INDIAN 'GEO-STRATEGISTS' CRYING WOLF Is it opportune to withdrawarmy from CHT? Sadeq Khan An Inter-Service Public Relations (ISPR) press release on July 29 confirmed that the government is in the process of withdrawing a brigade of army troops, including three infantry battalions and 35 security camps, from the vulnerable districts of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). 'This withdrawal process will start immediately and will conclude in September 2009,' the release said. 'As Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is pledged-bound to implement the Chittagong Hill Tracts Treaty signed in 1997, she directed withdrawal of the troops from the region,' an official at the army headquarters told a newsman. The pull-out was originally planned for June-July, according to the official. This will be the biggest ever army withdrawal from the area after CHT peace deal was signed, said the statement. The 1996-2001 Awami League government concluded a peace deal in 1997, with Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Sangstha (PCJSS), aiming to end two decades of bloody insurgency in the region. A total of 200 security camps were withdrawn in different phases since the deal was signed, said the statement. Contacted for comment on the fresh government decision of army pullout, a senior leader of the PCJSS, the militant organisation of the dominant tribe in CHT, refrained from making any observation. The conflict in the CHT, that accounts for nearly one-tenth of the country's total land mass dates back to 1962 when the then Pakistan government built Kaptai hydro-electricity plant that caused displacement of as many as 100,000 of the native people. In post-independence Bangladesh, rebel Shanti Bahini, the armed wing of the PCJSS, launched its first offensive on an army convoy in 1977 in strong protest against the then government's rehabilitation scheme for plain land people in the CHT areas.. The government increased army deployment as the Shanti Bahini continued hit and run raids and ransom collection, from a cross the Indian border, until signing of the treaty. It is noteworthy that some dissident sleeper units of erstwhile Shanti Bahini had spurned the deal and stayed back in India on the other side of CHT borders. They are in a position to resume insurgency. It is also noteworthy that since the tragic Peelkhana massacre of commanding army officers in BDR rebellion last February, the investigations have been dragging on, preventing normalisation and reorganisation of our border forces. The BDR outposts have remained unarmed and uneasy. Scantily armed patrols are naturally dispirited, and commanding officers are yet to be hearty with the men. In the disarray, our northern and western borders have remained insecure. USA and some other foreign governments, who are partners of Bangladesh in anti-terrorist strategy and tactics, have expressly voiced concerns that Bangladesh borders are now unguarded and unsafe, easing passage for terrorists and narcotics traffic as well as for criminal influx. One wonders whether the government had adequately considered the implications of withdrawing an army brigade from CHT, thereby rendering our unguarded eastern borders deficient in surveillance and unsafe as well. Indian 'hot pursuit' The government of India has increased anti-Maoist military operations to the west of our borders and anti-insurgency operations in the north and east of our borders against tribal unrest and separatism. Fugitives from these operations will naturally try to cross into our borders and endanger our own peace and security. In such circumstance, grounds may be created for Indian security men to intrude into our territory in "hot pursuit" of fugitives. Bangladesh must, as it did in the past, remain prepared to defend its territory against intrusion of any sort. This is particularly so as the Indian strategic establishment appear to be having difficulties in adjusting to changing geo-political order after the failure of Bush doctrine. Indian Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister appear clear in their minds that under the impact of global financial crisis and from the experience of global war on terror, geo-strategic balance of the world order has shifted somewhat necessitating US-China cooperation, and the sole superpower is not so keen at the moment to prop up Indian power explicitly for the containment of China. But other political leaders and leaders of opinion in India seem unnerved by the signs and unmoved in their positions. So it is that Dr. Manmohan Singh's signing of an Indo-Pakistan Joint Declaration at Sharm-el Sheikh NAM summit de-linking India-Pakistan peace talks from cross-border terrorism has created an uproar in Indian polity that has not subsided. Indian strategic establishment is also expressly unhappy with US-Secretary of State Hilary Clinton's visit, during which she spoke of "greening" the Indo-US strategic partnership with a plethora of non-military issues. Suddenly a section of the Indian strategic establishment appear to be dropping traditional restraint and opting for drastic steps to push out Chinese influence from its periphery. They are pro-active in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and their propaganda machine has also been tuned accordingly. They go so far as to question the motives of Sheikh Hasina Government of Bangladesh as well, and conjure spectres of an Eastern sub-Himalayan geo-strategic anti-Indian Compact. To quote an Indian Analyst Vijay Sakhuja (China Brief, Volume 9, issue 15, dated July 23): "According to Munshi Faiz Ahmad, Bangladesh's ambassador to China, Bangladesh and China have enjoyed a "time-tested, all-weather friendship" (China Daily, March 26). During their meeting on the sidelines of the U.N. Conference on the World Financial and Economic crisis in June 2009, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi assured his Bangladeshi counterpart Dipu Moni that it was China's policy to "strengthen and develop the relations of friendship and cooperation with Bangladesh." For her part, Moni said that "Bangladesh sees China as its close friend and cooperation partner" (Xinhua News Agency, June 26). ..... Chinese leadership has consistently advised Bangladesh to pursue an independent foreign policy and encouraged it to move away from India's sphere of influence. ...... Some retired Indian army officers, they believe that Chinese leaders may have even given Bangladesh security assurances that Beijing would stand by Dhaka and help it defend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity should it be threatened by India.." 'Chicken neck' threatened? Sakhuja goes on to suggest that fresh concern arises from India's vulnerability in the Siliguri corridor, often referred to as the 'chicken neck': "This 200 kilometers (km) long and 40 km wide corridor links mainland India by rail, road and air with its Northeast region, a part of which (90,000 sq km in Arunachal Pradesh) is claimed by China and is a significant source of tension for bilateral relations. At present, there is significant PLA deployment along the borders. To its north is Bhutan, and in the south is Bangladesh. The Siliguri corridor figures prominently in the Sino-Bangladesh friendship and the two sides, according to Indian military experts, have a sophisticated strategy to sever India from the Northeast region. It is also noted that 'China wants to get Tawang [an administrative district in the state of Arunachal Pradesh] to come closer to the Siliguri corridor' so that it can link up with Bangladesh from the north (Why Assam Bleeds, sify.com, November 10, 2008). ...... Illegal migrants from Bangladesh and Indian insurgent groups such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), who have safe heavens in Bangladesh, crisscross through porous borders that can act as catalysts for social disorder, unrest and insurgency in the corridor. According to one analyst, the ULFA leadership has shifted its base to China, and the investigations relating to the March 2004 offloading of a weapons consignment from China at Chittagong seaport revealed the complicity of government agencies (India, Bangladesh: Joint Task Force for Countering Militancy, sspconline.org, May 27, 2009)." Finally, Sakhuja links up Indian military disadvantage from Chinese presence in Pakistani and Sri Lankan ports and possible access to Chittagong port with Myanmar and Nepalese land routes open to Chinese access: "There are concerns that Bangladesh may offer Chittagong port for development to China, ostensibly for commercial purposes, but which could also be used for staging Chinese naval assets. This is to be expected and can be reasonably tied to the Chinese development of Gwadar port in Pakistan and Hambantota port in Sri Lanka. China and Bangladesh, along with Myanmar, have decided to build the 900 km Kunming Highway linking Chittagong with Kunming through Myanmar to facilitate greater trade [7]. This would not only overcome the long sea passage from the east coast of China through Singapore (for trans-shipment) to Bangladesh, but would also lower transport costs and add to the economy of Yunnan?province. This also fits well in their joint initiative of improving Chittagong port infrastructure that can now be put to dual use for merchant vessels and also for the navies of the two countries. ? The Chinese approach of systematically nurturing and promoting diplomatic linkages with Bangladesh provides it with a number of strategic advantages against India. Likewise, there are also several related strategic fallouts for Bangladesh. As far as China is concerned, it will be in a position to link its electronic listening systems at Coco Island in Myanmar and the staging/listening systems in Bangladesh and monitor Indian naval and missile activity. Given the wide disparities in the India-Bangladesh naval order of battle, Bangladesh would be under pressure to open its facilities to the PLA Navy as a countervailing force against the Indian Navy. (Thus) China-Bangladesh military cooperation has the potential to exacerbate regional tensions along the Himalayas and result in high-intensity competition." Clearly, there is desperation in current Indian strategic thinking, in the backdrop of which Bangladesh must remain cool and cautions. The unseemly hurry with which a parliamentary team led by Abdur Razzak MP was sent to Delhi to dance to the tune of Indian authorities over the highly controversial Tipaimukh Dam Project is seen as unnecessarily buckling under Delhi South Block's pressure by Sheikh Hasina's government. There was scope to delay the delegation on the genuine ground that Bangladesh needed time to examine the studies released last week on NEEPCO website by Indian authorities. Sheikh Hasina's government stands compromised by the Razzak delegation in the eyes of the people of Bangladesh as well as the people of northeast India who are gravely threatened by earthquake risks and environmental degradation sure to be caused by the Dam. |
__._,_.___
