During this occupation, rather than a bold decisive response against the soldiers involved in the killing spree, the one-month old government of Awami League opted to negotiate with the mutineers, thus indirectly giving those soldiers enough time to hunt and kill all the military officers trapped inside occupied Pilkhana campus and commit an array of other crimes including loot, arson, rape etc.
Immediately after the incident, considering the sensitivity of the issue or out of political indecisiveness, while the main opposition party refrained from being overtly critical of governments stand, the media gave the government a free ride by not critically discussing government handling of the mutiny.
The media spin that was most widely used during the immediate aftermath was that by sacrificing 57 senior army officers, government prevented an even bigger civilian casualty in the heart of Dhaka. This logic is based on a hypothetical scenario that a group of paramilitary soldiers without heavy weapons will fight a fierce artillery gunfight and war with a combined force of the army, Navy and the air force and thus would endanger the safety of residents living in nearby areas.
Although government's decision got a free ride at the time of the incidence, it is imperative that we discuss the decision in a critical point of view. This kind of discussion is very important in formulating a national strategy for any such problem in the future.
First basic flaw in the civilian casualty spin is the hypothetical nature of the consequences. It is very difficult to believe that a group of BDR soldiers will be able to fight such a fierce war with armed forces. This sort of situation is not unprecedented in Bangladesh. Since independence there are instances where similar occupation/ hostage situation in the heart of Dhaka or other parts of the country were dealt with decisive military counter offensives. Examples can be cited are 1977 occupation of Dhaka Airport at Tejgaon, 1994 occupation of Ansar HQ in Khilgaon, 1977 revolt in Bogra cantonment.
Second logic was that it was a hostage situation and government had no option but to give in to the demands of the killers. Examples of Pakistan Lal Mosque, Aircraft hijacking, and lately Taj hotel etc were shown. But one has to understand that PIlkhana is not an aircraft or a mosque or a hotel. It is a part of Bangladesh, double the size of vatican city. It has two graduate level colleges, three schools, several mosques, botanical garden with rose/ orchid garden, paddy fields, markets, shops, zoo within it's walled boundary. In addition there are residential quarter, lush green fields and sports complex. It was not a hostage situation, it was occupation of a part of Bangladesh. A war was declared. A soldier, called for duty, was shot and killed in front of Pilkhana on 25th morning and another soldier was wounded who later died. Civilians were also shot at indiscriminately and killed.
Although heavily armed military units were deployed within 30 minutes of the first shot at PIlkhana, the forces were kept idle and later was withdrawn. While supreme commander and the army chief is expected to be in secure war room in defence HQ, our army chief was seen sitting all day at the unsecured civilian residence of the PM that was also within firing distance from Pilkhana.
The rest of the story is more pathetic. Mysteriously, after two days of permissive killing, all the mutineers fled the campus under cover of darkness. Frantic SOS calls from the brightest officers stopped one after one.
Two days later when mass graves, charred bodies were being discovered, most of the killers were out of reach with an unknown amount of weapons and ammunition.
A point is frequently made, that is, bloodshed could be avoided by government's 'cool headed' acts. It is painfully difficult to understand what this school of thought try to say. In any conventional war of modern time, loss of any general or other senior level military officer is seen as major debacle in any war. In all recent war literature, loss of senior officers, esp Generals, are depicted as one of the worst case scenario. We did not lose one General, we lost nearly fifty of our smartest, brightest and senior-most military officers. The whole of our army's senior command got destabilized. How can one find solace that blood loss could have been avoided by PM Hasina's able leadership? What about those 57 Military officers' blood?
In the coming years, there will be more discussion on handling of Pilkhana massacre. This would look like a big failure of PM and will keep haunting her.
When PM Hasina's father was being surrounded by the killers, his frantic phone calls did not bring any help from the Army high command or paramilitary Rakhkhi bahini. This has always been an issue of pain for Ms. Hasina. But when a similar SOS came to her, although her initial gut feeling supported sending in army, she later failed. A 15th August style massacre was replicated under her watch. Children of Major General Shakil or Colonel Mujib lost both of their parents and hundreds of others lost either their parents, husbands, brothers, sister, sons or daughters. Even teen age maid/ helping boys were also killed.
The reason of this command failure from civilian and military leadership was not PM Hasina's sole failure. There was inherent problem in her advisers. In Pilkhana type situation, it was the job of the military chief to set up command center, device a strategy, design specific plans and present the PM with the defense/ military perspective in dealing with such scenerio. In this regard, the person who failed most miserably is the then Army Chief. Post 1/11 role of this Army Chief created an uneasy relationship between him and the civilian leadership. PM could not trust this army chief. hence she kept him sitting in her leaving room all day in a kind of house arrest situation.
The government was very new too. It was the job of Chief of Army Staff to advise and convince PM to take prompt action and present her with the strategy and the plans. But this chief's post 1/11 activities handicapped his ability to perform his job with authority. This CAS had no moral or legal right to remain as Army chief after his failed coup of 1/11.
In ideal world, there must not be any lack of trust between the head of the government and the Army chief. If that develops, any patriotic army chief, who cares more for his forces and the country than his own job, should resign. CAS Moeen U Ahmed was so eager to keep his own job, he totally failed in his job to defend the country as well as protect his officers. He failed his army as well as the nation.
We must learn from our experience of 25th February. As a nation we must know what we will do if Myanmar send 500 mercenary to occupy Cox'sbazaar, or JMB takes over Bholarhat Upazilla and impose strict Islamic law or Maldives send troops to capture Mongla port? Would we send the local MP with white flag?
We always talk about the spirit of 1971. On 25th March night of 1971, EPR jawans/ officers were attacked in a similar way in the same garrison in Pilkhana. Those soldiers did not raise white flag citing neighborhood civilian. As a war was declared, EPR jawans of Pilkhana fought back.This is the spirit of 1971. A war was imposed on us on 25th february 2009. We raised white flag without fighting. This was not in line with spirit of 1971. May be our Chief Justice Mr ABM Khairul Haq, citing '71 er chetona' as the principle of of constitution, would write another 400 page verdict someday declaring governments BDR handling was illegal.Jokes aside, seriously speaking, if we have to send local MPs with white flags to deal with occupation and mutiny and make army retreat with their dead soldiers, Why we build and maintain the army?
A battle was imposed on us on 25th February 2009. We failed to respond appropriately, thus losing 57 of our brightest military officers.It is a shame. And it was a command failure of the civilian and military leadership.
[ First Published in rumiahmed.wordpress.com on the first anniversary of 25th February]
Updated: February 25 2011.
http://unheardvoice.net/blog/2011/02/25/the-war-that-was-never-fought/
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