Yeah, yeah. Its all cover up. ... and the poor Hijacker of Indian Airliner living in Pakistan, in who's name ISI had sent $ 100,000 in to account of leader of 9/11 Hijacker was killed to 'shut him up' by ISI also so, he would not reveal Pakistan's involvement in 9/11.
The Air Force Chief and at least a couple of other Generals, who FBI had wanted to interview for their involvement with Taliban and Al Qaeda were also killed in Pakistan by ISI to avoid getting exposed.
--- In alochona@yahoogroups.com, Isha Khan <bdmailer@...> wrote:
>
> Why the Planes Were Not Intercepted on 9/11
>
> The Wall Street Lawyer and the Special Ops Hijack Coordinator
>
> by Kevin Ryan
>
> Of the many unanswered questions about the attacks of September 11, one of
> the most important is: Why were none of the four planes intercepted? A
> rough answer is that the failure of the US air defenses can be traced to a
> number of factors and people. There were policy changes, facility changes,
> and personnel changes that had recently been made, and there were highly
> coincidental military exercises that were occurring on that day. But some
> of the most startling facts about the air defense failures have to do with
> the utter failure of communications between the agencies responsible for
> protecting the nation. At the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), two
> people stood out in this failed chain of communications. One was a lawyer
> on his first day at the job, and another was a Special Operations Commander
> who was never held responsible for his critical role, or even questioned
> about it.
>
> The 9/11 Commission wrote in its report that "On 9/11, the defense of U.S.
> airspace depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the FAA
> and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)."[1]
>
> According to the Commission, this interaction began with air traffic
> controllers (ATCs) at the relevant regional FAA control centers, which on
> 9/11 included Boston, New York, Cleveland, and Indianapolis. In the event
> of a hijacking, these ATCs were expected to "notify their supervisors, who
> in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA headquarters.
> Headquarters had a hijack coordinator, who was the director of the FAA
> Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate. "
>
> The hijack coordinator would then "contact the Pentagon's National Military
> Command Center (NMCC)" and "the NMCC would then seek approval from the
> Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance. If
> approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD's chain of
> command [to the interceptor pilots]."[2]
>
> The 9/11 Commission report (hereafter, "the report") indicated that the
> military was eventually notified about all the hijackings, but none of those
> notifications were made in time to intercept the hijacked aircraft. The
> report also contradicted a good deal of testimony given on the subject by
> suggesting that earlier statements made by military leaders, in testimony to
> the Commission, were "incorrect." The corrections to these statements led
> to a reassessment of how much time the military actually had to respond to
> requests for interception from the FAA. Ultimately, the report stated that
> "NEADS air defenders had nine minutes' notice on the first hijacked plane,
> no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no
> advance notice on the fourth."[3]
>
> The report does not place blame for the failure to intercept on any specific
> people in the chain of communications, but it specifically exonerates "NEADS
> commanders and officers" and "[i]ndividual FAA controllers, facility
> managers and Command Center managers*.*" In fact, the report goes so far as
> to praise these people for how well they did.[4] Curiously, the hijack
> coordinator at FAA headquarters was not mentioned in the list of those who
> were exonerated.
>
> The ATCs did notify their management as required, but further notification
> to FAA headquarters (FAA HQ) was apparently riddled with delays. FAA HQ got
> plenty of notice of the four hijacked planes, but failed to do its job. One
> of the most glaring examples was demonstrated by the failure of FAA HQ to
> request military assistance for the fourth hijacking, that of Flight 93.
>
> On page 28, the report says, "By 9:34, word of the hijacking had reached FAA
> headquarters." Despite this advance notice, Flight 93 "crashed" in
> Pennsylvania sometime between 10:03 and 10:07.
>
> To put this in perspective, at 9:34 it had been over 30 minutes since a
> second airliner had crashed into the World Trade Center (WTC). It was known
> that a third plane was hijacked, and it was about to crash into the
> Pentagon. Everyone in the country knew we were under a coordinated
> terrorist attack via hijacked aircraft because, as of 9:03, mainstream news
> stations including CNN had already been televising it.
>
> That was the situation when FAA HQ was notified about a fourth hijacking.
> Given those circumstances, an objective observer would expect the highest
> level of urgency throughout all levels of government in response to that
> fourth hijacking. But FAA management did not follow the protocol to ask for
> military assistance. The 9/11 Commission contends that FAA HQ gave air
> defenders no notice whatsoever of the hijacking of Flight 93 until after the
> plane had been destroyed. For whatever reasons, the FAA's Command Center
> (located in Herndon, VA) did not request military assistance, either. In
> fact, neither the Command Center nor FAA HQ contacted NMCC to request
> military assistance for any of the hijacked planes.
>
> Therefore it seems reasonable to look at the people whose roles were most
> important in this failed chain of communications. Once the entire country
> was aware that we were under attack and that planes were being hijacked and
> used as weapons, the two people who were most important to the FAA's
> response were: 1) the person running the FAA's national Command Center and
> 2) the hijack coordinator at FAA headquarters.
>
> It turns out that these two people were both new to their jobs. In fact, it
> was the first day on the job for Benedict Leo Sliney, the national
> operations manager at FAA's Command Center.
>
> *Benedict Sliney*
>
> Benedict Sliney was an ATC in the US Air Force during the Vietnam War and,
> after that, worked at the FAA for the first half of his professional
> career. In the 1980s, Sliney went on from the FAA to work as an attorney
> and continued in that career throughout the 1990s. He worked for several
> law firms during this time, handling various kinds of cases, and he was a
> partner in some of those firms.
>
> Sliney's clients included financial investors who were accused of Securities
> and Exchange violations. In one 1998 case, he represented Steven K.
> Gourlay, Jr., an employee of Sterling Foster. It was reported that Sterling
> Foster was "secretly controlled" by Randolph Pace and was at the center of
> "one of the most notorious scams ever."[5] Sliney got Gourlay's charges
> dropped in 1998, but, in a related 2002 case, Gourlay pled guilty to
> conspiracy to commit securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud, and was
> sentenced to six months in prison.[6,7]
>
> In the summer of 2000, Sliney represented Merrill Lynch in a case in which
> the delay of the transfer of clients' funds to Smith Barney was said to have
> "caused their investments with Merrill, Lynch to lose some $638,000 in
> value." Sliney was able to get Merrill Lynch off the hook.[8]
>
> For whatever reasons, Sliney decided to leave his lucrative law
> careerbehind just months before 9/11 in order to return to the FAA.
> It was
> reported that Jack Kies, FAA's manager of tactical operations, offered
> Sliney the job of Command Center national operations manager. Instead,
> Sliney asked to work as a specialist and he started in that role. Kies
> offered Sliney the national operations manager position again six months
> later, and Sliney accepted.[9] His first day on the job was 9/11/01.
>
> On 9/11, others present at the FAA's Command Center outranked Sliney.
> Interviews of those others, however, including Linda Schuessler and John
> White, confirm that Ben Sliney was given the lead in the Command Center's
> response to the hijackings that day. Despite that critical role, Sliney is
> mentioned only one time in the narrative of the 9/11 Commission report.
>
> According to the summary of his interview for the investigation, Sliney was
> first notified of "a hijack in progress" sometime between 8:15 and 8:20
> EDT. This was about the same time as communications were lost with American
> Airlines Flight 11, the first of the planes to be hijacked, and it was about
> 30 minutes before that plane crashed into the north tower of the World Trade
> Center (WTC). It was nearly two hours before Flight 93 was destroyed in
> Pennsylvania. Incredibly, according to Sliney's interview, it was not until
> after a second confirmed hijacking occurred and two planes had crashed into
> the WTC (nearly an hour after he learned about the first hijacking) that
> Sliney "realized that the hijackers were piloting the aircraft."[10]
>
> After the second tower was hit, Sliney responded by asking for a military
> response via the special military outfit assigned to the FAA's Command
> Center, the Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC). This was at approximately
> 9:06 am. At the time, one of the three military officers in the ATSC called
> the NMCC and that officer was told that "senior leaders" at the NMCC were
> "in a meeting to determine their response" to the attacks, and would call
> back.[11] As this example shows, there are at least as many unanswered
> questions about what went on at the NMCC that morning as there are about
> what happened at the FAA.[12]
>
> Several of the FAA's top people confirmed that the military was engaged and
> knew about the hijackings early on. This included Jeff Griffith at the
> Command Center and Monte Belger, the FAA's acting Deputy Administrator, who
> was present at FAA Headquarters. Belger stated that "[T]here were military
> people on duty at the FAA Command Center, as Mr. Sliney said. They were
> participating in what was going on. There were military people in the FAA's
> Air Traffic Organization in a situation room. They were participating in
> what was going on."[13]
>
> Sliney's interview summary is full of phrases like he "did not recall" and
> "was not aware," although he did recall "being informed" that interceptors
> were eventually launched (too late). Apparently, Sliney didn't even know
> what the fighters would do if they were launched. He recalled thinking:
> "Well, what are they going to do?" Additionally, in an apparent defensive
> posture, Sliney claimed "definitively that he did not receive a request to
> authorize a request to the military for assistance."[14]
>
> One might think that the national operations manager for the FAA's Command
> Center would not need a "request to authorize a request for military
> assistance" and that he might know what military assistance would entail.
> But Sliney's interview summary suggests that he did not even know what the
> protocol was for requesting military assistance in the event of a
> hijacking. Sliney's understanding on 9/11 "and today" (two years later,
> when the interview was conducted) was that an FAA request for military
> assistance "emanates from the effected Center…directly to the military*.*"
> That is, Sliney supposedly was not aware of any role that the FAAs' Command
> Center or FAA HQ might have had in the request for interception of hijacked
> aircraft. This appears to be in contradiction to the protocol given by the
> 9/11 Commission report and it is definitely in contradiction to the concept
> of a "hijack coordinator."
>
> In addition to the confusion about the Command Center's role in requesting
> military assistance, it seems there was only one person at FAA headquarters
> who was authorized to request military assistance. On 9/11, Ben Sliney was
> told that no one could find that one person. Sliney later recounted his
> experience learning of that fact in this way:
>
> I said something like, "That's incredible. There's only one person. There
> must be someone designated or someone who will assume the responsibility of
> issuing an order, you know." We were becoming frustrated in our attempts to
> get some information. What was the military response?[15]
>
> *Michael Canavan*
>
> The hijack coordinator at FAA headquarters, Lt. Gen. Michael A. Canavan, had
> been in his position for only nine months, and would leave the job within a
> month of 9/11. Surprisingly, although Mike Canavan was mentioned in the
> 9/11 Commission report, he was not cited for his role as the FAA's hijack
> coordinator, a role that was at the center of the failure to intercept the
> planes on 9/11.
>
> Instead of being mentioned as the hijack coordinator, Canavan was in the
> report because he had been the commander of the Joint Special Operations
> Command (JSOC), which ran the military's counterterrorism operations and
> covert missions. The report described Canavan's part in the failure to
> follow-through on a carefully laid-out 1998 CIA plan to capture Osama bin
> Laden (OBL) in Afghanistan. Canavan was quoted as saying that the plan put
> tribal Afghanis at too much risk and that the "operation was too complicated
> for the CIA."[16]
>
> Nearly the entirety of Canavan's career was in military special operations.
> He was a Special Forces soldier for many years, and before he was JSOC
> Commander, he was Special Operations Commander for the US European Command
> (SOCEUR), which included operations throughout Africa as well. Canavan was
> SOCEUR from 1994 to 1996 and JSOC Commander from 1996 to 1998.
>
> JSOC is a successor organization to the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC),
> which was a secret government-funded organization authorized by the National
> Security Council in 1948. The OPC was led by CIA director Allen Dulles and
> Frank Wisner, a State Department official who wielded unprecedented power
> due to his position in New York law and financial circles. The JSOC was
> created in 1980 by the Pentagon and run by Ted Shackley's OPC colleague,
> Richard Stillwell. According to author Joseph Trento, JSOC quickly became
> "one of the most secret operations of the US government."[17]
>
> Creation of the JSOC was, ostensibly, a response to the failed 1980 hostage
> rescue attempt in Iran called Operation Eagle Claw. JSOC immediately went
> on to engage in an "array of highly covert activities" by way of "black
> budgets."[18] This included operations in Honduras and El Salvador which
> supported the illegal wars associated with the Nicaraguan rebels called the
> Contras.
>
> In 1987, JSOC was assigned to a new military command called the US Special
> Operations Command (SOCOM) that came about through the work of Senator
> William S. Cohen. Senator Cohen went on to become the Secretary of Defense
> from 1997 to 2001, and it was he who led the Quadrennial Defense Review of
> 1997 that reduced the number of fighters actively protecting the
> continentalUS from 100 to 14.[19] Cohen is now chairman of The Cohen
> group, where he
> works with his Vice Chairman, Marc Grossman, whom FBI whistleblower Sibel
> Edmonds says figures prominently in the information she has been trying to
> provide.
>
> Interestingly, Hugh Shelton was the commander of SOCOM during the same years
> that Canavan was the commander of JSOC. Shelton went on to become the
> chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which is the highest position
> in the US military. He was in that position on September 11th and was, like
> Canavan, curiously absent for just the morning hours on that day.[20]
>
> In any case, it seems odd that Michael Canavan occupied what turned out to
> be the most important position relative to the failure to intercept the
> hijacked planes on 9/11 and was also involved in evaluating plans to capture
> OBL just three years earlier. Apart from the coincidence that he was
> selected as the most qualified person for both of those very different
> positions, he was also a central figure in these two different reasons why
> the 9/11 attacks were said to have succeeded.
>
> When he first started the job as FAA's hijack coordinator, just nine months
> before the attacks, Canavan was in charge of running training exercises that
> were "pretty damn close to [the] 9/11 plot,*"* according to John Hawley, an
> employee in the FAA's intelligence division.[21] In his comments to the 9/11
> Commission, Canavan denied having participated in any such exercises and the
> Commission apparently didn't think to reconcile the conflicting comments it
> had received from Hawley and Canavan on this important issue.
>
> That's not surprising in light of the fact that Canavan's treatment by the
> 9/11 Commission was one of uncritical deference. Reading through the
> transcript of the related hearing gives the impression that the Commission
> members were not only trying to avoid asking the General any difficult
> questions, but they were fawning over him.
>
> Lee Hamilton began his questioning of Canavan by saying "You're pretty tough
> on the airlines, aren't you?"[22] As with many of the statements and reports
> made by Hamilton, however, the evidence suggests that the opposite is true.
>
> In May 2001, Canavan wrote an internal FAA memorandum that initiated a new
> policy of more lax fines for airlines and airports that had security
> problems. The memo suggested that, if the airlines or airports had a
> written plan to fix the problem, fines were not needed. For whatever
> reason, the memo was also taken to mean that FAA agents didn't even have to
> enforce corrections as long as the airline or airport said they were working
> on it. Canavan's memo was repeatedly cited as a cause of failure to fix
> security problems in the months leading up to 9/11.[23,24]
>
> Canavan's job as hijack coordinator was clearly the most important link in
> the communications chain between the FAA and the military. But the 9/11
> Commission did not address this hijack coordinator position in terms of how
> it was fulfilled on 9/11, and did not mention the alarming fact that we
> don't know who actually handled the job of hijack coordinator on the day of
> 9/11. We don't know because Canavan said he was in Puerto Rico that morning
> and claimed to have missed out on "everything that happened that day."[25]
>
> Here is Canavan's exact statement to the Commission, in response to a
> question from Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste, whose questions were, like
> Hamilton's, rather submissive:
>
> Here's my answer — and it's not to duck the question. Number one, I was
> visiting the airport in San Juan that day when this happened. That was a
> CADEX airport, and I was down there also to remove someone down there that
> was in a key position. So when 9/11 happened, that's where I was. I was able
> to get back to Washington that evening on a special flight from the Army
> back from San Juan, back to Washington. So everything that transpired that
> day in terms of times, I have to — and I have no information on that now,
> because when I got back we weren't — that wasn't the issue at the time. We
> were — when I got back it was, What are we going to do over the next 48
> hours to strengthen what just happened?[26]
>
> One might think that the Commissioners would have expressed surprise at
> Canavan's rambling, somewhat incoherent claim that he was just not available
> during the events of 9/11. We would certainly expect the Commissioners to
> have followed up with detailed questions about who was in charge that day
> with respect to the most important role related to the failed national
> response. But that was not the case. Instead, Ben-Veniste redirected the
> discussion while "putting aside the issue." None of the other Commissioners
> said a word about Canavan being missing that day or even asked who was
> filling in for him as the primary contact between the FAA and the military
> with regard to hijackings. And, of course, the 9/11 Commission report did
> not mention any of it at all.
>
> In the interest of finding out what happened, we should return to the
> failure of FAA HQ to request military assistance for Flight 93. We should
> ask: What was FAA HQ doing with this information for those 30 minutes in the
> absence of the one person who was charged to do something about it?
> Apparently, for fifteen minutes, nothing was done. But after fifteen
> minutes, according to the 9/11 Commission report, the conversations were
> going nowhere.
>
> At 9:49, according to the report, this was the exchange between the FAA
> Command Center and FAA HQ.
>
> Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?
>
> FAA Headquarters: Oh, God, I don't know.
>
> Command Center: Uh, that's a decision somebody's gonna have to make
> probably in the next ten minutes.
>
> FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room*.*
>
> The Commission report says that ineffectual discussions about scrambling
> aircraft were still occurring at FAA HQ twenty minutes after it had received
> notification of the fourth hijacking.
>
> At 9:53 am, "FAA headquarters informed the Command Center that the deputy
> director for air traffic services was talking to Monte Belger about
> scrambling aircraft."
>
> Apart from contradicting Benedict Sliney's testimony that an FAA request for
> military assistance "emanates from the effected Center … directly to the
> military," this part of the 9/11 Commission report never mentions who the
> "deputy director for air traffic services" was. Tape recordings suggest
> that it was someone named Peter. This might have been Peter H. Challan, an
> engineer who had worked for the FAA since 1969 and had been Deputy Associate
> Administrator for Air Traffic Services since July 1999. But the Deputy
> Director of Air Traffic Services that day was Jeff Griffith. Monte Belger
> was the Deputy Administrator for the FAA, second in command to the FAA
> Administrator, Jane Garvey. Belger and Griffith later denied they ever had
> a conversation about scrambling aircraft, despite the 9/11 Commission
> stating this as fact.
>
> Jane Garvey was also present during the failed response at FAA HQ. She was
> the FAA Administrator from 1997 to 2002 and, coincidentally, in the years
> before that, had been the director of Logan International Airport in Boston,
> where two of the flights took off on 9/11. Apparently Garvey's record as
> director for the Logan airport, which had for many years the worst security
> record of any major airport, was not a problem for her nomination to the top
> job at FAA. It was Garvey who appointed Canavan to his role as Associate
> Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and, therefore, as hijack
> coordinator.
>
> In any case, in the absence of the hijack coordinator, the FAA was
> completely incompetent in terms of communicating the need to intercept the
> hijacked planes on 9/11. Officially, the only notice of the hijackings to
> the military came directly from the FAA centers, bypassing both the Command
> Center and FAA HQ. Boston Center reached the North East Air Defense Sector
> (NEADS) at 8:37 to request help with the first hijacking, and New York
> Center notified the military of the second hijacking at 9:03. NEADS only
> found out about the third hijacking at 9:34 by calling the Washington center
> to ask about Flight 11, and the military was said to have first learned
> about the hijacking of Flight 93 from Cleveland Center at 10:07. Still, none
> of the planes were intercepted.
>
> *9/11 and special operations*
>
> Although Michael Canavan was unavailable to perform his critical job
> function on 9/11, he was fully involved in the response to the attacks.
> Just two days later, he attended a "Principals Committee Meeting" chaired by
> Condoleezza Rice that included all of Bush's "war cabinet."[27] This meeting
> set the stage for how the new War on Terror would be conducted.
>
> Canavan later cashed in on the windfalls of the resulting wars and the
> privatization of military operations when he was hired on at Anteon
> International Corporation as president of its Information Systems Group. In
> doing so, he joined a number of prominent defense department alumni,
> including his former special operations colleague, SOCOM commander and JCS
> chairman Hugh Shelton, who was on the board of directors at Anteon.
>
> Since 9/11, covert activities have been encouraged at a much higher level,
> but, prior to 9/11, SOCOM was not supposed to conduct covert operations.
> Therefore, JSOC worked intimately with the CIA's clandestine division called
> the Special Activities Division (SAD). Canavan led those kinds of operations
> in northern Iraq, Liberia and Bosnia. He ran special operations in Croatia
> in 1996 and, according to President Clinton, was the one who
> identified Secretary
> of Commerce Ron Brown's body after Brown's plane crashed there.[28]
>
> JSOC regularly works with foreign intelligence agencies, including the
> Mossad.[29] It has been involved with hijackings, for example that of
> the *Achille
> Lauro* and TWA Flight 847. It has also operated from bases in foreign
> countries, such as Saudi Arabia, for many years.[30] Presidential Decision
> Directive PDD-25 gave JSOC one of the rare exemptions from the Posse
> Comitatus Act of 1878, which means that JSOC can legally conduct its
> missions within the US.[31]
>
> In the "War on Terror", the special mission units of JSOC have been given
> the authority to pursue secret operations around the world. JSOC
> effectively operates outside the law, capturing and killing people with or
> without the knowledge of the host countries in which it operates. JSOC
> missions are always low-profile, and the US government will not acknowledge
> any specifics about them.
>
> Reporter Seymour Hersh has reported that the JSOC was under the command of
> Vice President Dick Cheney after the attacks.[32] Hersh also claimed that
> the leaders of JSOC "are all members of, or at least supporters of, the
> Knights of Malta" and that "many of them are members of Opus Dei."[33] The
> ties between the Knights of Malta and high-level US intelligence personnel,
> including William Casey and William Donovan, have been well-documented.[34]
> Such accusations have also been made of Louis Freeh, who headed the FBI from
> 1993 to June 2001 and would have worked closely with Canavan and Shelton in
> the pursuit of special operations targets.
>
> Other special operations leaders who were involved in the lack of response
> on 9/11 included Richard Armitage, who was present on the Secure Video
> Teleconference (SVTS) during the attacks.[35] This was the White House
> meeting chaired by Richard Clarke, which the 9/11 Commission said convened
> at 9:25 and included leaders of the CIA, the FBI, the FAA, as well as the
> departments of State, Defense and Justice. Even with all those leaders in
> on the call, nothing was done to stop Flight 93 from "crashing" that
> morning, approximately 40 minutes after the call began. Instead, we were
> left completely undefended.
>
> Like Canavan and Shelton, Armitage was involved in special operations in
> Vietnam and later was reportedly involved in several of the most well-known
> covert operations in US history, including the Phoenix Program and the
> Iran-Contra crimes.[36] Although he had spent many years in the Defense
> department, he was Deputy Secretary of State on 9/11. After the invasion of
> Iraq, he was identified as the one who betrayed CIA agent Valerie Plame by
> revealing her identity, apparently in retaliation for her husband's attempt
> to set the record straight on weapons of mass destruction. Armitage
> admitted he revealed Plame's identity, but claimed it was done
> inadvertently.[37]
>
> Another special operations soldier who testified to the 9/11 Commission and
> played a significant role with regard to the airlines and facilities prior
> to 9/11 was Brian Michael Jenkins. While Shelton and Canavan were running
> SOCOM and JSOC, Jenkins was the deputy chairman of Kroll when that company
> was designing the security system for the World Trade Center (WTC)
> complex.[38]
>
> Jenkins was appointed by President Clinton to be a member of the White House
> Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, where he collaborated with James
> Abrahamson of WTC security company Stratesec, and FBI director (and alleged
> Opus Dei member) Louis Freeh. In 1999 and 2000, Jenkins served as an
> advisor to the National Commission on Terrorism, led by L. Paul Bremer, who
> went on to be an executive of WTC impact zone tenant, Marsh & McLennan, and
> then the Iraq occupation governor. Jenkins returned to the RAND
> Corporation, where he had previously worked with Donald Rumsfeld,
> Condoleezza Rice, Frank Carlucci of The Carlyle Group, and Paul Kaminski of
> Anteon.
>
> Lieutenant Colonel John Blitch was yet another special operations soldier
> who played a big part in the events immediately following 9/11. Blitch
> spent his career in the US Army's Special Forces and was said to have
> retired just the day before 9/11 to become an employee of Science
> Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Immediately following the
> attacks, he was put in charge of the team of robotic machine operators that
> explored the pile at Ground Zero, using devices that had previously been
> used for elimination of unexploded ordnance.
>
> *Conclusions*
>
> Despite being given plenty of notice about the four planes hijacked on 9/11,
> FAA management did not request military assistance to ensure the planes were
> intercepted before they crashed. The 9/11 Commission attributes this to a
> string of gross failures in communication between the FAA and the military
> on 9/11. However, the report places no blame on any of the people who were
> involved and doesn't even mention the one person who was most important to
> this chain of communications.
>
> One of the most important people involved was Benedict Sliney, who had, just
> before 9/11, left a lucrative law career defending Wall Street financiers to
> return to work as a specialist at the FAA. It was his first day on the
> job. With regard to ensuring military interception of the hijacked planes,
> he said he did not receive a "request to authorize a request." Sliney also
> claimed to not know that FAA management at the Command Center, where he was
> in charge, or FAA HQ, had any role in requests for military assistance.
> This is in contradiction to the stated protocol in the 9/11 Commission
> report and also the idea of an FAA "hijack coordinator."
>
> The FAA hijack coordinator was Michael Canavan, a career special operations
> commander who had come to the civilian FAA job only nine months before
> 9/11. According to an FAA intelligence agent, one of the first things
> Canavan did in that job was lead and participate in exercises that were
> "pretty damn close to the 9/11 plot." He was also known within the FAA for
> writing a memo just a few months before 9/11 that instituted a new leniency
> with regard to airport and airline security.
>
> With regard to the communication failures, Canavan offered the unsolicited
> excuse that he was absent during the morning hours of 9/11, in Puerto Rico.
> The 9/11 Commission did not pursue this excuse, nor did it ask who was
> filling the critical hijack coordinator role in Canavan's absence. In fact,
> the 9/11 Commission report didn't address the hijack coordinator role at
> all. The report mentioned Sliney only once in the entire narrative and did
> not refer to Canavan in his role as hijack coordinator.
>
> When a new, honest investigation is finally convened, it should look into
> why a lawyer, who knew how to handle evidence and get financiers off the
> hook, was experiencing his first day on the job as national operation
> manager at the FAA. And If 9/11 was a "special operation" as many people
> now suspect, that investigation might consider that a number of special
> operations specialists were in place to ensure that the operation went off
> without a hitch and was not discovered. Long-time special operations
> leaders like Michael Canavan, Hugh Shelton, Brian Michael Jenkins, and
> Richard Armitage played critical parts with respect to the facilities,
> events, and official story of 9/11. These facts seem worth investigating.
>
> *References*
>
> [1] The 9/11 Commission Report, page 14
>
> [2] The 9/11 Commission report, pages 17 to 18
>
> [3] The 9/11 Commission report, page 34
>
> [4] Ibid
>
> [5] Matthew Goldstein, When Bad Scams Go Good, The Wall Street Journal, May
> 21, 2001,
> http://www.smartmoney.com/investing/stocks/when-bad-scams-go-good-10573/
>
> [6] NASD Regulation, Inc. Office of Dispute Resolution, Arbitration No.
> 9644952
>
> [7] Westlaw citation WL 31426028, United States District Court, S.D. New
> York, No. 00 CR 91-11 RWS, Oct. 28, 2002
>
> [8] United States District Court, E.D. New York, 103 F.Supp.2d 579, Downes
> v. O'Connell, 103 F.Supp.2d 579 (2000)
>
> [9] Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That
> Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11, Free Press, 2008, page 2
>
> [10] 9/11 Commisison memorandum for the record, Interview with Benedict
> Sliney, May 21, 2004
>
> [11] History Commons 9/11 Timeline page for John Czabaranek,
> http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=john_czabaranek_1
>
> [12] Matthew Everett, The Repeatedly Delayed Responses of the Pentagon
> Command Center on 9/11, 911blogger.com, November 7, 2010,
> http://911blogger.com/news/2010-11-07/repeatedly-delayed-responses-pentagon-command-center-911
>
> [13] History Commons 9/11 Timeline page for Monty Belger,
> http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=monty_belger
>
> [14] 9/11 Commisison memorandum for the record, Interview with Benedict
> Sliney, May 21, 2004
>
> [15] History Commons 9/11 Timeline page for Ben Sliney,
> http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=ben_sliney
>
> [16] The 9/11 Commission report, page 113
>
> [17] Peter Dale Scott, American War Machine, Rowan & Littlefield, 2010
>
> [18] Harvey M. Sapolsky, Benjamin H. Friedman, Brendan Rittenhouse Green, US
> military innovation since the Cold War: creation without destruction, Taylor
> & Francis Publishers, 2009
>
> [19] History Commons 9/11 Timeline profile for William S. Cohen,
> http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=william_s._cohen
>
> [20] History Commons 9/11 Timeline profile for Henry Hugh Shelton,
> http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=henry_h._shelton
>
> [21] 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the Record (MFR) on John Hawley
> interview, October 8, 2003,
> http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00608.pdf
>
> [22] Transcript of 9/11 Commission public hearing of May 23, 2003, 9/11
> Commission Archive,
> http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm
>
> [23] Andrew R. Thomas, Aviation Security Management: Volume 1, Greenwood
> Publishing Group, page 78,
> http://terrortalk.org/myfiles/Terrorism%20Books/Aviation%20Security%20Management.pdf
>
> [24] Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, FAA Culture of Bureaucracy Stymies Security
> Reform Efforts, Critics Say, Los Angeles
>
> [25] History Commons 9/11 Timeline profile for Mike Canavan,
> http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=mike_canavan#a830faahijackcoordinator
>
> [26] Interview of Michael Canavan, 9/11 Commission Public Hearing, May 23,
> 2003,
> http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing2/9-11Commission_Hearing_2003-05-23.htm
>
> [27] 9/11 Commission Report, footnote 36 to Chapter 10
>
> [28] White House press briefing by Leon Panetta, January 10, 1996
>
> [29] Gordon Thomas, Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad, Thomas
> Dunne Books, 1995, pp 309-310
>
> [30] John T. Carney, Benjamin F. Schemmer, No Room for Error: The Story
> Behind the USAF Special Tactics Unit, Presido Press, 2002, p 232
>
> [31] Graeme C. S. Steven, Rohan Gunaratna, Counterterrorism: a reference
> handbook, ABC-CLIO, 2004, p 230
>
> [32] Abbas Al Lawati, `You can't authorise murder': Hersh, Gulf News, May
> 12, 2009,
> http://gulfnews.com/news/region/palestinian-territories/you-can-t-authorise-murder-hersh-1.68504
>
> [33] Blake Hounshell, Seymour Hersh unleashed, Foreign Policy, January 18,
> 2011, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/18/seymour_hersh_unleashed
>
> [34] Matthew Phelan, Pulitzer Prize Winner Seymour Hersh And The Men Who
> Want Him Committed, WhoWhatWhy.com, Feb 23, 2011,
> http://whowhatwhy.com/2011/02/23/pulitzer-prize-winner-seymour-hersh-and-the-men-who-want-him-committed/
>
> [35] Summary of 9/11 Commission interview with John Flaherty, Chief of Staff
> for Secretary of Transportation, Norman Mineta, April 2004
>
> [36] Spartacus Educational webpage for Richard Armitage,
> http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKarmitage.htm
>
> [37] CNN Politics, Armitage admits leaking Plame's identity, September 08,
> 2006,
> http://articles.cnn.com/2006-09-08/politics/leak.armitage_1_novak-and-other-journalists-cia-officer-valerie-plame-patrick-fitzgerald?_s=PM:POLITICS
>
> [38] Kevin R. Ryan, Demolition Access To The WTC Towers: Part Two –
> Security, 911Review.com, August 22, 2009,
> http://911review.com/articles/ryan/demolition_access_p2.html
>
>
> *Kevin R. Ryan* began to investigate the tragedy of September 11th, 2001
> through his work as Site Manager for a division of Underwriters Laboratories
> (UL). He was fired by UL in 2004 for writing to the National Institute of
> Standards and Technology (NIST), asking about its World Trade Center
> investigation and UL's work to ensure the fire resistance of the buildings.
> He now serves as co-editor of the Journal of 9/11 Studies, and board
> director at Architects and Engineers for 9/11 Truth. Ryan has co-authored
> several books and peer-reviewed scientific articles on the subject. Read
> more articles by Kevin
> Ryan<http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/author/kevin-ryan/>
> .
> *http://ultruth.wordpress.com/* <http://ultruth.wordpress.com/>
>
> http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/29/why-the-planes-were-not-intercepted-on-911/
>
------------------------------------
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