These are particularly hate-filled and hate-inspired crimes and not spontaneous emotionally charged acts. This burning sense of hatred is at the core of Bangladesh politics. On one side are Bangla nationalists who define their nationhood in terms of the Bengali language and culture and an indigenous Easternised Islam. For them, national, cultural and linguistic identity supercedes loyalty to an Arab-dominated Wahhabi Islam. There is a minority of fanatical Islamists conditioned by Wahhabism for whom the Islamic identity comes first. These are the elements on which Pakistan depended to keep East Pakistan subservient to West Pakistan.
Typical products of this conditioning are General Ershad, Begum Khaleda Zia and all members of Jamaat-e-Islami. Though her husband made the first broadcast proclaiming the independence of Bangladesh, Khaleda Zia spent the war in Pakistani military cantonments in East Pakistan, away from her husband. There is a view that even Ziaur Rahman, emerging as one of the four sector commanders leading the Mukti Bahini, was not a person committed to Bangla nationalism but a smart officer who took advantage of the existing situation. His ambition and his Islamist orientation came to the fore after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib and the reinstatement in important positions of officers who returned from Pakistan after sitting out the Liberation War. There is a belief — widespread among high-ranking Awami League leaders — that General Zia was at least an accessory to Mujibur Rahman's murder, if not an actual conspirator. General Ershad was one of those who stayed on in Pakistan during the entire war and he never professed any loyalty to the ideals of the Awami League.
While the Mukti Bahini of the Awami League fought the Pakistan army with support from India and the international community, a civil war was raging within Bangladesh in which the Islamist collaborators — with the active support of the Pakistan army — carried out a campaign of ethnic cleansing, of a magnitude that resulted in a million dead within Bangladesh and 10 million refugees on Indian soil. Many Pakistanis still argue that this campaign had in fact subdued the Bangladeshi freedom struggle and, but for the Indian intervention, with Soviet support, Pakistan would still be ruling East Pakistan. While all genocides after the mid-'70s have been subjected to UN investigation, the Bangladesh massacre is yet to be investigated and fully accounted for. Even the Cambodian war crimes trial on the Khmer Rouge massacres of the '70s has at last begun in Phnom Penh. The dimensions of the Bangladesh killings are so stupendous and are such distant memories that when I referred to those figures in an article post-2000, a young assistant editor of a national daily cut down my figures to a small fraction on the ground they were highly implausible. I had to refer him to the original documents from the period.
Today the Awami League has been voted back to power with an overwhelming majority. The government has indicated its intention to bring the collaborators of 1971 to trial. This could not be done earlier for two reasons: first, except for one term when the Awami League was in power, for the rest of the period since 1975 the regimes in power in Bangladesh were collaborator-friendly. Second, the present army leadership, commissioned at the earliest about 1971, is free from the taint of collaborationism. The way in which the army conducted the elections also shows that it has no Islamist, Wahhabi bias. Its leadership has come out strongly in support of the present Awami League government after the uprising; its own assessment of the uprising's significance does not differ from the government's. The army understands that the uprising was targeted not only at the Awami League government but also at the army which is today against Wahhabi Islamism and collaborationism. The army clearly demonstrated its commitment by hanging those who carried out the serial terrorist bomb attacks three years ago.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has wisely decided to seek US and UK help in the investigation. That will expose the extremist inspiration for this uprising and the likely external support it received. Her government has indicated its willingness to examine the feasibility of transit rights for India through Bangladesh territory and promised to cooperate in the elimination of terrorist camps in Bangladesh and contain the operations of the ISI in and from Bangladesh territory. It is also logical to expect more meaningful economic cooperation between India and Bangladesh. It should be noted that the interim army regime had under consideration many of these initiatives. Thus, for the Islamists, both the Awami League government and the present army are enemies. That explains why a large number of army officers were targeted with such brutality.
Some elements in Bangladesh with deep Wahhabi Islamist roots going back to the 1971 civil war have since then developed strong links with Al-Qaeda or with the ISI. It will be unrealistic to expect that they will give up their jihad after the failure of this uprising. There is a reasonable probability that with the Awami League government and a professional army in place the Islamists will try to make it into a battlefield for spreading jihadi Islam.
The Obama administration is placing increased emphasis on Indonesia and Southeast Asia in its efforts to connect with gentle Islam. Bangladesh is an important transit point for jihadi operations in Southeast Asia. There is a good case for the US, the European Union, Japan, India, Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries to support Bangladesh politically, economically, militarily and in terms of intelligence cooperation.
The writer is a senior defence analyst
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-ghosts-of-1971/431017/0
__._,_.___
