--- On Thu, 5/28/09, alaldulal@aol.com <alaldulal@aol.com> wrote:
"Thanks to Dr. Habib Siddiqui for his kind appreciation of my humble contribution in our liberation war in 1971.
I had no intension of dwelling on the Zia controversy any further, and would prefer to leave it to the future writers/historians.
However, one item caught my attention. Dr. Siddiqui mentioned 'Major Zia (incidently, he was promoted to Lt Col during the war and a full Colonel immediately after the war) was reluctant to accept his wife after the war had ended'. It is news to me. Never heard it before. What I learnt that after Zia revolted in Chittagong his wife, with two infant children, was hiding from place to place in Dhaka. She was finally arrested, on a tip, from one of her relatives house and kept under military custody in Dhaka. She was not alone in that situation. Begum Mujib and her family were also under military custody in those days, though they were allowed to stay at their Dhanmondi residence. Khaleda had no residence of her own. We also knew Hasina conceived Joy during that period.
Sheikh Mujib was a great leader and may have played a role in Zia's personal matter. But, I thought Mujib had little love left for Zia who had the 'audacity' to declare independence, even though on Sheikh Mujib's behalf, an honor only reserved for h im. As a result, Zia was superseded by his junior Safiullah. But Zia was a bigger name and more popular than other war heroes, and could not be sidelined for long without any valid reason. So he was brought to Dhaka from Comilla and the post of Deputy Army Chief was especially created to accommodate him. Zia and Safiullah were, however, promoted to Col, Brig and Maj Gen together.
I had a personal association with Zia, both during and after the war. It is, therefore, natural for me to have a weakness for the man. I believe I am not alone; and others may have other reasons to remember and respect him.
My knowledge is limited and I am not much of a reader either. Yet, I had time to read "Witness to Surrender" by Siddiq Salek, "Amar Phasi Chai" by Matiur Rahman Rentu, and a few others to learn more about our war and politics from different perspective.
Finally, I would like to invite Dr. Siddiqui to an article, a comment, by our common friend Shamsher M Chowdhury on the book by Ambassador William Milam. It was published in the New Age on 5/26/09. It is given below."
Sincerely,
AOC
Candid viewpoints
by Shamsher M Chowdhury New Age 26/5/09 Bangladesh and Pakistan:Flirting with Failure in South Asia by William B Milam
AMBASSADOR William B Milam or Bill Milam as he is popularly called, takes us on a journey in his book through the political evolution in Bangladesh and Pakistan in the period following their break-up as one country and the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971. Having served as the ambassador of the United States to both these countries, it would be fair to assume that Ambassador Milam would have had a ringside view to follow developments closely enough to reach the conclusions that he has in his book.
In the words of the author, the book is interspersed with several motifs. Religion is one, and understandably so since it was religion that was the basis for partitioning India after the British Raj ended in 1947. As a corollary to that, culture has been cited as the second motif and history is the third. A recurring motif is the relations of both of these countries with their giant neighbour India. A common element is the role of the military in the political developments in both of the countries.
In the case of Bangladesh, Milam believed that with the reintroduction of democratic political civilian-led government in early 1990s, the military had retreated to the barracks for good. He was less sure about that in the case of Pakistan. This was the main conclusion when the book was ready for print in early 2007. But events in Bangladesh in January 2007 forced him to change all that and the book needed rewording before it was finally published in 2009.
In the 'Introduction' chapter, Milam blames the 'poisonous, zero-sum' political culture of the major political forces in Bangladesh for creating the opportunity for a return of the military in January 2007, al beit, this time behind a civilian façade. In chapter 6 he details how this zero-sum game was played out in the fifteen-plus years of civil political rule since 1991, resulting in a violent and confrontational political culture where the only real losers were the very voters who had entrusted these very politicians with their fate.
In writing for the Pakistani English daily 'Daily Times' on January 24, 2007, Ambassador Milam wondered whether the intervention in Bangladesh on January 11, 2007 would lead the country back from the brink or plunge it in the drink.
As we now see with hindsight, the solution, especially the introduction of a state of emergency and its gross misuse, only served to destroy the very political fabric of the country. Most commentators give the interim government a mixed scorecard. All agree it was powerless. The infamous, and abortive, 'minus-two' formula and the highly politicised anti-corruption drive were its two most stark failures, not to mention the gross use of physical and mental torture on people under custody in violation of international conventions to which Bangladesh is signatory. They even made 'reform' sound like a dirty word, almost synonymous with collaborating with the enemy. In an attempt to 'cleanse' the society of corrupt government and political officials, this government launched the much touted 'Truth and Accountability Commission' (referred to in the book). As events subsequently prove, this was not just a cruel joke; it was a corrupt concept that ran counter to the very fundamental of the country's constitution that all citizens are equal in the eyes of the law. Worse, it was an exercise in deception.
In the epilogue, Ambassador Milam characterises the publishing of a voter list with photos and the issuances of a national identity card as a remarkable achievement of the interim government. On the election day in December 2008, there appeared, inexplicably, a second voter's list, without photos whose authenticity is yet to be measured. As regards the national identity cards, fake and counterfeit ones are now increasingly available in the market!
Milam talks at length, and presents his assessments, of personalities whose very names define the=2 0political landscape of Bangladesh even long after their violent departure from the scene – Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Ziaur Rahman. Chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated to that, although Pakistan's Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto is mentioned in details in chapter 2, but only in the context of Pakistan.
In the opening narration of chapter 2, Milam describes Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto as 'flawed leaders' with limited intellect or ability to '…anticipate possible future events'… and they failed to 'build upon promising democratic beginnings.' He says that they both assumed leadership in a 'burst of expectation and optimism but were unable to cash in on the strong mandate they had to nurture and establish viable democracies.' He calls both of them 'historical failures because there own flaws were important contributing factors to the demise of democracy on their watch' in their respective countries.
Talking about the beginning of Bangladesh's journey as an independent state following its victory in 1971, Milam mentions the inherent positives the country possessed: a surfeit of good feeling and enthusiasm and a sense of euphoria that helped the early developments like writing a constitution in a 'remarkably short timeframe'. Despite the negatives like abject poverty and illiteracy, not to mention the wanton damage caused by the occupying Pakistani army during the period of the liberation war, Bangladesh, in the words of Milam, 'was relatively fertile soil for democracy' that bestowed on Bangladesh a more advantageous beginning than many newly independent, developing countries. But then he talks of the 'surfeit of corruption, venality, self-aggrandizement…' that quickly engulfed the country, exacerbated by the new government's mismanagement of the economic recovery and 'overt favoritism towards its own partisans.' The author, then, says in the concluding paragraph on page 30: 'The civilian regime took office with overwhelming support, but its hold on the loyalties of most Bangladeshis was dissipated after three years to a point that undemocratic alternatives became attractive as early as 1975.'
Ambassador Milam characterises Sheikh Mujib's period of governance as one from 'Euphoria to Neuralgia'. Mujib is described as the undisputed leader of a new Bangladesh, who was faced with the daunting task of rebuilding a country shattered by the civil war, with a dysfunctional economy and crippled transportation system, severe law and order problems and a population displaced far and wide. As mentioned earlier, the author credits, rightly, the government of the day with framing a liberal, democratic constitution with an independent judiciary for the new country within a short time. But, as mentioned in the book, with increasing political and economic pressure, adherence to liberal constitutionalism and judicial independence broke down by the end of 1974.
In page 34, the author writes about Mujib sinking into 'a bog of corruption and ineptitude'. He describes Mujib as a good example of charismatic leaders of independent movements who do not always possess the organisational skills or intellectual flexibility to lead successfully the country their charisma had brought about. The subsequent paragraphs goes into details how this charismatic leader seemed to be 'woefully short' of the essential mental agility needed to mould the new country into a viable nation. Milam is particularly critical of the socialistic economic policy pursued by the Awami League government under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Large-scale nationalisation of both the manufacturing sector, especially the jute industry, and the service sector, banks and insurance was severely damaging.
The author calls the parliamentary elections of March 1973 as the 'beginning of the end' for Mujib. Till then Sheikh Mujib and his party still enjoyed relative popularity but the accumulating problems had reduced its appeal. Hence the Awami League leaders 'couldn't resist padding the result by blatantly and unnecessarily rigging the polls.' In the words of the author, this exacerbated what had already become 'widespread and growing popular discontent with Mujib and the League.' Things indeed got worse by the reign of terror launched by the much-despised Jatiya Rakhi Bahini.
In the following paragraphs Milam writes how this sense of discontentment continued to grow into widening disillusionment. With the introduction of the one-party governance system (BAKSAL) by amending the constitution to a presidential one and thereby giving Sheikh Mujib more personal power, 'as if lack of power were at the root of his problems, rather than bad policies combined with overt corruption and incompetence (page 37)… Bangladesh had been transformed from a democracy into a personal dictatorship by the man who led its independence movement (page 38).'
Milam completes his narrative on this charismatic leader by briefly describing the events of his violent and brutal death, and that of most of his family members, in the early morning of August 15, 1975. He says 'popular esteem for Mujib had fallen so low by then that few lamented this brutal act, but its legacy continues to haunt Bangladeshi politics.'
Chapter 3 of the book is exclusively about Ziaur Rahman and his governance from 1975 to his 'untimely' death in 1981; he calls this period 'A short lived but fecund era' and he calls Zia's politics as one of 'hope and transition'. The word fecund has been used here to mean 'very productive, or creative intellectually'.
Talking of how Ziaur Rahman was thrust into the leadership in Bangladesh following the chaotic period caused by military attempts to govern following Sheikh Mujib's assassination in 1975, Milam states one of Zia's early acts after he became chief martial law administrator was to rescind Mujib's one-party system. As Zia slowly but surely consolidated his power and 'enhanced his already wide spread popularity', he set about travelling all over the country mingling with the common people in a 'new and unprecedented form of politicking' spreading 'offer of hope for a better future.'
Like other military rulers in South Asia, and elsewhere, before and after him, Zia 'developed political ambitions and much of Bangladesh supported those aspirations as the first ray of optimism in their hard-scrabble lives.' Milam describes Ziaur Rahman becoming president in April 1977 as 'a reflection of his immense popularity with the public.'
Milam talks at some length on 'Zia's fledging democracy' and says President Zia's economic and social programmes 'laid the basis of a far-reaching social revolution' which continued to build momentum, and no government, no matter how autocratic, 'could have halted this revolution….' The economy was progressing and social development was approaching 'take off'.
In page 61, Bill Milam talks of Zia's killing and says the hope for democracy dies with him.' However, Milam is critical of Zia's inability as president to strengthen institutions that underpin a democratic system and he set in motion some trends that undermine it like 'acquiescence to corruption as a way to buy off potential enemies…' and he had not 'set up a mechanism for the automatic and peaceful transfer of power.'
In the closing parts of his narratives on this 'extraordinarily popular' man, Ambassador Milam tries to fathom the 'Enigma of Ziaur Rahman'. On the one hand he was a military leader, a national hero (he was the first to announce the formation of provisional government of Bangladesh from a radio station in Chittagong in March 1971, page 35), and yet one 'who returned his country to civilian rule and to civilian dominated two-party electoral democracy' and 'whether that was by design or default shall never be known.' One thing seemed clear to the author that Zia was 'a pragmatic nationalist' and that was his main – maybe his only – principle. He used democratic processes to wield political power but doubts he believed in them. He used corruption to ensure loyalty but was incorruptible himself. He also discarded some of the impo rtant principles for which he had fought a bloody war of separation from Pakistan, to which Zia's response was a typical combination of pragmatism and political vision – a desire 'to unite and integrate the entire population of Bangladesh into a national identity (page 67).' The iconic Nelson Mandela once said, it's not always about principles, it's how you use your position to face the bigger national challenge (my quote, as paraphrased).
Milam describes Zia's political legacy as a mixed one. Among his most positive bequests to the nation was the reintroduction of the multiparty political system that had 'withered under Mujib …. And Zia restored stability to Bangladesh when it appeared to be on the path towards catastrophic and chaotic failure… More than stability, he seems to have brought hope back to a beleaguered population, as disillusioned as it was by the near anarchy that obtained in the final months of Mujib's democratic experiment.' But his political legacy involved an authoritarian system of almost personal rule. While this might be justified because of 'his success in bringing the country back from the brink', it was liable to misuse by less scrupulous politicians. Milam describes Zia as also being honest and trustworthy. He says, 'Zia laid the basis for durable and robust democracy that must develop if Bangladesh is to continue its progress as a leader in social development among both the Third World and the Muslim world.'
A telling tribute to Ziaur Rahman comes in page 69 of the book: 'It's hard to imagine what would have happened to Bangladesh had Ziaur Rahman been assassinated in 1975 instead of 1981. A failed state on the model of Afghanistan or Liberia might well have resulted. Zia saved Bangladesh from that fate.'
Chapter 6 lists the destructive and destabilising nature of confrontational politics practiced by the two major political parties when they alternated in government and in opposition between 1991 and 2006. Governance worsened with each successive government and corruption and sycophancy gripped almost every organ of the state. They both failed to live up to the people's expectations.
But Bangladesh had a democracy to talk about and it was in transition. Besides, the social and economic indices were much b etter than countries in similar positions. There was very tangible success in the area of Primary and Secondary education and gender parity was achieved at the secondary level. Employment opportunities for women had overtaken even some developed countries.
In the context of Bangladeshi political leaders, Bill Milam in his book has implied that power, or more power, does not always help one to succeed in governing: people give you that power anyway when they repose their trust and faith in you. It's how you reward that trust with conviction and through your efforts to reach out to them, to touch them and respond to their ethos that makes the difference between success and failure.
Politicians and political leaders, present and of the future, of all hue and political observers would be well advised to read, and more importantly study, Ambassador Bill Milam's book. It's instructive and yet not prescriptive. Importantly, it is candid.
Shamsher M Chowdhury, Bir Bikra m, is a decorated freedom fighter and former foreign secretary and ambassador/high commissioner of Bangladesh to Sri Lanka, Germany, Vietnam and the United States.
-----Original Message----- From: Isha Khan <bd_mailer@yahoo.com> To: Dhaka Mails <dhakamails@yahoogroups.com> Sent: Thu, 28 May 2009 7:32 pm Subject: Fw: Re: Zia That I Knew: A Flashback
--- On Wed, 5/27/09, saeva@aol.com <saeva@aol.com> wrote:
Thanks to Mr. Chowdhury for his clarifying remarks that the write-up was his own as an ex-Army officer and was based on his own recollection of those days as he saw Maj. Zia. I assumed that he had merely posted the piece from an ex-officer while protecting the identity of the author. I was mistaken. My salutation to him for being a freedom fighter. Without the sacrifice of people like him, we probably won't have seen the independence of Bangladesh. May Allah reward him.
As far as20Major Rafiq is concerned, when he wrote the book "A Tale of Millions", he was not affiliated with any political party. So, I would like to believe that his original version was a non-partisan account. If the book has since gone through revisions on the content, it is possible that changes, if any, may reflect his partisanship of the time. And that would be unfortunate.
No one should contradict the fact that Maj. Ziaur Rahman had read a statement from Chittagong Radio in late March that said that he had declared independence on behalf of Sk. Mujib. I heard it myself along with many residents of Chittagong. I strongly doubt Capt. Oli's version that he or Lt. Shamsher M. Chowdhury had drafted the statement. As I maintain, many of us living in the Nasirabad-Sholoshahar area also saw a print copy of Sk. Mujib's declaration of independence the day after March 25 military crackdown in Dhaka. Why should Sk. Mujib challenge Zia on the matter of declaration from K alurghat station when it was a fact and not rumor? Was not he the same person who had promoted Zia to become the Deputy Army Chief? Nor should we forget here that Major Zia was reluctant to accept his wife after the war had ended, but it was Sk. Mujib who as a fatherly figure convinced him to do so. It is irony of fate that Mrs. Zia would later celebrate her fake birthday on the day Mujib was murdered. She has been accused of trying to distort history. Politics truly brings the worst in our people.
As to20the murder of some 1200 Bengali recruits on the night of March 25 by the Pakistan Army, neither Col. M.R. Chowdhury nor Maj. Zia can escape from being held partially responsible. They failed to warn their rank and file in advance. Unlike Maj. Rafiq, they had full trust in "brotherly love" of Pakistani folks for which blunder many innocent Bangladeshi soldiers were slaughtered.
Best regards,
Habib Siddiqui
-----Original Message----- From: Isha Khan < bd_mailer@yahoo.com> To: Isha Khan < bd_mailer@yahoo.com> Sent: Wed, 27 May 2009 10:38 pm Subject: Re: Fw: Re: Zia That I Knew: A Flashback |
This is in response to the comments by Dr. Siddiqui. Below is the response from the writer:
"I am glad that Dr. Siddiqui took time to read my write-up and offer his comments. I appreciate it. We have the right to our own views, and I did not attempt to impose my views on anyone. I wrote the facts that I was part of, and those that I learnt from friends. Most officers I named in the article are still alive and can verify.
I fully agree with Dr. Siddiqui that 'in our love for anyone, we need not rewrite history to undeservingly give credit to someone when it is not due.' I could say the same thing to him.
Major Rafique could not be immune to partisan feelings and perceptions, knowing his current political identity. I read his book 'Lokkho Praner Binimoye' when it was published long time ago. The English version and its later editions have lot of changes and additions. About 2 months ago in a TV talk show, Rafique gave his version of the independence declaration, implying (if I am not wrong) he was instrumental in making the declaration from a make shift wireless network with the help one Mr. Khandakar. He also mentioned of a declaration received from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman through some source. He totally underplayed, rather ignored for understandable reasons, the role of Ziaur Rahman and the declaration he made at Kalurghat. When questioned by the host about a report that a declaration (perhaps obtained by ASM Abdur Rob on the night of December 25, 1971) from Sheikh Mujib was sent to the BDR network at Pilkhana, Major Rafique was vague.
Major Rafique wrote his side of the story about Chittagong in 1971. I was not part of that. Whatever I wrote was related to me by friends and from reading other accounts. I do not claim to be 100% correct.
There was nothing for Zia to contradict Rafique's account. M R Chowdhury and Zia advised Rafique not to preempt any action that might tantamount to mutiny at a time when Sheikh Mujib was still negotiating with the Pakistanis (if you recall, until December 24, 1971). In this context, I may point out that Sheikh Mujib himself never contradicted Zia's declaration of independence either.
From Dr. Siddiue's comments it also appeared that M R Chowdhury and Zia were mostly responsible for the Chittagong massacre. I can only say that any person with some military knowledge would recognize that the operation Search Light of the Pakistanis was a much bigger game plan than individual actions by Zia or Rafique, and the subsequent events testified that.
Finally, my anonymity does not make my account fake. The military officials and others that I named, as well as Bangladesh military records, can easily find out who I am. The issue is not who I am, it is what I said."
Thanks and sincerely,
AOC
--- On Tue, 5/26/09, Isha Khan <bd_mailer@yahoo.com> wrote:
From: Isha Khan <bd_mailer@yahoo.com>
Subject: Fw: Re: Zia That I Knew: A Flashback
To: "Dhaka Mails" <dhakamails@yahoogroups.com>
Date: Tuesday, May 26, 2009, 7:10 PM
--- On Tue, 5/26/09, saeva@aol.com <saeva@aol.com> wrote:
From the link in NFB: http://www. newsfrombangladesh.net/view.php?hidRecord=265512, it is obvious that Mr. A.O. Chowdhury is not the person whose account on Zia we are reading, but that he is simply relaying information from an admirer of Ziaur Rahman (see, e.g., the statement: "Retrospect - This is a story related to me by a friend, who preferred to remain anonymous"). This kind of posting is problematic in the sense that it does not allow the reader to know who actually is the author, and therefore, whether or not, one can trust him. If the author is serious, he ought to disclose his identity and let people judge the credibility of his story. To me, the write-up appears to come from a blind supporter of the BNP who wants to salvage Zia's image on some controvesial issues.
The writer's account of the 1971 Pakistani crackdown in Chittagong is somewhat difficult to believe and is at variance with the accounts provided by Major Rafiq in his "The Tale of the Millions". How did the 8th Bengal revolt and under whose leadership on the night of March 25? What happened to Zia's own family members, including wife? Note that 8th Bengal's no. 2,=2 0Maj. Zia, himself was on his way to the port for unloading arms for the Pakistan Army. Before that night, Maj. Rafiq says that both Zia and M.R. Chowdhury were opposed to take arms against the Pakistani soldiers. In his lifetime, Zia never challenged Rafiq's version of20history. As a prize for their trust with the Pakistan Army, Col. M.R. Chowdhury was the first senior officer of Bangladeshi origin who was killed by the Pakistani forces in Chittagong on the night of March 25. Not only that some 1200 Bengali new recruits were killed in Sholoshahar, only a couple of miles from my home. If either of them had a little doubt about their "trusting" Pakistani brethren many observers and analysts believe that most of those lives would have been saved.
The report below also seems to be a revisionist attempt in doctoring history. It says, "Here on March 27, 1971, Zia made his famous declaration of independence at the Kalurghat Radio Station. According to Oli, he was instrumental in the making of the declaration. He even claimed to have made Zia. Shamsher told me that he drafted the final version of the declaration. So much for the controversy over the declaration of independence made by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on the night of March 25, 1971." I remember very well seeing a copy of Sk. Mujib's telegraph material on the evening of March 26. I have no clue who wrote that piece, how it was sent and to whom . It had Sk. Mujib's NAME printed at the bottom, giving the impression that it was sent on hi s behest. Thus this material which was later to be called the declaration of independence by Sk. Mujib was seen by me and many others in Chittagong at least 24 hours before I heard Zia's short speech in broken Bengali over the radio. If the declaration was written by Shamsher M. Chowdhury, it is news to us. I don't recall the ex-U.S. Ambassador claiming such.
Only two doors next to our home "Prantik" on Zakir Hossain Road lived Bangladeshi Capt. Moslemuddin and Punjabi Capt. Rizvi. If I am not mistaken Moslem was with the Signal corps and had shown the copy to elders in our locality.. After Chittagong fell to the Pakistan Army he fled from his home (and probably joined the retreating Bangladeshi forces like Zia and many others that survived). I have, therefore, serious doubt about Oli's version and find the report below to be a sly attempt to distort history.
This statement of mine should not be interpreted as belittling Zia's, Shamsher's and Oli's contribution during our liberation war. What I am cautioning against is that in our love for anyone, we need not rewrite history to undeservingly give credit to someone when it is not due. When we do that we only soil their image. Unfortunately, in a highly partisan atmosphere of ours, I see many such blind supporters who are doing disservice to our nation.
Intellectuals within our community have to rise above petty, narrow20partisanship (above idol worship of their iconic figures) to be taken seriously.
Regards,
Habib Siddiqui
-----Original Message----- From: bd_mailer@yahoo.com To: Dhaka Mails < dhakamails@yahoogroups.com> Sent: Tue, 26 May 2009 11:13 am Abu Obaid Chowdhury New York, USA
Following my defection from Pakistan Army in 1971 and after being cleared by the In dian and Mujibna gar authorities, I was posted to 'Z Force' of Lt Col Ziaur Rahman in the eastern theater of Bangladesh liberation war. The nearly 20-day journey took me from Lahore to Khemkaran to Ferozepur to Delhi to Kolkata to Agartala and finally to Masimpur, the 4 sector headquarters of Lt Col C R Dutta (later Major General).
As I reached my temporary accommodation, I heard a familiar voice next room. He was talking to Col Dutta. I went to check and found a gentleman in uniform, somewhat tired, half lying on the bamboo made platform, used as bed. It was dark and I could not see the face clearly. I wished him and introduced myself. He sat down and said, "So you are the Captain who came to raise my artillery unit. Sit down." I still could not make out who the person was, though looked familiar. 2/Lt Sajjad Ali Zahir (later Lt Col), another defectee from West Pakistan and posted to my unit, joined me at Agartala. He followed me to the room. As I introduced Sajjad to the man, almost instantly the name flashed across my mind. "He is Col Ziaur Rahman", I said to Sajjad. Earlier, then Major Ziaur Rahman was an instructor in th e military academy20when I was a cadet and his solid, deep voice was well known to me.On his query, I had to tell Col Zia my defection story—how I crossed the Lahore-Khemkaran border in a military jeep, how I sur vived after falling with the jeep in the Kasur River, who I reported to at India's Rajoke cantonment etc. He seemed to know the route and area pretty well. Somewhat surprised, I asked how he knew the names of those villages, tracks, BRB canal, barriers etc. "I was fighting the Indians there in 1965 with 1 E Bengal Regiment", Zia said. After dinner, Zia left for his headquarters at Kailashahar. Before leaving he told me to take stock of my unit at Kukital and report to him in a day or two to find out what I needed to make the unit battle worthy within the shortest possible time. Capt Oli Ahmed (later Col and BNP Minister) and my Sialkot time friend Capt M A Halim (later Maj Gen), Brigade Major and Quartermaster respectively at Z Force, were very helpful in providing me with the material support I needed. Whole Bangladesh is Firing Range About two weeks later, Col M A G Osmani (later General and Minister), C-in-C of the Mukti Bahini, was visiting the area. Zia brought him to my camp with a view to showing the readiness of my guns for operation. I arranged a mock gun firing drill for the visiting team. Lt (later Capt and late) Sheikh Kamal, ADC to the C-in-C, told me afterwards, "Sir, the C -in-C was very impressed with the exercise. I heard him saying so to Col Zia." Of course, Osmani himself appreciated the preparedness and congratulated those who participated in the drill. At the luncheon at my camp, I asked him if I could conduct a practice firing before going to the real one, for which I needed a firing range. "The whole Bangladesh is your firing range, my boy", said Osmani, "go ahead..." He gave me a blank check. After a day or two, while returning from forward positions, I noticed a large convoy of vehicles carrying soldiers passing by. Initially I thought they were Indians, but with a closer look I recognized they were our Mukti Bahini soldiers. In those days, we had the same OG (olive green) uniform worn by the Indian army in that area. After a while, I found Col Zia coming in a jeep. He stopped when he saw me. I asked him what was all that. "That's my 1st Bengal", Zia brimmed with pride."W here are they goi ng?" I asked.He got off his jeep and asked me to follow him. We went up on a high ground from where we could oversee the convoy passing."They are going to Atgram, to take up positions in preparation for the attack on the Pakistanis" , Zia said as he was preparing to sit down. He briefly explained the plan for a 3-prong attack in north eastern Sylhet with his 1st, 3rd and 8th Bengal regiments.
"Am I not part of your brigade?" I asked, suppressing my disappointment.
"Of course you are", Zia asserted.
"Then why am I left out of this?" I demanded.
"Are you ready?" he asked me.
"Anytime", I replied. I cannot describe in words the expression of happiness and pride that I noticed in Zia's face at that moment. "Fine", he said, "you are going in support of 8th Bengal, possibly tonight. On my way, I will talk to Brigadier (I don't remember the name who was Zia's Indian support counterpart) to issue the ammunition and gun towers (trucks) to you on a priority basis. See me at headquarters later tonight. I will give you further details. < div> My excitement knew no bounds and was about to run away to arranged the details for the D-day I was waiting for. Fight the War Our Way "Wait, sit down", Col Zia stopped me, "there is time. Give me company while I see my unit clear away." As the convoy moved on, our discussion shifted to different directions. I told him how Pakistanis in the west had been conducting misleading propaganda about our war, our heroes and our future. In Pakistan, Zia and many others were already dead. I discovered a different Zia from the reclusive and serious one that most people knew. It looked like he wanted to open his mind. We talked about the war, the strategy, its conduct and the policy makers in Mujibnagar. He expressed his frustration at the style and pace the war was going. He didn't like too much dependence on India for the conduct of our war. "It is our war, we should fight it our way, not on someone else's convenience", he said. He did not hide his dislike for Col Osmani, the Mukti Bahini chief. "That man20with white moustache , Zia said referring to Osmani, "has no idea about the situation in the war fronts and the enemy.. Just passing orders off the map at someone else's dictation. I don't like it". I was a bit embarrassed that he would open up like that with a subordinate and junior officer. But I also knew Zia, for whatever reasons, developed a liking for me and could confide. Our association continued till I met the president last in September 1980. The sun was setting when we got up to leave. I told Col Zia that I could be late to reach his headquarters tonight because I had a number of errands to complete before I moved out. "Don't worry", Zia assured me, "I don't go to bed early". I later learnt that Zia usually worked till early hours of the morning in those days. He slept very little. I came to Zia's headquarters around 11 pm and found him working in his tent, dimly lighted by a lantern. Our meeting was brief. He showed me the deployment of208 Bengal Regiment20off the map and I was to place guns suitably to support its attacks and advances. He called his BM Capt Oli and DQ Capt Halim to provide me whatever I needed. My unit's first operation in Baralekha, Sylhet was a huge success. Next morning, an overjoyed Col Zia, accompanied by Capt Oli, visited my gun position. Greeting with a warm handshake, he told me, "You made history in our liberation war". He went round and shook hands and congratulated every man I had. Before Col Zia left, I told him that I would be going to the forward locations of 8 Bengal as FOO (Forward Observation Officer) soon. "Make sure the gun position is well taken care of. These guns are very precious for us", Zia advised.
"It is in good hand, sir", I assured him.
Sometime in 1973, then army deputy chief Maj Gen Ziaur Rahman was on a visit to Chittagong where I was a staff officer to Col (later Lt Gen and BNP Minister) Mir Shawkat Ali, the local commander. At a luncheon for Zia at the commander's Flag Staff House where Brigadier Khalilur Rahman (later Maj Gen, Defense Adviser to Khandakar Mushtaque and AL MP), just repatriated from Pakistan, was also present. Zia and Khal il were discussing20our liberation war. At one stage, Zia called me to tell the brigadier how I raised my artillery unit and how long it took me to train and make it ready for the war. "The whole thing took me less=2 0than 3 weeks", I said.
A skeptical brigadier asked, "If you are given the men and material, would you be able to accomplish the same now?"
"Definitely, sir; however, it may take a little longer time," I replied.
"Please bear in mind, sir", I added, "it was wartime, that too a liberation war. Our only mission was to fight and win. We used every minute of our time, day and night, to get ready. I had some excellent trained artillery men from former Pakistan army. They formed the core, the rest were ordinary soldiers, students and others.
You got to see their spirit to believe it, sir. The beauty was, the unit that went to operation on a Ramadan afternoon without prior practice firing, had its very first shell falling right on the target, a Pakistani concentration in Baralekha, Sylhet, readying for an attack on 8 Bengal positions. That unexpected (Pakistanis never knew before that Mukti Bahini had artillery power) and devastating artillery sh elling forced the20disarrayed enemy to start a process of retreat leading to a complete defeat in that area." I could see a proud Gen Zia enjoying our conversation standing nearby. He perhaps desired to highlight my contributions20in our liberation war to the one who missed that chance. The Revolt in Chittagong Once at Kailashahar, Capt Oli told me the story how 8 E Bengal revolted at Halishahar in Chittagong on the night of March 25, 1971. The facts were later corroborated by Major Shamsher M Chowdhury, a batch mate (later Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to the US), Brigadier Chowdhury Khaluquzzaman (later Ambassador), and Capt Mahfuzur Rahman (later Lt Col and hanged following the assassination of Zia). They were all serving in 8 Bengal at that time. Lt Col M R Chowdhury of East Bengal Recruits' Center (EBRC), Major Ziaur Rahman, Second-in-Command of 8 Bengal, Capt Rafiqul Islam (later Major and AL Minister) of East Pakistan Rifles and a few other officers had a number of secret coordinating meetings in Chittagong to cope with the situation if Pakistanis attacked the Bengalis. They sent messages to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to inform that Pakistanis were preparing to disarm and attack the Ben gali elements of the military and sought his advice and direction. They did not receive any. (Please see "A Tale of Millions" by Major Rafiqul Islam.) On the night of March 25, 1971, operation Search Light , designed to annihilate the Bengalis by Pakistan Army, started in the cantonments, including Chittagong. Shamsher confirmed that elements of 20 Baluch and 31 Punjab regiments were advancing towards Halishahar. 8 Bengal then decided to revolt and resist the Pakistanis. They arrested the Pakistani officers, including the Commanding Officer Lt Col Rashid Janjua (these officers were later killed) and wanted Ziaur Rahman to take command. At that moment, Zia was being taken, under naval escorts, to the Chittagong port, ostensibly to help unload the Chinese armaments from HMV Swat. According to other versions, Zia was actually on his way to his final journey! Khaliquzzaman rushed to get Zia and luckily found him waiting by the roadside while his escorts were clearing a barricade at Agrabad area. Khaliquzzaman whispered to Zia of the decision of 8 Bengal and then went to the navy Lt to say that Col Ansari, the new Punjabi Commandant at the EBRC, wanted Zia at Chittagong cantonment immediately. The Punjabi Lt did not suspect any foul play. Zia and Khaliquzzaman rushed to the unit and found a truncated unit ready for action. Half of the men deserted out of fear and confusion. Major Shawkat recently arrived from Quetta after completing staff college course and was temporarily appointed Adjutant of 8 Bengal.=2 0As he was new in the unit, other officers could not take him into confidence at first. Some young officers were not sure if Shawkat was a Bengali at all. Shawkat was at his quarter and knew nothing about all that was going in the unit at that moment. Upon arrival, Zia went to Shawkat and asked if he would join the revolt. Shawkat thought for a while and then decided to join the group. Though 8 Bengal readied itself to meet the attacking Pakistanis, they were outnumbered. Zia decided to fall back to Kalurghat and reorganize. They fought pitch battles and suffered heavy casualties in the process. Capt Harun Ahmed Chowdhury (later Maj Gen and Ambassador), Shamsher and others were mortally wounded and captured by the Pakistanis. Here on March 27, 1971, Zia made his famous declaration of independence at the Kalurghat Radio Station. According to Oli, he was instrumental in the making of the declaration... He even claimed to have made Zia. Shamsher told me that he drafted the final version of the declaration. So much for the cont roversy over the declaration of independence made by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on the night of March 25, 1971. Audacity to Distort Zia's Role Lately, a few AL ministers and parliamentarians started disputing Zia's participation in the war of liberation. Former minister Prof Abu Syed and one Dr. Mina Farah of New York, who chose to incinerate her Muslim son instead of burial, had the audacity to claim in recent talk shows that Zia was not a freedom fighter at all. I can only say that these persons need to get their brain checked. Special Mission In September 1980, I was sent to Dhaka on a special mission concerning military cooperation in one of the middle-eastern countries. My meetings with Minister Prof Shamsul Huq and Foreign Secretary SHMS Kibria were not positive. Army chief General H M Ershad and chief of the general staff Maj Gen Abdul Manaf were hesitant. I wanted to talk to the president. While I was waiting in the office of the Military Secretary to the President Col Sadequr Rahman Chowdhury in Bangabhaban, President Zia suddenly burst in and asked me, without any prelude, "What kind of proposal is it? How can we agree to this? We have no capability to unde rtake such a task. Besides , we can't afford to enter into a kind of rivalry with a superpower." I understood the president came straight from the meeting deliberating on the same issue. While coming to the Bangabhaban, I saw Ershad there. "Sir, give me a few minutes", I requested the president, "and I will explain the stake involved, how it can be made possible and what we stand to gain... There is no superpower rivalry, and I believe you were not given the correct picture by our foreign office." The president tried to defend the foreign office though. We sat down and I stated what I thought right. I also said something to the president in confidence which only I could dare say. I pointed out that peripheral and invisible resources (I even listed those resources) of our military would be more than enough to make an initial commitment. In return, we can seek financial assistance and resources to raise more units, modernize, equip and train our forces. It would be an ongoing process. That did the job! I could see a glow in the face of the president. "Please do not say 9 8NO', sir," I be gged the president, further adding, "for the first time, a rich friend requested Bangladesh for something". "Wait a moment=E 2, he told me and turned to the MSP, "Sadeq, get hold of Ershad, he was leaving. I need to talk to him again". The president went out of the room and I was hoping for the best. After half an hour, the president came back and told me, "Ok, you tell them, we accept the proposal in principle. But, we need to discuss further. We may have to send a team of experts to examine the details".
"Thank you, sir. But, it needs to be conveyed by our foreign office", I humbly submitted."I will talk to the foreign minister," the president said.
A little relaxed, I now had time to exchange usual pleasantries with the president. At one stage, he picked up a newspaper, I thought it was Holiday, from the desk of the MSP and proudly showed me a news item that said Bangladesh would export certain type of quality rice.
"How can we do that?" It was my time to be surprised now.
"We will do it, you will see", asserted a confident president .
I later learnt that the Foreign Office maintained its original position. I felt a huge overseas opportunity for our defense forces was sabotaged. (I am unable to detail the opportunity here). That was the last time I saw Shaheed President Ziaur Rahman. After his death, I went to Bangladesh on vacation. My wife and I visited a bereaved Begum Zia at her residence. Brigadier Mahtab (late), an old friend, was with me. Begum Zia talked very little, but acknowledged receipt of my condolence letter. In course of our discussion, she asked me, "What do you think should happen now and how the things should be run?" I could not figure out what she meant. Mahtab clarified that who I should think to take the leadership and carry forward ideals of Zia at that juncture. I was not prepared for such a question and had no idea what Begum Zia was trying to lead me to, least of all her political ambition. I just fumbled that if anybody could come close to the stature of Ziaur Rahman, I thought it would be General M A Manzur. Unfortunately, he was the man behind the assassination of the president. (At that time, we were made to believe it was Manzur who masterminded the bloody coup in Chittagong. Later, however, I had different view about Manzur's complicity.) I expressed my inability to name a successor to Zia. Years later, I said to myself in retrospect, "Stupid, the right answer should have been: you Madam." In a letter to General Ershad commending his efforts in quelling the Chittagong rebellion, I said, 'given the peoples' love and respect Shaheed President Zia received (reportedly 2 million people gathered around Dhaka airport when his coffin was brought in from Chittagong and attended his final Janaza), a Zia-like death is worth million times'. I also submitted that he had huge responsibilities for the stability in the military, as well as the nation. Ershad was kind enough to reply saying he was 'working' on some ideas and would seek our support. I later learnt what he was 'working' on. We Have Been Orphaned I went to the Bangabhaban again, this time to see Justice Abdus Sattar, the acting president. As I was waiting at the office of Col S R Chowdhury, the MSP related an experience. While on a visit to Zia's mazaar at one night, he found an old man crying by the grave. Sadeq went=2 0to share the feelings and console the man. He came all the way from Rangpur to pay his respect to the shaheed president. "'Badsha' Zia had walked through my front yard", the old man continued to cry, 8 0how can I forget that? We have been orphaned." During a courtesy call on Maj Gen Mohabbat Jan Chowdhury (later Minister of Ershad), Director General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), I asked how come his intelligence failed when such a tragedy took place in Chittagong? Gen Chowdhury said that they knew something was in the offing in Chittagong and warned the president accordingly, but the president did not take it seriously. They also reminded the president on more than one occasion that Gen Manzur was going out of control, often refused to follow orders and instructions from army headquarters and mostly did things his way. According to M J Chowdhury, the president never believed them; he would rather rebuke them (repatriated and non-freedom fighter officers) instead, saying that they were jealous of Manzur who was far more superior in intellect and competence. A footnote: The President's rehabilitation of the repatriated officers in high positions in the military enraged the young freedom fighter officers. The coup that killed the president was staged b y freedom fighter officers. During a discussion with Gen Manzur in his office in Chittagong in 1979, I discovered how bitter he was against the non-freedom fighters. At the same time, I knew Zia and Manzur enjoyed great cordiality, mutual con fidence and close relation. After the November 7, 1975 Sepoy-Janata Uprising, situation in the military was almost out of control and its discipline was at its lowest. Zia brought in Brig Manzur from New Delhi, where he was the military adviser, and appointed him the chief of the general staff. It was Manzur who brought back order in the military. Incorruptible Zia President Ziaur Rahman's austere and honest lifestyle was legendary. Even his worst enemy can not dispute that. Critics, however, blamed him for doing little against corrupt practices of some of his ministers and political leaders. In late 1972, I called on then Brigadier Zia at his residence to introduce my newly married wife. Other than being overwhelmed with the extraordinary beauty of Begum Zia, my wife noticed that Zia was wearing an ordinary leather sandal having repairs done. It was a common knowledge what was found in Zia's broken suitcase at the Chittagong Circuit House follow ing his assassination on May 30, 1981—a few change of clothes that included a torn vest.Here is a story I heard from Hussain Ahmed, a former IGP and Secretary. An SP came to his20residence at a late hour of night with a request to cancel his posting to a distant place. A much annoyed IGP dismissed the request. Before leaving, the disappointed SP pointed to his accompanying gentleman who remained absolutely silent the whole time, "Sir, do you know him?" The IGP replied in negative. "He is Mizanur Rahman, brother of the President", said the SP. Naturally, the IGP became a little soft and more accommodating now and asked the SP to see him in the office. He, however, did not recall if that request was ever met. Later, the IGP casually related the story to Air Vice Marshal Islam, then DGFI. A day or two later, IGP's red phone rang at around 3 am. Somewhat disturbed to be awakened at that odd hour, he picked up the phone and received a thunder. "I heard that b—— went to you for a favor?" It was the president and it took time for the IGP to understand what he was=2 0referring to. The IGP tried to pacify the president saying that his brother just accompanied the SP and did not utter a word at all. "I would like to have a full report tomorrow", the president insisted and dropped the phone. Reportedly, president Ziaur Rahman sent out circulars to all departments that personal requests by his family members should be directed to him immediately. Everybody knew the fact that Zia refused to intervene when his son Tarique was thrown out of Shaheen School. During an official visit to Zambia, High Commissioner A N Hamidullah was briefing the president on the program, repeatedly mentioning of an appointment with president's brother Rezaur Rahman who was working there as an engineer. The president did not like it. He rebuked the High Commissioner for putting his brother's appointment in the official program. "I know my brother is here. I will meet him at my own convenience, and it is my personal matter", the president reminded the High Commissioner. Another story from Hussain Ahmed. The almost daily Bangabhaban evening meetings used to run for long hours and working dinners were served fro m the house. The menu was more than simple–rice or roti with one curry and dal. Minister Moudud Ahmed found difficulty to take that any more. At dinner time, he requested the president if he could be excused as he had promised his childre n to eat together. The president smiled and let him go. One may recall that Ziaur Rahman introduced Toyota Corolla as the official car at all levels, including for himself. A few Mercedes that Bangabhaban had were used only for foreign dignitaries during official visits. Alas, the Zia family seemed to have failed to keep the clean image that Zia had in his lifetime! |
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