[ALOCHONA] Beyond the Chicken's Neck: Indian national security and Burma

Beyond the Chicken's Neck: Indian national security and Burma

By Christopher Smith

Recent unrest along the Indo-Burmese border highlights a simple, yet vital, truth: Indian foreign policy regarding Burma is first and foremost a question of Indian national security.The 1,640 kilometre border shared by India and Burma is largely a tangle of jungle, hills and valleys. This terrain, so vastly different from the Gangetic plains and heartland of the Indian sub-continent is populated by an array of peoples equally diverse from their fellow countrymen. While the states in question were largely inaugurated on the basis of ethnic demands, a multitude of ethnic and tribal groups continue to call, and fight, for further recognition and rights. Almost all the groups concerned claim land on either side of the manufactured borders, both domestic and the international boundary with Burma.

This Northeast region has been beset by violence ever since the advent of the modern Indian state became apparent. Thus since the birth of India New Delhi has sought and groped for a means of pacifying and integrating this volatile corner. And the security method of choice, gaining in momentum over the past 10 to 15 years, is that of prioritizing domestic, economic and energy security. As a Home Ministry official succinctly commented, to ensure that ethnic and nationalist movements "will become too comfortable to fight in the jungle again."

Burma watchers enjoy harking back to the days of Rajiv Gandhi and his outspoken support for democratic reforms in Burma. Those days are history. Further, Rajiv Gandhi, following in the footsteps of his mother, played politics on a global level at a time when political idealism still reigned supreme. The times have changed.

It is important to recognize that Rajiv Gandhi's approach came prior to the rise of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) as a serious militant threat to India's Northeast. While ULFA was in no way the first armed liberation movement on the scene, preceded by decades by the likes of the Naga National Council and Mizo National Front as well as others, the breadth and timing of the insurrection warned New Delhi as to the continued fragile state of security in its Northeastern states.

Of course the name Gandhi automatically conjures up the image of the Mahatma, and again Burma watchers love to question the merit of current Indian foreign policy in the shadow of Gandhian teachings.And today a further spectre haunts and binds Indian and Burmese security issues: that of a politically unstable Bangladesh and the impact of Malthusian population that flows to and from that troubled country, along with the accusation of its soil serving as a staging ground for terrorist cells and operations.

These shared physical security threats naturally encourage a working relationship between New Delhi and Naypyidaw. And such an approach is doubly reinforced with New Delhi's continuing prioritization of economic opportunity and development. Since the advent of the 1991 "Look East" policy, Burma has served as an enchanting gateway to the markets of Southeast Asia – the only ASEAN member country with which India shares a border.

From the mid 1980s to 2005, Indian trade with Burma has mushroomed from a meager US $13 million a year to nearly US $ 600 million annually. Meanwhile, the increased importance placed on attaining energy security hardly needs comment as relating to a factor in favouring relations between the two nations.

And for better or worse, the results of New Delhi's initiatives can be witnessed on the crudest level on the streets of Northeastern cities. Invariably, the urban centres are awash with vehicular traffic, exhaust from freight trucks to taxis to jeeps choking the lives of city centres across the region.

The policy adopted by New Delhi to confront this volatile security question, economic development and integration, demands stability. Much as the debate in New Delhi regarding political events in Nepal rests on an ongoing struggle between those that view a potential Maoist-led government in Kathmandu as a beacon of light for India's own communist insurgencies and those who see a Maoist-led Nepal as a staging ground and strategic reserve for Northeastern insurgents, the New Delhi establishment also faces a realist security dilemma regarding Burmese opposition demands for a drastic overhaul of the current Burmese political landscape and what effect such an occurrence may have on Northeastern security.

It can be argued that in a worst case scenario for Burma, the end to military government only reignites violent campaigns for independence and rights of outlying communities. Given the porous border, potential for shared interests and histories of the communities involved – the Kukis, for example, inhabit parts of Burma, Nagaland and Manipur, while the Kachins have long since had ties with various Indian rebel outfits – this could easily spill over into India's Northeast.

Yet it can also be said possible that a best-case scenario in Burma could prove equally disruptive to India's Northeast. Having seen advantages gained in Burma, India 's still oppressed and marginalized minority communities may be moved to increase pressure on New Delhi for further concession.

In short, one way or the other, the paradoxical dilemma facing New Delhi is encapsulated in political commentator Sanjoy Hazarika's definition of Third World democracies as a "fatal flaw of aspirations never being met." Political idealism is thus eschewed, and to this end the means of addressing the security threat is to be one dominated by political and economic realism. If India's security policy regarding Burma is to be affected, such concerns must be made immaterial.

Thus, what New Delhi demands of security is for stability in Burma and any improvements in the political lives of the Burmese population to accrue under the direct control and watchful eye of a central governing authority – whether SPDC or NLD, Naypyidaw or Rangoon. And anymore, economic interests and development figure prominently in security designs.

This is not to say that elements within the Indian government and other regional bodies would not and do not sincerely hope for and urge change in Burma, witness the recent birthday wishes sent to Aung San Suu Kyi by 17 Indian Members of Parliament, but rather that such change will not be risked at the threat of further inciting unrest and insecurity at home and jeopardizing economic integration.

India today, as much as foreign voices may wish to suggest otherwise, is not the land of Gandhian initiatives, either of Mahatma or Rajiv. Engagement with Burmese leaders thus arises as a logical and rational approach. Geography of the modern political landscape and regional economic interests and demands of the 21st century have shaped India's position – a phenomena not shared by European and American states.

If Western policymakers and advocacy groups wish to see change in Burma, appreciation of regional security interests must be prioritized. And to this end, no place is more volatile along the Burmese frontier than India beyond the Chicken's Neck*.

* The Chicken's Neck is a term affiliated with the narrow land corridor between Nepal and Bangladesh. Measuring little more than 20 kilometers in width, it is India's only land access to its Northeastern states ( Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur , Sikkim, Tripura and Mizoram).

http://www.mizzima.com/MizzimaNews/EdOp/20...-June-2007.html

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