anyway. On one occasion in the past the judges even asked for new evidence, and I assume Moreno Ocampo gave it his best shot. This is not like Srebrenica where there was a mystery about whether they could get secret communications from the Serbs ordering the massacre. Here the facts are pretty straightforward and well known. A lot has been written about this issue documenting the statistics similar to the arguments of the prosecutor.
If someone were to come forward and say that the prosecutor made a mistake because there is a whole lot of evidence that was not presented with regard to the case of Darfur, then we might have a more compelling argument that the Pre-Trial Chamber ruling could be revised or that there will be another bite at the apple. I have not heard that, and I assume the prosecutor has presented the best evidence that he has, and it is widely available evidence, including the UN Commission's report and all the NGO material. I do not think it is likely that he will get leave to appeal, and I question whether the judges will even agree that they can give him leave to appeal such a decision. If they do grant him leave to appeal, well, then we are into the question of fact and of law. Mainly, however, we are not debating the facts here, we are debating the application of the legal definition to the facts. No one quarrels with the facts Moreno Ocampo presented and I do not think he has additional facts that could provide him with stronger arguments for a genocide charge.

Q: Does the Court's refusal to grant the genocide charge amount to a failure in any way for the prosecutor? Some have argued, in Sudan, that this shows the weakness of all the charges. Others think that it shows that the Pre-Trial Chamber is a credible body and not merely a rubber-stamp for the prosecutor. What do you think?

A: I think this shows one more bad exercise of discretion by the prosecutor, one more bad call by Moreno Ocampo. He was chastened last year because of his decisions on gathering evidence that he could not then disclose to the defense and that led to a terrible and unnecessary delay in the Lubanga proceedings for more than six months. This was an error in judgment and I think seeking a warrant for genocide charges in Darfur was also an error in judgment. I think he should have confined himself to the clearly established charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The same Pre-Trial Chamber has already granted two arrest warrants for those charges; the judges had already concluded that the events in Darfur justify those two charges, as in the Ali Kushyab and Ahmad Harun arrest warrants. Presumably they would have done the same thing in the blink of an eye should that have been all they were asked to do. Then the only question would be: does the evidence link the dots between Bashir and those crimes. Had this been Moreno Ocampo's strategy, we probably would have had an arrest warrant in August instead of February. The delay of six months in issuing the arrest warrant was due to the prosecutor insisting on trying to get a genocide charge, which was doomed to fail as shown by the Pre-Trial Chamber's ruling. These actions show a lack of good judgment on the prosecutor's part; it is a mistake, and not the first he's made.
As for showing weakness or strength of the Court, it just shows it is a Court that functions properly. When the prosecutor asks for something, the judges look at it seriously and come to a decision that is based on an accurate, intelligent and well-reasoned assessment of the law; people should be satisfied that what we have here is a serious, functioning institution capable of issuing judgments of high quality. What more could you ask for?

Q: In one of your articles you mention that some human rights activists considered the UN Commission's report a betrayal because it failed to find genocide charges. What will be the reaction of human rights activists to the Court's findings? How will the Court's ruling influence the actions of human rights activities on Darfur in the future?

A: Well, I cannot predict how they all will react. As I've mentioned, two of the leading international NGOs, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have not labeled the conflict in Darfur a genocide. I haven't checked what the International Federation of Human Rights or International Commission of Jurists have said on the matter, but I imagine they've taken the same cautious approach. The big international human rights organizations have not bought into the idea that the violence in Darfur should be labeled as genocide, and everything from these organizations I have read indicates great satisfaction that a head of state was charged with serious atrocities and this is being addressed by the ICC. I think there must be a considerable amount of jubilation, at least among the major international NGOs.
There is, of course, another community, a specialized community of NGOs focused on Darfur, and some of the academics who write about Darfur as well, and they may find this ruling to be a repudiation of their views. Some of them are not singing from the same hymn sheet as the rest of us because they adopt a definition of genocide that is simply their own. I work from the Genocide Convention, the Yugoslavia Statute, the Rome Statute, and so on, but some of the people involved in these debates have their own definition of genocide. All that these actors can say is that the narrow definition of genocide, which they do not endorse, has been applied by the Court.
I have always thought that there was a bit of an obsession with trying to label Darfur as genocide. This is not the only case where we see this obsession: there are people who want to label speeches by Iranian President Ahmadinejad as genocidal, people who want to label the war in Gaza as genocide, etc. There are many examples of what I call the `extravagant' use of the term genocide. For people who indulge in that, they can keep doing it, but if they want to be part of the legal debate, they should just get over it.

Q: What kind of outcomes will we need to see from the Court in order to ensure its legitimacy? What about the Lubanga and Bemba trials: do you think the Bashir case has taken too much attention away from these cases? What will be the outcome for the Court if these two cases are tried successfully, but Bashir remains at large? What do we need to see overall from the Court in order to establish it as a legitimate actor on the international stage?

A: The Court is doing that right now. It is becoming more and more of a legitimate actor on the international stage. It had a slow start. The first phase in the history of the Court was the adoption of the Rome Statute and that was from the early 1990s until 1998. This was an exhilarating period in terms of the development of international criminal law and particularly because the more hesitant or conservative models of what an international criminal court might look like, which were the ones advanced by the International Law Commission in 1994, were totally set aside in favour of a much more robust and innovative, radical if you will, international criminal court, with an independent prosecutor separate from the UN, and many features that I won't go into. But what resulted was the Rome Statute. So that was a very exciting period. And then there was a period of about four years for entry into force, which was like a continuation of the first period. Achieving 67 ratifications within less than four years was something nobody had ever dreamed would take place. Most people on the night of July 17, 1998 when the Statute was adopted thought it would take at least a decade to get to 60 and maybe longer. So things went very quickly. And then when the Court started, when all the officials were elected and the Court became operational in mid- 2003, it went through a difficult period when things didn't seem to work. There were plans that it would hold its first trial in 2005, the budget set aside money for the first trial, but there was no trial until 2009. That's four years behind schedule, and pretty much everything has seemed to take much longer [in this period]. I don't know what the explanation is for that, but whatever it is, it's taking longer than expected and perhaps it is simply that that's how long things should take. We'd been through a previous period that had gone exceedingly quickly and that led us to think that it would always be like that and it hasn't been. But now the Court is operating and it is addressing the big conflicts of our time, like Darfur. It wasn't insignificant that a little over a month ago the Palestinian Authority attempted to engage the Court with regard to Gaza. Whether that will or can take place is a matter of some debate, but the idea that the Court was appearing to engage with or be relevant to the conflict in the Middle East is a big step; it shows the Court is on the big stage now. It's moving forward, it's just taken a little longer than we thought. Now we have a trial going, we're going to have more trials. This is great. I don't have any magic formula for what it should do now. I think it should just do more of what it's doing. The prosecutor ought to reflect upon some of his mistakes and try to correct them. That would make his office more productive and more efficient.

Q. Does the ICC have an implicitly political role to fulfill in conflict situations? If so, what should that role be? Should the Court strive to remain politically neutral?

A. I'm glad you asked that question. I have strong opinions on this. I would have held to the view in the 1990s that the Court should be totally separate from political debates and that there should be no possibility of political involvement in the work of the Court. As you know, in the final Statute, there's a bit of a compromise there, mainly with respect to Article 16, which allows the Security Council to temporarily halt the proceedings of the Court. The other places where you have quite a clear political involvement of the Court are the triggering mechanisms where you allow both the Security Council and states to trigger the Court. This is politics. These are political bodies that make their decisions politically. I'm increasingly of the view that politics is actually a part of international criminal law and that it's unavoidable.
I see this increasingly in decisions about whom to prosecute: decisions about individuals who are prosecuted and also about the organizations that are targeted. In Uganda, for example, the prosecution has targeted the rebels and not the government. I think that's a political decision. The prosecutor has couched it in a strange and ultimately unconvincing theory about prosecuting the most serious crimes, but he defines this in a purely quantitative way. So if the rebels kill more people than the government, then the rebels should be the focus. But the problem with that is you need a more qualitative approach when deciding who your targets should be. Most of us living in an orderly society would find it far more threatening that the government is committing crimes, even if the outlaws are committing more, because outlaws are supposed to commit crimes and governments aren't. So the prosecutor's decision to go after rebels rather than the government has a whiff of the political to it. If it is purely based on this mathematical calculation, then it's a mistaken one.
I think there's politics going on already. The Darfur prosecution, the decision to prosecute a head of state, is a profoundly political decision. There can hardly be anything more political. You're calling for regime change; that's the consequence of what you're doing. When the prosecutor explained this last July, he said: "I investigate the facts, I'm just an apolitical prosecutor who investigates the facts and goes where they lead me," as if he were Colombo or Sherlock Holmes. But that's not what he's doing. It's a political decision: he goes to the Security Council and asks them to intervene. I'm increasingly of the view that there is politics in this.
I think that our debates in the 1990s when the Rome Statute was being adopted were a bit distorted. What we didn't like about politics in the 1990s was the idea that the Security Council would be the political guardian. That was the extent of our vision. So the way we rejected the Security Council's engagement with the Court and the Security Council's possible control over the Court was with the argument that there should be no politics in the Court. I think in retrospect that maybe we went too far with that. I actually think that those prosecutions often, perhaps not always, involve political determinations.
I've asked people about this at the Court and some people say no, there should be no politics, like what the prosecutor said. Others have said to me, actually the prosecutor has political advisors around him, which kind of confirms my own intuition, which is that there is politics involved and it is quite conscious. But that being said, I think part of the problem is, the idea that political decisions will be taken by the prosecutor suggests a prosecutor who has a different skill set than the man in the job right now. He's a criminal law prosecutor. Once you acknowledge that the role of the prosecutor has a strong political dimension, then you either solve it by getting a prosecutor who is recruited for political expertise and judgment, or you provide some other mechanism to provide political oversight for the prosecutor. These are my preliminary reflections.
I go back and look at events like Nuremberg, where you could say it was political forces who set up the tribunal and they decided politically that the Nazis needed to be prosecuted. One of the critiques of Nuremberg that you often hear was that it was one-sided. That's obviously true, but my question to people is: what should they have done then? Should they have had a second trial of the tribunal that tried 24 British leaders and 24 American leaders? Everyone seems to acknowledge that that's an absurd suggestion, but say maybe they should have prosecuted a few of the allied war crimes for balance. We get this debate at the Yugoslavia tribunal with choosing the ethnicity of the defendants, we get into claims at the Rwanda tribunal that the RPF and not just the Hutu extremists should be prosecuted, we've had it at the Sierra Leone Special Court where they submitted arguments about which faction should be prosecuted and how harshly, how relevant it was that one side was good guys and one bad guys, and all of this involves politics. And I'm more and more of the view that rather than being in denial about the politics we should acknowledge it and then confront it. We should recognize that it is part of these decisions and then find ways to address it in an appropriate and transparent and convincing way, rather than saying as the prosecutor sometimes does that this isn't about politics. It is about politics.

Q. Could you speculate on the future of the Court five or ten years from now? What are the best- and worst-case scenarios for the Court and what can international actors do to improve the Court's standing and legitimacy in the next few years?

A: I really don't know. It is extremely difficult to predict the future in this case.
I think, when you say best and worst case, certainly people shouldn't exclude the possibility that the Court will be a failure, that it will collapse and won't work. I think that people are naïve to just think that this just moves ahead. The idea that the Court is just going to move ahead and keep progressing and everything, which we would all like, I don't see that as being guaranteed, and we certainly have historical examples of institutions created way ahead of their time. The League of Nations, for example, was ahead of its time. It collapsed and a new institution had to be created. I can't rule that out for the ICC. I heard James Crawford, who was involved in the International Law Commission in the early 1990s and one of the key architects of the Rome Statute, speculating about this at a conference last May. He said we had a conservative draft at the International Law Commission in 1994 because we didn't think the international community was ready for more than that. It wasn't because we were conservative, he said; we were giving the international community what we thought it was ready for. But of course what happened between the draft in 1994 and the Rome Statute in 1998 was the radical reconfiguration of the Statute and a new conception of what the Court should be. That happened very quickly and maybe we moved too quickly. Maybe we created an institution that's ahead of its time. I'm not arguing that position, but it is just one of the possible scenarios. That was Professor Crawford's explanation of maybe why we're having such a hard time now, why we had such a hard time getting the Court going. I can't rule that possibility out.
The other scenario is that the Court moves forward, solves its problem, and becomes a more dynamic and more universal institution. Here the difficulties are, as I've mentioned, the role of politics in the Court. And I do think we need to find a solution to this one or face continuing difficulties or problems. In terms of participation in the Court, we're now up to 108 state parties and likely there will be some more. But we still don't have the biggest countries or some of the most powerful countries, including India, China, or the US, and we don't have three of the five permanent members of the Security Council: China, the US, and the Russian Federation. We don't have India, Pakistan, or Iran. These are big pieces and it's a question, a big question mark, of whether the Court will become more universal by engaging with those pieces. The other part of it is that the Court is right now not dominated by the permanent members of the Security Council. So the absence of three of the permanent members is perhaps a weakness but it is also a blessing because it's enabled this institution to develop and grow without the overwhelming role and participation and presence of the permanent members of the Security Council and the Security Council acting as the Security Council, which is what would happen if you got 3 or 4 of them. I'm told now that at the Assemblies of States Parties they talk about the P4, which describes the permanent members excluding the US, because it has been boycotting the Assembly of States Parties for the last several years. If the big players are brought in, it will change the dynamics of the Court and it may make the smaller players less enthusiastic and less keen on it. So that's maybe a development too that we have to keep an eye on.
I'm also seriously concerned about recent developments around the Bashir arrest warrant. African states were keen supporters of the Court in the early years. Now, they seem to be turning against the Court. This is not a good development. At the same time, the United States is warming up to the Court. Personally, I like the court better when it had the support of African States and was disliked by the US. I prefer that to a Court that the US likes but that African States are uncomfortable with.
But you know, if one looked at the last 15 years or so, that is, the point when what we might call the international justice accountability movement began in earnest, it now shows no signs of stopping. It reflects some kind of idea in the human rights movement and a thirst that people have in countries around the world to see that the perpetrators of serious human rights violations are brought to justice in one form or another. That field generally continues to grow. I would assume that the ICC is in a way the centerpiece of this, and the movement that surrounds the ICC keeps growing in so many other ways, that even if the ICC would falter a little bit, the movement would keep pulling the Court along with it. I would bet my money on the ICC being a much more significant and meaningful and relevant institution ten years from now than it is at present. But I'm prepared to acknowledge the caveat, because it focuses our mind to accept the danger that the Court could fail. We shouldn't be overconfident; we have to keep addressing the shortcomings and the problems.
Interview conducted by Zachary Manfredi and Julie Veroff.


--- In alochona@yahoogroups.com, Farida Majid <farida_majid@...> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> Dear Taj,
>
> Your note to Tarek is exasperatingly naïve, not to mention that it re-confirms a belief that I share with the writer Amitabh Ghose: subcontinentals do not understand racism.
>
> [Some years ago I was browsing through Amitabh's web site and came upon a dialogue he was having with Dipesh Chakraborty. At one point he recounted his reading about MLK, Jr and other black leaders of the Civil Rights movement while he was a student at JNU, New Delhi. But not until he arrived in the USA and lived there for a while did he realize how much he did not understand about racism.]
>
> You have also completely missed the point Tarek is trying to make in the context – the UN Conference on Racism –US and other Western nations' boycott -- the Ahmedinejad speech – the lady from Rwanda standing next to him, barred from speaking at the meeting because she is not 100% Tutsi, etc. Unlike you, I have been following the developing news about this conference in 2009 and its predecessor in Durban. Tune in, if you can, and hurry if you want to join the action. From my vantage point in the corner of Dhaka and the brewing ugly politics around me, I cannot press enough the importance and immediate relevance of highlighting Muslims killing Muslims as an instance of racism.
>
> Tarek deserves thanks for this timely speech from Bangladeshis as well as from Pakistanis who are in the throes of an ongoing Taliban nightmare.
>
> Taj, there is more to racism than skin-color difference. Even Tarek's speech has not made that very clear. I think one can almost say that pale-skinned people being superior is an afterthought, a convenient addendum to the cockamamie narratives spun for the purpose of legitimizing land and/or gold grabs. Racial inferiority is a handy invention whenever human exploitation is to be justified, as in slavery.
>
> If Aryan intruders in India were mere adventurers and engaged in trade with the natives, the Mahabharata would be a different epic without the Kurukshetra war and without the overarching racial dramas of Aryan/non-Aryan tensions. Columbus did not set sail to find a new trade route to rich India with a prior racial bias towards the people of India. William Dalrymple's recent studies show that racism was not a factor in the relationship between the European White Moghuls of 18th century and their Indian surroundings.
>
> The present day menace of Muslims killing Muslims must be understood in a much more comprehensive racial terms. Skin-color difference between West Pakistanis and East Pakistanis is only the visible aspect of the Bangladesh genocide of 1971. Tarek Fatah should note that the War of Liberation of Bangladesh is not over yet and the undefeated razakar Jamaatis are hell-bent on keeping the country destabilized. These people are fellow-Bengali Islamists ferociously committed to communalism of the "two nation theory" kind.
>
> I urge all scholars to engage in this enterprise because, for one thing, racism is not being re-interpreted, and the Muslim racists are using the old interpretations to advance their own imperialist agenda by mayhem and murder. Darfur genocide is a prime example. Afghanistan and Pakistan are others.
>
> I myself should get into the act but am disabled by circumstances beyond my control.
>
> With fond wishes and regards,
>
> Farida apa
>
>
>
>
>
> From: taj_hashmi@...
> To: farida_majid@...
> Subject: RE: From Bangladesh to Darfur: Racism leads to Genocide in the Muslim World
> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2009 20:48:06 -0400
>
>
>
> Dear Farida Apa:
>
> This is how I reacted to Tarek Fatah's article:
>
> Dear Tarek:
>
> I read your interesting piece on racism among Arab and Pakistani Muslims. I fully agree with you that many Arabs despise black Africans (and even South Asians), calling them Abd and Miskeen, respectively. However, I have slight disagreements with your assessment of the genocieds in Bangladesh and Darfur.
>
> The genocides in Bangladesh and Darfur had (has) absolutely nothing to do with racism -- it was all about the conflicts of hegemonies, power, and power. Many light-skinned Bengalis were killed by dark-skinned Pakistani soldiers.
>
> The case of Darfur is not that simple either -- it's NOT between Arab and non-Arab Sudanese. Darfurians are peasants and their "Arab" persecutors are nomadic "tribals". With the continuation of severe drought in the north for the last decade or so, northern nomads have been encroaching on Darfurians' fertile land in the south to graze their cattle, sheep, goats and camel. Darfurian resistance has led to the fighting -- killing and expropriation of southern Darfurians are parts of this conflict over the land, not that dissimilar from what happened (can happen again) in the Chittagong Hill Tracts between outsiders (Bengali settlers) and indigenous "tribals" in the sub-region. It's not a conflict between Muslim Bengalis and Buddhist Chakma, Mogh, Marma and others in CHT. It's not a racial or communal conflict at all.
>
> Southern Darfurians for the last fifty-odd years have been fighting for independence from Sudan. So, it's all about ethno-nationalist identities and freedom rather than a conflict between "light-skinned Arabs" and "dark-skinned" Darfurians. Both of them speak Arabic and the northern Darfurians have hardly any visible Arab / Semitic features, nor are they "light-skinned" either.
>
> Cheers.
>
> Taj
>
>
>
>
> From: farida_majid@...
> Subject: FW: From Bangladesh to Darfur: Racism leads to Genocide in the Muslim World
> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2009 17:42:28 -0400
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> To: From: tarekfatah@...: Wed, 22 Apr 2009 10:11:26 -0400
> Subject: From Bangladesh to Darfur: Racism leads to Genocide in the Muslim World
>
>
>
> Tuesday, April 21, 2009
>
> From Bangladesh to Darfur:
>
> How internalised racism has permitted lighter skinned
>
> Muslims to slaughter their darker skinned co-religionists.
>
> Speech by Tarek Fatah
>
> The Durban Review Conference
> Geneva, Switzerland
> http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=164051190246
>
> Dear NGO colleagues and delegates,
>
> I speak to you deeply disappointed that my colleague Milly Nsekalije, a survivor of the Rwandan massacre could not share her story with all of you because in the eyes of some since she is not 100% Tutsi, she cannot have been a victim of the Genocide.
>
>
>
> With Milly Nsekalije, a mixed-race survivor of the Rwadan Genocide, who was denied the right
> to speak by Tutsi activists as she was "not 100% pure Tutsi."
> What does it say about the state of racism in our world when the victims of a genocide practise exclusion on the basis of the so-called purity of blood lines and ethnicities.
>
> Worse than her exclusion from today's event is the fact that it has happened at a conference meant to combat racism, when it fact, in my opinion, whether it was yesterday's speech by Mahmood Ahmadenijad or this afternoon's barring off Ms. Nsekalije, we have turned the concept of racism upside down.
>
> Having said that, please allow me to dwell on how racism plays out its dirty game, not just as a Black-White divide, but also as a cancer that affects relations between people of colour, often sharing the same religion, but different shades of brown or black skin.
>
> When the issue of racism comes up, the internalised racism that devours the people of the developing world in Asia and Africa, from within, rarely comes up for discussion.
>
> This afternoon I would like to shed some light on two genocides—one in 1970-71 and the other that continues as I speak. In both instances the root of the problem lay in how one group of Muslims felt they were racially superior to their victims, who also happened to be Muslims. In both cases the doctrine of racial superiority and the practise of institutional racism went unchallenged even after the horrible consequences of such racism was evident and for all to see.
>
>
> Bangladesh
> The first genocide took place in then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh and second is taking place in Darfur. Let me dwell on the Bangladesh genocide first.
>
>
>
>
> In 1970 in Pakistan, my country of birth was divided between two wings; an eastern part that is today known as Bangladesh and the western rump that survived a subsequent war with India as the state we know as Pakistan.
>
> East Pakistan was inhabited by the darker skinned Bengali people who happened to be the majority community of the country, but found themselves ruled by a lighter skinned minority from what was known as West Pakistan—separated by a 1,000 miles.
>
> In the first 25 years of the country, the racist depiction of the darker skinned Bengalis as an inferior and incapable people became the unquestioned dogma among the ruling minority. In addition to the racist depiction of the darker-skinned Bengalis, their culture was portrayed as unislamic and being influenced by Hinduism. Their music, cuisine and attire were mocked while their language was banned and led to widespread protests and deaths in 1952.
>
> In 1970, after suffering under the minority rule of West Pakistan for 25 years, the people of East Pakistan voted to elect a party based in their region and gained a clear majority in the country's national parliament.
>
> However, the racist view that Bengali people were incapable of ruling the country or that they were traitors to the fair-skinned minority of West Pakistan, led to a military intervention and widespread massacres in which one million people were killed in a ten-month period.
>
> The killing of the Bengali people by the West Pakistan army stopped only when India intervened and defeated the Pakistan Armed forces, but not before hundreds of Bengali intellectuals, professors, poets, authors, musicians and painters, were rounded up and massacred in the final act of mass murder that started with the tolerance of racism as an act of faith.
>
> One million Muslims were murdered by fellow Muslims in an orgy of hate that defied the teachings of Islam and the very Prophet Muhammad who was being invoked by the Pakistan Army. At the root of this sad blot on Islamic history and all of humanity lay the view that people of darker skin are inferior to those for geographic reasons have for no fault of theirs, a lighter skin colour.
>
> One would have hoped that the lessons of 1970-71 would have been learnt in the Muslim World, but the sad fact is that the ubiquitous racism that resides inside the Islamic world has faced no opposition. On the contrary there is near universal denial about this cancer, not just among the governments that rule with oppressive instruments of power, but also many NGOs and civil society groups in the Muslim world.
>
>
> Darfur
> The latest manifestation of racism leading to a genocide is in Sudan where the Arab Janjaweed militia and the Arab government in Khartoum has resulted in the killing of 500,000 Darfuri Muslims whose only fault is that they are Black and thus considered as inferior to the ruling classes of that country.
>
>
>
>
> The mistreatment of Black Muslims by those who feel they are superior because of their lighter skin colour has been historical. Only in the Middle East can one get away by addressing a Black man as "Ya Abdi", which translates to the horrible words, "Oh you slave".
>
> The acceptance of racism among the dominant community in the Arab world has today resulted in not just the genocide of Darfuris, but also the celebration by the Arab League of the man charged by the International Criminal Court, President Bashir of Sudan.
>
> It is time that the medieval doctrine of the inferiority of non-Arab Muslims to Arab Muslims is laid to rest. It is necessary that Arab countries and leaders of Arab NGOs denounce this doctrine that has led to the discrimination of darker skinned Muslims by Arab governments in counties as far apart as Dubai to Darfur.
>
> Behind the genocide of Bengal and Darfur, separated by 30 years, is the unchallenged doctrine of racial superiority of one ethnic group over another that has gone unnoticed and unpunished by any institution anywhere in the world.
>
> This doctrine of racism has brought untold misery on the victims of this cancer, but this becomes worse when such racism is given a religious validation. In this day and age, we have fatwas from contemporary Islamic scholars who maintain that a non-Arab Muslim like me would be committing an act of sin if I considered myself equal to an Arab.
>
> Fatwas from the 14th century have been dusted off the shelves, re-furbished and published on on-line Islamist forums to justify the superiority of one group over the other. This has provided the moral justification to the mass murder being committed on the Black Muslims of Darfur, which unfortunately, has gone unmentioned even at this conference.
>
>
> Conclusion
> Let me conclude by suggesting that if racism is a mountain that we all need to conquer, then we have not yet come to a place where we can see this mountain in the horizon, let alone be at base camp.
>
> Ladies and gentlemen, sisters and brothers, if we cannot allow a woman to speak here because she is of mixed blood or the fact that untouchability in India is not on the agenda in Geneva, or that nations of the OIC seek the right to restrict free speech, or a demagogue from Iran with blood on his hands has the audacity to lecture us on human rights, then all I can say is that in the words of Robert Frost, we have miles to go before we sleep…
>
>
>
> Rediscover Hotmail®: Get quick friend updates right in your inbox. Check it out.
>
>
> Windows Live Messenger makes it easier to stay in touch – learn how!
> _________________________________________________________________
> Windows Live™ Hotmail®:…more than just e-mail.
> http://windowslive.com/online/hotmail?ocid=TXT_TAGLM_WL_HM_more_042009
>


------------------------------------

[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.comYahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/alochona/

<*> Your email settings:
Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/alochona/join
(Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
mailto:alochona-digest@yahoogroups.com
mailto:alochona-fullfeatured@yahoogroups.com

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
alochona-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/