It was, however, not long before our intrinsic sense of suspicion took over and we wanted the Indian army to leave our soil, much to the displeasure of the Indian ruling establishment. But then that's what we are. The history of the population of the deltaic eastern Bengal of having had their destiny decided by outsiders has made us inherently suspicious, fearful and distrusting.
Over the last nearly four decades of our existence as an independent nation state, it is this lack of trust and a sense of suspicion and fear that has come to define the very nature of our relations with our giant neighbour India. Our experience during this same period has in fact served to reinforce these very traits. Global history also shows that in a big neighbour/small neighbour scenario, the onus is inevitably on the bigger neighbour to make the right move to win the confidence of the smaller neighbour, simply because size scares. And Bangladesh can be no exception to this phenomenon.
From the moment of the beginning of our journey as a nation state, we felt a sense of intrusion into our decision making process. This sense was not just one of perception, most of it was in fact real. A senior Indian diplomat once told me personally at a social meeting in New Delhi 'India wishes to see a pliant state in Bangladesh'!
The first true test came when both countries decided to address the land boundary demarcation, a legacy from the two centuries of colonial rule. The British might have left our subcontinent in 1947 but they certainly left behind a lot of problems for us. The Radcliff award of the land territorial boundaries of India and Pakistan left much to be desired. In some cases even the fundamental principles determining the partitioning of India were not followed.
We in independent Bangladesh inherited some of those problems as a successor state. There were Bangladeshi enclaves in India, and vice versa, and land in adverse possession of each other. Attempts were made to resolve this issue early on and an agreement was signed by the prime ministers of Bangladesh and India in 1974. This was thought to have paved the way for a solution. But that was not to be. Bangladesh did not delay in delivering on its part of the deal by ratifying the agreement and handing over ownership of Berubari to India in quick succession. But the Indian obligations have not yet been met on one pretext or the other.
Thus Bangladeshis inhabiting some of our enclaves in India like Angarpatha and Dahagram, for example, were subjected to inhuman sufferings, and in fact continue to suffer to this day. It was not until the early 1990s that the two countries reached an agreement that allowed the inhabitants of these two enclaves to use a corridor to come to Bangladesh if they needed to. But the corridor is open for only twelve hours of the day, during the daytime. This means that at night they cannot come to Bangladesh even in the case of extreme medical or other emergencies. They are also subjected to humiliating checks and controls by Indian security forces along the border. There is hardly any proper schooling or medical facilities within the enclaves. They need unhindered access to Bangladesh for their very survival! The harrowing tales of this people were narrated at a recent seminar in Dhaka. Anybody listening to their heartbreaking plight would have had to be moved.
But does India care? It must. After all, we are talking of genuine human sufferings here.The construction and subsequent commissioning of the Farakka barrage in Indian West Bengal over the once mighty Ganges River and its debilitating impact on Bangladesh is now known to all, both at home and abroad. India went ahead with this severely damaging project in total disregard and disdain for all protestations of Bangladesh governments and Bangladeshis from all walks of life.
The severity of its impact on the economy, ecology and society of Bangladesh left Bangladesh with no other option but to take it to the UN and that too after every effort to resolve it bilaterally had failed in the face of sustained Indian intransigence. It was only with a change of government in India following the elections in 1977 that an agreement was signed for five years that guaranteed an equitable share of water for Bangladesh. But the outcome of the Indian elections in early 1980 changed all that and once again Bangladesh was being deprived of its rightful share of water as a lower riparian country, resulting in alarmingly increasing desertification, vastly reduced navigability and large scale population displacement. It was said in New Delhi at that time that 'India cannot give the waters of the Ganges to Bangladesh for the sake of good neighbourly relations alone'. In other words, Bangladesh needed to do more to please India. The much talked about Ganges Water Treaty of 1996 was possible because of having an 'India friendly' government in Dhaka. It was, in the end, all about politics.
But even that treaty does not guarantee Bangladesh what amount of water it deserves and needs. Besides, the damage already done is irreversible. The immediate and long-term negative effects of Farakka barrage on Bangladesh have all been catalogued. It is there for all to see.
Now comes the proposed Tipaimukh dam project on the Barak river in the Indian state of Manipur and the potential of this causing as much, if not more, damage to the north-eastern regions of Bangladesh. Like in the case of Farakka, India plans to go ahead with the Tipaimukh dam project in total disregard for the rights of Bangladesh as a lower riparian country and in violation of existing international conventions on sharing of water of common rivers. Importantly, it will be violating at least two provisions of the much touted Ganges Water Treaty of 1996, viz. the principle of no harm and the one stating that consultations will have to be held between the two countries before any one undertakes any project on the rivers whose waters are shared by Bangladesh and India. Dr Habib Siddiqui, a Bangladeshi-American writing from Pennsylvania, said recently: 'The Indian government's decision to construct the Tipaimukh dam in north-east India is not only arrogant but it is criminal to the core.' This is the degree of anger emanating from Bangladeshis everywhere. Can India continue to ignore this?
By not acknowledging what Farakka has already done to Bangladesh and what the Tipaimukh dam project can do, India is not just treating with utter disdain a neighbour who desires friendship with respect, it has in fact chosen to ignore the dangers to our very existence.
The construction of barbed wire fencing around Bangladesh and the daily killing of innocent Bangladeshis by Indian border guards certainly does not speak of good neighbourliness. These are in fact acts of outright hostility. It certainly doesn't help things when the Indian foreign secretary condescendingly declares publicly in Dhaka that he feels 'good fences make good neighbours'.
It is this deadly combination of disrespect and hostility by India that impedes building of confidence on this side of the border and makes the average Bangladeshi distrustful and fearful of its giant neighbour. In fact, many look at India as a source of threat.
As has been mentioned in the earlier part of this piece, the responsibility of rebuilding this lost confidence lies squarely on India's giant shoulders. As a first step, India needs to shift away from its policy of regionalising its domestic political problems. The Tamil Nadu-Sri Lanka situation is a case in point. The LTTE, once considered the most fearsome terrorist outfit of all times, derived moral, material and importantly, political support directly from India. New Delhi found such a policy expedient in order to pacify and win support of the volatile political leadership of the state of Tamil Nadu, who openly sympathised with the Sri Lankan Tamils in their brutal campaign for a separate Tamil state in northeast of Sri Lanka. The rest is history. But Sri Lanka today remains a sharply divided society and may continue to be so for a very long time to come.
Perhaps, the same would have been the case in Bangladesh with the way events were turning out in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The Shantibahini found safe refuge and support in the neighbouring Indian state of Tripura. This allowed New Delhi to find favour with the leaders of the state. A peace deal between the two countries, however flawed, saved the situation from turning worse.
Both of the instances cited above were part of New Delhi's policy of using 'leverage' against its smaller neighbours to serve its own domestic, geo-political and strategic interests. It is alarming that protagonists of such a policy more often than not are rewarded. Experience, however, shows that in the end nobody wins.
India now has a strong functional democracy. Her growing political and economic clout in the world is an undeniable reality. As an emerging global player, India today is in a position to rise above narrow parochial outlooks, reach out to her smaller neighbours and make them feel safe and secure. This can best be achieved by seriously addressing and seeking mutually beneficial solutions to issues that are of vital interest to her neighbours and their survival. This is the way forward. Anything different and it will be difficult to blame countries like Bangladesh for being fearful of Indian designs in the region and view India less as a friend.
Shamsher M Chowdhury is a decorated freedom fighter and retired foreign secretary and former ambassador of Bangladesh to the United States, Germany and Vietnam and High Commissioner to Sri Lanka
