Misgivings, obduracy blight Dhaka-Delhi relations M. Shahidul Islam Something weird is souring Dhaka- Delhi relations prior to the PM's scheduled visit to India. There seems more to the last minute deferral of the visit than what meets the eye. For, if one must believe the reason given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) about the deferral of the visit, the blame must go to India, which, according to the Foreign Minister, "requested" for rescheduling the visit. Teesta agreement That, however, does not tally with the facts unearthed so far. Sources say Dhaka felt insulted, snubbed and betrayed in a number of pre-summit interactions, prompting the PM to pause and reflect further before making a desperate dash to sign agreements which could prove suicidal for the nation. Dhaka is learnt to have taken offence when Delhi flatly rejected on December 5 a proposition to hold a meeting of the Joint River Commission (JRC) to finalize an agreement on the sharing of Teesta river waters during PM's upcoming visit. A different brand of chemistry thus intruded into the bilateral equations once that negative Indian decision was conveyed to Bangladesh officials at the conclusion of the second day's meeting of the JRC experts, which commenced in the state guest house Meghna on December 4. A meeting source said, "India proposed to hold Secretary-level meeting first, prior to JRC," which they argued not being possible before PM's (now-postponed) visit from December 18-21. Another source in the MOFA, however, regretted that the Indian proposal was unacceptable due to the Teesta water sharing agreement being pending since 2005 when Bangladesh first delivered to India the first draft of the agreement, with proposition that Bangladesh and India each would get 40 per cent water of the river and 20 per cent would go to Bay of Bengal for maintaining adequate flow in the channel. "That was why Dhaka decided to hand over the draft of the agreement to India prior to PM's visit so that the agreement could be finalized and signed during the scheduled summit of the two PMs," the source maintained. Besides, Dhaka found it surprising that India failed to comply with its commitment to finalize the Teesta agreement 'sooner,' made during Foreign Minister Dipu Moni's Delhi visit in September. Sources also say Dhaka had other reasons to feel insulted and snubbed. While Delhi failed to accept the Teesta water agreement, Dhaka had meanwhile complied in a hurry with the finalization of three other agreements that Delhi wanted desperately to get concluded during PM's visit. The concluded agreements include (1) Treaties on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, (2) Transfer of Prisoners, and, (3) Bilateral Agreement on Combating International Terrorism. Signed during Home Secretary level meeting in Delhi on December 1, the three agreements are slated to obtain treaty status after the two PMs sign them during the upcoming Delhi summit. But, in return, Dhaka got nothing. Threats from ULFA There are also reports that the visit was postponed due to credible threats from the ULFA activists. That prospect borders on 'may be,' notwithstanding that, since coming to power, the AL-led regime has been doing for Delhi much more than what could be lawfully expected of any sovereign nation. For instance, long before these legal instruments could become efficacious, Indian special force had already conducted a covert operation inside Bangladesh on November 1 and abducted two ULFA leaders - Chitrabon Hazarika and Sasha Choudhury - from a residence in Dhaka. The two leaders were later produced in a court in Assam the next day. Ever since, other ULFA leaders have been making threats against Bangladesh and its PM in particular, the latest threat coming on December 5 following abduction of ULFA's founding chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa, from Dhaka and his appearance before a judicial magistrate in Gawahati the next morning. The threat against the PM followed Rajkhowa's angry comment in the court premise that "Bangladesh had betrayed us." ULFA threats often prove credible, and, other reports do indicate the ULFA leaders are tired of the theatrics and the mendacity of the regime in Dhaka. Despite Indian Border Security Force (BSF) having admitted that they took possession of the ULFA leaders (Rajkhowa, his wife and their two children, his personal bodyguard Raja Bora, as well as the deputy commander-in-chief of ULFA's military wing, Raju Barua, among others) from Bangladesh authorities, the insistence by Home Minister Shahara Khatun that 'our security forces were not involved in the arrests of ULFA leaders' further indicated the recent raids in Dhaka having been conducted by Indian Special forces. And, these unlawful actions have startled legal communities and other observers due to Bangladesh and India not having any extradition treaty, although Indian intelligence agencies have hinted a number of times since the AL-led regime's coming to power that Dhaka has 'tacitly' agreed to track down Indian insurgents hiding in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, these 'abduction' incidents have so elevated the mood of Indian officials that, following the latest abduction in Dhaka and possession of so many top ranking ULFA leaders by India, foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao, said on December 5 that cooperation between New Delhi and Dhaka had delivered "very positive results." Yet, that Delhi remains characteristically lax toward reciprocating on long-outstanding matter like the Teesta water sharing agreement is a matter of deeper concern. Such concerns have prompted many observers to say in anger, "If the nation's sovereignty is trumped at will in the absence of legal instruments allowing intrusion into a third country of the special force of another, what consequence the new treaties will have on the territorial integrity of Bangladesh?" They further ask: "Will Indian forces enter Bangladesh in witch hunt of northeast insurgents (or alleged Islamic militants) if our own forces fail to comply with Indian requests?" Fear of retribution Make no mistake that they certainly will. That is why the evolving scenarios lead one to fear that Bangladesh faces one of the gravest dangers of being attacked by a number of Indian insurgent groups if the AL-led regime moves too aggressively to aid India in quelling their liberation struggles. At least 17 insurgent outfits of varied denominations are active and perilously armed all across Bangladesh borders. Some experts fear, the fall out in Bangladesh from any immature Indo-Bangladesh collaborations against northeast insurgents could be unspecified and massive. When the AL-led government made a similar move in 1996, ULFA leader Poresh Borua had made it clear by saying: "Bangladesh will be targeted and get attacked if it assists India that goes against our Liberation movement." Added to the ongoing China-India rivalry, as well as the alleged Chinese backing for a hybrid of insurgent groups operating in Indian northeast, Bangladesh must juggle assiduously through a maze of strategic dilemmas and our policy makers must ponder thoroughly whether the PM must sign those agreements at all. Double standard Dhaka must not also forget the painful memory of Indian double standard in matters relating to our vital national interests. In 1972, India cited security threat as its main reason not to allow Bangladesh the use of Calcutta port (the Chittagong port being almost inoperative due to obstruction created by war-damaged sunken ships). That Dhaka now can not invoke its own reasoning to say 'no' to many of the 'anti-national-interest' propositions of India is indicative of how beholden the AL-led regime is to this regional bully. As well, Dhaka's failure over the last 38 years to obtain from Delhi any agreement to use the 16 miles transit through Indian territory (the Siliguri Corridor) for bilateral trade between two SAARC countries - Bhutan and Nepal - shall serve as aide memoirs before a decision to concede anything substantive to Delhi in the upcoming summit. Transit & transshipment Then, there are other major variables to be factored in. As speculations thicken that the PM will ink the transit deal too during her upcoming visit to Delhi, the very prospect of it instils fears in the heart of our people. Transit refers to the passage across our territory of Indian goods, using Indian transports, without discrimination whether those goods are military or civil. Transshipment, on the other hand, refers to the same movement of goods using the transport of transiting countries, which Dhaka may agree, if compelled to. India did avail transshipment facilities from Pakistan since 1947 to commute goods to the northeast, until relations soured in the 960s, leading to the 1965 war. Belgium syndrome One of the prime movers of Bangladesh-China relationship is China's vehement objection to Bangladesh granting transit facilities to India, due mainly to Beijing's concern that, in case of any Indo-China hostility, India will bring her troops to North Eastern provinces through Bangladesh to prevent severance of the Siliguri corridor from mainland India. This strategic conundrum reminds one of the Belgium syndromes. Belgium lost its sovereignty during the Second World War after the Nazi forces invaded that country on May 10, 1940, precipitating the invasion of Netherlands and the Luxemburg in the broader military sweeps that followed. If the allied forces did not win the war, Belgium to date would have remained a German satellite. Likewise, if India and China go to war once again, as they did in 1962, India will conquer Bangladesh first by using the transit at Ashugonj and Chittagong ports, and the corridor being offered in the name of Asian highway, as Hitler did against Belgium. Moreover, nearly half of India's total armed forces being already deployed in the trouble-ridden northeast, the strategic priority of the region has increased manifold in recent years, especially after Pakistan became militarily weaker amidst a foreign-imposed civil war and the invasion of Afghanistan, allowing India to focus singularly on China by slowly gobbling Bangladesh into its underbelly for use as strategic depth, a buffer, and a subjugated economic hinterland. |
__._,_.___
