Prof Dr Dilara Choudhury
While analysing democracy and civil-military relations in Bangladesh, two very important statements are noteworthy. First, in 1991, the newly elected Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, after resolving the debate over presidential vis-à-vis parliamentary system in bipartisan manner, stated that the Jatiya Sangshad was a symbol of the nation's collective wisdom, and it would take a hot-headed general to drive his tanks through that House (Talukdar Maniruzzaman: 1992).
Such was the prevalent euphoria in the country about the future of democracy and the consequent prospect of a healthy civil-military relation. Khaleda Zia's statement signified a turning point in Bangladesh's civil-military relations in the context of military's interventions in politics for more than a decade, despite constitutional provision (Article 103) and the Army Act (Articles 292 and 293). It was justifiably assumed that with the deepening of democracy classical civil-military relations -- i.e. civilian control of military, which lies at the very heart of any functional democracy -- would be established. Crafting a functional democracy was the litmus test for the political leaders of Bangladesh.
Regrettably, even after nearly twenty years of a democratic order, the military's potential intervention in politics still looms large in the horizon as indicated by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's recent statement while explaining the reason for the abolition of the caretaker government (CTG). Although her decision to abolish the system of CTG has been politically motivated, she tried to convince the opposition of her view that the possibility of military intervention through CTG -- like in 2007. However, her statement encapsulated the ominous fact that Bangladesh Army is a significant factor in Bangladesh politics. Why has Bangladesh not been able to establish a classical civil-military relation whereas it is a success story for military intervention prone South American countries like Nicaragua, Brazil and Chile? Why, after so many years of democracy, are we still living under the shadow of the military?
Tragically, the principle reason lies in the nature of our politics, which is characterised by deadly confrontations, revenge, and struggle for power by the two major political parties, giving rise to a dysfunctional democratic order with an abysmal record of institution building. This is equally applicable when it comes to institutionalising a classical civil-military relation. It is a gargantuan task, especially in countries where the military, even after quitting state power, are reluctant to give up their residual powers, exercise power from behind the scene and look for opportunities to seize power again. Problems are exacerbated if the party-systems are fraught with myriad difficulties like lack of consensus, mutual trust, and overt quest for power. As such, the leadership of these countries must muster all their wisdom and ingenuity to deepen democracy and, to begin with, try to get rid of army's residual powers.
Unfortunately though, Bangladesh belongs to the above-mentioned category. The leadership has fallen short of demonstrating political acumen. Due to mutual antagonism successive regimes, despite some positive developments like chalking out peacetime role for the military, setting up of military academies and schools to inculcate professionalism, establishment of channels and institutions ensuring regular communications between civil-military leaders, strengthening of Parliamentary Committees and improving relations between media and ISPR, wanted to keep the armed forces on their respective sides due to a widely accepted perception that to win the elections they need the tacit support of the army.
This ominous fact has, recently, been highlighted by AL general secretary's recent statement that all previous CTGs were military governments. As a result, both leaders, when in power, allegedly try to please the army. Both have reiterated that they would build a modern army, though there is no clear-cut defense policy. Parties in power have also, instead of formulating the right policies, especially a comprehensive defense policy, and creating a vibrant defence ministry through which the military would be subordinated to civilian leaders and society at large, tried to control the army via dual command. Holding of the defense ministry portfolio by the prime minister herself, creation of ad-hoc headquarters, bifurcation of the defense ministry and placement of the Armed Forces Division under the prime minister, have blocked the traditional command channel (Defense Ministry) under which the chiefs of three services operate. Files for the president's approval are processed, signifying that the prime minister wants to deal with important military matters herself, in other words, exercise control through her trusted P.S.O. who advises her on military matters, and processes files for the president's approval.
These developments, as well as their attempts to win over the military, have accelerated the politicisation of the institution. As a result, successive regimes have either failed, or are not willing, to eliminate the military's residual powers, which should have been the first step towards the desired goal. Military budgets are still nontransparent and unaccountable. There is no explanation why the budget has tripled in the last eleven years. A tendency to appoint retired or on lien army officials in civil administration, which is on the rise (78 during past BNP regime and 178 during two and half years of the present regime), also demonstrates the military's clout in politics. The points above clearly show why Bangladesh's democratic political order is still vulnerable to military intervention.
It should be understood that military intervention in politics cannot be prevented through a constitutional bar. Whereas rooting democracy firmly, steady economic growth, and sound law and order situation can keep the military away from mainstream politics. What is then the fundamental duty of our political leadership? The politicians must fully adhere to their commitment to democracy, try to come to a sort of agreement like the "Charter of Democracy," signed by late Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif before Pakistan's 2007 parliamentary elections, and stop their alleged activities to try to involve the military in their partisan battles.
They must realise that democracy will end in Bangladesh if there is another military intervention, which will also mean the end of Bangladesh. It is their legal and moral responsibility to save the nation from that grim possibility.
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