Wikileaks cables on Bangladesh reveal truth behind 'Minus 2', DGFI's role in forming IDP The first batch of US embassy cables related to Bangladesh, released on whistleblower site WikiLeaks, has failed to reveal much that the public will find particularly enlightening or interesting, except maybe an affirmation that the "Minus 2" strategy to remove the leaders of the Awami League and BNP had in-fact been in place in 2007.
In probably the most damaging revelation contained within the handful of cables released so far that touch upon Bangladesh, the DGFI is implicated in an effort to absorb the banned terrorist organization, the Harkat ul Jihad, into mainstream politics through a misbegotten attempt at forming the Islamic Development Party (IDP), just before the December 2008 elections.
Hasina, Khaleda's return put CTG at 'crossroads' The most intriguing cable as far as Bangladesh is concerned, originating from the US mission in New Delhi dated April 27, 2007, reveals the thinking between the US, the UK and India in the aftermath of the '1/11' political changeover in 2007.
This was four days after the arrest warrant out against Sheikh Hasina at that time was suspended, and two days after the ban on her re-entering the country was lifted.
The subject of the cable is given as "Indian official sees Bangladesh at crossroads, Sri Lanka deteriorating, Burma becoming uni-dimensional." The content of the cable describes a meeting between a joint-secretary at the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Mohan Kumar, and the political counselor at the US embassy in Delhi, Ted Osius.
In the meeting, Kumar is said to have told Osius that "the caretaker government in Bangladesh has reached a crossroads by allowing Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia to return, stating such a move weakens the government and will force it to reassert itself in some way."
The cable goes on to assert the role that can be played by the US, the UK and India in cajoling the caretaker government of the time into holding "credible" elections, while insisting that the army "needs to remain out of politics."
Kumar also briefed the US diplomat with an assessment of Chief Adviser Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed, lending credence to the widely-held view that Dr Ahmed was not in control of the government, but rather an "executor" for the military.
There is some praise for the progress made between BDR-BSF relations, and Kumar is also said to have asked for US help in getting Bangladesh to open up its economy. The British High Commission's then-political counsellor in Delhi, Alex Hall, also attended the meeting, with Osius entering to find the other two already discussing Bangladesh.
All three men agreed that the decision by the caretaker govt to allow Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia back into the country had put Bangladesh "on the crossroads." In a clear reference to what became known as the infamous 'Minus 2' strategy in Bangladesh, the three men all noted that the government had "gone back on its decision to remove the two women from the political scene."
In lieu of that, the three men foresaw three possible alternative scenarios, including an "unlikely" military coup. They assert that their respective countries should agree on "a core message" to take to the Fakhruddin government, pressing for elections and voter-list reforms, while again making clear that the military needs to stay out of politics.
The cable also notes how Kumar said Indian conglomerate TATA had complained to him about the caretaker government "impeding its entry" into Bangladesh. The rest of the cable contains some Indian frustrations over the volume of trade between the two countries, and then goes on to discuss Burma and Sri Lanka.
DGFI, and other topics The allegations made about the DGFI can be very damaging. The cable also reflects wide discrepancies between the NSI and RAB's assessments back then of the threat posed by HuJi. It also notes matter-of-factly that any move to enter the mainstream of Bangladeshi politics by the Huji, through the formation of the IDP, would probably not meet with much success, as the people would reject them.
The DGFI's efforts were also met with harsh resistance from the US embassy, and eventually shelved, according to a cable from the US Secretary of State in November 2008 to US embassies in Tripoli, Casablanca and Johannesburg. None of the cables released so far originate from the US embassy in Dhaka, although data compiled on the total cache of cables by The Guardian and Der Spiegel, indicates as many as 1984 cables sent from Dhaka to Washington, among the total of 251,287.
As of Saturday evening in Bangladesh, only 1618 of these cables have been released. That is less than 1% of the total number of cables obtained by WikiLeaks. Only a handful mention Bangladesh. Apart from the two mentioned above, the others refer to Bangladesh more generally within a group of nations, for example one that reveals the French government was planning to DNA-test visa applicants from Bangladesh and 8 other countries.
It may be expected that cables from the Dhaka embassy will start coming out in the near future, and they will contain the really juicy bits on what the thinking has been surrounding Bangladesh in international corridors of power. With the cables released so far representing only the tip of the iceberg, much more can be expected in the days to come. A time-series graph of the data relating to Bangladesh, specifically those originating from Dhaka, shows a great spike in the number of dispatches in 2009, as the world looked closely at Bangladesh's return to democracy.
Of the 1984 dispatches from Dhaka yet to be released (contrary to how the news has been represented in some sections of the Bangladeshi media today), 29 enjoy the top status 'Secret-No foreigners'; 93 are marked 'secret'; a further 28 are said to be 'confidential-no foreigners'; 693 are 'confidential'; 227 are 'unclassified-for official use only' and 914 are 'unclassified', according to Der Spiegel.
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