Brig. Khaled wanted Kh. Moshtaque to continue as President
The
Not only that, Khaled Mosharraf even wanted that Moshtaque Ahmed should continue as President of the country. In a contradictory remark, the report mentioned that "there was possibility of Indian intervention, which could be avoided by the narrowest margin, it stated that they had no evidence that
The then US ambassador to Dhaka Mr Boster sent the report (Subject: Last Week in Bangladesh in Retrospect) through telegram No 5470 from Embassy of Dhaka to Washington D.C and that was simultaneously sent to American Embassy in Bangkok, Colombo, Islamabad, Kabul, Kathmandu, Moscow, New Delhi, Rangoon, Peking, American Consul office in Calcutta and US Commander in Chief of Pacific Command (CINCPAC) for Political Adviser.
Though the whole document was released, still many issues like (a) how the Indian intervention could be avoided; (b) who were the army majors, who had total grip on Mushtaque government; (c) the name of the army officers who were killed along with their wives; (d) who were the army officers, who did not like Mosharraf and (e) what was the function of the Chief Martial Law Administrator Justice A S M Sayem remained unanswered.
The content of the telegram report is being published for the Holiday readers verbatim:
"1. It may be useful to offer a capsule summary of the chaotic events of last week in
Brig. Khaled's ambition
2. The confrontation between Brigadier Mosharraf, Chief of the Army General Staff, who had been embittered by his failure to share in the promotion, received by some of his colleagues after the assassination of President Mujib by the Majors in August 15 and who was also believed to be on a list of army officers to be investigated -- which had recently been drawn up by the Majors, began in the early hours of Monday Morning, November 3. We don't know positively whether Mosharraf was the architect of the confrontation, as many contend, or whether, as one good source has told us, he simply went along with subordinates who were determined to end the special role of the Majors in the Moshtaque Government, a role which resulted among other things in the harassment of some of the military officers. This source also held that one of Mosharraf's objectives- although he was undoubtedly mindful of the personal glory that might await him-was to take control of his subordinates' plans in such a way as to avoid major bloodshed.
3. Brig. Mosharraf and his allies quickly took control, early Monday morning of the cantonment as well as most of the city of Dhaka and pressed their confrontation with the Moshtaque government by flying a Mig fighter and armed helicopter over the city in a show of strength which was also intended to intimidate the tank crews loyal to the government.
Against this background, Brig. Mosharraf placed four demands on Moshtaque: (1) That Mosharraf replace Major General Ziaur Rahman, his personal rival, as Chief of Staff (2) That the majors be returned to regular army discipline; (3) That the tank forces loyal to the government be disarmed; and (4) That Moshtaque remain in office. Outgunned and apparently intend above all on avoiding bloodshed, which would also have invited Indian intervention, Moshtaque eventually yielded after negotiating during the course of a long day for compromise with Brig. Mosharraf by which the majors and some of their colleagues, to whom Moshtaque was indebted for his presidency, were permitted to depart Bangladesh.
Before this compromise had been reached, the Moshtaque Government had called on the army forces at Comilla to come to its aid but had been refused on the ground that the Comilla Commander would only respond to the orders of the Chief of Army Staff (who was then under arrest) or the Chief of the General Staff (Mosharraf).
Brig. Khaled and Majors' departure
4. The confrontation brought another bloody result which, we have good reason to believe, had been part of an earlier contingency plan to be carried out in the event that Moshatque were to be killed, i.e. the murder of his former colleagues in the Awami League Party leadership who were now his political enemies--former Prime Minister Monsoor Ali, former Vice President Syed Nazrul Islam, former Prime Minister, Finanace Minister and Indophile Tajuddin Ahmed, and former Industries Minister Kamruzzaman. These leaders were killed, evidently by order of one or more of the Majors, early Monday morning at Dacca Central Jail. The event added a note of mystery to Brig. Khaled Mosharraf's acquiescence to the departure of the Majors later in the day, one version having it that Mosharraf did not yet know when the plane left
5. With the explosive situation defused to a degree by the departure of the majors, negotiations between Moshtaque and Mosharraf continued on Tuesday and Wednesday, resulting in Mosharraf's designation as Chief of Staff late Tuesday night, and eventually in Moshtaque's resignation early Thursday morning with the simultaneous announcement that a non-political figure, Chief Justice A.S.M Sayem, would be appointed President. Sayem was sworn in on Thursday and promptly dissolved the parliament. Reports, which we accept, were rife that the cabinet had already resigned in protest against the murder of the former government leaders.
Brig. Mosharraf ousted
6. But it now become clear that Brig. Mosharraf's assumption of power in the army was unpalatable to most of his fellow officers and enlisted ranks, both because General Zia evidently held a much wider popular following among them but also, and very importantly, because Mosharraf was widely seen, whether accurately or not, as an instrument of Indian policy. This perception was buttressed by the pro-Mujib procession on Tuesday and Wednesday's hartal to protest the killings at
Extensive firing went throughout the city all night and all during the day Friday, most of it celebratory after Brig. Mosharraf was ousted. One authoritative source has told us that only about 30 were killed in the overthrow; other reports reached us which put the figure in the hundreds.
Revolt and new problem
7. The successful revolt of the lower ranks now brought a new problem, the rampant indiscipline of the enlisted men, many of whom now turned on officers against whom they might have grudges and others began presenting demands on the army leadership for a better deal in their future treatment. Widespread reports were current throughout the weekend that large numbers of military officers had fled or were at least staying away from the cantonment out of fear of the rampaging sepoys and several reports reached us of the murder of military officers and of their wives.
8. Meanwhile the post-Mosharraf government took shape in a meeting early Friday morning between General Zia, Moshtaque and presumably other principal aides. Moshtaque was offered the presidency anew but declined on the ground that, in the still explosive situation, the country required a non-political, non controversial President. Consequently the decision was reached to keep Justice Sayem in the presidency and to turn over to him as well the functions of Chief Martial Law Administrator, a role which had been filled briefly by General Zia. We were pointedly assured that these arrangements enjoyed full support both within the military and within the political leadership so that the way was now clear for the restoration of stability in the country.
9. As of Monday morning, November 10, the situation had returned to an apparent normalcy, with international air service resumed on Sunday, but the general uneasiness was still being fed by reports of continued killings among the military and of possible Indian actions along the border. The prospect was for, at best, a continued state of tension and uncertainty.
Anti-Indian overtones
10. Comment. Three conclusions implicit in the above account should be underlined. The first is that the actions of the main participants in the coup and counter-coup appear to have been non-political, except in the sense that Mosharraf had the additional disadvantage of appearing to be pro-Indian. The army forces which overthrew Moshtaque and the majors, appear to have acted primarily out of a sense of grievance against the Majors. The counter -coup was the work of lower ranks who far preferred Zia to Mosharraf and who were also concerned where Mosharraf's loyalty might lie. We have no reason to believe that the regime of the past week was anti- American, pro- Indian or pro-Soviet in character.
11. The second is that we have no evidence that
12. The third is the confirmation of how strongly and pervasively anti-Indian antipathies are felt here -- from the top of the leadership to the lowest groups of society, although we have no evidence that Brig. Khaled Mosharraf was pro-Indian, and some say that he was not; he was widely identified as such and the wild celebration here of his overthrow carried distinctly anti- Indian overtones. Boster."
http://www.weeklyholiday.net/front.html#06
(I don't think the Americans were entirely right. Khaled Musharaf was probably an Indian stooge like Gen. Moin U Ahmad and as far as I know the Jail Killings were not carried out by the same people who did the 15th August coup – MBI Munshi)
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