Dear all,
Please read the forwarded letter of a galant freedom fighter to Sarmila Bose, the infamous author of a book of distorted story about our great LIBERATION WAR !
Respectfully,
Dr. Manik
Atlanta
-
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Salim Akbar <salim_iba@yahoo.com>
Date: Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 9:22 PM
Subject: [MBA12] Letter to Sarmila Bose.
To: IBA <mba12@iba-alumni.net>
Dear All:
One Sarmila Bose had writtena book on Bangladesh Liberation war. I had
read the book and found her book full of holes. I have written a
letter to her via her publisher, but I do not really expect any reply.
For those of you who are interested, I am adding this letter with this
e-mail.
Dear Ms. Sarmila Bose:
I have read your book "Dead Reckoning Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh
War", first with great eagerness and excitement which slowly turned to
sadness as I came to the end of it.
I would not have written to you, but as I found my name mentioned in
the book (last paragraph of page 133 of the book that I have), I
thought that I would like to take this opportunity to put the records
straight once and for all of what actually happened in the night of
August 25th 1971, when we carried out the operations against the
Pakistanis, and the subsequent events that followed.
You write that this was the first and last opportunistic attack by
Rumi. It was not. When our group was selected to blow up Siddergonj
Power Station, we were specially trained by Captain Haider (later Lt.
Col) on the use of explosives, Anerga gun and Rocket launchers. We
were already trained in grenade attack and CQB (close quarter battle)
weapons. Finally we were split into two groups and sent to the front
line for a week. This was done according to Captain Haider's order so
that we have some front line experience. Rumi was not in my group.
Later when we met we compared notes. Rumi had teamed up with Doc
Akther and had ambushed and killed two Pakistani soldiers at a BOP
(border out post) in the early morning when they had come out to
respond to natures call. This was, as far as I can recall was near the
Kasbah border. For me, I had fired two rockets from a rocket launcher
in another front; one shot went wild and the next one was a direct hit
on a bunker of Pakistani soldiers, casualties unknown.
Later, when we had set up camp at a village called "Perulia" on the
outskirts of Dacca, we always were on guard in shits of 24/7. This way
we could ensure the safety of all, including the families that had
given us shelter. As it was monsoon, we also had two country boats
made for ease of movements. We had some encounters with the West
Pakistani Police and local Razakars in which Rumi rook part and the
casualty on the other side was four of the West Pakistani police
killed, along with two Razakars, and on our side it was nil. This was
due to careful planning of the ambush which was a great success.
So Madam, I hope you realize that we were not exactly "Green Horns"
when we took part in the operation of August 25, 1971. We have shot at
the enemy, been fired upon, killed some of them, seen dead bodies and
buried them. Admittedly we were not battle hardened soldiers, but we
have enough nerve and experience to take the Pakistanis' head on.
Let me now explain what happened of that night and in the following
days. We did not kill policemen, (as you mentioned in your book); they
were Pakistani soldiers. West Pakistani policemen did not carry AK 47
or G-3 rifles with them when they are on duty; only soldiers did.
There were a bunch of them around 10 or 12 soldiers, in fact about a
section of a platoon of them armed with AK 47's and G-3 guns.
We were in the hijacked car when meet this bunch on road # 18 in
Dhanmondi. They were smoking and chatting among themselves. Kazi bahi
ordered Alam bahi to drive along and then make a "U" turn 100 meters
further. Bodi bahi wanted to get down and surround them, so that we
could collect the weapons once they were dead, but Kazi bahi vetoed
the idea. Instead he told Alam Bahi to go towards them and to come to
a crawl when we reached them. Once that happened, four sten guns
opened up, three Indian made sten guns and one AK 47 that Kazi Bahi
had. Only Alam Bahi and Sapan Bahi did not shoot, as the former was
driving and the later was setting behind him in the back seat. Rumi
took active part in the shooting, country to what you mention in your
book.
The soldiers of course had no idea what had hit them. They did not
stand a chance, all were mowed down. I saw one of them clutching his
chest as he fell. The rest part of the action is accurately described
in your book. Death toll of Pakistani soldiers in one night was about
15 to 18, the highest in Dacca in one operation: and for the
muktibahni nil.
You mention in your book that we had "amateurish attitude which do not
match the stories of their having received training as 'guerrillas' ".
This is far from being true. While undergoing training at Malaghar,
we were drilled on the notion of secrecy and on a "need to know"
basis, which we followed to the letter. For example I knew the address
of Rumi in Dhaka and vice versa, but I had no idea where others had
put up while in Dhaka. The idea was that if one was captured by the
Pakistani Army, then he could not reveal the address of others even if
he wanted to, as he simply did not know it. This is far from being
amateurish, wouldn't you agree?
You also mention that we all stayed back after the operation. This
again is not true. In fact Kazi bahi ordered me to go back to the base
camp and take charge of it till they return. I did just that. The
other stayed back for the treatment of Jewel Bhai who was wounded in
an operation, but not at the Siddergonj area. Kazi bhai got in touch
with Dr. Fazle Rabbi, and he had promised to treat Jewel Bhai with
other fellow doctors in a private clinic in Dhaka. It may be mentioned
that Jewel Bhai was a famous cricketer at that time who got a chance
in the Pakistan team as a 12th man in 1970. Had he survived the war, I
am sure that he would have left his mark in the cricketing world.
The other reason why they stayed back was to plan for the main target,
blowing up of Siddergonj power station, the major one that supplied
electricity to Dhaka. Tayeb Ali (who was a fruit seller in 1970 and
also was a member of our group) was asked by Kazi Bhai to set up a
house near the power station along with his wife. (They were a
childless couple at that time so thankfully no children were present
in the scene). Tayeb Ali kept an eye of the movements of the Pakistani
Army at Siddergonj power station, the number of guards, the
fortification of the power station and other intelligence that would
prove to be invaluable when we finally attacked the power station. In
fact he had made friends with some of the peons of the plant and with
their help had managed to smuggle in 40 kg of PK (plastic explosive)
in the plant, hidden in one of the go downs of the plant that was
mostly left unused after the preliminary search of the premises by the
Pakistani's guarding the place. Of course 40 kg of PK was hardly
adequate to blow up the huge plant; we needed 400kg to see the damn
thing through. While we had 200 kg of PK with us that we had carried,
the rest was sent to us from Malaghar once the news reached the high
command through personal couriers. Of course we were under no
illusions that the attack at Siddergonj plant would be a vital one,
and fatal casualties could be expected on our side. However, we were
determined to carry it out.
So everything was going according to plan. But like all good plans,
there is always the unexpected and this was the treatment of Jewel
Bhai.
The way Rumi and others were captured reminds me of the betrayal of
the last Independent Nawab of Bengal in 1757. The Pakistani army went
hopping mad after such an action in Dhaka on August 25th. They put all
their efforts to capture us. The local collaborators were put into
active service by the intelligence branch of the Pakistani, now famous
or infamous ISI. It paid off. One 'Mir Jaffar' pointed out to the
Pakkies Bodi bahi and he was picked up by the army. Under third degree
torture he had no option but to reveal the address of Kazi bahi where
he was holed up with Azad bahi and wounded Jewel bahi. The raided the
hose, and while Kazi bahi escaped killing two of the enemy, the others
were wounded and taken prisoners. Under the same torture Azad bahi
reveled the address of Rumi. As far as I know, Bodi bahi has never
been to Rumi house (he apparently did not take part in the planning)
and had never met Mrs. Jahanara Imam (Auntie to all of us). She had
heard of him of course, but never actually met him. After the action
of 25th , in that very night only Rumi, Kazi bahi and me went to his
place, while others did not. Need to know basis was still in force.
Later on some of them met at Rumi's place for planning but not Sapan
bahi or Bodi bahi.
After the war ended I had a discussion with Jami (Rumi's younger
brother) about what had happened after they were taken to the MP
Hostel where the Pakistani's had set up interrogation cells. The
Pakistani's kept torturing Rumi and kept shouting "Where is Salim?"
under the false notion that I had done most of the shooting. Rumi kept
shut. Had he opened his mouth, I would not be writing this letter to
you, I would probably be dead along with some members of my family.
You also pose a question in your book "How did this 'action'
contribute to the goal of Bangladesh's independence?" Well this is a
difficult question to answer. With all due respect, he was no Bina Das
who had shot the Governor of Bengal at a convocation ceremony in
Calcutta University and MISSED. The one that we and Rumi had shot may
only have been foot soldiers of the Pakistani Army, but we did not
miss, they remained dead. Unlike Kudiram, we did not get the wrong
guy, we targeted the soldiers and we got them.
After the capture of most of Rumi and others, there was a lull. We had
lost a lot of arms and ammunition. But things picked up from mid
September 1971. Prior to the action of August 25th , only two major
attacks had occurred in Dhaka. One was the attack on an army check
post at Farmgate where some soldiers were killed and the other was the
blowing up of male toilet section in the ground floor of the then
Inter Continental Hotel where most of the foreigners including
journalist used to stay. This daring attack made world headlines,
though there wasn't any casualty. It showed the world that the
Muktibahni could move with impunity in Dhaka, not to speak of the rest
of the country, the then East Pakistan. But the attack of 25th August
was remarkable in the sense that it caused the maximum casualty to the
Pakistani Army in a single operation.
The news of the attack and subsequent capture had reached Malaghar.
New groups who had completed their three months training (we were
exceptions as we were handpicked by Kazi bahi and later checked by
Captain Haider to determine if the choice of Kazi bahi was correct or
not) came to Dhaka. Sector 2 (Malaghar) was responsible for Dhaka for
sheer geographical proximity. By mid September 4 smaller power
stations were blown up by a group lead by Gazi Golum Dastagir. Baccu
bahi set up camp near Savar. My friend Towfic (we had gone to the war
together) planned and blew up a filling station right in the heart of
Dhaka at Paltan. My cousin and his group blew up the propaganda office
at Santinaar. Grenade attacks on the police, army and Razakars became
a daily occurrence. Razakars deserted their posts in doves. By mid
October the Pakistani Army moved in conveys of at least two truckloads
of solders, unlike their pervious movements by jeeps. The movement at
night by the Army was stricter and less frequent. I am not saying that
all these are consequence of the 25th August attack; most likely it is
a coincidence as the groups that came latter were better trained and
better armed.
That is why I said the question posed by you is a difficult one to
answer. But all the groups who came later were inspired by the action
of August 25th, as later discussion with them reveled.
You have in your book said that the Pakistani force was not an
occupying force, but the national army of Pakistan. To a certain point
your assessment is true. But on 25-26 March 1971, when this army
turned their weapons on their own citizens, killing thousands in the
one night, and we had declared our independence after that, then they
became the occupying force. It does not take a Rocket Genius to figure
this out.
Madam, I don't think that you have ever faced war, and indeed I pray
that you never do. But those of us who went to war willingly in 1971
(I was only 16 then, a candidate for SSC examination) later in groups
formed a "Band of Brotherhood" that can only be experienced but cannot
be described fully. Ask any combat veteran in any country and I am
sure that he or she will come up with the same answer. There were 12
of us initially from Malaghar (later it increased in size) and out of
that 8 were tortured and killed by the Pakistani Army. Only 4
survived, and so far only Tayeb Ali died naturally. I am saying this
that the sacrifice made by the others did not go in vain, but counted
for something in the overall liberation war.
You had made a thorough research of the incident that took place in
Joydevpur to make your point that many incidents in the war was either
fabricated or blown out of proportion. I sincerely wish that you had
taken a similar approach while describing the incident of August 25th
1971, instead of making it some kind of a cowboy adventure on the part
of the Muktibahni.
I hope that you will take time out of your busy schedule to reply to
my letter. I look forward to that.
Sincerely Yours
Salim Akbar
Apartment E-4
House # 1
Road # 134
Gulshan 1
Dhaka 1212.
e- mail address: salim_iba@yahoo.com
Mobile: 01715107411
_______________________________________________
MBA12 mailing list
MBA12@iba-alumni.net
http://iba-alumni.net/mailman/listinfo/mba12_iba-alumni.net
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Salim Akbar <salim_iba@yahoo.com>
Date: Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 9:22 PM
Subject: [MBA12] Letter to Sarmila Bose.
To: IBA <mba12@iba-alumni.net>
Dear All:
One Sarmila Bose had writtena book on Bangladesh Liberation war. I had
read the book and found her book full of holes. I have written a
letter to her via her publisher, but I do not really expect any reply.
For those of you who are interested, I am adding this letter with this
e-mail.
Dear Ms. Sarmila Bose:
I have read your book "Dead Reckoning Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh
War", first with great eagerness and excitement which slowly turned to
sadness as I came to the end of it.
I would not have written to you, but as I found my name mentioned in
the book (last paragraph of page 133 of the book that I have), I
thought that I would like to take this opportunity to put the records
straight once and for all of what actually happened in the night of
August 25th 1971, when we carried out the operations against the
Pakistanis, and the subsequent events that followed.
You write that this was the first and last opportunistic attack by
Rumi. It was not. When our group was selected to blow up Siddergonj
Power Station, we were specially trained by Captain Haider (later Lt.
Col) on the use of explosives, Anerga gun and Rocket launchers. We
were already trained in grenade attack and CQB (close quarter battle)
weapons. Finally we were split into two groups and sent to the front
line for a week. This was done according to Captain Haider's order so
that we have some front line experience. Rumi was not in my group.
Later when we met we compared notes. Rumi had teamed up with Doc
Akther and had ambushed and killed two Pakistani soldiers at a BOP
(border out post) in the early morning when they had come out to
respond to natures call. This was, as far as I can recall was near the
Kasbah border. For me, I had fired two rockets from a rocket launcher
in another front; one shot went wild and the next one was a direct hit
on a bunker of Pakistani soldiers, casualties unknown.
Later, when we had set up camp at a village called "Perulia" on the
outskirts of Dacca, we always were on guard in shits of 24/7. This way
we could ensure the safety of all, including the families that had
given us shelter. As it was monsoon, we also had two country boats
made for ease of movements. We had some encounters with the West
Pakistani Police and local Razakars in which Rumi rook part and the
casualty on the other side was four of the West Pakistani police
killed, along with two Razakars, and on our side it was nil. This was
due to careful planning of the ambush which was a great success.
So Madam, I hope you realize that we were not exactly "Green Horns"
when we took part in the operation of August 25, 1971. We have shot at
the enemy, been fired upon, killed some of them, seen dead bodies and
buried them. Admittedly we were not battle hardened soldiers, but we
have enough nerve and experience to take the Pakistanis' head on.
Let me now explain what happened of that night and in the following
days. We did not kill policemen, (as you mentioned in your book); they
were Pakistani soldiers. West Pakistani policemen did not carry AK 47
or G-3 rifles with them when they are on duty; only soldiers did.
There were a bunch of them around 10 or 12 soldiers, in fact about a
section of a platoon of them armed with AK 47's and G-3 guns.
We were in the hijacked car when meet this bunch on road # 18 in
Dhanmondi. They were smoking and chatting among themselves. Kazi bahi
ordered Alam bahi to drive along and then make a "U" turn 100 meters
further. Bodi bahi wanted to get down and surround them, so that we
could collect the weapons once they were dead, but Kazi bahi vetoed
the idea. Instead he told Alam Bahi to go towards them and to come to
a crawl when we reached them. Once that happened, four sten guns
opened up, three Indian made sten guns and one AK 47 that Kazi Bahi
had. Only Alam Bahi and Sapan Bahi did not shoot, as the former was
driving and the later was setting behind him in the back seat. Rumi
took active part in the shooting, country to what you mention in your
book.
The soldiers of course had no idea what had hit them. They did not
stand a chance, all were mowed down. I saw one of them clutching his
chest as he fell. The rest part of the action is accurately described
in your book. Death toll of Pakistani soldiers in one night was about
15 to 18, the highest in Dacca in one operation: and for the
muktibahni nil.
You mention in your book that we had "amateurish attitude which do not
match the stories of their having received training as 'guerrillas' ".
This is far from being true. While undergoing training at Malaghar,
we were drilled on the notion of secrecy and on a "need to know"
basis, which we followed to the letter. For example I knew the address
of Rumi in Dhaka and vice versa, but I had no idea where others had
put up while in Dhaka. The idea was that if one was captured by the
Pakistani Army, then he could not reveal the address of others even if
he wanted to, as he simply did not know it. This is far from being
amateurish, wouldn't you agree?
You also mention that we all stayed back after the operation. This
again is not true. In fact Kazi bahi ordered me to go back to the base
camp and take charge of it till they return. I did just that. The
other stayed back for the treatment of Jewel Bhai who was wounded in
an operation, but not at the Siddergonj area. Kazi bhai got in touch
with Dr. Fazle Rabbi, and he had promised to treat Jewel Bhai with
other fellow doctors in a private clinic in Dhaka. It may be mentioned
that Jewel Bhai was a famous cricketer at that time who got a chance
in the Pakistan team as a 12th man in 1970. Had he survived the war, I
am sure that he would have left his mark in the cricketing world.
The other reason why they stayed back was to plan for the main target,
blowing up of Siddergonj power station, the major one that supplied
electricity to Dhaka. Tayeb Ali (who was a fruit seller in 1970 and
also was a member of our group) was asked by Kazi Bhai to set up a
house near the power station along with his wife. (They were a
childless couple at that time so thankfully no children were present
in the scene). Tayeb Ali kept an eye of the movements of the Pakistani
Army at Siddergonj power station, the number of guards, the
fortification of the power station and other intelligence that would
prove to be invaluable when we finally attacked the power station. In
fact he had made friends with some of the peons of the plant and with
their help had managed to smuggle in 40 kg of PK (plastic explosive)
in the plant, hidden in one of the go downs of the plant that was
mostly left unused after the preliminary search of the premises by the
Pakistani's guarding the place. Of course 40 kg of PK was hardly
adequate to blow up the huge plant; we needed 400kg to see the damn
thing through. While we had 200 kg of PK with us that we had carried,
the rest was sent to us from Malaghar once the news reached the high
command through personal couriers. Of course we were under no
illusions that the attack at Siddergonj plant would be a vital one,
and fatal casualties could be expected on our side. However, we were
determined to carry it out.
So everything was going according to plan. But like all good plans,
there is always the unexpected and this was the treatment of Jewel
Bhai.
The way Rumi and others were captured reminds me of the betrayal of
the last Independent Nawab of Bengal in 1757. The Pakistani army went
hopping mad after such an action in Dhaka on August 25th. They put all
their efforts to capture us. The local collaborators were put into
active service by the intelligence branch of the Pakistani, now famous
or infamous ISI. It paid off. One 'Mir Jaffar' pointed out to the
Pakkies Bodi bahi and he was picked up by the army. Under third degree
torture he had no option but to reveal the address of Kazi bahi where
he was holed up with Azad bahi and wounded Jewel bahi. The raided the
hose, and while Kazi bahi escaped killing two of the enemy, the others
were wounded and taken prisoners. Under the same torture Azad bahi
reveled the address of Rumi. As far as I know, Bodi bahi has never
been to Rumi house (he apparently did not take part in the planning)
and had never met Mrs. Jahanara Imam (Auntie to all of us). She had
heard of him of course, but never actually met him. After the action
of 25th , in that very night only Rumi, Kazi bahi and me went to his
place, while others did not. Need to know basis was still in force.
Later on some of them met at Rumi's place for planning but not Sapan
bahi or Bodi bahi.
After the war ended I had a discussion with Jami (Rumi's younger
brother) about what had happened after they were taken to the MP
Hostel where the Pakistani's had set up interrogation cells. The
Pakistani's kept torturing Rumi and kept shouting "Where is Salim?"
under the false notion that I had done most of the shooting. Rumi kept
shut. Had he opened his mouth, I would not be writing this letter to
you, I would probably be dead along with some members of my family.
You also pose a question in your book "How did this 'action'
contribute to the goal of Bangladesh's independence?" Well this is a
difficult question to answer. With all due respect, he was no Bina Das
who had shot the Governor of Bengal at a convocation ceremony in
Calcutta University and MISSED. The one that we and Rumi had shot may
only have been foot soldiers of the Pakistani Army, but we did not
miss, they remained dead. Unlike Kudiram, we did not get the wrong
guy, we targeted the soldiers and we got them.
After the capture of most of Rumi and others, there was a lull. We had
lost a lot of arms and ammunition. But things picked up from mid
September 1971. Prior to the action of August 25th , only two major
attacks had occurred in Dhaka. One was the attack on an army check
post at Farmgate where some soldiers were killed and the other was the
blowing up of male toilet section in the ground floor of the then
Inter Continental Hotel where most of the foreigners including
journalist used to stay. This daring attack made world headlines,
though there wasn't any casualty. It showed the world that the
Muktibahni could move with impunity in Dhaka, not to speak of the rest
of the country, the then East Pakistan. But the attack of 25th August
was remarkable in the sense that it caused the maximum casualty to the
Pakistani Army in a single operation.
The news of the attack and subsequent capture had reached Malaghar.
New groups who had completed their three months training (we were
exceptions as we were handpicked by Kazi bahi and later checked by
Captain Haider to determine if the choice of Kazi bahi was correct or
not) came to Dhaka. Sector 2 (Malaghar) was responsible for Dhaka for
sheer geographical proximity. By mid September 4 smaller power
stations were blown up by a group lead by Gazi Golum Dastagir. Baccu
bahi set up camp near Savar. My friend Towfic (we had gone to the war
together) planned and blew up a filling station right in the heart of
Dhaka at Paltan. My cousin and his group blew up the propaganda office
at Santinaar. Grenade attacks on the police, army and Razakars became
a daily occurrence. Razakars deserted their posts in doves. By mid
October the Pakistani Army moved in conveys of at least two truckloads
of solders, unlike their pervious movements by jeeps. The movement at
night by the Army was stricter and less frequent. I am not saying that
all these are consequence of the 25th August attack; most likely it is
a coincidence as the groups that came latter were better trained and
better armed.
That is why I said the question posed by you is a difficult one to
answer. But all the groups who came later were inspired by the action
of August 25th, as later discussion with them reveled.
You have in your book said that the Pakistani force was not an
occupying force, but the national army of Pakistan. To a certain point
your assessment is true. But on 25-26 March 1971, when this army
turned their weapons on their own citizens, killing thousands in the
one night, and we had declared our independence after that, then they
became the occupying force. It does not take a Rocket Genius to figure
this out.
Madam, I don't think that you have ever faced war, and indeed I pray
that you never do. But those of us who went to war willingly in 1971
(I was only 16 then, a candidate for SSC examination) later in groups
formed a "Band of Brotherhood" that can only be experienced but cannot
be described fully. Ask any combat veteran in any country and I am
sure that he or she will come up with the same answer. There were 12
of us initially from Malaghar (later it increased in size) and out of
that 8 were tortured and killed by the Pakistani Army. Only 4
survived, and so far only Tayeb Ali died naturally. I am saying this
that the sacrifice made by the others did not go in vain, but counted
for something in the overall liberation war.
You had made a thorough research of the incident that took place in
Joydevpur to make your point that many incidents in the war was either
fabricated or blown out of proportion. I sincerely wish that you had
taken a similar approach while describing the incident of August 25th
1971, instead of making it some kind of a cowboy adventure on the part
of the Muktibahni.
I hope that you will take time out of your busy schedule to reply to
my letter. I look forward to that.
Sincerely Yours
Salim Akbar
Apartment E-4
House # 1
Road # 134
Gulshan 1
Dhaka 1212.
e- mail address: salim_iba@yahoo.com
Mobile: 01715107411
_______________________________________________
MBA12 mailing list
MBA12@iba-alumni.net
http://iba-alumni.net/mailman/listinfo/mba12_iba-alumni.net
__._,_.___
