'Prince' Joy Wazed and Ciovacco: A missed opportunity Wazed and Ciovacco's article in the HIR, titled "Stemming the Rise of Islamic Extremism in Bangladesh", has once again become a semi-mainstream topic, thanks to a recent seminar on the subject, in which Waliur Rahman, a former diplomat, quoted – and then erased – the percentage of new recruits to the army entering from the madrassas. Wazed and Ciovacco do not cite sources in their article, so this and a few other numbers they mention are hard to authenticate. Below, I list some of the troubling points about their article.
1. "Moulobadi" In the 3rd paragraph of the section titled "The Situation on the Ground", the authors say:
As anyone remotely familiar with the language knows, "Moulobadi" derives from the root word "moul", meaning roots or fundamentals. "Moulobadi" thus denotes a fundamentalist, not necessarily an Islamist, but anyone who takes their ideology too seriously. This mistranslation is symptomatic of the entire article. It either indicates that the authors have sacrificed nuance for brevity. Or it indicates that they are not aware of the nuance in the first place and they seriously believe that Islamic fundamentalism is the only fundamentalism that leads to violence, coercion and the sacrifice of basic rights in Bangladesh. 2. Mish-mash of Islamists In the 4th paragraph of the section titled "The Situation on the Ground", the authors say:
Jamaat-e-Islami used to support reunification overtly and has since given up this demand, at least overtly. Of the "shadow groups" mentioned, two have "Bangladesh" in their names, noting they are hardly Pakistan-leaning. Indigenous radical Islamism is a separate threat that cannot be dealt with a sedition charge any more than the KKK in the US can be charged with sedition. They can, however, be charged with violent crimes and dealt with accordingly. That BNP had "direct and indirect involvement" with the perpetrators of the coordinated bomb blasts is still something that is heard in whispers without any substantiation from proper sources. In fact, the 1/11 government – hardly a BNP-friendly entity – was the actor which suppressed a Daily Star report on these alleged links, not the BNP. The authors' lack of citations represents a growing problem. 3. The 35% statistic In the last paragraph of the section titled "The Situation on the Ground", the authors say:
Firstly, the source for this statistic is not given and until then, it cannot be validated. If this statistic were true, it would be interesting to ask how many of the recruits were NCOs, officer cadres and other specialized services (medical, engineering, etc). Secondly, the Bangladeshi Army is a meritocratic organization. If madrasha students pass the Entrance Examination, there are no grounds to bar them from serving their country. The fear seems to be that these madrasha students will remain imbued with radical ideas about governance and freedoms and that the Army's own training and indoctrination will have no effect on them. Thirdly, the sentence that immediately follows seems to be deliberately pandering to their American audience's fears of a "hostile Islamist takeover". The solution to this is not to monitor the background of army recruits, but to de-legitimise coup d'etat once and for all so that democracy is the "only game in town". It's hard but not impossible. Sadly, the authors do not seem to suggest this. 4. The Burkha indicator In the first paragraph of the next section titled "Toward Renewal: A Secular Plan", the authors ask a question:
Before we get into the difficult problems surrounding this issue, one has to wonder (yet again, thanks to the lack of citations) exactly where they are getting this figure of 500 percent in the last 5 years from. Besides, since it is a percentage, what was the base figure, and what is the ratio of burkha wearing women to non-burkha wearing women? But the real problem is the use of the burkha as a barometer for the "growing tide of Islamism". Nowhere have I seen any study that correlates religiosity with religion-inspired violence: ie. Islam with Islamism. Why treat the burkha as an indicator of Islamism rather than Islam, when there is no clear evidence either way as to why a woman chooses to don a burkha? Is there an opinion poll of burkha-wearing women floating around somewhere in which they are asked why they chose to buy the burkhas – whether out of religious devotion or the threats/persuasion of some radical religious leader/group? If there is, it would be nice if it were brought to our attention. (For the record, because I know it will come up, my personal opinion is that Islam does not require anyone to wear a burkha in order to be a Muslim.) It is here that one begins to get slightly irritated with the authors. Their casual causation would have been laughable had it not been so serious. In a year when France denied citizenship to a woman because of her burkha, one is in no doubt what fear and alarm the burkha as a symbol – a nuance-less shorthand – inspires in Westerners. That the authors throw this about casually into a question about AL prospects is irresponsible to say the least, and makes them look as if they are pandering to the fears of their audience, instead of presenting a nuanced picture. 5. The policy prescriptions The authors provide 5 policy prescriptions:
The first is sorely needed and will work, but not if implemented by an Awami League government whose affiliated members write articles such as this one. The second is a fine prescription, as I am all for more elementary schools and hospitals in this under-served land of ours, even if the intention is simply to break some supposed "monopoly on education that the madrassas now enjoy". The third prescription is accompanied by this curious sentence: "To counter the increased military recruitment from the madrassas, more youths—especially the secular-minded—must also be taught how to pass the Army's Entrance Exams." Exactly how we will find the "secular-minded" is best left to the imagination. What are the metrics by which we will measure the secular-mindedness of new recruits? Suppose we look at their backgrounds: are we trying to say that secular Bangla and English medium schools have not produced extremists? What else do we have? Beards, burkhas, prayer mat-ownership, Che t-shirts? Shall we stand our new recruits a round at the RAOWA Club and see which ones refuse? Or perhaps, invite them to Pahela Boishakh/Valentine's/New (Gregorian) Years' celebration at Captain's World and see who doesn't show up? Is it not enough that they resolve to defend the state – a secular construct, comprising not just of Muslims – from all enemies, that they will go to battle other Muslims, even radical Islamists, to serve their government? God, that non-secular entity, knows that I think our army needs reform and the AL has a unique mandate to do it. But that reform is needed in the areas of deference to civilian authority and moving out of the business sphere, not some Islamic juju manufactured by (as yet) unsubstantiated data and even more unsubstantiated anxieties in Washington. The fourth prescription may or may not work. Bangladesh is not Saudi Arabia – extremism in Bangladesh is less ideological than systemically-driven. The fear is that if an extremist cleric is suddenly converted, another will take his place. Demand always finds a supply. And in a country of so much frustration, there is always a demand for extreme ideologies – whether Islamic, leftist or simply nihilistic. Which brings us to the fifth prescription, on which there is no argument. Yes we need poverty eradication. But the way the authors tie growth and development with the Awami League's secularism (as opposed to its efficiency, greater capability, different political economic outlook etc) hardly holds up to rigorous scrutiny. What the authors should have said To summarise quickly: Bangladesh is a country with multifarious problems, of which Islamist extremists are one. Awami League's coming to power has potential to alleviate a lot of these problems, but they must take the following steps which no previous government has taken. 1. They must crack down on all sorts of coercion – whether motivated by extremist interpretations of Islam, party politics, economic interest, societal prejudices or unchecked government power. 2. They must ensure rule of law and access to essential public services and public employment for all, regardless of religion, gender, ethnicity or class. 3. They must ensure growth, education and decent healthcare without putting labels like "Islamic" and "Secular" to it. All this would help Bangladesh develop and take care of its problems. Not overnight, not in five years, not just through an AL government, but in the long run. And extreme Islamism will die along with the country's other diseases. The article and the AL agenda In the end, the fact that this article was co-authored by "an adviser to Sheikh Hasina" bodes ill for the Awami League's future trajectory. One of the greatest historical slurs thrown against the Awami League by their opponents is this: that the party imposes a mutually exclusive choice between one's religion and one's secular ideology (i.e. where secularism means "Dhormonirpekkhota", not some imported Western/Indian version). The party frequently protests "Religion is an individual matter, we never said don't be religious" to counter this slur. And it truly does practise this – as the late Dhaka Mayor Hanif or Sheikh Hasina herself (or her adviser, pictured this week at the Kaaba, wearing the outfit of a Haji) can attest. In a country such as ours, I would suggest that Awami League counts some of the more devout Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Buddhists in their ranks - people who believe in secularism without giving up their religion. What this article does is reinstate that mutually exclusive choice all over again: that one cannot be religious and dhormoniropekkho at the same time. And worse, in prescribing that our army (and presumably, the civil and other government services) recruit through discrimination, ensures that religious considerations will be well and truly ingrained into the government. Hardly dhormoniropekkho. The harm that the opinions expressed can cause is immense, but the Awami League's secular agenda – a very different sort of secularism than the one envisioned in American thinktanks and colleges – might just be the biggest casualty. A better argument would have had to be Jeffersonian to truly resonate: that the separation of mosque and state must be to protect the believers – not to pander to the West's nightmares about terrorists. Stylistic corrections for HIR editors: Under the section, "Rehabilitate the Extremist Clerics" we find the phrase "whither on the vine". Things do not "whither" on vines, they wither on vines. Under the section, "Increase Recruitment into the Military from Secular Schools", we find the phrase: "JI's strategy to Islamify the military". The accepted term is usually "Islamise/Islamize". "Islamify" makes the authors, already on shaky ground, sound like characters out of The O.C. who turn any noun or adjective into a transitive by adding "-ify", e.g. "smartify".
http://unheardvoice.net/blog/2009/04/26/wazed-and-ciovacco-a-missed-opportunity/ |
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