WIKILEAKS : The India card, whether it is played from New Delhi or in Bangladesh, could have significant impact. Date 15 Aug 2006
Awami League leaders, though, have privately told us ( US embassy), and presumably others, that they are confident of winning the next election with the help of massive Indian financing.
The Bangladeshis also complain that the Indians refuse to take up offers to visit jointly any alleged terrorist camp, anytime, anywhere. Asked if they have evidence to substantiate allegations of terrorist activity in Bangladesh,Indian High Commission officials tell us their information on training camps comes from terrorists captured in India. In general, however, they refer us for details to press reports or New Delhi. we recommend that the Department and Embassy New Delhi once again ask Govt Of India (GOI)interlocutors for evidence to corroborate alarming claims, like the one made to A/S Boucher in New Delhi (ref a), that Jamaat Islami finances the terrorist group Jamaatul Mujahidin Bangladesh. We would follow up through various channels to encourage GOB action.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
S E C R E T SECTION DHAKA
SUBJECT: INDO-BANGLADESH RELATIONS SHOW NEW STRAIN
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Butenis,
Wikileaks Reference ID NO : 06DHAKA5332
DECL: 08/15/2006
Date :2006-08-22
US Embassy Dhaka
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Butenis, reason para 1.4 d.
¶1. (S) Summary. After a brief respite between the Dhaka
SAARC summit in October and Prime Minister Zia's visit to New
Delhi in March, Indo-Bangladeshi relations are again showing
strain. Given India's support for the opposition Awami
League, Indian antagonism towards the current government, and
the ruling coalition's penchant for fierce anti-India
rhetoric on the campaign trail, the strains seem likely to
worsen as various sides play the "India card" in the upcoming
elections. However, the concerted action India and
Bangladesh both took to end the latest border skirmishes
indicates that neither side is interested in a genuine
crisis. See para nine for action requested. End Summary.
Bilateral Doldrums
------------------
¶2. (C) As the Indo-Pak detente developed in 2004, Indian
officials and commentators intensified their allegations that
Bangladesh was quickly degenerating into a hotbed of Islamist
extremism and terrorism. Traditional bilateral grievances --
over water rights, border demarcations, migration, and trade
-- were exacerbated by charges that Bangladesh, in cahoots
with Pakistan, harbored ULFA and other northeast Indian
terrorists. Bangladesh, in turn, charged India with
sheltering Bangladeshi criminal kingpins and irredentist
Hindu Bengali "terrorists."
¶3. (C) In 2005, Bangladeshi officials fumed when, at the last
minute, India pulled the plug on the February SAARC summit in
Dhaka, citing in part security concerns after opposition
leader Kibria was killed two weeks earlier in a town 70 miles
away. Some military officers and government supporters
genuinely believe that India engineered last year's
traumatizing wave of attacks by Jamaat ul-Mujahidin
Bangladesh. Bangladeshis also groused that during her
frequent visits to India, Awami League president Sheikh
Hasina is received like a reigning head of state, and allege
that Awami League leaders routinely go to India for medical
treatment and other purposes as guests of the Indian
government. Senior ministers routinely blame negative
foreign press reports on an Indian conspiracy to denigrate
Bangladesh for economic and political reasons.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia's March 20-22 trip to
India produced no movement on any of these disputes.
According to Foreign Secretary Hemayetuddin, it was a "wasted
opportunity" as the Bangladeshis went with a full agenda
ready to negotiate but encountered only Indian stonewalling.
It is incumbent on the regional superpower, Bangladeshis
insist, to be generous with its smaller neighbors. For its
part, the Indian High Commission says that Zia soured the
tone of her visit by arriving 20 minutes late for her kickoff
meeting with President Kalam.
The Strains Intensify
------------------------------------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) In the past four weeks, Indo-Bangladeshi relations
have shown new strain:
A) On the margins of the July SAARC ministerial in Dhaka, MEA
Minister of State Ahmed, at an Awami League-friendly venue,
reiterated Indian concerns about Bangladesh's socio-political
trends and set forth a vision of a secular Bangladesh that
effectively endorsed the Awami League's political platform.
Since Bangladesh is already in an undeclared election
campaign, government supporters were particularly sensitive
to Ahmed's "partisan" remarks.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B) A highly tendentious column in the Washington Post
reiterated the essentially Awami League and Indian view that
Bangladesh is falling into an Islamist abyss. Dated factual
errors suggested the column was not a new assessment, which
fueled speculation about its timing and motivation.
C) Indian opposition BJP President Singh called for the
invasion of Bangladesh, and Pakistan, to root out alleged
terrorist infrastructure. While some Bangladeshis noted his
call was widely repudiated in India, they also pointed out
that it reflected the government's position that Bangladesh
is unable or unwilling to stop terrorists from using
Bangladesh as a platform against India.
D) Renewed skirmishes between Indian and Bangladeshi border
forces led to more deaths and dislocations, with each side
accusing the other of unprovoked aggression. According to
Bangladeshi NGO figures, over 400 Bangladeshis have been
killed by Indian BSF personnel in the past five years.
E) It became clear that the Bangladesh government would not,
during this term, make a decision on the USD 3 billion Tata
steel and power project for political and bureaucratic
reasons, despite Tata's significantly improved offer on gas
pricing. Such a deal would be a watershed for Bangladesh's
international business profile. Ironically, public
opposition came not from Jamaat Islami, which became
supportive after part of the project was slotted for its
leader's parliamentary constituency, but from leftist
economists and pro-Awami League commentators.
Electoral Volatility
---------------------------------------------------------------------
¶6. (S) Bangladeshi general elections are violent and
volatile, and the January 2007 iteration will be no
different. The India "card," whether it is played from New
Delhi or in Bangladesh, could have significant impact. The
ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its coalition partner
Jamaat Islami will again play the India card, especially in
the border areas where anti-Indian sentiment runs highest;
India, they will say, plots to eviscerate Bangladesh's
Islamic and nationalist identity and to install as its lapdog
the opposition Awami League.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
¶7. (S) The Awami League recognizes that its widely perceived
intimacy with New Delhi is a major political liability.
However, it makes only fitful efforts to demonstrate
distance, like Sheikh Hasina's ridiculous assertion recently
that the BNP created the current power crisis to justify
buying electricity from India. The Awami League is not short
of funds or rich Bangladeshi backers, but the ruling
coalition -- after five years in power -- has more. Awami
League leaders, though, have privately told us, and
presumably others, that they are confident of winning the
next election with the help of massive Indian financing.
Trying to Bridge the Terrorism Gap
---------------------------------- -------------------------
¶8. (C) Terrorism is the issue that could throw the
relationship into crisis, particularly if another major
terrorist incident occurs in India and it is traced back to
Bangladesh. The Bangladeshis and the Indians insist that the
other side never asks for help on terrorism cases or responds
to its own requests for assistance. The Bangladeshis also
complain that the Indians refuse to take up offers to visit
jointly any alleged terrorist camp, anytime, anywhere. Asked
if they have evidence to substantiate allegations of
terrorist activity in Bangladesh, High Commission officials
tell us their information on training camps comes from
terrorists captured in India. In general, however, they
refer us for details to press reports or New Delhi.
Action Request
--------------
¶9. (C) Given the renewed strain of Indo-Bangladeshi relations
and the potential for further deterioration during the
elections, and our own interest in identifying and removing
terrorist elements from Bangladesh, we recommend that the
Department and Embassy New Delhi once again ask GOI
interlocutors for evidence to corroborate alarming claims,
like the one made to A/S Boucher in New Delhi (ref a), that
Jamaat Islami finances the terrorist group Jamaatul Mujahidin
Bangladesh. We would follow up through various channels to
encourage GOB action. In addition, we should encourage the
GOB and the GOI to exercise rhetorical restraint. We do not
believe it would be appropriate or effective for the USG to
mediate Indo-Bangladeshi disputes, but we are in a position
to offer counsel as needed and to serve as a channel to key
decision-makers who in Bangladesh are located far from the
Foreign Ministry.
BUTENIS
http://newsfrombangladesh.net/view.php?hidRecord=366494
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
S E C R E T SECTION DHAKA
SUBJECT: INDO-BANGLADESH RELATIONS SHOW NEW STRAIN
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Butenis,
Wikileaks Reference ID NO : 06DHAKA5332
DECL: 08/15/2006
Date :2006-08-22
US Embassy Dhaka
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Butenis, reason para 1.4 d.
¶1. (S) Summary. After a brief respite between the Dhaka
SAARC summit in October and Prime Minister Zia's visit to New
Delhi in March, Indo-Bangladeshi relations are again showing
strain. Given India's support for the opposition Awami
League, Indian antagonism towards the current government, and
the ruling coalition's penchant for fierce anti-India
rhetoric on the campaign trail, the strains seem likely to
worsen as various sides play the "India card" in the upcoming
elections. However, the concerted action India and
Bangladesh both took to end the latest border skirmishes
indicates that neither side is interested in a genuine
crisis. See para nine for action requested. End Summary.
Bilateral Doldrums
------------------
¶2. (C) As the Indo-Pak detente developed in 2004, Indian
officials and commentators intensified their allegations that
Bangladesh was quickly degenerating into a hotbed of Islamist
extremism and terrorism. Traditional bilateral grievances --
over water rights, border demarcations, migration, and trade
-- were exacerbated by charges that Bangladesh, in cahoots
with Pakistan, harbored ULFA and other northeast Indian
terrorists. Bangladesh, in turn, charged India with
sheltering Bangladeshi criminal kingpins and irredentist
Hindu Bengali "terrorists."
¶3. (C) In 2005, Bangladeshi officials fumed when, at the last
minute, India pulled the plug on the February SAARC summit in
Dhaka, citing in part security concerns after opposition
leader Kibria was killed two weeks earlier in a town 70 miles
away. Some military officers and government supporters
genuinely believe that India engineered last year's
traumatizing wave of attacks by Jamaat ul-Mujahidin
Bangladesh. Bangladeshis also groused that during her
frequent visits to India, Awami League president Sheikh
Hasina is received like a reigning head of state, and allege
that Awami League leaders routinely go to India for medical
treatment and other purposes as guests of the Indian
government. Senior ministers routinely blame negative
foreign press reports on an Indian conspiracy to denigrate
Bangladesh for economic and political reasons.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
¶4. (C) Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia's March 20-22 trip to
India produced no movement on any of these disputes.
According to Foreign Secretary Hemayetuddin, it was a "wasted
opportunity" as the Bangladeshis went with a full agenda
ready to negotiate but encountered only Indian stonewalling.
It is incumbent on the regional superpower, Bangladeshis
insist, to be generous with its smaller neighbors. For its
part, the Indian High Commission says that Zia soured the
tone of her visit by arriving 20 minutes late for her kickoff
meeting with President Kalam.
The Strains Intensify
------------------------------------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) In the past four weeks, Indo-Bangladeshi relations
have shown new strain:
A) On the margins of the July SAARC ministerial in Dhaka, MEA
Minister of State Ahmed, at an Awami League-friendly venue,
reiterated Indian concerns about Bangladesh's socio-political
trends and set forth a vision of a secular Bangladesh that
effectively endorsed the Awami League's political platform.
Since Bangladesh is already in an undeclared election
campaign, government supporters were particularly sensitive
to Ahmed's "partisan" remarks.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B) A highly tendentious column in the Washington Post
reiterated the essentially Awami League and Indian view that
Bangladesh is falling into an Islamist abyss. Dated factual
errors suggested the column was not a new assessment, which
fueled speculation about its timing and motivation.
C) Indian opposition BJP President Singh called for the
invasion of Bangladesh, and Pakistan, to root out alleged
terrorist infrastructure. While some Bangladeshis noted his
call was widely repudiated in India, they also pointed out
that it reflected the government's position that Bangladesh
is unable or unwilling to stop terrorists from using
Bangladesh as a platform against India.
D) Renewed skirmishes between Indian and Bangladeshi border
forces led to more deaths and dislocations, with each side
accusing the other of unprovoked aggression. According to
Bangladeshi NGO figures, over 400 Bangladeshis have been
killed by Indian BSF personnel in the past five years.
E) It became clear that the Bangladesh government would not,
during this term, make a decision on the USD 3 billion Tata
steel and power project for political and bureaucratic
reasons, despite Tata's significantly improved offer on gas
pricing. Such a deal would be a watershed for Bangladesh's
international business profile. Ironically, public
opposition came not from Jamaat Islami, which became
supportive after part of the project was slotted for its
leader's parliamentary constituency, but from leftist
economists and pro-Awami League commentators.
Electoral Volatility
---------------------------------------------------------------------
¶6. (S) Bangladeshi general elections are violent and
volatile, and the January 2007 iteration will be no
different. The India "card," whether it is played from New
Delhi or in Bangladesh, could have significant impact. The
ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its coalition partner
Jamaat Islami will again play the India card, especially in
the border areas where anti-Indian sentiment runs highest;
India, they will say, plots to eviscerate Bangladesh's
Islamic and nationalist identity and to install as its lapdog
the opposition Awami League.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
¶7. (S) The Awami League recognizes that its widely perceived
intimacy with New Delhi is a major political liability.
However, it makes only fitful efforts to demonstrate
distance, like Sheikh Hasina's ridiculous assertion recently
that the BNP created the current power crisis to justify
buying electricity from India. The Awami League is not short
of funds or rich Bangladeshi backers, but the ruling
coalition -- after five years in power -- has more. Awami
League leaders, though, have privately told us, and
presumably others, that they are confident of winning the
next election with the help of massive Indian financing.
Trying to Bridge the Terrorism Gap
---------------------------------- -------------------------
¶8. (C) Terrorism is the issue that could throw the
relationship into crisis, particularly if another major
terrorist incident occurs in India and it is traced back to
Bangladesh. The Bangladeshis and the Indians insist that the
other side never asks for help on terrorism cases or responds
to its own requests for assistance. The Bangladeshis also
complain that the Indians refuse to take up offers to visit
jointly any alleged terrorist camp, anytime, anywhere. Asked
if they have evidence to substantiate allegations of
terrorist activity in Bangladesh, High Commission officials
tell us their information on training camps comes from
terrorists captured in India. In general, however, they
refer us for details to press reports or New Delhi.
Action Request
--------------
¶9. (C) Given the renewed strain of Indo-Bangladeshi relations
and the potential for further deterioration during the
elections, and our own interest in identifying and removing
terrorist elements from Bangladesh, we recommend that the
Department and Embassy New Delhi once again ask GOI
interlocutors for evidence to corroborate alarming claims,
like the one made to A/S Boucher in New Delhi (ref a), that
Jamaat Islami finances the terrorist group Jamaatul Mujahidin
Bangladesh. We would follow up through various channels to
encourage GOB action. In addition, we should encourage the
GOB and the GOI to exercise rhetorical restraint. We do not
believe it would be appropriate or effective for the USG to
mediate Indo-Bangladeshi disputes, but we are in a position
to offer counsel as needed and to serve as a channel to key
decision-makers who in Bangladesh are located far from the
Foreign Ministry.
BUTENIS
http://newsfrombangladesh.net/view.php?hidRecord=366494
__._,_.___
