Chapter Forty-Nine
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman carried the constitutional movement for East Pakistan's regional autonomy to its utmost limit. Regional autonomy, as visualized and demanded by the Awami League, could not really be achieved within the framework of the Pakistan state, the movement for it's achievement reached a stage in the month of March when it was no longer possible to push it further on the constitutional path. Or, in other words, there was a breakdown and collapse of the Awami League's constitutional movement for self-determination and autonomy.
But the movement, independent of the Awami League, leapt forward and broke all barriers in its way. This trend began more vigorously from 1 March 1971 after Yahya's broadcast postponing the National Assembly session scheduled for 3 March.
After 7 March the Awami League took control of the provincial administration, including the police and jail administration, without a formal summoning of the provincial assembly. This was done in the name of a democratic right, and in such a way that it could hardly be characterized as constitutional. With this move, the constitutional movement was stretched beyond the limits of constitutionalism and for a constitutional party, it was an exceptional achievement.
Had the Awami League not been a constitutional party and one whose programme was limited to autonomy within the framework of the Pakistan state, it could have declared independence on 7 March using the show of massive popular support as justification. At that time the Bengalis were in the majority in the army in East Pakistan and the Bengali officers and men were willing to mutiny against the Pakistan state and the West Pakistan army. They only needed a call from the Awami League leader Sheikh Mujib.
The Awami League did not move in that direction, because they had not thought of such a plan. Instead, they were entrenched on the constitutional path of non-cooperation when the whole country was seething with anger against the Pakistan government and would have risen as one in defence of an independent Bangladesh government had it been proclaimed by the Awami League. However, the Awami League, particularly Sheikh Mujib, got cold feet and, in spite of much rhetoric and bombast they remained stuck in one position and were incapable of taking the final vital step forward.
This crisis of nerve weakened the position of the Awami League, in spite of their control of the civil government of East Pakistan. The turbulence of the people, including the students, who were openly clamouring for independence, a stand which was noticed by the Pakistan army authorities, President Yahya Khan and also Bhutto. It was, therefore, not difficult for them to embroil the Awami League leadership in a quagmire of negotiations buying time to reenforce the armed strength in East Pakistan as quickly as possible.
An in-depth study of the course the dialogue took, shows that with every passing day the bargaining power of the Awami League was on the decline and the government's negotiating team tightened its coils around the Awami League. On the evening of 24 March the dialogues broke down.
The military crackdown began on the night of 25 March for which the Awami League was completely unprepared and, as such, it was not possible for them to formulate a new plan.
War was unleashed on the people of East Bengal by the Pakistan government and the people took up the challenge. In fact, there was no need to formally declare a war or proclaim independence. The crackdown on the 25th night automatically and inevitably led the people to a war which was nothing short of a war of independence.
In the initial stage of the war, the principal leader of the Awami League, Shiekh Mujibur Rahman, surrendered to the Pakistan army and a number of his party men and followers fled to India 'as fast as their legs could carry them'.
These cowardly acts of the Awami League leaders clearly demonstrate that they had no plan whatsoever to declare and organize a war of independence in the eventuality of the failure of the dialogues.
Sheikh Mujib was not able to act in accordance with his reputation but nevertheless, in 1971, he had become a symbol of Bengali nationalism and the hero of East Bengal's struggle for autonomy. For this reason, in the absence of a better alternative
and at the critical moment of the military crackdown, he continued to be the central rallying figure.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's surrender to the Pakistani army was so incredible that for quite some time the people and even a large number of Awami League workers, did not believe that he had not stayed with them in their struggle and was, instead, safe in the custody of the Pakistan government in far away West Pakistan.
Rehman Sobhan said in a public lecture1 in April 2002 that
The post-liberation debate over who declared independence of Bangladesh is thus a largely irrelevant debate. It is self-evident to anyone with common sense that the operative issue is not who declared independence but when Bangladeshis asserted their own independence, which they did during the month of March 1971.
This observation was curiously preceded by the statement that
The proclamation of independence by Bangabandhu on 26 March in response to the military assault on the Bengalis ordered by Yahya Khan, was a juridical act recognizing a de facto and legitimate authority.2
In spite of Rehman Sobhan's statement about the irrelevance of the debate on who declared independence, it was actually the Awami Leaguers who opened this debate after 1971 by claiming that Sheikh Mujib had declared the independence of Bangladesh on 26 March.
Rehman Sobhan says that Sheikh Mujib had done so `in response to the military assault on the Bengalis ordered by Yahya Khan.' This assault began on the night of 25 and 26 March and `in response to that' Sheikh Mujib is supposed to have declared the independence of Bangladesh. So, according to Rehman Sobhan, the declaration of independence happened on the spur of the moment in response to the assault on the people and it was not in accordance with any previous decision of the Awami League or in accordance with any plan worked out by them. Explaining this curious position he says, 'By the 25 March 1971 Bangladesh was already a sovereign state in the minds of its citizens'3 and proclamation of independence by Sheikh Mujib was a mere 'juridical act recognising a de facto legitimate authority.'
It has now been clearly established that this so-called `juridical act' of Sheikh Mujib did not take place because he was taken prisoner at midnight on 25 and 26 March. Moreover, it could not have happened for the very important reason that in spite of the fact that `By the 25 March 1971 Bangladesh was already a sovereign state in the minds of its citizens' there is nothing to show that in recognition of that fact, either the Awami League organization or its supreme leader ever discussed the question of independence in their central committee meetings or even as late as on the eve of the military crackdown on 25 March.
It was clear to everyone by 24 March and definately by 25 March that a military action was imminent. In the face of such an eventuality, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did not speak to anybody, including Rehman Sobhan, who met him on the afternoon of 25 March about a declaration of independence. Nor did he have any discussion with Tajuddin Ahmed, Amirul Islam or Kamal Hossain on the subject, with all of whom he was in constant touch.
On the afternoon of 25 March Rehman Sobhan said,
Bangabandhu told us that the army had decided to go for a crackdown. He went on to say, I quote from memory, 'Yahya thinks that he can crush the movement by killing me. But he is mistaken. An independent Bangladesh will be built on my grave.' Bangabandhu appeared to have a rather fatalistic attitude to what he seemed to accept as his imminent death. He suggested that a new generation would carry on the liberation struggle.4
The picture of Sheikh Mujib which Rehman Sobhan has portrayed on the eve of the military crackdown was certainty not the picture of a man who could possibly declare a war of independence 'in response to the military assault' about which, by that time, he seemed to have certain knowledge. An act like the declaration of independence of a country was, in effect, a declaration of war against an enemy armed to the teeth and it could not have been the act of a man who 'appeared to have a rather fatalistic attitude to what he seemed to accept as his imminent death.' It was the attitude of a man whose personal and organizational leadership had completely collapsed.
The declaration of independence is a highly political matter and it can happen as a result of a peoples' long struggle and the collective and formal decision of an organized party or forces which represent the will of the people. As such it cannot be an act of any particular individual, whoever he may be.
It had been claimed by certain Awami League leaders (though not by all of them) and intellectuals close to the Awami League, that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared independence in the early hours of 26 March 1971, in response to the military crackdown. It is, therefore, necessary first to follow the story as narrated by his followers.
In this connection it is interesting to note that the 'declaration of independence' story did not originate from Dhaka, though all the top leaders of the Awami League and the closest associates of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were with him on 25 March. Some of them, like Kamal Hossain and Amirul Islam, stayed at his residence till 10:30 p.m. on the 25th night. There is no evidence to show that the declaration of independence was ever discussed in the Awami League Central Working Committee or even unofficially by Awami League leaders like Tajuddin Ahmed, Kamal Hossain, Amirul Islam, Syed Nazrul Islam, Mushtaq Ahmed or any other.
The story of Sheikh Mujib's 'declaration of independence' originated in Chittagong and was circulated by the leaders of Chittagong Awami League. Yet it is difficult to establish, even from their evidence, that Sheikh Mujib ever committed himself to that position.
In March 1971, M.R. Siddiqui was the president of the Chittagong district Awami League and a member of the National Assembly. It is helpful to quote Siddiqui at some length.
While describing the situation at the time, M.R. Siddiqui said,
One ship MV. Swat carrying arms, ammunition, explosives and soldiers arrived in Chittagong. Being alerted, Awami League Action Committee urged the port workers not to unload the ship. Army tried to force the workers at gunpoint, but without success. They asked the EPR Jawans to shoot, which they refused. Then the army shot 7 EPR Jawans on the spot. Then they ordered the army in the cantonment to clear the ship. Brig. Majumdar asked for advice as to what he should do. I could not take a decision as refusal to obey would amount to mutiny and open confrontation with Pak army.5
So in spite of the Bengali officers of the Pakistan army and port workers being prepared for military and open confrontation in that critical situation, the Awami League leadership had no contingency for that.
Continuing his narration Siddiqui said,
I straightaway drove to Dhaka on 23 March for consultation with Bangabandhu and for his instruction. I met him in his house. He said he was hoping there will be a satisfactory conclusion of the dialogue and he does not think there will be a war as long as Yahya was there as president.6
Amazingly it appears from the statement of M.R. Siddiqui, who was one of the top leaders of the Awami League in Chittagong and later a member of Mujib's Awami League cabinet, that Sheikh Mujib reposed complete confidence in the goodwill as well as the capability of Yahya Khan to come to a 'satisfactory conclusion of the dialogue'.
Mujib spoke about Yahya in these terms when, according to all available evidence, the latter had already approved and signed the action codenamed Operation Searchlight.
In spite of Sheikh Mujib's complete confidence in Yahya, Siddiqui felt differently. He said,
I told him that war has started in Chittagong and I see all preparation for a full-scale attack. He asked me to hurry back to Chittagong to mobilize all forces there and defend Chittagong. In case of an attack he will escape to Chittagong and join us in the fight.7
A man who told Siddiqui on 23 March that in case of an attack in Dhaka he would run to Chittagong and join in the fight, had told Amirul Islam and Kamal Hossain at 10:30 p.m. on 25 March that if he left his house then the army would kill everybody in Dhaka and he could not let that happen and so had decided to stay in his house to surrender to the Pakistan army.
Judged in this light, Sheikh Mujib did not at all mean what he said to Siddiqui about his intention to join the fight. Moreover, the way he switched from a position of having complete confidence in President Yahya to his instruction to Siddiqui to hurry back to Chittagong and mobilize all forces there for resistance, hardly gives what he said to Siddiqui any credibility.
On hearing about Mujib's intention to fight, Siddiqui continued, 'I enquired when to give the green signal to Army, EPR, police and civil administration. He was not sure.'8 This was obvious, because he had never seriously considered resistance.
Then
Col. Osmani was called in for consultation and he suggested that when the Radio stops broadcasting we should take that as the zero hour. But I said that it could happen due to power failure. Then he said when they try to disarm Bengalis we should take that the war has started and resist. However, I rushed back to Chittagong but too late.9
Choosing the radio stopping its broadcasting as the signal was odd, because if the attack began at midnight or after, there would, in any case, be no radio, because the broadcast stopped at midnight. To say that the Bengalis should only begin to resist when Pakistani army made a move to disarm Bengalis, amounted to saying that up till a full-scale and all-out attack on the people and the Bengali army men happened, there should be no resistance. This was particularly strange in the context of M.R. Siddiqui's report to Sheikh Mujib in which he said that the Pakistan army had, in fact, shot seven Bengali jawans of the EPR because of their refusal to shoot the rebellious port workers.10
M.R. Siddiqui, while continuing his narration, said,
Twenty-fifth situation was very tense in Chittagong. We did not know what was happening in Dhaka. At around 7 p.m. I managed to contact Sheikh Saheb through his neighbour Mr Mosharraf Hossain and Mr Naeem Gauhar. He asked them to tell me that talks had failed. Ask Army, EPR and police not to surrender arms and give a call to people to give resistance. After this all communication with Dhaka was cut off.11
So it appears that there was no attempt from any Awami League leaders, including Sheikh Mujib, to contact Chittagong on the critical evening of the 25th. When contacted by M.R. Siddiqui through Mujib's neighbours he indirectly received a message from Sheikh Mujib who asked them to organize a resistance.
This kind of talk about 'resistance' by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was nothing new. He talked about it in his Race Course Maidan speech on 7 March 1971 as he talked about a freedom war. But next day he launched a programme of civil nor,-cooperation and engaged himself and his party colleagues in a dialogue with Yahya Khan and his negotiating team.
According to M.R. Siddiqui, he received another message supposedly sent by Sheikh Mujib:
On 26th morning at about 6-30 a.m. my wife Latifa received a phone call from Mr Moinul Alam [Ittefaq correspondent in Chittagong] who gave her a message from Bangabandhu received through wireless operators of Chittagong. The message read 'Message to the people of Bangladesh and to the people of the world. Rajarbagh police camp and Peelkhana EPR suddenly attacked by Pak Army at 2400 hours. Thousands of people killed. Fierce fighting going on. Appeal to the world for help in our freedom struggle. Resist by all your means. May Allah be with you. Joy Bangla. Message from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.' This message was passed on to me immediately.12
So this is the 'declaration of independence' where the independence of Bangladesh is not actually declared! There is talk of resistance and an appeal to the world for help in 'our freedom struggle.'
Is the declaration of independence of a country such a petty affair that this obtuse message can be taken, in all seriousness, as a declaration of independence? Why this obscure method, instead of an announcement to the country and to the world through the Dhaka Radio and Television. Why transmit to an unknown wireless operator quietly to be passed on only to M.R. Siddiqui through the local correspondent of a Dhaka daily newspaper? This is a pertinent question because the Dhaka Radio and Television centre were under the control of Bengalis at least till 10 p.m. on 25 March. That declaration should have been made by Sheikh Mujib himself. It could have easily been recorded in his residence with a simple recording machine in the presence of his party colleagues when the breakdown of the dialogue became known, and the military crackdown inevitable.
The likelihood of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman transmitting such a message was almost zero, because he had no means of sending such a message through the wireless. According to all available evidence, long before midnight, he became incommunicado, and he had no means to communicate with others. M.R. Siddiqui himself said that it was close to 7 p.m., after he received Mujib's message through his neighbours, that all communication with Dhaka was cut off.
Thus it is highly probable that the so-called message was a fake, one manufactured and passed on by some well-meaning and desperate individuals in Chittagong wanting to do something in that critical situation.
For the leaders of the Awami League in Chittagong, it was like a straw to a drowning man, and they held on to it firmly, taking it as a declaration of independence by their leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
M.R. Siddiqui passed on the message to the Chittagong Sangram Parishad (Committee of Action) on the morning of 26 March. According to him,
The Sangram Parishad immediately discussed the message and decided to announce the appeal over the radio. By this time the radio station at Agrabad was already inaccessible because of the presence of Pak army. We collected Belal Chowdhury, Sultan Ali and other staff of Radio Pakistan, Chittagong who suggested broadcasting the message from Kalurghat relay station.13
Interestingly the 'message of Sheikh Mujib' to the nation was in English! So
A draft of the announcement was made in Bengali by Dr Abu Jafar and others and it was decided that M.A. Hannan, general secretary of district Awami League, would read out the announcement. Accordingly, on 26 March at 2:30 p.m. Mr Hannan read out the historical announcement in the name of Sheikh Mujib which is known as the Declaration of Independence.14
On this M.A. Hannan said,
After return from Kalurghat it was decided that Bangabandhu's declaration of independence will have to be announced through the radio. According to that decision I, on behalf of Bangabandhu, declared independence from the Kalurghat transmission centre. In this I was helped by Rakhal Chandra Banik of the radio office and M.P. and M.N.A. Abu Mansur, Ataur Rahman Kaiser and Mosharraf Hossain.15
Professor A.R. Mallick, vice chancellor of Chittagong University, said that he heard Hannan's announcement, made from Chittagong Radio. 16 Others heard it in Chittagong, but there was no reports from outside that it was heard anywhere else. In any case, the announcement failed to have any impact on the people. The reason could be the vagueness of the message as a declaration of independence, and secondly, the inconsequentiality of the man who announced it. It could have galvanized the people effectively if it had been announced by any central leader of consequence from Dhaka.
On 27 March Major Ziaur Rahman of the East Bengal Regiment made another declaration of independence and from all available evidence, it is not clear what made him do so. He had had some contact with the Awami League leaders like Hannan, Ataur Rahman Kaiser and M.A. Mannan near the Chittagong Cantonment and in Boalkhali on the 26th, but Hannan does not mention any discussion held with him about the declaration of independence or about the message which reached them. It was, however, decided that Major Zia would come to Kalurghat on the 27th.17
After that there was no contact between the Awami League leaders and Major Zia, who went to Kalurghat on 27 March and having access to the radio transmission centre made a 'Declaration of Independence' on his own behalf-a declaration in which he styled himself as the president of the country!
Thus two declarations of independence were made, by separate individuals, from the same Kalurghat transmission centre.
On Major Zia's 'Declaration of Independence' M.R. Siddiqui said,
Major Zia and his troops were placed to guard the Kalurghat Radio Station. Next day on 27 March Zia went on the air and declared himself the President and gave a call for freedom fight. This confused the Awami Leaguers and the public. A.K. Khan who heard the news said that it will be interpreted as an Army coup and there will be no support nationally or internationally. He made out a new draft in English. Major Zia realized the mistake and read out the new draft saying Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the President and the call was on his behalf.18
Unlike the previous announcement, both announcements of Major Zia were heard by people all over the country and it had a tremendous impact on them.
Faruk Aziz Khan, later Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed's secretary in Calcutta, was stationed in Kaptai, a small town in the district of Rangamati in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. He described Major Zia's declaration in his book Spring `71 which was slightly different.
On receiving the news of the army action in Dhaka and elsewhere Major Zia immediately left the city and proceeded towards Cox's Bazar and on the way camped near Kalurghat radio station... Some Awami League activists and Chittagong radio station employees who thought that a radio broadcast made by an army officer would greatly help mobilise the armed forces against the Pakistani action approached Major Zia to make a proclamation that they had drafted and Major Zia readily agreed and the proclamation was made by him on 27 March in the evening that made him an instant hero. Major Zia's broadcast of 27 March 1971 is of historic significance. But it also increased the risk of our democratic movement against dictator Yahya being misunderstood by the rest of the world as an army rebellion. The recorded proclamation was repeated next day; this time a revised version which I learnt much later.19
Faruk Aziz Khan further said,
On 27th evening .... we heard the declaration of Major Zia on the Chittagong radio proclaiming himself as the acting President of independent Bangladesh. Next day the proclamation was repeated several times. He said that with the approval of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman he was proclaiming himself as the acting President of 'Swadhin Bangladesh'.20
Major Zia made a declaration of independence over the Chittagong radio on 27 March and it is an indisputable fact that, at that time, it was his declaration, and not Hannan's, which was heard throughout the country and created a huge impact. In the absence of any announcement from Dhaka, either by Sheikh Mujib or any other Awami League leader of consequence, people had nothing to hold on to at the critical hour of the Pakistani military aggression. Major Zia's proclamation created considerable enthusiasm among the people and particularly among those who were waiting to actively join the forces of resistance.
Major Zia's proclamation, in fact, was a chance incident. After the military crackdown on the night of 25 March the spirit of rebellion and resistance was aroused in the people throughout Bangladesh, including the Bengali men and officers of the Pakistani
armed forces. So, like Major Zia, there were many others who immediately opted for resistance. In Chittagong, Brig. Majumdar would have begun the resistance on the 23 March if he had not been prevented from doing so by the Awami League leaders of Chittagong. Major Khaled Mosharraf, Major Showkat Ali, Major Abu Taher, Major Shafiullah, Captain Jalil and others immediately decided to go to war. Even a retired army officer like Major Kazi Nuruzzaman actively joined the resistance forces. If they had had the same opportunity and access to a radio, some of them could have acted in the same way that Major Zia did.
However, it was Major Zia who made the historical proclamation on 27 March and it helped the resistance forces organize at a moment when the political leadership had collapsed. The civilians felt confident that the Bengali officers of the army would actively join the ranks of the resistance. The army men who were scattered in different parts of the country felt that a new opportunity had opened up for them to organize and participate in the war of independence. This was the basic historical significance of the proclamation of Major Zia on 27 March 1971.
It would be entirely wrong to conclude that in the absence of Major Zia the war of resistance would not have begun or that Ziaur Rahman suddenly emerged from being an unknown army officer to become the leader of the nation, one who could command the people to go to war against the Pakistani state. Such magic does not take place in history.
In a written public lecture Rehman Sobhan rightly said,
In the Bangladesh of 1971 it was unreal to imagine that an unknown army officer could proclaim independence for 75 million Bangladeshis without any authority to do so and could be expected to be taken seriously by anyone. Indeed, such anonymous declarations could only generate apprehension in the international arena that Bangladesh was degenerating into anarchy. At that time the only person who was invested with the credibility to declare independence in the legally acceptable sense of the term was Bangabandhu because he enjoyed both electoral legitimacy and had a total political mandate from the people of Bangladesh to speak for them.21
However, the fact was that in spite of being invested with the necessary authority, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman failed to rise to the occasion and instead of declaring independence chose to surrender to the enemy. In that situation, being under wanton armed attack, millions of people felt the urge to resist and declared to themselves the independence of Bangladesh. This urge was what was reflected in the proclamation of Major Zia and it was for this reason that it created such a great impact on the minds of the people-people who were under army attack and millions of others who felt the urge to join the war of independence.
Here it is important to note, that in spite of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's cold feet and his failure to act as the brave leader of his people in the face of the gravest crisis in the life of the nation, he continued, in the absence of a better alternative, to be a rallying figure and a political authority of the highest importance. This necessitated that his name be associated with the proclamation made by Major Zia, though in the first announcement it was done without any reference to him.
A lot of confusion was created from the beginning between the formal 'declaration of independence' and formal declaration of `the war of independence'. Obviously, they are not the same as real independence comes at the end of the war of independence, when the enemy is completely vanquished. So, first there has to be a war of independence and that beginning was made by the people themselves in response to the army crackdown on the night of 25 March 1971, without waiting for any leader's formal declaration. The announcement by Major Zia could not be classified as a declaration of independence. It was, in fact, a declaration of the `war of independence'. Real independence had to wait till 16 December 1971, when the Pakistani army formally surrendered to the so-called joint command of the Indian and Bangladeshi armed forces at Dhaka.
NOTES
1. Rehman Sobhan, Bangabandhu and the Emergence of Independent Back to main text
Bangladesh, public lecture-4, Institute of Liberation, Bangabandhu and
Bangladesh Studies, 2nd print, 21 April 2000, p. 20.
2. Ibid. Back to main text
3. Ibid. Back to main text
4. Rehman Sobhan, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 390. Back to main text
5. M.R. Siddiqui, BFWD, Vol. 15, p. 182. Back to main text
6. Ibid. Back to main text
7. Ibid. Back to main text
8. Ibid. Back to main text
9. Ibid. Back to main text
10. Ibid. Back to main text
11. Ibid., p. 183. Back to main text
12. Ibid., p. 183. Back to main text
13. Ibid., p. 183. Back to main text
14. Ibid., p. 183. Back to main text
15. M.A. Hannan, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 191. Back to main text
16. A.R. Mallick, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 4. Back to main text
17. M.A. Hannan, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 191. Back to main text
18. M.R. Siddiqui, BFWD, vol. 15, pp. 183-4. Back to main text
19. Faruq Aziz Khan, op. cit., p. 85. Back to main text
20. Faruq Aziz Khan, op. cit., p. 85. Back to main text
21. Rehman Sobhan, lecture, p. 2. Back to main text
Source: Badruddin Umar's "The Emergence of Bangladesh", published by Oxford University Press.
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