Gen. Jacob's memories of Bangladesh: Some factual errors
In 1971, as Chief of Staff (COS) of India's Eastern Command (EC)
(GOC-in-C Lt. Gen JS Aurora), Maj.Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) JFR 'Jack'
Jacob played a key role in the Pakistan Army's surrender on 16
December.
Dhaka's largely circulated English daily of 6 November 2010
published Gen Jacob's article titled "My Memories of Bangladesh" that
broadly comprises three sections.
The first describes his initial contact with what is now Bangladesh
in 1943 when Jacob moved with his battery to Arakan. The third
contains his views on Bangladesh's current economic condition and
future prospects.
These two sections are peripheral to the second and substantive
part of Jacob's recollections of the 1971 War. This is most relevant
to Bangladeshis and will be analysed here.
The overwhelming impression created by Jacob's memories is its
singular focus on, even embellishment of, his role and contribution in
1971 that, like Alice in Wonderland, gets "curiouser and curiouser" as
the narrative unfolds.
EBR troops' border crossing
Thus, Jacob asserts in para 13 that "...he went to the border to
help extricate them (EBR soldiers)…trying to enter India"… and "...at
Benapole, deployed an infantry battalion to cover their movement into
India."
He doesn't give any dates and implies the EBR units entered en
masse through Benapole at more or less the same time. The reality is
different.
Only 1 EBR based in Jessore may have used Benapole but certainly
not 2 EBR (Major Shafiullah), 4 EBR ( Major Khaled Musharraf) or 8 EBR
(Major Ziaur Rahman) who entered India on different dates in April
1971 from Mymensingh, Comilla and CHT borders, that is, from eastern
Bangladesh whereas Benapole is on the western side. These three majors
along with Col. Osmany et al conferred at Teliapara Tea Garden, Sylhet
on 4 April (Muyeedul Hasan Muldhara '71, page 15) and went their
separate routes thereafter.
By early April, India had declared the border open. So it's unclear
why Jacob deployed this battalion, since there were no Pakistani
regulars astride Benapole? And what is one to make of his reference
that this battalion fired on the Pakistanis at a customs post—neither
name nor location given—inside Bangladesh (para.14)?
Government-in exile
In this paragraph, Jacob refers to Tajuddin's meeting with British
MP Griffith at this customs post but doesn't give the date or purpose.
Whether this meeting occurred is doubtful. And had it occurred, what
use it would have served is unclear.
Tajuddin crossed the border at Kushtia on 30 March evening with
Barrister Amirul Islam and was escorted by BSF DG Rustomjee to Delhi
to meet Indira Gandhi twice, the first on 3 April (Muldhara '71, pages
10-12).
In paragraph 15, Jacob states that prominent Bangladeshi leaders
like Tajuddin, Nazrul Islam, Kamruzzaman, Mansur Ali, (Col.) Osmany
and (Grp. Capt.) Khandker had reached India by end-March. This is
incorrect.
Osmany was inside Bangladesh till at least 6 April (see above)
while Khandker crossed the border on 9 May (Muktijuddher Purbapar
Katopkathan page37). Tajuddin met Kamruzzaman and some AL leaders on 8
April at a house in Bhabanipore, Kolkata only on 8 April and others
like Nazrul Islam, Mansur Ali, Mushtaque Ahmed and Osmany in Agartala
on 11 April (Muldhara '71, pages 16-17).
Jacob is right to point out that India allotted the Bangladesh
leaders 8 Theatre Road as the seat of the government-in-exile where it
started functioning "immediately." This overstates the case.
It naturally took a while for the exile government to collect
together, settle down and work effectively. Analysis of its
deliberations unsurprisingly reveals some lapses into dissension
(failure of United Front mechanism), discord (relationship of Mujib
Bahini with government-in-exile) and even treachery (Mushtaq's contact
with the Americans) (See Muldhara'71, various chapters).
National liberation movements rarely function frictionless. Thus,
the leadership struggle between Mao Dze Dong and Li-Li San was settled
in Mao's favour at the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935 during The
Long March 1934-36.
Similarly, de Gaulle's wartime relationship with Churchill and
Roosevelt was frosty. The British and Free French intelligence
services—Special Operations Executive (SOE) and Bureau Central de
Renseignements et d'Action (BCRA)—infiltrated agents into France
independently although located within a few miles of each other in
London.
Their bitter rivalry led French Resistance leader Henry Frenay to
complain in July 1943 while secretly visiting London: The French were
fighting on three fronts: Germans in Occupied France; Vichy in
Unoccupied France; Anglo-Americans in London!
But in the end the exile government achieved its objective: the
independence of Bangladesh.
Mukti Bahini organisation
Jacob claims in paragraph 15: "I set up the Mukti Bahini. 8 camps
were organized. Sector commanders were appointed." Jacob does not
elaborate but implies that he was directly involved in all of these
activities. Let's evaluate this assertion.
Delhi decided on 30 April to entrust the MB's training to the
Indian Army, with the first camp set up on 9 May (Muldhara 71, page
21). Jacob as COS, EC may have been involved at the outset in
implementing this decision.
But his further involvement appears marginal. The compelling
evidence is Jacob's book "Surrender at Dacca" (OUP 1997) which
extensively details the operational and logistical steps he took to
prepare for the coming war with Pakistan.
On page 64 of his book, Jacob bemoans the fact that he could not
brief his boss Lt. Gen Aurora about logistics as Aurora was "involved
in advising the Mukti Bahini and spent time touring" (page 64). Gen.
Jacob can't have it both ways: run with the hares and hunt with the
hounds!
In the third week of May, the Bangladesh authorities established
the Bangladesh Armed Forces (Niomito Bahini) by merging EBR and EPR
troops with Col. Osmany as C-in-C. Sectors' demarcation and Sector
Commanders' appointments was finalised at a military conference in
Kolkata on 10 July 1971 (Muldhara '71, page.26; Muktijuddher Purbapar
Katopkathan pages 49-50) though some sectors were functioning earlier.
The Indian officer most closely associated with coordinating the
Mukti Bahini's day-to-day operations was Maj.Gen. BN Sarkar from Fort
William who, together with Bangladesh high command, prepared monthly
list of targets from September onwards as guerrilla activities
accelerated (Muktijuddher Purbapar Katopkathan page 102).
Campaign character
In paragraph 14, Jacob talks about a "lightning campaign," a
favourite term of Indian generals about the 1971 War's eastern theatre
(see DK Palit 'The Lightning Campaign').
Against a demoralized enemy and enjoying overwhelming military,
political and diplomatic advantages, it nevertheless took the Indian
Army 10 days to reach the outskirts of Dacca (Mirpur), and that too by
a subsidiary unit (95 Bde of 101 Comm Z Area under Maj. Gen. GC Nagra,
a course mate of Lt. Gen. AAK Niazi).
The Agartala-based main Indian force of IV Corps (Lt. Gen. Sagat
Singh) of three mountain divisions made relatively stodgy progress,
reaching the Meghna river ports by 15 December. This was not a bad
rate of movement considering the terrain and infrastructure but hardly
a 'blitzkrieg" (swift operations combining tank, air support and
lorried infantry bypassing enemy strong points like Rommel's 7th
Panzer Division did in May 1940).
Could the Indian Army have reached Dhaka sooner? This is difficult
to answer. Certainly allocating more resources to Nagra's anaemic
northern force—whose infantry component essentially comprised one
mountain brigade—that marched along the Tura/Tangail/Dhaka axis may
have paid dividends. But this is being wise in hindsight.
Surrender ceremony
Perhaps Gen. Jacob's most interesting claim is in paragraph 18.
Citing the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, Jacob quotes Niazi as
saying that Jacob blackmailed him into surrendering even though the
latter had 26,000 (sic!) troops in Dhaka. Facts don't support this
view.
Niazi's core strength was three infantry divisions: 9 Div in
Jessore; 14 Div in Dhaka; and 16 Div in Natore/Bogra; and two
under-strength ad-hoc 36 and 39 Divisions with HQs in Dhaka and
Chandpur.
Thus, nearly all the crack troops were deployed astride the border
far from Dhaka. They made no move to reach the capital which Indian
air superiority would have made difficult if not impossible. Thus to
claim there were 26,000 troops in Dacca and immediate environs on 16
December is stretching things.
In paragraph 18 Jacob makes a fascinating claim: "In the space of
four hours, a ceasefire was converted into an unconditional public
surrender, the first in history" (underscoring supplied).
Taking together these three ingredients—hours, ceasefire and
surrender—this claim may have technical validity but its rich
frankness boggles the mind. Unconditional surrenders of course have
been done publicly before 1971 e.g. Japanese surrender on the
battleship USS Missouri on 2 September 1945 in Tokyo Bay.
Miscellaneous points
In paragraph 11, Jacob claims to have listened on 25 March "…with
difficulty to the orders given by tank commanders at Dhaka
University—"traverse left open window, fire…" Did the technology then
available enable Jacob to do so from Kolkata? If so, this must be
considered a major scoop by Indian intelligence. But some scepticism
is warranted.
There are some minor factual errors. In paragraph 1, Jacob mentions
his battery crossed "undivided Bengal" en-route to Arakan in 1943. At
that time, Bengal comprised East and West Bengal. Pakistan's Lt. Gen.
Yaqub was Commander, Eastern Command not Governor, East Pakistan
(paragraph 7).
In his article, Jacob is described as Deputy Commander, EC in 1971.
There was no such post. From COS, EC, he later became GOC-in-C, EC,
was promoted to Lt. Gen. from where Jacob retired, joined BJP (the one
prominent Indian Jew who did)) and then became Governor of Goa.
Conclusion
Jacob undoubtedly did a superb job in 1971 as EC's principal staff
officer for which he deserves full credit. His memories make
interesting reading but as a historical document have limited value.
(The author is a freelancer. His article Bangladesh War 1971: Tales
by Generals Jacob and Niazi, reviewing Jacob and Niazi's books
appeared in The Holiday 41st Anniversary issue, 23 December 2005
http://www.weeklyholiday.net/front.html#05
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