BDR Mutiny: To assault or not? Options differ on the merit of an army assault on the Pilkhana mutineers on February 25. The anti-interventionists argue that attacking the armed rebels would have caused considerable casualties amongst the combatants and civilians inside and outside Pilkhana, property damage, riflemen outside Dhaka to mutiny in sympathy, and blood feud between the army and the Bangladesh Rifles. First, on the number of armed mutineers. Although about 5,000 riflemen were present, about 450 or less than 10 per cent appear to have been involved and only about a 100 or so hardcore types active in killing, molesting and looting (newspaper reports). Second, BDR equipment is basically hand-me-down and discarded army issue. Apart from rifles, the BDR had machine guns and recoilless rifles. These are offensive and defensive weapons. The three-inch mortars are not much use in defence. Since rebellion is a capital crime, it is interesting that the mutineers did not establish defensive positions in anticipation of an assault, a standard response. Did they get a hint that this was not on the cards? Contrast this with the response to the BDR mutiny on February 16, 1972 when Bangabandhu used S force to crush the mutiny after talks failed. In contrast to the anti-authoritarian and/or anti-colonial rationale of mutinies such as the PRC's Yanchang Uprising 1927 and Vietnam's Yen Bai 1930, the BDR mutiny lacked any overarching political or social themes but focused on pecuniary benefits. The riflemen's demands lacked purity and a just cause. Their will to fight and die for their beliefs was absent. This explains why desertions started after the first cowardly killings began about 10:00am or so. Most riflemen wanted benefits, not involvement in murder. When could the assault have taken place? One answer: almost at the mutiny's outset. This is based on ex-RAB intelligence chief late Colonel Gulzar Ahmed's request at 9:30am on February 25 to his RAB colleagues to send two platoons (sixty men) as the killers '…don't seem to be organised' (newspaper reports March 16). As an anti-terrorism veteran, his evaluation can't be ignored. While assault preparations were ongoing, security forces could and should have quarantined Pilkhana, signalling to the mutineers that they were surrounded, escape impossible and they had better negotiate or face the consequences. Instead TV crews interviewed the mutineers. The authorities sent an odd assortment of intermediaries untrained in mutiny and hostage negotiations to parley. We don't know what they talked but did the authorities' uncoordinated actions embolden the mutineers to believe that officialdom was 'weak' and public sentiment not entirely against them? As to the actual assault, this could have been made by troops from 46 Brigade and Air Defence Unit, located near the Dhaka cantonment, between 11:00am and 12:00 noon, judged by what the army high command told the prime minister (newspaper reports). The probability of success of an assault was high, with casualties being in the 'acceptable' rather than 'unacceptable' range. This assessment stems from the mutineers' poor motivation, unwillingness to die, inferior arms and lack of defensive preparations. These same factors would have prevented riflemen outside Dhaka from rebelling. Even if they had, their scattered location would have meant limited local impact that nearby army units could have contained easily. There was never any indication that the army would not obey orders. So the chance of sustained fighting or cooperation between the two sets of jawans was remote. Given what we now know, it's unlikely that the officers' lives could have been saved since most of the killings were over by noon. The question then is whether the assault preparations would have hastened the killings or pre-empted them. There is no easy answer. But quelling a mutiny inherently involves risks and uncertainty. But good planning and execution would have minimised but not eliminated them, e.g. Entebbe 1976. Pilkhana's defences comprise nothing more substantial than a high wall. The Pakistanis on March 25, 1971 using jeep-mounted 106 mm recoilless rifles easily breached it with few civilian deaths. The assault debate is a legitimate one. Equally legitimate is one about the process and quality of official decision making to tackle the mutiny. Was it proper for top officials to parley with the mutineers, announce amnesty and give indirect assurances about meeting their demands? This chain of events, contrary to conventional practice in dealing with mutiny and hostages, gives the impression rightly or wrongly that the authorities were more concerned with the mutineers' grievances than the hostages' fate. The combination of mutiny, massacre and quality of response has hurt national security. Repairing it will be hard. The reports of the Anis and army committees hopefully will be a first step in healing. http://www.newagebd.com/2009/mar/24/oped.html#1 |
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