[ALOCHONA] Re: TIPAIMUKH WILL BE HELPFUL TO CONTROL FLOOD IN BD !!!!

This kind of chamchagiri is to be found only in Bangladesh - and only in the 'intellectual' classes. Grassroots AL supporters could never dream up this kind of crap. Manik is a plonker and the tragedy is that there are so many like him. Still, at least people like him articulate what people like Farida feel!

--- In alochona@yahoogroups.com, Desh Bondhu <desh_bondhu@...> wrote:
>
> Good News!!!!
>
> Yes, your are right(!).
>
> Tipaimukh Dam will stop flood in Bangladesh, because flood never occur in Desert !!!
>
> We will then produce dates instead of rice.
>
> Very grateful to India!!!
>
> Desh-Bondhu,
> 'Desher Kotha Bolay'
>
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2011, at 01:30, Muhammad Ali <manik195709@...> wrote:
>
> > Dear All,
> >
> > Please read the experts opinions about the beneficiary role of TIPAIMUKH project to control flood in BD .
> >
> > Regards,
> > Dr. Manik
> >
> > r 25, 2011 | Filed under: Foreign Policies,Politics,South Asia,World | Posted by: gms
> >
> > While renewable energy advocates see hydroelectric facilities as largely beneficial, things get complex when the rivers to be harnessed cross international borders.
> > Bangladesh and India are now at loggerheads over the latter proposed Tipaimukh Dam across the Barak River in Manipur. New Delhi is attempting to assure Dhaka that the Tipaimukh hydroelectric project will not adversely impact Bangladesh, but India’s bland assurances are contradicted by a 2005 study by the Institute of Water Modeling (IWM) Bangladesh, which concluded that during a drier monsoon season, when Bangladesh will need water for fisheries and cultivation, Tipaimukh dam authorities would nevertheless retain 27 percent more water in June, 16 percent in July, 14 percent in August and 4 percent in September than an average monsoon year. The water retention accordingly would also reduce the navigability of the Barak’s two downstream channels, the Surma and Kushiyara rivers.
> > In 2007 India’s North Eastern Electric Power Corp. commissioned the Agricultural Finance Corporation of Mumbai to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the Tipaimukh dam. In the Impact of the Project on Environmental section the EIA noted, Average water availability at downstream for monsoon season at post dam condition will decrease by 30 per cent in comparison to pre-dam condition and thereby will provide relief to downstream populations from recurring flood havoc, effectively validating Bangladeshi concerns about reduced water flow.
> > The EIA report asserted that the Tipaimukh dam will help control floods, a view supported by some Bangladeshi experts, who agree that the dam may help control flash floods, but others have warned of worse flooding to come. Among the skeptics is Shahjalal University of Science and Technology Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering head Professor Jahir Bin Alam, who observed, The dam and the reservoir have certain limitations. The dam may control some of the annual flooding. But when there is a really big rise in water levels, the gates will have to be opened to save the dam itself. That will lead to a much bigger flood downstream.
> >
> > According to the Indian government, the 1,280 foot-long and 535 foot-high Tipaimukh embankment dam, first proposed in the early 1970s, is necessary for flood control andhydroelectric power generation in one of India’s most impoverished states. The dam was originally designed solely to contain flood waters in the lower Barak valley but hydro power generation was later incorporated into the project, which has now been redesigned to be able to generate 1,500 megawatts of electricity from six 250 megawatt Francis turbine-generators.
> > Brac University vice-chancellor Ainun Nishat, a water expert, observed that the Tipaimukh dam could be useful for Bangladesh and could play a role in flood control if it were a joint project and managed in line with Bangladesh’s requirements “But we know neither their construction plan nor their management plan.”
> > Prof Asif Nazrul, an expert on international river law, stated that being a lower riparian country, Bangladesh has the right to be informed before any action relating to an international river is taken, adding, “It is also a duty of a good neighbor and international practice to inform its lower riparian country about any project on any shared river.”
> > Another factor worrying Bangladeshi experts is that the Tipaimukh region is seismically active. In August 1988 a major earthquake occurred on the Manipur-Myanmar border, measuring 6.6 on the Richter scale.
> > The Tipaimukh dam is now turning into a political issue in Bangladesh, as on 22 November at a public rally in Dhamrai, Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Dol (Bangladesh Nationalist Party, or BNP) Chairman Khaleda Zia demanded India immediately discontinue the construction of the Tipaimukh facility and called for discussions between Dhaka and New Delhi on the controversial project, offering the government BNP support if it would lodge a protest with India against the project unilateral move. Khaleda also heavily criticized the government for not protesting the earlier construction of dams by India on many other common rivers, which disrupted and lessened the river’s flows by the time they entered Bangladesh.
> >
> > As a result of political pressure, the day after Zia’s criticism Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced that she will shortly dispatch a special envoy to India to discuss New Delhi’s intention on the Tipaimukh dam project, noting that in 1996 her government had negotiated and signed a water sharing treaty with India over the Ganges which ensured that both nations received an equitable of the river’s water.
> > Besides the Ganges agreement as a model, Hasina also has a second tool to hand, the Bangladeshi-Indian Joint River Commission (JRC), established in the 1972 Indo-Bangladeshi Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace.
> > The JRC was instrumental in forging the 1996 Ganges agreement and reviving its mandate should be Hasina’s highest priority, whileIndia should play the role of a good neighbor and listen carefully toDhaka’s concerns.
> > By. John C.K. Daly of Oilprice.com
> > Related Posts :
> >
> >
> > From: Faruque Alamgir <faruquealamgir@...>
> > To: dahuk@yahoogroups.com; wideminds <WideMinds@yahoogroups.com>; notun_bangladesh@yahoogroups.com; mohiuddin@...; Nayan Khan <udarakash08@...>; anis.ahmed@...; Sonar Bangladesh <sonarbangladesh@yahoogroups.com>; serajurrahman@...; alochona <alochona@yahoogroups.com>; Dr. Abid Bahar <abidbahar@...>; Md. Aminul Islam <aminul_islam_raj@...>; Amra Bangladesi <amra-bangladesi@yahoogroups.com>; zoglul@...; Bangla Zindabad <Bangladesh-Zindabad@yahoogroups.com>; ezajur <Ezajur@...>; Desh Bondhu <desh_bondhu@...>; delwar <delwar98@...>; farhadmazhar@...; History islam <history_islam@yahoogroups.com>; "rezwansiddiqui@..." <rezwansiddiqui@...>
> > Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2011 7:28 AM
> > Subject: [WideMinds] Re: [Dahuk]: Re: [Bangladesh-Zindabad] GEOPOLITICS ------ KAPTAI & TIPAIMUKH !!!!!!!!!
> >
> > Dear Desh Bondhu,
> >
> > "CHORAI NA SUNEY DHORMER KAHINI" THE FAMOUS BANGLA PROBAD IS APPROPRIATE FOR THESE QUISLINGS WHO ARE WORKING DAY IN DAY OUT OPENLY N SHAMELESSLY LIKE PAA CHATA SHRMEOS FOR THEIR FATHER'S LAND BASTARD HIDU STAAAAAAAAA.
> > SHAME ON THESE PEOPLE WHO TALKS ABOUT BANGLADESH UPHOLDING THE CAUSE OF HIDU STAAN TARNISHING THE HOPE N ASPIRATION OF BANGLADESHIS TO LEAD A FREE, SAFE N SOVEREIGN NATIONALITY.
> >
> > Faruque Alamgir
> >
> > On Sun, Nov 27, 2011 at 5:48 AM, Desh Bondhu <desh_bondhu@...> wrote:
> >
> > Mr. Ali,
> > Are you really from India??? Or working openly for india??? Or yor maternal side is from India like Sk. Mujib???
> >
> > What's the point you are raising here???
> > Should we keep silent and leave the country???
> >
> > Your diplomacy to 'JUSTIFY' the Tipaimukh Dam is SHAMELESS and You are saying India is rightly building the dam.
> >
> > It looks you are securing your bread and butter by this paid job.
> >
> > Desh-Bondhu,
> > 'Desher Kotha Bolay'
> >
> > On 26 Nov 2011, at 17:46, Muhammad Ali <manik195709@...> wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Dear All,
> >>
> >> Lots of "HUE & CRY" are going on with the project of building of Tipaimukh Dam . Before we protest about the ill effects of the proposed dam , we should look at our own Kaptai Dam !! When Kaptai Dam was built in 1962 about 100,000 people were displaced and few of them received adequate compensation . Many of the displaced people ( 40,000 ) had left the country ( Settled in India and Burma ). In 2002 during BNP led govt. , two more units were installed to increase the the capacity of the Dam . The BNP govt. did not discuss the new plan with the potentially affected tribal groups who are concerned about loosing the fringe land and an important source of income ( Rice cultivation ).
> >> This the true character of BNP and their ally ! When they are in power they don't care about the people . When you can't protect your own environment , then don't cry and don't do politics with "TIPAIMUKH" !! Please read the following article on Kaptai Dam.
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >> Dr. Muhammad Ali Manik
> >> Member, Advisory Committee,
> >> US Awami League.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Water Resources Development, Vol. 18, No. 1, 197â€"208, 2002
> >> People versus Power: The Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in
> >> Bangladesh
> >> SAILA PARVEEN & I. M. FAISAL
> >> Environmental Studies, North South University, 12 Kemal Ataturk, Banani C/A, Dhaka 1213,
> >> Bangladesh. E-mail: imfaisal@...
> >> ABSTRACT This paper examines the impacts of the Kaptai dam, in the Chittagong Hill
> >> Tracts of Bangladesh, on the tribal communities of that area. Kaptai dam is the only
> >> hydropower source in Bangladesh, with an installed capacity of 230 MW; about 5% of
> >> the electricity consumed in the country is produced there. When the dam was built in
> >> 1962, some 100 000 people were displaced and few of them received adequate compensation.
> >> Recently, the Power Development Board (PDB) of Bangladesh has announced a
> >> plan to install two new 50 MW units that will bring the capacity of the dam to 330
> >> MW. This plan will cause the reservoir water level to rise and may take away about 7500
> >> ha of the fringe land, which the tribal people use for rice cultivation during the
> >> Aprilâ€"August period each year. As before, the PDB has not discussed this plan with the
> >> potentially affected tribal groups, who are concerned about losing the fringe land and an
> >> important source of income. The paper discusses the original displacement issue and this
> >> recent development in the light of the geopolitical history of this region. It attempts to
> >> present an objective analysis of these issues and views held by various concerned parties.
> >> It then proposes a scheme for managing the Kaptai reservoir based on a participatory
> >> approach that will ensure both economic efciency and social equity.
> >> Introduction
> >> Located in the scenic landscape of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), the Kaptai
> >> dam, on the River Karnafuli, is the only hydro-electric power source in
> >> Bangladesh (Figure 1). Commissioned on 30 March 1962, the dam initially had
> >> two hydropower units with a total capacity of 80 MW. Presently, the dam has
> >> ve units with a total capacity of 230 MW and it produces approximately 5% of
> >> the electricity consumed in Bangladesh. Basic features of the dam are shown in
> >> Table 1 (PDB, 1985).
> >> The Kaptai dam was supposed to provide benets in terms of hydropower,
> >> ood control, irrigation and drainage, navigation and enhanced forest resource
> >> harvesting. Most of these objectives have been served in various degrees except
> >> irrigation and drainage. More recently, commercial sh culture and recreation
> >> activities have been introduced in the lake.
> >> This, however, is part of the story. During construction, the dam ooded an
> >> area of some 655 km2, which included about 22 000 ha of cultivable landâ€"40%
> >> of all such land in the CHT. The lake took away the homes of 18 000 families and
> >> displaced 100 000 tribal people, of which 70% were Chakma (Government of
> >> 0790-0627 Print/1360-0648 On-line/02/010197â€"12 Ã" 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd
> >> DOI: 10.1080/0790062022012175 6
> >> 198 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
> >> Figure 1. Location of the Kaptai dam in the CHT.
> >> Bangladesh, 1975). The dam also ooded the original Rangamati town and the
> >> palace of the Chakma Raja (king).
> >> A rather casual attempt was made to rehabilitate this large group of peopleâ€"
> >> nearly 25% of the local population. Ofcially, the majority of the displaced
> >> people were rehabilitated on the upper reaches of the rivers Kasalong and
> >> Chengi during the early phase of the project (construction of the dam began in
> >> Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh 199
> >> Table 1. Basic features of the Kaptai dam
> >> Feature Size/type
> >> Body of the dam Earth
> >> Length 670.6 m
> >> Height 45.7 m
> >> Crest width 7.6 m
> >> Maximum water level 33.5 m (110 feet above
> >> mean sea level (MSL))
> >> Minimum water level 20.1 m (66 feet MSL)
> >> Capacity at 33 m MSL 6477 3 106 m3
> >> Reservoir at 33 m MSL 777 km2
> >> Spillway length 227 m
> >> Maximum spillway discharge 16 000 cumecs
> >> Installed capacity (ve units) 230 MW
> >> October 1957). In reality, the newly created ‘environmental refugees’ were
> >> resettled in the low-lying areas of Langdu, Barkal and Bhaghaichari as per the
> >> advice of the project ofcials. Much of this resettlement area had gone underwater
> >> by 1962 as the reservoir gradually lled up, causing many to be displaced
> >> for the second time. This had naturally aggrieved the tribal population as they
> >> received few if any of the benets of the dam.
> >> Many of the displaced people had left the country; some estimates say that
> >> 40 000 of them went to the sparsely populated states of Mizoram, Tripura,
> >> Assam and Arunachal in India. Another 20 000 may have gone to Burma
> >> (Samad, 1998). The Chakma people call this event Bara Parang or the Great
> >> Exodus, a detailed account of which may be found in Chakma et al. (1995).
> >> This event and a series of administrative and legislative actions taken since the
> >> birth of Pakistan had ultimately led to the 22-year-long violent and armed
> >> confrontations between the Bangladesh government and the tribal people that
> >> began in the mid-1970s and lasted till the signing of the peace treaty in 1997.
> >> Some provisions of the treaty have not been implemented yet and these remain
> >> as the source of discord between the government of Bangladesh and the tribal
> >> people of the CHT.
> >> In this backdrop, the Power Development Board (PDB) of Bangladesh is
> >> considering a plan to install two new 50 MW units at Kaptai. If materialized,
> >> more water will have to be stored in the reservoir, which may cause the lowest
> >> reservoir level to rise by as much as 6.5 m. As a result, approximately 7500 ha
> >> of the seasonal fringe land may become permanently inundated where rice is
> >> grown from mid-April to mid-August.1 This plan has sparked the old debate
> >> and fear that the dam authority and the government are not sensitive to the
> >> needs of the local people in this region.
> >> This issue has given rise to a series of questions that must be addressed. What
> >> are the arguments put forward by the PDB in support of this plan? Have the
> >> local people been consulted about this plan in advance? Is the government
> >> aware of the geopolitical implications of this potential impact? What actions, if
> >> any, are being considered by the government to address this concern? And
> >> nally, what approach should the government follow so that development of
> >> fresh contentions can be avoided in future?
> >> 200 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
> >> Objectives and Methodology
> >> The questions raised above will be critically examined in this paper in the light
> >> of the historic development of the geopolitical events in the CHT. The paper will
> >> specically look at the human and environmental impacts of the dam created in
> >> the past as well as the potential impact of the proposed expansion plan
> >> (installing units 6 and 7). Views from both sidesâ€"the tribal communities and the
> >> PDBâ€"will be presented in relation to the operation of the dam and its impacts
> >> on the local people and the environment. The paper will then suggest an
> >> approach that can help resolve this latest issue of dispute in a mutually
> >> agreeable way.
> >> The study will be based on information collected from secondary sources in
> >> the form of papers, reports, books and academic publications and primary
> >> information collected through interviews with key informants.
> >> Geopolitical Description of the CHT
> >> The CHT is located in the south-east part of Bangladesh. The British created this
> >> region in 1860 under the 22nd Administrative Act. At that time, most of it was
> >> densely forested and inhabited by tribal people (less than 5% of the population
> >> were Bengalis from the plain lands). The district was created in recognition of its
> >> unique natural and cultural characteristics. At present, the CHT is comprised of
> >> three administrative districts, Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban, which
> >> were created in 1983. The total area of the CHT is 13 148 km2, which is about
> >> 10% of the land area of Bangladesh, although only 2% of the population lived in
> >> the CHT in 1991. Currently, the population of the CHT is evenly composed of
> >> Bengalis (50%) and tribal communities (50%). The Chakma are the largest tribal
> >> group, constituting about 24% of the CHT population. The other major tribes are
> >> the Marma and the Tripura, representing 14% and 6% of the population
> >> (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1995).
> >> Geographically, the CHT can be divided into a number of river valleys:
> >> Chengi, Maini, Kasalong, Rankhiang and Sangu. All these rivers except the
> >> Sangu are tributaries to the Karnafuli River, on which the Kaptai dam is located.
> >> These river valleys are 30â€"80 km long and 3â€"10 km wide, surrounded by hills a
> >> few hundred to a thousand metres high. In some places the valleys may be
> >> 20â€"30 km wide. These valleys are very suitable for agriculture and horticulture.
> >> The rest of the CHT mostly comprises hills and forests where the tribal people
> >> practice jhum (shifting slash and burn) cultivation. It includes 1538 km2 of
> >> reserved forest and another 5400 km2 of unclassied state forest areas (Johnson
> >> & Ahmed, 1957; Rashid, 1991). The forests are of both evergreen and deciduous
> >> types and provide valuable resources such as wood (both timber and fuel),
> >> bamboo, cane and honey. Commercial tea and rubber plantations and horticulture
> >> have been introduced in the CHT in recent years.
> >> Chronology of Events in the CHT and the Issue of Human Displacement
> >> The tribal people have been living in the CHT for a long time but they are not
> >> the original settlers in that area. Most of the CHT was not inhabited or was
> >> barely inhabited by people till the large-scale in-migration in the 17th and 18th
> >> centuries. The Chakmas moved into the CHT with their king when the Marma
> >> Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh 201
> >> Table 2. Chronology of major events in the CHT (1860â€"1971)
> >> Year Event
> >> 1860 Formation of hill tracts under Lord Canning.
> >> 1900 The CHT manual was introduced as the basic framework for administration.
> >> 1935 The British government of India dened the hills as a ‘totally excluded area’, taking it out of
> >> Bengal’s control.
> >> 1948 The CHT Police Regulation was annulled and the police force,whichwasmanned by the tribal
> >> people, was disbanded.
> >> 1955 The CHT area was surveyed and legal measures for land registration were adopted.
> >> 1955 Muslim League leaders tried to designate the CHT as a regular district; this was resisted by
> >> Colonel Niblett, the last British-born Deputy Commissioner of the CHT and the Chakma Raja.
> >> 1956 The rst constitution of Pakistan retained the special status of the CHT as the ‘excluded area’.
> >> However, under Clause 51(I), only a Muslim could hold the position of the Head of the State
> >> of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Thus, all the tribal and non-Muslimpeople were effectively
> >> downgraded to second-class citizens.
> >> 1958 After the military takeover in Pakistan the ‘opening up’ of the CHT was accelerated.
> >> 1960 Government transferred all local indigenous employees in administration to other parts of East
> >> Pakistan.
> >> 1962 The constitution changed the status of the CHT from an ‘excluded area’ to a ‘tribal area’.
> >> 1962 Construction of the Kaptai hydro-electric dam was completed, which submerged 22 000 ha of
> >> cultivable land and displaced 100 000 people without proper compensation and rehabilitation.
> >> 1964 By an act of parliament, the CHT ceased to be a tribal area from 10 January 1964. Accelerated
> >> inux of Bengalis had sown the seed of politicization of the CHT.
> >> 1971 Liberation war and independence of Bangladesh.
> >> king of Arakan (most of Arakan lies in Myanmar now) drove him out. Later on,
> >> the Mughols drove the Marma people out of Arakan in 1756 (Hutchinson, 1906).
> >> Other tribes of the CHT have a similar history.
> >> According to Thomas Herbert Lewin, a soldier-cum-administrator of British
> >> India’s north-east frontier, “a greater proportion of the hill tribes at present
> >> living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts undoubtedly came about two generations
> >> ago from Arakan. This is asserted both by their own traditions and by records
> >> in Chittagong Collectorate” (Lewin, 1869). Accordingly, the claim often made by
> >> the tribal people that they are the ‘sons of the soil’ is not valid in the sense of
> >> being original settlers in the CHT. Bengali settlers lived in parts of the CHT long
> >> before that time, albeit in small numbers.
> >> The different tribal communities of the CHT have lived separately from the
> >> beginning and have distinct linguistic, cultural and anthropological features.
> >> Over the course of about 300 years, these hill communities have gone through
> >> a series of interventions sometimes protecting and sometimes undermining their
> >> interests. These events have been summarized in Table 2 for the 1860â€"1971
> >> period.
> >> It is evident from the series of events that the displacement of 100 000 tribal
> >> people due to the Kaptai dam was almost inevitable, as their control over the
> >> region was gradually being curtailed, which culminated with the annulment of
> >> the tribal area status of the CHT in 1964.
> >> The issue of resettlement of the displaced people was handled poorly for a
> >> number of reasons. There was a general lack of understanding of the tribal
> >> culture by the government of Pakistan and the donor agencies (the dam was
> >> 202 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
> >> funded by USAID). They thought that these were ‘nomadic’ hill-people practising
> >> jhum cultivation and it was unnecessary to design a permanent resettlement
> >> programme for them. In reality, the tribal people did move from hill to hill but
> >> they had a long cycle of jhum cultivation. Before the inundation of the Karnafuli
> >> valley, the average cycle of jhum cultivation was 7â€"10 years, and in some cases
> >> 10â€"15 years. After inundation of the river valleys, which took away 40% of the
> >> fertile agricultural land, this cycle became reduced to only 3â€"5 years as thousands
> >> of local people were forced back to jhum cultivation. This pressure on land
> >> was further intensied by the rapid population growth that took place during
> >> the 1960s and 1970s in the entire CHT area. The collective outcome of these
> >> developments was intensive agriculture both in the remaining plain lands and
> >> in the hills, leading to soil erosion, productivity loss and water pollution caused
> >> by increased use of fertilizer and pesticides.
> >> The other important reason for not having an adequate relocation scheme was
> >> simply the lack of adequate budgetary provision. Initially, some compensation
> >> was paid for the loss of land, trees and structures but there was little money
> >> available for rehabilitating 100 000 people. The majority of them were taken to
> >> the Kasalong valley, where a reserved forest was partly cleared to create land for
> >> these people. When the water level of the reservoir rose after completion of the
> >> dam in 1962, much of this land went underwater and the government simply
> >> gave up all efforts to resettle these people again, thus contributing to the Bara
> >> Parang.
> >> Interviews with the local people as well as senior government ofcials indicate
> >> several inadequacies of the resettlement programme. The government could not
> >> keep its promise to compensate for the lost arable land with similar land
> >> elsewhere. First, not enough arable land was available in the region; each family
> >> was given a maximum of 10 acres (4 ha) of land even though they owned more
> >> land in the project area. Secondly, fertile land in the river valley was compensated
> >> by hilly lands, which was of no immediate use to the people, who had got
> >> accustomed to the plain land farming introduced in the CHT by the British from
> >> the early 20th century. Thirdly, when monetary compensation was made, it was
> >> too small: for example, the displaced people received only Taka 500â€"700 per
> >> hectare as compensation whereas they had to pay Taka 5000 per hectare to buy
> >> similar arable plain land in other areas where some of them eventually settled
> >> (Chakma et al., 1995).
> >> The government of Pakistan had made a rather late attempt in 1968â€"69 to
> >> rehabilitate some 11 000 families in 51 moujas surrounding the lake.2 A total of
> >> 66 000 ha of land was allocated for this purpose. As per the plan, each family
> >> received on average 2.4 ha of land for growing fruits, in addition to fruit
> >> saplings, fertilizer and pesticides. Extension ofcers arranged training in horticulture
> >> and initially the resettled people participated in the programme enthusiastically.
> >> Unfortunately, the plan did not work well in the end because little or
> >> no attention was paid to the storage and marketing aspects of the produce.
> >> People grew mango, jackfruit, pineapple and lemon but did not receive a fair
> >> price for the products. In fact they fell prey to exploitation by the middlemen.
> >> Moreover, over the years the productivity of the land has fallen signicantly,
> >> rendering the programme less effective now.
> >> The large-scale displacement of the tribal people caused by the Kaptai dam is
> >> certainly one of the important factors that have contributed to the worsening of
> >> the relationship between the tribal and Bengali populations in the CHT. In the
> >> Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh 203
> >> latter part of the 1960s, the rate of inux of the Bengalis increased due to the
> >> setting up of some major industrial infrastructures such as the Karnafuli pulp
> >> and paper mill and administrative ofces of various departments of the government.
> >> Events after Independence
> >> During the independence war of Bangladesh in 1971, the CHT population
> >> supported the Mukti Bahini (freedom ghters) against the Pakistani army. The
> >> following year, Manobendra Larma, a leading gure from the tribal people,
> >> became a member of the rst national parliament of Bangladesh. He formed the
> >> Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS, or the Chittagong Hill Tribal
> >> People’s Co-ordination Association) on 24 June 1972 in a convention of tribal
> >> leaders held in Rangamati. At the same time the tribal students formed an
> >> association called the Pahari Chatra Samity (PCS).
> >> Initially, both the PCJSS and the PCS tried to establish their claims through
> >> democratic and non-violent ways. First, Larma called on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,
> >> the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, to protest the fact that the ethnic
> >> minorities were designated as Bengalis in the rst constitution of Bangladesh.
> >> Larma, with a delegation of the tribal people, also demanded autonomy for the
> >> CHT region, which was denied on grounds of territorial integrity and sovereignty
> >> of the country. Other issues taken up by the PCJSS included: legal
> >> protection from attacks by the Bengali settlers and illegal dispossession of
> >> property; ending the migration of Bengalis from plain lands; the recovery of lost
> >> property; and tolerance of tribal culture and religion.
> >> In 1975, the Mujib government was overthrown by a military coup and the
> >> relationship between the PCJSS and the military government worsened. During
> >> this time (1975â€"76), the PCJSS formed its secret armed wing, the Santi Bahini
> >> (Peace Force). It received shelter and training in the neighbouring Indian states
> >> of Tripura and Mizoram, and began to engage in guerilla warfare with the
> >> Bangladeshi police and army. As a result, a large contingent of the Bangladesh
> >> army remained deployed in the CHT after then and both sides suffered major
> >> causalities, although reliable statistics are hard to come by. In the early 1980s, the
> >> Bangladesh government brought a large number of landless people from the
> >> districts of Chittagong, Sylhel, Comilla and Noakhali into the CHT.3 This action
> >> contributed to the rapid change in the population composition in the CHT
> >> (Figure 2) and intensied the number of conicts with and the resentment of the
> >> tribal people.
> >> The armed confrontation slowed down in the early 1990s. After the general
> >> election of 1991, the newly formed government formed a special committee on
> >> the CHT region to arrive at political solutions for issues raised by the PCJSS. The
> >> rst meeting of this committee with the PCJSS was held on 5 November 1992.
> >> This marked the beginning of the peace-making process, which led to an
> >> agreement between the two parties regarding the repatriation of the tribal
> >> refugees from India. Accordingly, the rst batch of the refugees returned home
> >> on 15 February 1994. The peace process continued, which culminated in signing
> >> the peace treaty between the government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS in
> >> December 1997.
> >> 204 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
> >> Figure 2. Changing composition of the population in the CHT. Source: Bangladesh
> >> Bureau of Statistics (1995).
> >> The Debate over the Proposed Expansion Plan
> >> In the backdrop of all this turmoil, the PDB has recently announced its plan to
> >> install two new hydropower units, 50 MW each, in the dam. These units are to
> >> be installed with nancial assistance from the Japan Bank of Investment Corporation
> >> (JBIC) in the form of a 30-year soft loan with a grace period of 10 years.
> >> However, how these extra units will be run has not been clearly spelled out.
> >> PDB ofcials have made statements that these units will be operated using the
> >> excess water that is released through the spillway. This excess water will be
> >> stored during the storage period (Julyâ€"November) and released gradually over
> >> the drawdown period (Decemberâ€"July) as per the rule curve (Figure 3). It should
> >> be mentioned that this rule curve was last revised in 1981 before installing the
> >> third unit. Since then three more units have been added and two more are being
> >> considered and, therefore, the rule curve needs updating. The PDB ofcials have
> >> said that installation of the two new units will change the rule curve and raise
> >> the lowest reservoir water level from 76 feet above mean sea level (MSL)
> >> (24.93 m MSL) to 90 feet MSL (29.52 m MSL). However, the reservoir level will
> >> be maintained at 90 feet MSL or lower throughout the Aprilâ€"August period,
> >> during which rice is grown in the fringe land, as per the instruction of a
> >> government circular.
> >> However, there are doubts as to whether the reservoir level can be maintained
> >> at or below the 90 feet MSL limit during the fringe land cultivation period. The
> >> economic analysis done by the consulting agency, the Tokyo Electric Power
> >> Services Company (TEPSCO), indicated that the project internal rate of return
> >> (IRR) is most favourable if the lowest reservoir level is kept at 96 feet MSL
> >> (31.5 m MSL). This will cause permanent ooding of about 7500 ha of fringe
> >> land, which is at the heart of the new debate. The tribal community of Kaptai,
> >> based on their long and bitter experience with the authorities in the past, are
> >> understandably apprehensive about the possibility of losing their income from
> >> the fringe land should the water level exceeds the 90 feet MSL limit. The issue
> >> has already been raised at various forums by the PCJSS including with the
> >> project sponsor JBIC.
> >> Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh 205
> >> Figure 3. Rule curve for the Kaptai hydropower station. Source: Noman (1997).
> >> The Future Course of Action
> >> The root of the problems emanating from the Kaptai dam lies in not recognizing
> >> the rights of the indigenous people and in the lack of willingness on the part of
> >> the authorities to communicate with them. There was virtually no consultation
> >> with the tribal people in the 1960s during construction of the Kaptai dam. Now
> >> the consequences can be seen: both the Bengalis and the tribal people have paid
> >> a high price for the problems created by the dam and the displacement of
> >> 100 000 people.
> >> In relation to the recent expansion plan, the tribal people, through the PCJSS,
> >> have made three specic demands. First, the benet of the damâ€"electricityâ€"
> >> should be made available to the hill communities. The PDB, on principle, is in
> >> agreement with this demand. However, the question here is of economic
> >> feasibility. The hill communities are small and dispersed, and extending power
> >> lines to those communities may be a very expensive undertaking. The PDB is
> >> also concerned that once the service is provided it will be very difcult or
> >> impossible to collect bills from these remote locations. This is an issue that the
> >> PDB and the PCJSS have to discuss in detail and come to an agreeable solution.
> >> The second issue raised by the PCJSS is that the PDB must compensate for any
> >> loss of crop grown in the fringe land that may be caused by the rise of the
> >> reservoir water level after installation of the proposed units. There is a government
> >> circular according to which the PDB is supposed to maintain the reservoir
> >> level below 90 feet (27.43 m) MSL during the rice-growing season. However, the
> >> government or the PDB is not legally obligated to compensate for any loss of
> >> crop in the fringe land should the water level rise above this limit. According to
> >> the PDB, all displaced people who used to reside within the area below 120 feet
> >> (36.57 m) MSL have been relocated and compensated by the then East Pakistan
> >> Water and Power Development Authority (EPWAPDA) during or after completion
> >> of the dam. Therefore, the PDB may try to minimize the potential loss of
> >> crop, but it is not required to compensate for such losses.
> >> The PDB further mentions that even without the new units, it is not possible
> >> to maintain the reservoir level below 90 feet MSL every year. In years with more
> >> than usual rainfall, more water is stored in the reservoir for protecting the
> >> downstream areas from ooding. In those years, fringe land cultivation is
> >> 206 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
> >> affected due to natural reasons and compensation is neither demanded nor paid
> >> by any side. Here, the argument put forward by the PDB seems reasonable.
> >> However, its position should be explained to the potentially affected group
> >> clearly and honestly. The extent of loss in economic terms should also be
> >> quantied and compared with the benet of power generation to get a better
> >> perspective on the issue. The PDB may set aside some funds to gradually train
> >> the affected group in alternative income generation means so that this issue
> >> becomes inconsequential over time. Due to the volatile and sensitive sociopolitical
> >> situation in the CHT, this issue has received a lot of local and international
> >> attention. As a result, the PDB has been asked by the sponsor JBIC to carry out
> >> a social impact study with the following specic objectives as mentioned in the
> >> terms of reference of the study: (1) develop a rule curve for reservoir operation;
> >> (2) assessment of social impact due to the proposed expansion of the Kaptai
> >> power plant for the sixth and seventh units, including the existing units; and (3)
> >> recommendation of impact mitigation measures, including assessment of needs
> >> for rehabilitation of affected people. Once the study is completed as per the
> >> terms of reference, the issue will be adequately addressed and this should be
> >> acceptable to the PDB and the PCJSS.
> >> The third demand of the PCJSS was to involve tribal labour in the dam-related
> >> maintenance and extension works. The PDB is not opposed to this idea but
> >> security issues may prevent the implementation of this proposal immediately.
> >> Besides, such activities are carried out only occasionally. However, this may be
> >> a politically important issue for the PCJSS and should be given serious consideration
> >> by the dam authority.
> >> In fact, taking a more holistic view, the government and the PCJSS need to
> >> work closely on developing an institutional framework that will allow them to
> >> discuss and deal with all dam-related issues in a systematic and democratic way.
> >> At present, there is a body called the Reservoir Operation Committee (ROC),
> >> which is supposed to provide general guidelines on reservoir operation.4 This is
> >> a high-level committee consisting of 18 members, who include the Divisional
> >> Commissioner of Chittagong, the Manager of Kaptai power station, District
> >> Commissioners of the CHT and representatives from various government agencies,
> >> including one from the army. There is no member in the ROC who directly
> >> represents the interest of the tribal community. Moreover, due to its too high a
> >> prole, it has not been able to meet even once since the commissioning of the
> >> dam in 1962. This clearly has to change: the ROC must be made smaller and it
> >> must include one or more representatives from the PCJSS so that it begins to
> >> operate as an efcient, effective and fair management body for the Kaptai
> >> reservoir.
> >> The issue of the dam related rehabilitation and loss of fringe-land cannot be
> >> separated from the general issue of dealing with the ethnic minorities in an
> >> equitable manner. In this regard important progress has been made by the
> >> government by enacting the Local Government Council Act 1989. This Act
> >> provides for a number of legal safeguards for the tribal population for preserving
> >> their rights and culture and for arbitration of social disputes. Another
> >> important milestone along this direction is the peace treaty of 1997. After signing
> >> the peace treaty, the people of the CHTâ€"both the Bengali settlers and the tribal
> >> communitiesâ€"have been hoping for a peaceful and prosperous future in this
> >> region and the government should avoid any attempt to disrupt this process.
> >> Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh 207
> >> The World Commission on Dams (WCD) has already prepared the road map
> >> to a better planning approach when it comes to planning, constructing and
> >> managing a dam. According to the WCD, issues pertaining to dams should be
> >> examined in the light of a few key criteria: efciency, equity, accountability,
> >> participatory decision making and sustainability. In the case of the Kaptai dam,
> >> the principles of equity, accountability and participatory decision making have
> >> not been followed from the beginning. The time has come to incorporate these
> >> at the earliest opportunity, not only to avoid fresh contentions in this region but
> >> also to let the tribal people have their say and reap some of the benets that the
> >> dam has to offer.
> >> Concluding Remarks
> >> All over the world, there are more than 15 000 large and numerous other small
> >> dams that have displaced some 60 million people from their homelands. In the
> >> recent past, Turkey has built the Ataturk dam in the Kurdish region, where some
> >> 60 000 people were displaced. Another project in this region, the Illisu dam, will
> >> affect about 75 000 people of the Kurdish region. Such encroachments on the
> >> resources and rights of the people of the land are not isolatedâ€"the Narmada in
> >> India, the Three Gorges in China, the Nam Theun II in Laos and the Itoiz in
> >> Spain are just a few examples of such violations.
> >> Unfortunately, a large part of the population displaced by dams has come
> >> from the underclass and the tribal communities. In India, about 40% of the
> >> people displaced by dams have been low castes or tribal people, even though
> >> they make up less than 6% of the Indian population. The story looks very similar
> >> in Bangladesh. It is about time that the government and the affected groups
> >> worked out a peaceful and mutually agreeable solution in a democratic way and
> >> through a properly designed institutional framework. This would go a long way
> >> in ensuring the security and prosperity of the CHT region in the new millennium.
> >> Notes
> >> 1. This estimate is based on the data provided by the Agricultural Extension Department of
> >> Rangamati via memo. no. 65(A) to the PDB ofce at Kaptai.
> >> 2. A mouja is a cluster of villages; several moujas make a union and several unions make a thana,
> >> which is the smallest administrative unit in Bangladesh.
> >> 3. The resettlement programme was carried out under government instructions issued through
> >> condential letters from the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division to the Deputy Commissioner
> >> of the CHT district dated 4 September 1980, Ref. No. 66(a), and from the Deputy
> >> Commissioner of the CHT district to his counterparts of the other districts dated 10 September
> >> 1980, Ref. No. 1055(a). In the letters, Bengali families from other districts were promised 2 ha of
> >> high land, 1.6 ha of mixed land and 1 ha of paddy land if they migrated to the CHT region
> >> (Chakma et al., 1995).
> >> 4. The latest composition of this committee has been specied in a circular of the Ministry of Power,
> >> Energy and Mineral Resources dated 25 February 2001, Ref. No. 2/B:/PG-88/251 (part)/88.
> >> References
> >> Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (1995) Statistical Yearbook (Dhaka, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics).
> >> Chakma, H., Chakma, T., Dewan, P. & Ullah, M. (1995) Bara Parang: The Tale of the Development
> >> Refugees of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Dhaka, Center for Sustainable Development).
> >> Government of Bangladesh (1975) Chittagong Hill Tracts District Gazetteer (Dhaka, BG Press).
> >> 208 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
> >> Hutchinson, R.H.S. (1906) An Account of Chittagong Hill Tracts (Calcutta, Bengal Secretariat Press).
> >> Johnson, B.C.L. & Ahmed, N. (1957) Geographical record: the Karnafuli Project, Oriental Geographer,
> >> 1(2), pp. 159â€"164.
> >> Lewin, T.H. (1869) The Hill Tracts of Chittagong and the Dwellers Therein (Calcutta, Bengal Printing
> >> Co.).
> >> Noman, N.S. (1997) Optimal operation of the Karnafuli reservoir, Bangladesh, Master of Engineering
> >> thesis, School of Civil Engineering, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand.
> >> PDB (1985) Karnafuli Hydro Station (Dhaka, Bangladesh Power Development Board).
> >> Rashid, H. (1991) The Geography of Bangladesh (Dhaka, University Press Ltd).
> >> Samad, S. (1998) Dams caused environmental refugees of the ethnic minorities in Chittagong, report
> >> presented at the WCD Regional Consultation Meeting held in Sri Lanka, 10â€"11 December
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>

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