Peace in CHT: A perspective on the military's role
A. F. Jaglul Ahmed
It has been more than a decade that the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) peace accord was signed. And it appears from the media and a few other groups that peace by and large seems to be far despite the sincere efforts of the government. The government's efforts in terms of handing over of the remaining subjects to the Hill District Councils, forming various committees to expedite the peace process, bringing normalcy in the daily life of the people living in CHT, undertaking development activities, and, above all, the shift in the working procedures, indicate that peace is near rather than far.
The factors that militate against peace are; individual and communal clashes over multiple claims on land, parochial political activities revolving more around fomenting communal tension rather than politics, armed group activities in disguise often portraying the situation as highly volatile due to unbalanced media coverage, uncompromising attitude of both the tribal and non-tribal groups on conflicting issues bringing both face to face on insignificant matters drawing, at times, national and international focus.
One who lives/works in the CHT would see the situation as quite normal. However, one who visits the area for a short-while or is seldom in touch with CHT affairs might view the situation with suspicion. Nevertheless, the actual state can only be determined through the lens of different actors who matter for establishing peace in CHT and whose views also vary. It took a long time to realise before the peace accord was signed that the problem was not a military one. The political and economic development partners and others like the media were quite late in getting involved in the peace process. The military played the lead role for long and according to some critics, are still playing it. Undeniably for various reasons, the military is critical in maintaining a congenial environment for making of peace complete. Other actors are reactive, some proactive or too active, to play their role to contribute to making peace or making it more complicated.
The efforts to establish peace before and after the signing of the accord have not yet been seen from the time point of view. Of the total engagement of the military in last thirty-five years, only fourteen years, after the accord, have been spent to implement peace. Perception of the method of establishing peace varies between various members of the military because "fighting" for peace is more difficult than winning a war. When there was combat situation for which the military was trained, providing direction was easier.
The military has to depend more on the wisdom and experiences of contemporary insurgency situations around the globe than a clear cut textbook solution. Experiences gained by militaries across the globe or from recorded history are different than that of ours. Our military, like in all other nations, believes in the Clausewitzian concept of victory as being the ultimate end state of all kinds of conflicts. And like Clausewitz, it is difficult for the military to view peace as the end state of all conflicts. Therefore, the tendency of the military is to first clearly determine the enemy that has to be defeated. Not an exception, our military on its first entry into CHT looked for the enemy and found the derailed group merged with the innocent tribal community.
The entire tribal community appeared to be the enemy but had to be engaged in general to segregate them from the real enemy. As a result, the innocent who underwent some collateral damages due to the prevalent combat situation nurture a hostile feeling towards the military. The military on its part finds it difficult to convince these people of their role and thus falters in advancing peace. The military's post-accord method of "fighting" for peace proves inadequate largely due to the antagonistic attitude of many tribal people, which is shaped by their pre-accord experiences. The misgivings exist even today and it is difficult to identify those that are fused with the entire tribal community and acting against peace. Under such a mind frame, the method of fighting is more often than not decided equivocally.
The fighting method in the pre-accord era was easier to be passed on from one person to another as the method was textbook-oriented and the situation was fast moving, where a sense of urgency always prevailed because of many factors. But in the post-accord era, the textbook method of combat disappeared, the face of the enemy got blurred and the sense of urgency of the soldiers vanished due to reduction in the level of threat. For any newcomer in CHT, the starting point is difficult to decide, legacy from the last is perhaps out of question. Unfortunately, when the military turned its end state from victory to peace, it was not understood clearly by the ethnic people. Therefore, the military is still labeled by many as an oppressive force.
At the tactical level at times, the military has to cope with the experience of the pre-accord era to deal with the post-accord situation. Some of the military personnel, now in high ranks, have to shift their approach of work from the ground experience of the much lower ranks. Sometimes it is not easy to make a clear shift and make it clear to the people associated with it. Clashes occur at times between the strategic and tactical methods of "fighting" for peace. A benign approach is always assumed to deal with the situation at the strategic level, but aggression is the normative approach at the tactical level for any military operation. How to switch from a combative to a benign mindset is a dilemma.
The military, at the tactical level, looks for immediate success, whereas what constitutes success is also not very clear in the post-accord situation. Even when the perception of the end state equally exists in all, the good efforts for a noble purpose fail to draw focus due to hostile propaganda by various quarters. Due largely to all these, operational or tactical focus sometimes fail to connect the strategic end state. With all these limitations, more often than not, the military is labeled as the impediment to peace, leaving it no scope to justify otherwise. Not too many books have been written by the old generation of the military to guide their new generation. The military still struggles to determine if the peace in CHT is far or near, and difficult or easier to achieve.
The author is currently commanding an infantry brigade in CHT.
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=212731
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Peace in CHT: A perspective on the role of the locals and media
Regional political activities that fomented communal tension rather than good politics, and uncompromising attitude, have affected the people adversely since the historic CHT Peace Accord was signed on December 2, 1997. Therefore, we need to pay more attention to the people and politics centering CHT.
While one cannot question the sincerity in approach the traditional method of looking at the issue has created complexity. The traditional approach to peace making in CHT did not change with the change of government. The overall situation there has often been considered insignificant compared to other complicated issues at the national level. There was very little dynamism in decision making; nor were experienced people posted in CHT to deal with the situation more efficiently.
Because of the divisive political culture of the country, peace in CHT has also been addressed with the same divisive outlook, failing to build trust in the locals. As a result, neither could mainstream politics be established nor could local politics mature to add to political plurality for the better future of the area and the country. Many of the local leaders who sacrificed so much for peace in CHT have also merged into mainstream politics, which has caused frustration in the locals. Politically, maximum effort has only been put during a crisis, and the focus shifted elsewhere as soon as the situation was brought under control, mostly by the security forces. Penetration of vicious groups in the disguise of various development activities has been seldom identified, or efforts made to deal with them politically.
The same perception like the military exists in the civil administration of the pre and post-accord scenario. The civil administration, like in the pre-accord time, still feels that the onus of peace remains on the military even in the post-accord phase despite the fact that they are the most important stakeholders in fructifying peace. At the same time, their working procedure doesn't seem to vary from that of the plains. As in the plains, they still feel that the people should be dependent on them for service rather than them towards the people of CHT. They seldom realise the need for quick response to arrest a crisis. Conventionalism is the method of operation. Bureaucracy and "red tape" prevent them from taking the driving seat. As a result, they fail to understand the situational change, and take a primitive outlook in dealing with the peace process. The role of the political actors for peace in CHT is more of pessimism than hope for the people.
The tribals at the elitist level, who were instrumental in bringing peace in CHT, had taken a "u-turn" historically. Starting from the British colonial period, they had never placed confidence on any kind of government. Confusion always prevailed as to what was good for them, which made them lose sympathy of the government. The tendency was always to walk backwards instead of moving forward.
There was always a dearth of elites to lead their struggle and it remains so today, and adequate number of elites for the next generation has not been created to inherit the ideal of their cause. Thus, the new generation can hardly grasp the spirit of the movement that the old generation had borne. Besides, leadership had remained in limited hands for decades, and fairness in their approach was twisted for individual gains. Peace, therefore, suffers at their hands, or it could be also said that it is slowed down by them implicitly while they explicitly proclaim otherwise.
The comparatively educated handful of youths at the mid-level doesn't find space to operate to lead the peace process due to the stubborn attitude of the old elites. Some of these elites have again been merged into the mainstream political culture. They have failed to exploit their portfolio for the benefit of the general mass and for peace, which eventually tarnished their ideal image. The lot of the majority of the innocent and poor tribals has not changed at all.
Thus the marginalised hill people are not too far wrong when they say that as yet peace is too far, although the same is also said by the elites. The poor education standard in CHT and the inability of most of the tribals to compete with the plains most often force them to return to CHT to be either absorbed by different NGOs or by miscreant groups. The other large segment of the population, the non-tribals are gradually gaining power by their sheer numbers but not intellectually. The mismatch of intellectuality between the tribals and non-tribal elites is the main reason for the failure to reach a compromise during a crisis, causing the prospect of a permanent peace in CHT to recede further.
With a much more secured environment than before, there is complete freedom of movement for everybody, even in the remotest areas of CHT.
Easy access to the people and to technology in CHT has made the media a powerful actor to portray peace in CHT in an objective manner; but that is not always the case. Needless to say, there is a difference in orientation, in perspective, and in ideological leanings within the media, which has been exploited by the elite tribals of CHT to portray the current status of the peace process in their own ways, which are not always consistent with reality.
The media is also playing its role from divided camps. There is an unhealthy competition by the electronic and print media through the abuse of various stringer journalists. Most of the media personnel being locals believe in serving their bosses more than serving their cause. The voice of the ordinary people is seldom heard and the elite's views are focused on mainly portraying that as the real situation. As a result, the ordinary people are befooled and national and international opinion is shaped against the situation, which is otherwise peaceful.
Any small gunfight in an intra-party clash is blown up in the first page of the newspapers or shown as running scroll in the television channels. This shows that the situation is volatile in the public mind, and questions the credibility of the security forces as well as the government's intention to implement peace.
The good work or the prolonged calm in the CHT fails to attract the eyes of the readers as these do not make interesting news. Besides, the media, with their various views, depict contrasting pictures of peace in CHT from which it is hard to form an objective view of the actual situation on the part of the general readers. Therefore, peace in CHT appears to the general people to be what the media portrays, however unreal that may be.
(This is Part 2 of a three-part article on CHT. The first part appeared in the December 4 issue.)
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=213692
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Peace in CHT: A perspective on development
Since long a lot of development programmes had been undertaken in CHT by many of our development partners. However, more needs to be done to fulfill the needs of the tribal people. And there are significant realities that the state faces, and those are felt by the "loyal soldiers" too. Therefore, this paper will analyse the peace and development issues of CHT and look for newer approaches for a long-lasting peace as the people dream.
The development partners were chosen from the national and international nongovernmental organisations, and their entry was encouraged to ensure inflow of cash into CHT to complement the government's development initiatives. Millions of dollars were poured into different projects for five to ten years' development goal. But ironically, the only visible developments in CHT till now are the initiatives taken by the government. Millions of dollars may have been poured in CHT by various development partners but visible effect is yet to be seen or even recognised by the people of CHT.
The development partners have, on the other hand, engaged the elite tribals tactfully to ensure publicity of their development work despite the ambiguous outcomes. A generous outlook was shown to the development partners by the government with the idea that whatever is donated by them will enhance the government's development efforts. The generosity of the government and the crafty play by the elites in CHT have been able to project these development partners as the real saviours of the tribal people. These partners have been somewhat of an alternative to the government, at least to the elites in CHT. Therefore, the state of peace in CHT is what is perceived by these development partners and echoed by the people of CHT.
Significant progress has been made as regards the creation of local government promised by the Accord despite the fact that it lacks legitimacy under the unitary system of government of Bangladesh. One can question the effectiveness of this local governance due to incomplete authority given to them or lack of proper rules of business for establishing clear co-relation to the other institutions and the traditional feudal character of "local administration."
Transfer of a number of subjects to this local government has already been done. The constitutional caveats didn't allow the handover of all the subjects, specifically those related to revenue, which are still controlled by the central government. An accord was signed agreeing to the many demands without considering how those could be applied to two different categories of inhabitants of CHT; it is difficult to provide the constitutional rights to the tribals ignoring the other community. Even before the government could really provide them such rights, legal complications have arisen due to a writ petition submitted in the High Court. Despite the constitutional complications, numbers of constitutional bodies have been formed to facilitate the process of peace, although their effectiveness is under question for different reasons.
If the government claims substantial progress in the implementation of peace, it is theoretically difficult to challenge it. But the perception of the other stakeholders is quite different. The military continues to be in the driving seat to control the overall situation as law enforcing agencies and civil administration have not been developed substantially. The military therefore, doesn't feel the real progress in peace implementation at the tactical level. The other actors, like the people, media or development partners etc., have a different view of the state of peace in CHT. Because of the fact that these actors have turned more powerful than others, the state of peace portrayed by them appears more credible to the national or international observers.
Removal of Bengalis settled in the '80s from CHT, withdrawal of the military, conventional management of land by the tribals, and voting rights of Bengalis are the four cardinal issues of CHT. In number they may be only four, but for their complexity they stand unparalleled to a lot that has been already done. Thus, the claims of substantial progress of the government pale into insignificance when juxtaposed with these four issues. And when publicising the lack of progress the aforementioned actors conveniently overlook the complexities of the matter.
The military should not be considered as an occupational force. Regrettably, all benign activities of the military are still labeled as evil by the elites of CHT and the common people believe so unwittingly. The military is working selflessly without any effort to publicise its activities. The fact that the peace effort was initiated by the military and carried through by the politicians has been forgotten due to long lapse of time and also due to the fact that other actors have turned out to be more influential.
Fourteen years and changeover of four democratic governments couldn't yet deliver what was expected by the people. A complete set-up of local government in the running of the affairs could not be established due to the constitutional provisions. Handover of all the thirty-two subjects prescribed in the Accord is perhaps difficult because of the constitutional stipulation. The latest denial of the government to accept the locals as indigenous people has been seen as an effort to marginalise them. The peace process is blocked and the hearts of the tribal people are broken and the political approach needs a review. The reality is, even the handover of all the subjects will not ensure peace unless the four aforementioned cardinal issues are resolved, which is indeed critical for any government.
The economic approach has also failed to deliver as was projected. The entire gamut of development in CHT as seen is: fifteen hundred kilometers of roads, increase in the number of schools and hospitals, telecommunication and things like that. The youth have no opportunity for jobs, except for a small segment absorbed by the NGOs and IOs. The benefit of the economic approach is again taken by the elites and the ordinary people are left out of it.
A lot of money has been poured into CHT by the IOs and NGOs and people feel that the lion's share has been pocketed by the elites without any significant development in changing their lives. Major development projects are being undertaken by the government, but cannot be projected properly because a vicious circle has grown to deprive the ordinary people. It is felt, though not expressed by the local people, that the military approach is the better option for development to bring changes in the lives of ordinary people.
The direct military, political or economic approach seems to have failed to ensure peace as per the dream of the general people. Direct approach will perhaps not succeed due to the complexities of the current situation and loss of public trust in them. Leaving it to time to take care of the peace is not the right idea as that will sideline the tribal population and make the non-tribals benefit eventually.
The tribal elites, getting the maximum benefit from all the actors, will keep the problem alive as long as they enjoy the benefits. An alternative method of attaining peace must be looked for so as to sideline the elites and involve the ordinary class in the process. Economic benefits must be ensured for the ordinary people, as well as their participation in different activities. Education at the middle level must be developed and job opportunities should be created for them in CHT.
Employment opportunities will only occur if sufficient power or electricity is ensured to allow the private entrepreneurs to invest. Frequent arrangement of reality shows, sports, theater etc could restore trust of the tribals in the government. The military can be the main partner, having been involved in the situation the longest. They can be the most effective actors to contribute to the process which can restore trust of the people in the military.
Midlevel leadership must be allowed to grow and establish local contact to avoid the rigid and old-fashioned leadership, which impedes instead of facilitates peace. Regional politics must be allowed to grow to add plurality in national politics. Finally, a piloted programme of the land issues can be undertaken to show that success can also be achieved in critical issues that are apparently intractable.
The author is currently commanding an infantry brigade in CHT.
(This is the concluding part of the three-part series.)
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=217371
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