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Friday, June 5, 2009

[ALOCHONA] Farakka to Tipaimukh – Some facts that belie fiction



Farakka to Tipaimukh – Some facts that belie fiction

By

Habib Siddiqui

 

One would like to believe that as an elderly writer Dr. M.T. Hussain, who claims to have had a very close rapport with late Mr. B.M. Abbas, is better positioned to guide our younger generation on a complicated issue like India's construction of a hydroelectric dam at Tipaimukh. In the past, his articles have shown a penchant for demeaning everything Awami League (AL) – more like opposition for the sake of opposition, something that he may have learned quite well from his iconic leader – Mowlana Bhashani who was termed the "prophet of violence" by the Time magazine in 1969.[1]

 

If we were expecting something constructive this time, Dr. Hussain has disappointed us again. Like most of his articles, this one, too, is rich with rhetoric that outruns facts. It is loaded with accusations, mostly unfounded as we shall see below, against the AL leadership for the problem with the Farakka Barrage but short on substance offering meaningful solutions that we could have taken in the past and what our generation could do today with the latest threat of the proposed Tipaimukh Dam. He ought to know that his deplorable partisanship is counterproductive, let alone being silly, for a healthy and objective dialogue that we need have today on a plethora of issues that matter to Bangladesh. As the recent election in Bangladesh has adequately demonstrated, the new generation that is born after 1975 is not as narrow-minded, dwelling upon the old past but is more concerned about things that affect them presently.  As much as the days of political idolatry are absurd these days, politics for the sake of politics is equally insane!

 

Let's talk about facts and not fiction. Although the construction of the Farakka Barrage was completed during the Mujib rule in 1974-5, the decision to build this dam can be traced back to 1951. In those days, hydroelectric dams were popular methods to generating electric power. India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan planned on building hundreds of hydropower dams from rivers that flowed down from the Himalayas. The Farakka dam was built to divert water from the Ganges River into the Hooghly River during the dry season (January to June), in order to flush out the accumulating silt which in the 1950s and 1960s was a problem at the major port of Kolkata on the Hooghly River. A series of negotiations between the Pakistani and Indian governments failed to persuade India into abandoning the Farakka project. The World Bank, the I.M.F and other international financial institutions financed the project.[2] So, one wonders how could Sk. Mujib be blamed for the Farakka Barrage!

 

After Bangladesh's independence the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission met over 90 times to discuss the Farakka Barrage issue, but without any results. The Bangladesh team was headed by Mr. B. M. Abbas. In April 1975, Bangladesh agreed to a trial operation of the Farakka Barrage for a period of 41 days from April 21 to May 31, 1975 to divert 11,000-16,000 cfs (cusecs) with the understanding that India will not operate feeder canal until a final agreement was reached between India and Bangladesh on the sharing of Ganges water. Bangladesh was assured of getting 40,000 cusecs during the dry season.

 

Unfortunately, soon after Sk. Mujib's death in August 15, 1975, taking advantage of the political change in Bangladesh, India violated the agreement (MOU) by cheating and diverting the full capacity of 40,000 cusecs unilaterally.. The matter was brought to the attention of U.N. General Assembly, which on November 26, 1976 adopted a consensus statement directing the parties to arrive at a fair and expeditious settlement. On November 5, 1977 the Ganges Waters Agreement was signed, assuring 34,500 cusecs for Bangladesh.[3] The five-year treaty expired in 1982 and after several shorter extensions lapsed entirely in 1989. The JRC statistics shows very clearly that Bangladesh did not get her due share during all those years (1977-91). There was no improvement of the situation during the first Khaleda Zia Administration (1991-96) with average water share reduced to 10,000 to 12,000 cusecs, with one extreme event of only 9,000 cusecs, during the dry season.[4]

 

After Sk. Hasina was elected Prime Minister, she visited India and signed a treaty with her counterpart Deve Gowda on Dec. 12, 1996.[5] The Treaty addressed the heart of the conflict: water allocation (35,000 cusecs) during the five months of the dry season (January-May – see the Table below). During the rest of the year, there is sufficient water that India can operate the Farakka diversion without creating problems for Bangladesh. The treaty stipulated that below a certain flow rate, India and Bangladesh will each share half of the water. Above a certain limit, Bangladesh will be guaranteed a certain minimum level, and if the water flow exceeds a given limit, India will withdraw a given amount, and the balance will be received by Bangladesh (which will be more than 50%).[6]

 

Period      Average          India's Share              BD's Share
 
             flow             (cusecs)                   (cusecs)
          1949-1988
           (cusecs)
Jan
1-10       107,516             40,000                     67,516
11-20      97,673              40,000                      57,673
21-31      90,154              40,000                     50,154
Feb
1-10       86,323              40,000                     46,323
11-20       82,839              40,000                     42,839
21-30      79,106              40,000                      39,106
March
1-10       74,419              39,419                     35,000
11-20      68,931              33,931                     35,000
21-31      64,688              35,000                     29,688
April
1-10       63,180              28,180                     35,000
11-20      62,633              35,000                     27,633
21-30      60,992              25,992                     35,000
May
1-10       67,251              35,000                     32,351
11-20      73,590              38,590                     35,000
21-31      81,834              40,000                     41,854 

The statement of Mr. I.K. Gujral, External Affairs Minister in the Rajya Sabha on December 12, 1996 on the visit of Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to India and the signing of the treaty on the sharing of Ganges water at Farakka reads: "[D]uring the critical period within the lean season, i.e. from March 1 to May 10, India and Bangladesh each shall receive a guaranteed flow of 35,000 cusecs of water in an alternating sequence of three 10-day periods each. This is aimed at meeting the fundamental requirements of both our countries through a just and reasonable sharing of the burden of shortage. The Treaty also has the merit of being a long-term arrangement combined with scope for reviews at shorter intervals to study the impact of the sharing formula and to make needed adjustments. While the Treaty will be for 30 years and renewable on mutual consent, there is a provision of mandatory reviews at the end of 5 years and even earlier after 2 years with provisions for adjustments as required. Pending a fresh understanding after the review stage, Bangladesh would continue to receive 90% of its share in accordance with the new formula. We would thus avoid a situation where there is no agreement on the sharing of the Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh… As the House would recall, we have already taken initiatives in the commercial sphere by extending tariff concessions to Bangladesh on a range of products of export interest to them. We propose to extend commercial credits of Rs. 1 billion to enhance trade relations further."[7]

 

In the light of the above facts, it is difficult to sustain Dr. Hussain's statement that the 1996 Treaty went against the interest of Bangladesh, becoming a fait accompli. I have never heard an intelligent person say that a treaty signed with the aim of getting fair and equitable share is worse than not having one. Was the 1977-treaty silly, too? More outrageous is the implied assertion that the AL government that had ruled only five years in the post-Mujib era of 34 years is solely to be blamed for all the maladies facing Bangladesh today, including the Tipaimukh Dam, soon to be constructed by India.

 

It is true though that India had not kept her side of the bargain since signing of the treaty. The Joint River Commission (JRC) statistics, as quoted by Syful Islam in the New Nation, March 9, 2009, shows that in 1999 Bangladesh got 1,033 cusecs of water at Teesta barrage point against its normal requirements of 10,000 cusecs of water. After JRC meeting in 2000 the water flow rose to 4,530 cusecs, in January 2001 it reduced to 1406 cusecs, in January 2002 to 1,000 cusecs, in January 2003 to 1,100 cusecs, in November 2006 to 950 cusecs, in January 2007 to 525 cusecs and in January 2008 to 1,500 cusecs.[8]

 

India's behavior mimics those of Israel in dishonoring every treaty that the rogue state had signed with the Palestinian Authority. Should not she be ashamed of her iniquity?

 

Syful Islam mentions about a study conducted by the "International Rivers", a U.S.-based NGO that protects rivers and defends the rights of communities, which revealed that India had already built 74 dams, Nepal 15, Pakistan 6 and Bhutan 5 in the Himalayan region in the recent years. It also found that 37 Indian, 7 Pakistani and 2 Nepalese dams were under construction in that area. The study also identified that India had planned to build 318 dams, Nepal 37, Pakistan 35 and Bhutan 16 to add over 1,50,000 MW of additional electricity capacity in the next 20 years.[9] With 4,300 large dams already constructed and many more in the pipeline, India is one of the world's most prolific dam-builders.[10] India is committed to building more than 100 dams in eight states of the north-east corner alone..[11] If these numbers are true, what has Bangladesh government – past and present - done to stop India from such projects that are going to be built on international rivers harming Bangladesh?

 

Let's now look at Tipaimukh. Manipur needs about 140 MW of power to fulfill the unrestricted demand at the peak hours (1700 hrs to 2200 hrs). The total availability of power from all the Central Sector plants located in Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura comes to around 105 MW.[12] The Tipaimukh Dam plan, built on the river Barak, which bifurcates into two streams as it enters Bangladesh as the rivers Surma and Kushiara, has been on the drawing board for nearly 40 years.[13] According to the implementing agency, North Eastern Electric Power Corporation (NEEPCO), this 390-meter-long, 163-meterhigh dam would have an installed capacity of 1,500 MW. As a multipurpose project, the dam also aims at flood moderation, improving navigation, irrigation and aquaculture in the region. Efforts were made in the past to get the World Bank or JBIC (a Japanese development bank) to back the project, but their involvement is still elusive.[14] It is costing India Rs. 6,800 crore — an escalation from the earlier estimated expenditure of Rs 5,163 crore. The foundation stone of the Tipaimukh project was laid by India's Union minister for industries and Cachar's representative in the Lok Sabha, Sontosh Mohan Dev, along with other central ministers, on December 16, 2006.[15] According to a Neepco source there, the work in January of 2007 mainly dealt with underground drilling at the reservoir site of the project. The Brahmaputra Board, a wing of the Union water resources ministry, drilled those sites in 1997. I want to know: what did the previous administrations in Bangladesh do about this dam?

 

No, I don't expect answers from Dr. Hussain, who is too cozy, too forgiving with non-AL governments that have ruled the country for most of the last 34 years. He imagines that just standing united will restrain India from constructing the Tipaimukh dam. He ought to know the futility of those long marches that Bhashani led against the Farakka Barrage in the mid-1970s. The very people targeted for drawing the benefits of the Tipaimukh dam living in the Manipur State had long been fighting a losing battle to stop this project. It is highly unlikely that demonstrations and protests inside Bangladesh would push India to abandon the project now, esp. after spending hundreds of crores of Rupees in front end loading (FEL) activities.

 

We have to be self-critical of our failure to bring world attention to the gargantuan harm that India's Farakka has brought upon Bangladesh. If we had succeeded in that endeavor, India today wouldn't be building the Tipaimukh dam. Whether we like it or not, we must realize that self-interest rules the day. In our world, there are no permanent friends or enemies. What is permanent is self-interest and that has to be pursued vigorously."[16]

 

At this stage, what actions and programs are meaningful for Bangladesh? As any rational person would tell us just protesting inside Bangladesh is not going to work. As a stronger party, India can afford to ignore such protests. Can India be persuaded to abandon dam projects on international rivers in favor of alternative options for energy need?[17] Given India's long history of dishonoring her agreements on Farakka with Bangladesh, can she be trusted for keeping any new promise? Are the UN and/or the ICJ only options Bangladesh has to redress her grievances? 

 



[1] http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,844753,00.html

[2] http://www.cyberbangladesh.org/disaster.html

[3] http://www.cyberbangladesh.org/disaster.html

[4] http://rezwanul.blogspot.com/2007/04/farakka-lost-battle-for-bangladesh.html

[5] http://www.geocities.com/athens/academy/5772/treaty.html

[6] http://rezwanul.blogspot.com/2007/04/farakka-lost-battle-for-bangladesh.html

[7] http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Foreign_Policy/ganga.htm

[8] http://nation.ittefaq.com/issues/2009/03/09/news0711.htm

[9] http://www.sos-arsenic..net/english/groundwater/waterbattle.html

[10] http://internationalrivers.org/en/south-asia/india

[11] http://internationalrivers.org/files/WRR.V20.N2.pdf

[12] http://www.e-pao.net/epSubPageExtractor.asp?src=news_section.opinions.Opinion_on_Building_of_Tipaimukh_Dam.Q_A_Tipaimukh_Hydro-electric_Project_1

[13] http://www.sos-arsenic.net/english/groundwater/waterbattle.html

[14] http://internationalrivers.org/files/WRR.V20.N2.pdf

[15] http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070102/asp/northeast/story_7208477.asp

[16] http://www.sos-arsenic.net/english/groundwater/respond.html; Barrister Harun ur Rashid, The Daily Star, January 05, 2005.

[17] See this author's article offering an alternative recommendation for India: http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/62938



--- On Thu, 6/4/09, bd_mailer@yahoo.com <bd_mailer@yahoo.com> wrote:

From: bd_mailer@yahoo.com <bd_mailer@yahoo.com>
Subject: India's Farakka Barrage to Tipaimukh: Bangladesh's Options
To: "Dhaka Mails" <dhakamails@yahoogroups.com>
Date: Thursday, June 4, 2009, 4:46 PM

India's Farakka Barrage to Tipaimukh: Bangladesh's Options

.M.T. Hussain
 
The unpalatable
After getting nod of Bangladesh for the river Ganges' water withdrawal by India in May 1974 at the Farakka Barrage point up 17 kilometers of the common border of the two countries, and what is called at the downstream the Padma river of Bangladesh in the west, India has taken now to build two dams at Tipamukh and Fulertal in the east on the river Barak that forms upper riparian of the Kushiara, Surma and mighty Meghna rivers of Bangladesh. The evils of Farakka in the three and a half decades in the downstream incurred yearly losses in money term at 150,000 lakhs crores Taka and the incoming Eastern two are estimated to incur yearly loss for Bangladesh at Taka 225,000 lakhs crores. Farrakka Barrage adversely affected the western and southwestern territory of one third Bangladesh and the eastern two dams to affect one fourth of Bangladesh in the eastern area.
My experience and some works
On the Farakka Barrage issue I had my first book (India's Farakka Barrage… now out of print) published in 1996. I was then fortunate not only to have facts from documents of the Bangladesh Government source but also from other published documents about the issue here and elsewhere at the international level. I was also fortunate to have a very close rapport with the renowned hydrological expert B M Abbas during his last days before passing away in Dhaka, in addition to useful information I had from his authoritative book The Ganges Water Dispute. Just a few months back I had two articles, one in Bengali and the other in English on the same topic of Farakka losses incurred by Bangladesh that I took advantage of an occasion of follow up of a surface scratching by the BBC Bengali Radio discussion meeting held at Rajshahi a few months earlier on the effects of the India's Farakka Barrage in Bangladesh as the razzmatazz of the discussion had nothing of losses of Bangladesh in concrete terms of money figure. In the two articles mentioned and published in dailies in Dhaka I cited figures in specific calculated terms. The figure of Bangladesh losses for 33 years since May 1974, the time the Farakka went on in full commission to 2007 at nearly 49 lakhs crore Taka, that made yearly average of about one and a half lakh crore Taka. A research organization based in the USA and corroborated by a local organization in their calculation for likely losses of Bangladesh due to the India's Tipaimukh Dam would still be higher at over two lakhs crore Taka than the yearly average due to the Farakka, thus exceeding yearly average of about one lakh crore Taka losses that Bangladesh has been incurring due to the death trap of the Farakka Barrage.
Miseries of millions on both sides
Although there were groups against the Farakka project in West Bengal and Bihar before the barrage was erected, as one was renowned irrigation engineer Kapil Bannerjee (See weekly Holiday, 29 May 09), there are groups, as well, against the other two proposed dams. The Tipaimukh dam to be built at 500 meters downstream of the confluence of the Barak and Tuivai rivers is planned for generation of 1,500MW of hydro-electricity and the Fulertal one for irrigation purpose there in the Eastern India. The likely affected ones included common poor people as also objections raised by area experts, environmentalists, etc. Because, the Dam if erected and made operational is certain to affect lives and livings of many people engaged in agriculture in the project region, fisheries and fishing trade, river craft works and to adversely affect ecological balance that may even add to risks of bigger scale earth quakes in the region according to the noted earth science expert and famous geologist like Dr. Soibam Ibotombi, Professor of the Indian Manipur University
International river rules and conventions
International rivers are well designated so for that they flow through many countries. The Ganges and the Barak are international rivers. There are international rules and conventions that guide modes of sharing waters of such rivers between countries in the riparian regions. The upper riparian country, in particular, is not permitted by the rules and conventions to withdraw and divert water of any amount that would harm the lower riparian country/s. The 1997 UN convention adopted two key issues, one, in gist stated by two words, 'no harm' and the other 'equitable sharing'. To elaborate the implications of the two set of terms, one can safely state that the upper riparian country can do no harm to lower riparian country by withdrawing or diverting normal natural flow of water, and if any such withdrawal and diversion is at all to be done, such mode must have prior sanction of the lower riparian country subject to the condition of mutually agreed equitable sharing. There are examples of such water sharing treaties between countries like Egypt and Sudan for the Nile waters, Germany and Hungary for the Danube, Pakistan and India for the Sind just to cite as instances. The Ganges water dispute with India started about four decades ago, but unfortunately no equitable sharing agreement had been possible. In 1974 there had been a memorandum of understanding for 'experimental operation' of the Farakka Barrage by India for 'forty days' only. But that experimental forty days went on and on, India cared little for the lower riparian Bangladesh. During Presidennt Zia's time there had been two-year treaty first in 1977 for sharing water of the Ganges and renewed once only, but during President Ershad there had been no treaty at all. Instead the Indian Government suggested the then President Ershad to forget about making any water sharing treaty and advised him to dredge Bangladeshi part of lower riparian area of the rivers for storing bigger volumes of water. Such dredging action program is not only very costly but also a recurring and very expensive matter having no durable solution to the problem due to siltation of river beds for obstruction of flows in the upper riparian region. The 1996 agreement made by the then government for 30 years duration sealed the ill fate of Bangladesh, at least, until the expiry of the period of the unequal an inequitable treaty until 2026.
1996 humiliation
I recall very clearly from a TV news item on the day in December 1996 how the 30-year treaty was undertaken by the then Sheikh Hasina during her visit to Kolakata and Delhi. The day previous to the treaty was signed in Delhi, Hasina not only met the West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu, but in her meet she fell on his feet to pay respect in somewhat Hindu style, Shashtyange Pronipat, and so pleased the Chief Minister blessed her as usual putting palm on her forehead and then made a brief remark that said that India would make a treaty for water sharing at the Farakka Barrage point for two to three years. Amazingly, the next day the treaty was signed for duration of 30 years and not for two or three years as Jyoti Bosu had predicted in blessing Hasina.
India pitied Bangladesh
If one would recall further back about the facts about 1974 MOU, 1977 water treaty for two years and renewed for another two years, no treaty whatsoever during the nine years term of Ershad and also none during the first term of Khaleda during 1991 to 1996 with the amazingly 30 year treaty made in December 1996 with P.M. Hasina that Bosu had predicted for a very short period. This treaty had no right standing so far as it did not meet international rules and conventions. Further that the treaty had no guarantee clause at all. These meant that the treaty went against the interest of lower riparian Bangladesh and violated international standard rules, conventions and norms. Thus it became a fait accompli that continues to harm Bangladesh, its ecology, economy and thus subservience to Delhi made in reality a mockery of sovereignty of Bangladesh. During the last 13 years it is the sad reality that India released for Bangladesh less quantities of water than Delhi had promised in the terms and schedule of the treaty; their excuse keeps on telling that they had no flow enough in the upper region and hence the lower quantum for Bangladesh became obvious.
Aggravate further
Having had the sad and painful experience due to India's Farakka Barrage being operated for the last 35 years, the Tipaimiukh dam has been floated to further aggravate the position of Bangladesh in this case in the eastern region involving one fourth of the much smaller and impoverished geographical area.
Redress at the UN
Being the Tipaimukh a life and death question for Banglkadesh, Bangladesh has to stand solidly united to restrain India to abandon the Tipaimukh dam project for good. But if she does not restrain on their own, Bangladesh has no option left to bring the matter in the knowledge of international bodies like the UN and the possibly into the International Court of Justice at the Hague for appropriate redress.




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