-----Forwarded Message-----
>From: Sukla Sen
>Sent: Jun 12, 2011 4:50 AM
>To: foil-l <foil-l@insaf.net>
>Subject: [foil] Zia, army & Islamization
>
>http://www.viewpointonline.net/zia-the-army-and-the-islamization-project.html#comments
>
>Zia, army & Islamization<http://www.viewpointonline.net/zia-the-army-and-the-islamization-project.html>
>by Masood Ashraf Raja
>
>*The fact that the West-Pakistani army committed thousands of recorded and
>unrecorded atrocities against their own countrymen further proved that Islam
>alone could not build a nation and that on both sides the incipient regional
>and ethnic differences had resurfaced, differences that Islam was unable to
>bridge*
>*
>*
>
>To suggest that the Pakistan army became completely Islamized during the Zia
>regime would be an extreme exaggeration and a false assertion and I am not
>suggesting that at all. My purpose in this brief article is to offer a sort
>of genealogy of Zia's Islamization project, its role in defining certain
>aspects of military life, and, most importantly, its strategic role in
>legitimizing Zia's illegal and unconstitutional rule.
>
>Zia came into power at a very turbulent time in the history of Pakistan:
>Pakistan had already lost East Pakistan and thus the idea of a religious
>identity capable of forging a strong national identity had already been
>squashed. The Bengalis, despite being predominantly Muslim, had relied on
>the concepts of ethnic identity against the supremacy of the West-Pakistanis
>to fight and create a separate nation. The fact that the West-Pakistani army
>committed thousands of recorded and unrecorded atrocities against their own
>countrymen further proved that Islam alone could not build a nation and that
>on both sides the incipient regional and ethnic differences had resurfaced,
>differences that Islam was unable to bridge.
>
>Also, for the first time in Pakistani history a seemingly secular political
>party (PPP), having lost East Pakistan, was contesting elections against a
>conglomeration of nine Islamist political parties. The 1977 election, thus,
>was an election that had the potential of defining Pakistan's future as a
>complex democracy or as a pseudo Islamized state. By eliminating Bhutto,
>Zia, within the logic of his coup, automatically foregrounded the Islamist
>view of the nation. So, in a way, Zia was not really an agent—no one is—but
>an important tool within the logic of Pakistan's struggle to define itself.
>
>Those of us who are old enough to remember are aware that Zia, who had
>promised to hold elections in ninety days, was not the die-hard
>Ameer-ul-Momineen that he presented himself to be in his later years: he was
>in fact a Dunhill-smoking mediocre general raised to the level of COAS
>simply because of his meekness his suitability to Mr. Bhutto. But, as is
>often the case, the seemingly meek general eventually came to take upon the
>persona of a modern day Mujahid and savior of Islam.
>
>In order to sustain his regime, Zia needed to court two important
>constituencies at home: the mullahs and the zamindars. He was able to court
>both these groups successfully, promising Islamization to the former and a
>status quo on land reform to the others. It is no wonder that both these
>groups, by and large, remained loyal to Zia throughout his years of illegal
>rule. The other major power source that was needed to legitimize Zia's
>regime—like that of all other Pakistani dictators—was the support from the
>United States. The US, we should remember, was already predisposed to
>supporting Zia for forestalling leftist tilt of Z. A. Bhutto, but the Soviet
>entry into Afghanistan rehabilitated Zia and created, once again, Pakistan's
>client status within the instrumental logic of US policy in the region.
>Thus, these national and international forces came together to give Zia,
>whose regime was also buttressed by the most innovative verdict ever to be
>given by a court of Law [the law of necessity argument!], the support
>required to sustain his regime.
>
>So did the army become completely Islamized during Zia regime: the simple
>answer is no. Majority of army officers remained in that liminal space where
>one can find an Islamic cultural identity merged with a modern secular
>world-view, but in symbolic terms a lot of things became possible for the
>Islamist groups to start having an impact on the rank and file of the army.
>
>For example, as young officers we were never told to go to the mosque or
>forced to become outwardly religious, but imperceptibly one knew that
>holding and displaying a sort of Islamized identity could not hurt one's
>career. I will dwell on the influence two religious organizations that I
>witnessed first hand during my career. I must point out that these
>organizations did not have the official recognition of the Zia regime, but
>as the climate was altered to suit a purely Islamist view of the nation and
>the world, more and more officers were lured into the arms of such
>organizations.
>
>The first to reach the officers group was the Tablighi Jamaat. A pacifist
>organization, though extremely conservative in its interpretation of the
>Sharia, the Jamaat encouraged young officers to grow beards, dress in a
>Muslim fashion, and to give their time for Tabligh and regular *chillas*.
>One interesting instance that I remember was from my tenure as a student at
>the School of Infantry. One of our brilliant instructors had converted to
>the ways of the Jamaat and could be usually seen roaming our campus in the
>evenings in a traditional white tunic with a nice white turban. Pretty soon,
>his students caught on and instead of learning the skills in classroom to do
>well in the course, the smart ones amongst us "converted" to the ways of
>their instructor and spent valuable time in learning the ways of their
>master. It was, to be honest, quite a comical situation but its consequences
>were grave: in whatever limited way, an outside the army religious
>organization had enough symbolic power to govern the conduct of Army
>officers. This symbolic power reached a level where the said officer, if
>required to choose, was more prone to listen to his religious mentors
>instead of following the military chain of command.
>
>The other more dangerous and more insidious organization that was making
>inroads into the officer corps—not in large numbers though—was Doc. Israr
>Ahmed's Tanzeem-e-Islami. I am more familiar with their working as I was,
>during the last two years of my service, seriously courted by the local
>leaders of this organization to join. While I never really joined the
>Tanzeem, I did spend quite a lot of time reading Doc. Israr's work and
>listening to his recorded lectures. A vehement critic of Shia Islam, Doc.
>Israr Ahmed was opposed to electoral politics and spent most of his life in
>theorizing an Islamist system of government. His main political theory is
>contained in one slim volume: *Munhij Inqalab Nabvi* [The Basis of Prophet
>Muhammad's Revolution]. According to Doc. Israr, the Prophet's life provides
>a staged account of success of the Prophetic revolution and the main feature
>of this historical revolution is not popular but elitist. So, the Tanzeem
>believed, and maybe still does, that if you could convert a large segment of
>the national elite—including the army officers—to the Tanzeem's religious
>views then a staged revolution could be launched. The major phase of this
>revolution—as described by Doc. Israr—was the pacifist phase, in which the
>Tanzeem, having gathered enough elite members, was to declare its intentions
>in open hoping to be persecuted by the state. It was hoped that seeing what
>was being done to the lovers of God, people would join the revolution and
>the entire edifice of Pakistani state would be reconstructed in the true
>image of the ninth century Arabia.
>
>Exceptionally masculinist in his views, Doc. Israr was a strict
>*Batinite* scholar
>and interpreted the Qur'an as a self-referential text and hoped to share the
>true meaning of the Qur'an by finding the most unsullied roots of the Arabic
>words used in the Qur'an. In such interpretation, only a purist retrieval of
>the original message of God could save the Muslims, thus marrying the future
>of Islam to a purely Islamic past retrieved only through an incisive
>interpretation of the Qur'an. In other words, as we literary critics
>understand it, the sacred text was transparent and held hidden meanings that
>could be retrieved through a masterly grasp of Arabic. Needless to say, I
>was deeply impressed by Doc. Israr's erudition and grasp of Arabic language,
>but was able to escape any deep indoctrination simply because I could not
>bring myself to even imagine that I, being a single human being, somehow had
>the capacity to truly understand the mind of God.
>
>By far the most damaging symbolic influence for the Pakistan army and
>Pakistan was Pakistan's involvement in the Soviet-Afghan war. I have written
>extensively on this topic, so I will only briefly rehearse my position. The
>Afghan Jihad became the core legitimizing narrative for Zia regime: it
>enabled Zia to latch on to power in the name of Islam and in the cause of
>Afghanistan against an "infidel" power, thus solidifying his national
>constituencies, and it also provided Zia a crucial spot within the logic of
>American regional interests. Pakistan, thus, became a staging ground for
>training, supporting, and launching of all kinds of Jihadist groups into
>Afghanistan and of course it is during this time that ISI also developed
>into the masterly agency that it is now. While Afghans died in thousands,
>their puppet masters in the United States and Pakistan coordinated weapons
>supply, training, housing, and medical care.
>
>In symbolic terms, Pakistan's articulation of Afghan civil war in Jihadist
>terms, linked all forms of male Muslim identity to a jihadist and
>masculinist subjectivity. And it is this legacy that we are dealing with
>right now. In way, then, The Zia regime, the United States, and the Saudis
>(who funded the war) were all responsible for moving Pakistan into a kind of
>Islamism that is inherently masculinist and relies on a perpetual threat
>from outside—ideological and material—to sustain its violent and ruthless
>practices. In terms of instrumentalizing the Islamists for strategic
>purposes, even Pervez Musharraf—who built his legitimacy by investing in
>secular values—used the fundamentalists as volunteer fighters in his
>misadventure in Kargil.
>
>Another by-product of this entire experience is the cadre of retired and
>some serving officers who are still caught up in those old supranational
>ideologies of Khilafat and a purist Islamist system. The fact that this
>system is driven by a Wahabi or Deobandi interpretation of Islam is yet
>another aspect of militant Islam in Pakistan. The problem with the teachings
>of Abdul Wahab and his followers is that it interiorizes Islam to that of a
>private affair by foregrounding *Tauhid* as the core principle. Thus,
>emphasis is placed on *Ibadaat* and the every day actions or interactions
>cease to matter so much. In the end, one finds a subjectivity created
>through material and discursive modes that is essentially male, self
>righteous, and unapologetically atavistic.
>
>How is Islam likely to survive as a viable way of life with its ninth
>century interpretations of the sacred is beyond my limited grasp; it has
>already become the most hated religion in the world partially due to
>ignorance about it but mostly due to the actions of its most visible
>advocates and adherents.
>
>So, did Pakistan army play a major role in this turn to fundamentalism? The
>answer is yes and no. Yes, in a sense because the Zia years did foreground a
>religious identity in all aspects of political life, and no because not all
>army officers are religious fanatics or terrorist sympathizers. Is there a
>cadre of retired and serving officers invested in Jihadist ideologies and
>sympathetic to entities outside the military chain of command? I think only
>people with more current and expansive knowledge of Pakistan army and its
>affiliated institutions can seriously answer that. But if there is such a
>group, I hope the ISI is keeping a better track of them than they did in
>case of the most wanted terrorist in the world.
>Author of *Constructing Pakistan* (Oxford UP, 2010) Masood Ashraf Raja is an
>Assistant Professor of Postcolonial Literature and Theory at the University
>of North Texas, United States and the editor of *Pakistaniaat: A Journal of
>Pakistan Studies*. His critical essays have been published in journals
>including *South Asian Review, Digest of Middle East Studies, Caribbean
>Studies, Muslim Public Affairs Journal*, and *Mosaic*. He is currently
>working on his second book, entitled *Secular Fundamentalism: Poetics of
>Incitement and the Muslim Sacred*.
>--
>Peace Is Doable
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