Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2013 10:58:25 +0600
Subject: Blame thy Neighbour: Perspectives on the Problematic Indo-Bangladesh Relationship
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Blame thy Neighbour: Perspectives on the Problematic Indo-Bangladesh Relationship
Taj Hashmi*
Overview
India has never been in good terms with its immediate neighbours, except Maldives. It is possibly the only country in the world, which has bad to very bad relationship with all its immediate neighbours. The Indo-Bangladesh relationship has always been strenuous. Although immediately after the emergence of Bangladesh – with direct Indian help and military intervention – the Bangladesh Government officially portrayed India as Bangladesh's "Bandhu Rashtra" or "Friendly State", yet most Bangladeshis were not enthused about the short- and long-term prospects of having mighty India as a neighbour. To them, India was not a benign neighbour but a hegemonic and expansionist power, determined to turn their country into a subservient ally and a market, or even worse, into a protectorate.
Ever since the 1975 military takeover in Bangladesh, the government and people in India have serious misgivings about their Muslim-majority neighbour in the east. India not only considers the country a source of illegal immigrants but also as one in league with Pakistan, allegedly a promoter of Islamist terror and a sanctuary for ethno-national separatists in India's Northeast. India's mistrust of Bangladesh intensifies whenever the "pro-Pakistani" and "Islam-loving" Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is in power in the country. India's demeanor changes substantially – it apparently becomes friendly towards Bangladesh – whenever the "pro-Indian" and apparently "secular" Awami League is in power.
Then again, contrary to what Manmohan Singh believes that around 25 per cent of Bangladeshis who are anti-Indian belong to the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami party and "are in the clutches of the ISI", thanks to Indian hegemonic behaviour towards Bangladesh, much more than 25 per cent of the Muslim population in the country are avowedly anti-Indian and they do not necessarily belong to any Islamist party as Islamist parties do not command more than five per cent popular support in Bangladesh.
This paper is an appraisal of the real and imaginary issues dogging the Indo-Bangladesh relations in historical, political, psychological and geo-political perspectives. It also aims at exploring the possibilities of a durable understanding between the two countries in an environment of mutual trust and respect.
Historical Roots of the Problem
Let us look at the historical roots of the problem as to why India and Bangladesh behave to each other as they have been since months after the emergence of Bangladesh. Historically, it is not correct to assume that Bangladesh came into being due to the bulk of the East Bengali Muslims' quest for a secular Bengali identity; and that the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 signalled the departure of East Bengali Muslims' Muslim identity, nourished and nurtured for at least a hundred years before the emergence of Pakistan in 1947. There is no reason to assume that East Bengali Muslims, who played the most important role in the creation of Pakistan, all of a sudden discarded anti-Hindu "communalism" (main sustainer of and rationale for Pakistan) and joined the bandwagon of the so-called secular Bengali Nationalism. East Pakistan's transformation into Bangladesh was not inevitable. Pakistani military crackdown leading to an indiscriminate killing of Bengalis in East Pakistan and Indian intervention played the vital roles in the creation of the country. Most importantly, for the bulk of Bangladeshis Muslims, 1971 just transformed their political not religious identity. They were/are still predisposed to anti-Indian (anti-Hindu) communal propaganda.
Most importantly, the post-Liberation Awami League Government's failure to address the problems of mass hunger, poverty, unemployment in the backdrop of mismanaged and corrupt ways of running the country, with reliance on India for its domestic and foreign policies, did not augur well for the Indo-Bangladesh friendship and understanding. While Bangladesh was apparently turning into the Kissinger's nightmarish "Basket Case" during the Mujib era, the vast majority of Bangladeshi Muslims started believing in all the conspiracy theories, such as: a) "India taking away their country's meagre resources"; b) "India created Bangladesh not only to weaken Pakistan but also to turn the country it helped become independent into an Indian market and colony"; and c) "Under Indian influence, the Mujib Government was working for a formal merger of their country with India". Renowned Indian journalist Basant Chatterjee, as an eyewitness gave a vivid account of the prevalent anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh soon after its emergence in 1971. He rightly pointed out that Bangladesh in 1973 had already become "Muslim Bengal", where the bulk of the Bengali Muslims blamed India for all of their problems, and were fast becoming pro-Islamic and anti-Indian, if not pro-Pakistani. The psyche of the average Bangladeshi Muslim has not changed much in 2013 with regards to their anti-Indian sentiment.
While the Bangladeshi Muslim psyche was still vulnerable to communal/anti-Indian mobilization, Indian highhandedness and inept foreign and trade policies towards Bangladesh, especially its dumping of substandard goods into Bangladesh and coercing the latter into signing a "friendship treaty" (on unequal terms) with India in 1972 to last twenty-five years, alienated many Bangladeshis. Meanwhile, by early 1972 supporters of Islam-oriented political parties – remained proscribed in Bangladesh for more than three years up to the military takeover in 1975 for collaborating with the Pakistani occupation army in 1971 – pro-Chinese leftists and others having strong reservations about India joined the anti-Indian camp under Maulana Bhashani. After the bloody overthrow of the Mujib government in 1975 (most Bangladeshis considered the regime pro-Indian) anti-Indian movement got further momentum due to various factors. What had already started soon after the emergence of Bangladesh in early 1972 – many pro-Bangladeshi and anti-Pakistani secular and liberal democratic politicians and people fast turned anti-Indian due to various factors – got further momentum after the overthrow of the Mujib. India's alleged plundering of Bangladeshi assets and its hegemonic foreign policy to keep Bangladesh subservient turned the average Bangladeshi into anti-Indian and anti-Mujib. Thus when Khondokar Mushtaque Ahmed, a senior minister in the Mujib Cabinet, became the President of Bangladesh after the August coup of 1975, Bangladesh came closer to Pakistan and through it to the Muslim World. Mushtaque would have declared Bangladesh an "Islamic Republic" but he is said to have refrained from doing so because of his apprehension of Indian military intervention. This is what one finds in some declassified State Department Documents.
Ever since 1975, lots of contentious issues between the two countries have further embittered the Indo-Bangladesh relationship. India's harbouring, arming and training pro-Mujib militants under Kader Siddiki who continued attacking Bangladeshi border outposts in 1975-1976 and the Chakma insurgents (Shanti Bahini) for two decades up to 1996; and Bangladesh's providing sanctuary to ULFA rebels for years, allegedly in collaboration with the ISI, may be mentioned in this regard.
India decided to build the Farakka Barrage across the Ganges in 1951, which came into operation in 1975.
India's unilateral decision to activate the Barrage – to the detriment of Bangladesh – alienated the bulk of the Bangladeshi population from India. Consequential to the Barrage, Bangladesh loses around 40,000 cusecs of water per year. The Indo-Bangladesh thirty-year agreement on water sharing signed in 1996, has not substantially improved the situation for Bangladesh. There is no guarantee clause in the agreement for minimum amounts of water to be supplied to Bangladesh. From the findings of water and ecology experts across the world, it appears that due to the barrage, there has been increased salinity of soil and water in northwestern Bangladesh. There has also been decline in soil quality and crop yields, shrinking fish population, decline of mangrove forest, increased erosion rates and sedimentation in the Ganges, more severe flooding in northern Bangladesh during the monsoon. Experts estimate the total damage to Bangladesh economy due to the Barrage at $3 billion per year.
While contentious issues like India's withdrawing water from the upstream of the Ganges in the north of the Farakka Barrage has been a big impediment to good neighbourly relationship between India and Bangladesh, the proposed Tipaimukh Barrage has emerged as another bone of contention between the two countries. The proposed Tipaimukh Barrage on the Barak, would adversely affect agriculture, and create environmental and navigational problems in the Surma and Kushiara rivers, adversely affecting more than thirty million people in northeastern Bangladesh. Again, ignoring Bangladesh's demand, India has not stopped unilateral withdrawal of water from the upstream of the Teesta Barrage of Bangladesh in northern Bangladesh, which has posed a serious threat to agriculture in greater Rangpur district of Bangladesh.
Indian ambivalence towards solving the border demarcation problem, and India's Border Security Forces or BSF's alleged unprovoked killing of Bangladeshi nationals on the border, especially the killing of 15-year-old Felani, a Bangladeshi girl on 7 January 2011, have further embittered the Indo-Bangladesh relationship. The acquittal of the BSF soldier, alleged to have killed Felani, disappointed and angered many in Bangladesh.
India is apprehensive of the influx of illegal immigrants, Islamist terrorists and Muslim protagonists of "Greater Bangladesh" from Bangladesh to destabilize the Northeast and West Bengal. Bangladesh is also worried about the long-term design of India-based Bengali Hindu extremists who want to carve out several southwestern Bangladeshi districts to create the so-called Swadhin Bangabhumi (Free Bengali Land) to settle Hindu Bengali refugees (and their descendants) who left East Pakistan/Bangladesh for India during the last sixty-odd years. The Swadhin Bangabhumi Andolon, a separatist movement to create a Hindu country out of southwestern Bangladesh started in 1973 in India. In an interview with the BBC in 2001, Chittaranjan Sutar, who was an Awami League MP and the main organiser of the movement, denied any existence of the movement at that time. The movement became active again in 2003 when it declared the independence of Hindu Republic of Bangabhumi. Hindu extremist groups in India, especially the VHP, championed the cause of the Bangabhumi.
Many Bangladeshis are apprehensive of another unlikely event, Indian annexation of their country, very similar to what happened to Hyderabad, Kashmir, Goa and Sikkim, which could lead to the return of millions of Hindu Bengali refugees and their descendants to Bangladesh to reclaim their abandoned (or sold at nominal prices) and stolen properties from their present Bangladeshi Muslim owners. Bangladeshis also do not want to compete with the better-educated Hindu Indians in the not-so-competitive job market in Bangladesh, which they apprehend would be the outcome of an Indian annexation of their country. Thousands of Indian professionals have already been working illegally in the private sector of Bangladesh, especially in the garment, NGO and IT sectors.
While water is a very big issue between the two neighbours, which is likely to aggravate further in the coming years as India will need more water for its dry and populous state of West Bengal, the lack of mutual trust, and most importantly, the lack of resolve to resolve the problem on both sides, are the stumbling blocks towards bringing the two countries closer to each other. The perpetual sense of deprivation and helplessness on part of Bangladesh vis-à-vis Indian highhandedness will not do any good to the parties. Tense Indo-Bangladesh relationship is also at the roots of many transnational security problems in the sub-region.
Surprisingly, there are some minor issues that have been dogging the relationship between the two neighbours for decades. One may mention the issue of the Bangladeshi enclaves in India at Angarpota and Dahagram. Although Bangladesh transferred the Indian enclave of Berubari in Bangladesh to India in 1974 by linking it to the Indian mainland, India has not yet reciprocated the same rights to the Bangladeshi nationals in the enclaves of Angarpota and Dahagram. Despite so many "agreements", India has not allowed free and uninterrupted 24-hour access to the Bangladeshis in the enclaves to the mainland of Bangladesh. There is a narrow corridor of Indian Territory called "Tin Bigha" that links the enclaves to the mainland of Bangladesh. India does not allow 24-hour access to the corridor. Consequently the Bangladeshis in the enclaves do not get access to law enforcers, hospitals, shopping centres, schools and other facilities in Bangladesh. They live in abject poverty, without access to gas and electricity. Then again, apparently there was a breakthrough as India and Bangladesh came to some agreements on the boundary agreement (over the enclaves) and India promised that no unilateral actions would be taken to deprive Bangladesh from its due share of Teesta water in 2011.
The Cold War impacted the Indo-Bangladesh relations in the post-Mujib era up to the end of the Cold War (1975-1990) – While the Soviet Union and its East European satellites favoured India, the West and its Arab allies and Pakistan favoured Bangladesh. The emergence of the "Neo Cold War" between America and China (and its clients in the Muslim World) is fast polarizing the Muslim and the Western worlds. America's promoting India as a bulwark against China – and against Pakistan in the long run – has direct bearings on the Indo-Bangladesh relationship. Hillary Clinton's telling India on 20th July 2011 in Chennai "it's time to lead" and "exercise political influence to match its fast-growing economic muscle" in South Asia, is not re-assuring for Bangladesh and Pakistan. India and Pakistan are also engaged in their proxy war over Kashmir in Afghanistan. Significantly, Bangladeshi political parties are not maintaining positive neutrality towards the Indo-Pak conflict in and around Afghanistan.
America's and the Israeli Lobby's not-so-hidden agenda to de-nuclearise Pakistan may be considered a catalyst in the new Big Game within and beyond Afghanistan. Thus Bangladesh has become a not-so-insignificant pawn in this game and has also become a battlefield of the Indo-Pakistan proxy war. While Pakistan has been keen on promoting Bangladesh as a destabilizing factor for India by its surreptitious support of Indian insurgents, Bangladesh under "pro-Pakistani" BNP-Jamaat coalition government responded favourably to Pakistan against India, the "common enemy".
Impediments and Bottlenecks to Good Relationship
There are several bilateral, sub-regional and global issues hindering the onset of normal relationship between the two neighbours. The bilateral issues include border security, boundary demarcation, trade, and transit rights, water management, travel and tourism. As reported in the media, on 7 July 2011, Indian and Bangladeshi foreign ministers, S.M. Krishna and Dipu Moni, "expressed firm optimism about signing of an interim agreement on water sharing of the common rivers Teesta and Feni, and a framework deal on land border during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Dhaka on September 6-7". We also read in the media that more deals on transit, import of power from India, joint venture power generation, cooperation in security, education, culture, and trade liberalisation, etc. were in the offing; details of which were being worked out, and both countries were expecting to complete the remaining task before the Indian Prime Minster's visit to Bangladesh in September 2011.
During the Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna's visit to Bangladesh in May 2012, two accords were signed between the two countries. One was on the transit rights to Bhutanese vehicles to Bangladeshi ports through India; and the other one was on the ratification of the Indo-Bangladesh agreement on promotion and protection of investments. As Indian BSF's shooting down dozens of Bangladeshi intruders into India in the recent past enraged Bangladesh, Mr. Krishna assured his Bangladeshi counterpart that in the future India would not shoot at Bangladeshi intruders and would only use "non-lethal weapons" to deal with border intruders from Bangladesh. Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dipu Moni co-chaired the first Bangladesh-India Joint Commission meeting with Indian External Affairs Minister SM Krishna. The Joint Commission was formed under the Framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development signed during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Dhaka on September 6-7, 2011. The reports of the Joint Commission noted that under India's $1 billion credit agreement inked two years ago, Bangladesh bought fifty double-decker buses from India. It is noteworthy that neither the Hasina-Manmohan MOU in 2010 nor the Krishna-Dipu Moni agreement in 2012 resolved the more pressing issues dogging the Indo-Bangladesh relations besides the issue of granting transit rights to India through Bangladesh to the former's Northeastern provinces.
However, as of October 2013, excepting the import of power from India and the inauguration of the environmentally hazardous coal-run joint power generation plant at Rampal in southwestern Bangladesh in close proximity to the Sundarbans, there has been no substantial improvement in the bilateral relationship between the two neighbours. On 5 October 2013, Sheikh Hasina and Manmohan Singh jointly unveiled the foundation plaque of the controversial coal-fired power plant at Rampal despite green groups' protest and bitter criticism of all major opposition parties and civil society in Bangladesh. One wonders if Manmohan Singh did the right thing by jointly sponsoring this highly controversial and unpopular power plant. This move is likely to further embitter the existing acrimonious relationship between the two neigbours. Some top BNP leaders and other opponents of the Rampal power plant single out Indian "vested interest" as the main factor behind the project, as they think, "only India will benefit from it".
Meanwhile, West Bengal's Chief Minister Mamata Bannerjee had raised objection to implementing the boundary agreement signed between India and Bangladesh without her and West Bengal's approval. As Bannerjee has been intransigent on implementing any boundary agreement with Bangladesh without her consent, so is Jaswant Singh of the Hindu rightist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Singh reveals that the BJP is not willing to amend the Indian Constitution to implement the boundary agreement. Sections of Indian politicians and media are, however, willing to fulfill India's commitment to Bangladesh to resolve all bilateral issues, including the Teesta Treaty and the Land Boundary Agreement. Interestingly, BJP's MP Varun Singh, son of Sanjay and Menoka Gandhi, supports the Teesta and Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh. Despite Varun Gandhi's positive gesture towards Bangladesh, influential BJP leaders, including Sushma Swaraj of the BJP, and Mamata Banerjee's Trinamul Congress in West Bengal are totally unwilling to concede anything to Bangladesh, which they think would adversely affect the best interests of India in general, and West Bengal in particular. It is noteworthy that in a recent survey conducted by the IBN, CNN and The Hindu, Bangladesh came on top as the most trusted country among Indians, ahead of even Russia. Analysts impute this to the collective guilt of Indians over New Delhi's "failure to be fair to Bangladesh". The seven Northeastern states of India, who would benefit most through the transit facilities to Chittagong port, are more pro-disposed to Bangladesh than elsewhere in India. In short, Indian politicians and policy makers in general are least interested in normailising the Indo-Bangladesh relationship. They seem to be totally disinterested neither in resolving the problem of BSF killing of Bangladeshi nationals at the Indo-Bangladesh borders, nor ratifying the Teesta Water and the Land Boundary Agreement. One cannot agree more with a Bangladeshi analyst that: "If India thinks that these two acts [stopping BSF killing of Bangladeshis at the border and punishing the BSF soldier who killed Felani] would be immense favour from her [to Bangladesh] … they [sic] are wrong. India's Bangladesh policy needs serious revision, pragmatic thinking and a dignified approach".
As several retired Bangladeshi diplomats have observed, India should do more towards normalizing its relationship with Bangladesh. India could have reciprocated Bangladesh's allowing the transportation of heavy equipments through its territory to build a power plant in Tripura state in 2011 and 2012. Bangladesh has also promised to transship 10,000 tonnes of food grains without any charge under "yet another 'special transit' facility" to India. As one retired Bangladeshi diplomat puts it, India has promised a lot to Bangladesh and signed several agreements, which have not yet been fully or partially implemented; and not only that, but India's promises are also fading. As India has failed to amend its constitution to implement the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement, it has only managed to grant 24-hour access to the Angarpota-Dahagram residents to the mainland of Bangladesh on a temporary basis, which can be withdrawn by India at a moment's notice. The Teesta Agreement is also unlikely to be implemented shortly. India has done very little to make Bangladesh happy during the last five years, 2008 to 2013. "No step has been taken to address the key issues on which substantive matters can be resolved. These include sharing of the waters of all the common rivers, peaceful management of the border as well as cross border investments" observes on retired Bangladeshi diplomat. In sum, India has lost historical opportunities to improve the Indo-Bangladesh relationship in the last few years. Last but not least, "Bangladesh did the tango with India gracefully and in harmony. But this may not always be the same in the future. In fact, political leaders in Bangladesh would be wary of giving India any leverage without a reciprocating gesture from India. Indian internal politics need to change dramatically to cope up with Bangladesh's new regional posturing".
Conclusions
In the backdrop of the unfriendly relationship between India and Bangladesh, which is a by-product of various historical, economic, cultural and political factors, one should not expect rapid normalization of the relationship overnight. Policy makers in both the countries should also realize that any sensitive issue, if not addressed to promote mutual trust, interest and understanding, might backfire to further embitter the fragile relationship. It is essential to keep in mind that it is difficult to get rid of the historical hangover induced by the age-old communal antagonism between Hindus and Muslims and the bitter memories of the Partition on both sides of the Indo-Bangladesh border. Then again, it is also not that easy to convince India to divert river waters from the arid lands in West Bengal to Bangladesh. It is equally difficult to contain the outflow of the illegal immigrants from the border districts of Bangladesh where the land-man ratio is gradually becoming untenable for the sustenance of the landless poor.
Again, what is most unfortunate is the political use of both avoidable and unavoidable issues that damage good friendly relationship between the two neigbours, by vested interest groups in both within and outside South Asia. Communally motivated politicians on both sides of the border make capital of the imaginary Hindu-Muslim fault line. Thus the BJP and members of the Hindu extremist Sangh Parivar in India and their counterparts in Bangladesh, such as the BNP, Jamaat-i-Islami and their ilk, love to play the communal card or the Muslim and Hindu bogeymen for political leverage, respectively. It is quite surprising that some so-called "Leftist/Progressive" leaders on both sides of the border also use the communal card for sheer political benefits. The age-old cold war between India and Pakistan, especially since the creation of Bangladesh with direct Indian involvement, also adversely affects Indo-Bangladesh relationship, as Pakistan has not totally abandoned the policy of using Bangladesh as its battlefield in its proxy war against India.
Leaders and members of the civil society in India and Bangladesh fail to educate, enlighten and "decommunalize" people for the sake of better Hindu-Muslim understanding and good relationship between the two neighbours. Some of them overtly or covertly play the agent provocateur role to tarnish the image of their neighbouring country out of political expediency and communal prejudice. The promotion of Taslima Nasrin and her controversial fiction Lajja, for example, by sections of the Indian politicians, media and intellectuals was simply counterproductive. Given the opportunity, their Bangladeshi counterparts would not shy out from promoting turncoats from India for political gains and communal gratification. It seems, while "Blame thy Neighbour" is the cornerstone of India's Bangladesh policy since the 1980s, "India Factor" is the most essential element in Bangladesh's relationship with countries in the region and beyond, especially the U.S. and China.
Bangladeshis in general, including politicians, analysts and members of the civil society, believe that India's hegemonic attitude is at the roots of its apparent intransigence and stubbornness towards Bangladesh. Most Bangladeshis still consider India a malevolent neigbour, if not an impending threat to their country's sovereignty and geographical integrity. A re-appraisal of some of the contentious issues, especially what Bangladesh in general thinks about them, is essential for understanding why the Indo-Bangladesh relationship is not on the even keel. What a minister in the Awami League Government (which is broadly known as "pro-Indian" to its predicament) has pointed out in September 2013 is very significant. He said: "India must keep in mind that we too are accountable to our people. Friendship isn't one-sided. Both sides have to come forward." This is significant because even some "pro-Indian" politicians in Bangladesh realize that Indian intransigence and unwillingness to normalize the Indo-Bangladesh relationship would further strengthen the anti-Indian Islamist and "communal" forces in Bangladesh, which would be also detrimental to the long-term geo-political and security interests of India, especially in the Northeast and West Bengal. Mahfuz Anam, the editor of a leading daily (Daily Star) in Bangladesh has rightly pointed out that good relations between India and Bangladesh are fundamental to the prosperity of the two nations. "India should help Bangladesh from a point of view of India's self-interest, as an economically prosperous Bangladesh will add to the peace and stability of the region and be a more attractive trading partner of India", he observes.
As bitter historical memories, geographical exigencies, and shifting global politics have adversely affected Indo-Bangladesh ties, so has the inept big brotherly attitude of India towards its smaller neighbours. Kuldip Nayar is quite instructive in this regard:
India needs to reflect on why all the neighbouring countries have distanced themselves from it. No doubt its size deters them. But more than that, their feeling is that New Delhi is becoming increasingly conscious of itself as an emerging world power. It tends to throw its weight about in such a manner that the neighbours are having doubts about its bona fides.
Last but least, India should realize that good relationship with Bangladesh is mutually beneficial to both the countries. It should pay heed to what retired Indian diplomat-turned-politician Mani Shankar Ayar thinks about the dysfunctional Indo-Bangladesh relationship, which is full of bad experience, mutual mistrust and apprehension. He thinks India has "failed to deliver" what Bangladesh has been expecting since long. He also believes that "benefits will not flow to the North Eastern region [of India] unless Bangladesh becomes a natural country of transit that will connect the region with the rest of India".
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* Dr Taj Hashmi is professor of security studies at Austin Peay State University in Tennessee, US. He taught at various other universities in Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Singapore and the US. He has authored several books and scores of academic papers, book chapters and popular articles. His major publications include Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia (Westview Press, 1992); Women and Islam in Bangladesh (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2000); Islam, Muslims and the Modern State (Palgrave-Macmillan, 1994). Sage is publishing his next book (January 2014), Global Jihad and America: The Hundred-Year-War beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.
Taj Hashmi*
Overview
India has never been in good terms with its immediate neighbours, except Maldives. It is possibly the only country in the world, which has bad to very bad relationship with all its immediate neighbours. The Indo-Bangladesh relationship has always been strenuous. Although immediately after the emergence of Bangladesh – with direct Indian help and military intervention – the Bangladesh Government officially portrayed India as Bangladesh's "Bandhu Rashtra" or "Friendly State", yet most Bangladeshis were not enthused about the short- and long-term prospects of having mighty India as a neighbour. To them, India was not a benign neighbour but a hegemonic and expansionist power, determined to turn their country into a subservient ally and a market, or even worse, into a protectorate.
Ever since the 1975 military takeover in Bangladesh, the government and people in India have serious misgivings about their Muslim-majority neighbour in the east. India not only considers the country a source of illegal immigrants but also as one in league with Pakistan, allegedly a promoter of Islamist terror and a sanctuary for ethno-national separatists in India's Northeast. India's mistrust of Bangladesh intensifies whenever the "pro-Pakistani" and "Islam-loving" Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is in power in the country. India's demeanor changes substantially – it apparently becomes friendly towards Bangladesh – whenever the "pro-Indian" and apparently "secular" Awami League is in power.
Then again, contrary to what Manmohan Singh believes that around 25 per cent of Bangladeshis who are anti-Indian belong to the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami party and "are in the clutches of the ISI", thanks to Indian hegemonic behaviour towards Bangladesh, much more than 25 per cent of the Muslim population in the country are avowedly anti-Indian and they do not necessarily belong to any Islamist party as Islamist parties do not command more than five per cent popular support in Bangladesh.
This paper is an appraisal of the real and imaginary issues dogging the Indo-Bangladesh relations in historical, political, psychological and geo-political perspectives. It also aims at exploring the possibilities of a durable understanding between the two countries in an environment of mutual trust and respect.
Historical Roots of the Problem
Let us look at the historical roots of the problem as to why India and Bangladesh behave to each other as they have been since months after the emergence of Bangladesh. Historically, it is not correct to assume that Bangladesh came into being due to the bulk of the East Bengali Muslims' quest for a secular Bengali identity; and that the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 signalled the departure of East Bengali Muslims' Muslim identity, nourished and nurtured for at least a hundred years before the emergence of Pakistan in 1947. There is no reason to assume that East Bengali Muslims, who played the most important role in the creation of Pakistan, all of a sudden discarded anti-Hindu "communalism" (main sustainer of and rationale for Pakistan) and joined the bandwagon of the so-called secular Bengali Nationalism. East Pakistan's transformation into Bangladesh was not inevitable. Pakistani military crackdown leading to an indiscriminate killing of Bengalis in East Pakistan and Indian intervention played the vital roles in the creation of the country. Most importantly, for the bulk of Bangladeshis Muslims, 1971 just transformed their political not religious identity. They were/are still predisposed to anti-Indian (anti-Hindu) communal propaganda.
Most importantly, the post-Liberation Awami League Government's failure to address the problems of mass hunger, poverty, unemployment in the backdrop of mismanaged and corrupt ways of running the country, with reliance on India for its domestic and foreign policies, did not augur well for the Indo-Bangladesh friendship and understanding. While Bangladesh was apparently turning into the Kissinger's nightmarish "Basket Case" during the Mujib era, the vast majority of Bangladeshi Muslims started believing in all the conspiracy theories, such as: a) "India taking away their country's meagre resources"; b) "India created Bangladesh not only to weaken Pakistan but also to turn the country it helped become independent into an Indian market and colony"; and c) "Under Indian influence, the Mujib Government was working for a formal merger of their country with India". Renowned Indian journalist Basant Chatterjee, as an eyewitness gave a vivid account of the prevalent anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh soon after its emergence in 1971. He rightly pointed out that Bangladesh in 1973 had already become "Muslim Bengal", where the bulk of the Bengali Muslims blamed India for all of their problems, and were fast becoming pro-Islamic and anti-Indian, if not pro-Pakistani. The psyche of the average Bangladeshi Muslim has not changed much in 2013 with regards to their anti-Indian sentiment.
While the Bangladeshi Muslim psyche was still vulnerable to communal/anti-Indian mobilization, Indian highhandedness and inept foreign and trade policies towards Bangladesh, especially its dumping of substandard goods into Bangladesh and coercing the latter into signing a "friendship treaty" (on unequal terms) with India in 1972 to last twenty-five years, alienated many Bangladeshis. Meanwhile, by early 1972 supporters of Islam-oriented political parties – remained proscribed in Bangladesh for more than three years up to the military takeover in 1975 for collaborating with the Pakistani occupation army in 1971 – pro-Chinese leftists and others having strong reservations about India joined the anti-Indian camp under Maulana Bhashani. After the bloody overthrow of the Mujib government in 1975 (most Bangladeshis considered the regime pro-Indian) anti-Indian movement got further momentum due to various factors. What had already started soon after the emergence of Bangladesh in early 1972 – many pro-Bangladeshi and anti-Pakistani secular and liberal democratic politicians and people fast turned anti-Indian due to various factors – got further momentum after the overthrow of the Mujib. India's alleged plundering of Bangladeshi assets and its hegemonic foreign policy to keep Bangladesh subservient turned the average Bangladeshi into anti-Indian and anti-Mujib. Thus when Khondokar Mushtaque Ahmed, a senior minister in the Mujib Cabinet, became the President of Bangladesh after the August coup of 1975, Bangladesh came closer to Pakistan and through it to the Muslim World. Mushtaque would have declared Bangladesh an "Islamic Republic" but he is said to have refrained from doing so because of his apprehension of Indian military intervention. This is what one finds in some declassified State Department Documents.
Ever since 1975, lots of contentious issues between the two countries have further embittered the Indo-Bangladesh relationship. India's harbouring, arming and training pro-Mujib militants under Kader Siddiki who continued attacking Bangladeshi border outposts in 1975-1976 and the Chakma insurgents (Shanti Bahini) for two decades up to 1996; and Bangladesh's providing sanctuary to ULFA rebels for years, allegedly in collaboration with the ISI, may be mentioned in this regard.
India decided to build the Farakka Barrage across the Ganges in 1951, which came into operation in 1975.
India's unilateral decision to activate the Barrage – to the detriment of Bangladesh – alienated the bulk of the Bangladeshi population from India. Consequential to the Barrage, Bangladesh loses around 40,000 cusecs of water per year. The Indo-Bangladesh thirty-year agreement on water sharing signed in 1996, has not substantially improved the situation for Bangladesh. There is no guarantee clause in the agreement for minimum amounts of water to be supplied to Bangladesh. From the findings of water and ecology experts across the world, it appears that due to the barrage, there has been increased salinity of soil and water in northwestern Bangladesh. There has also been decline in soil quality and crop yields, shrinking fish population, decline of mangrove forest, increased erosion rates and sedimentation in the Ganges, more severe flooding in northern Bangladesh during the monsoon. Experts estimate the total damage to Bangladesh economy due to the Barrage at $3 billion per year.
While contentious issues like India's withdrawing water from the upstream of the Ganges in the north of the Farakka Barrage has been a big impediment to good neighbourly relationship between India and Bangladesh, the proposed Tipaimukh Barrage has emerged as another bone of contention between the two countries. The proposed Tipaimukh Barrage on the Barak, would adversely affect agriculture, and create environmental and navigational problems in the Surma and Kushiara rivers, adversely affecting more than thirty million people in northeastern Bangladesh. Again, ignoring Bangladesh's demand, India has not stopped unilateral withdrawal of water from the upstream of the Teesta Barrage of Bangladesh in northern Bangladesh, which has posed a serious threat to agriculture in greater Rangpur district of Bangladesh.
Indian ambivalence towards solving the border demarcation problem, and India's Border Security Forces or BSF's alleged unprovoked killing of Bangladeshi nationals on the border, especially the killing of 15-year-old Felani, a Bangladeshi girl on 7 January 2011, have further embittered the Indo-Bangladesh relationship. The acquittal of the BSF soldier, alleged to have killed Felani, disappointed and angered many in Bangladesh.
India is apprehensive of the influx of illegal immigrants, Islamist terrorists and Muslim protagonists of "Greater Bangladesh" from Bangladesh to destabilize the Northeast and West Bengal. Bangladesh is also worried about the long-term design of India-based Bengali Hindu extremists who want to carve out several southwestern Bangladeshi districts to create the so-called Swadhin Bangabhumi (Free Bengali Land) to settle Hindu Bengali refugees (and their descendants) who left East Pakistan/Bangladesh for India during the last sixty-odd years. The Swadhin Bangabhumi Andolon, a separatist movement to create a Hindu country out of southwestern Bangladesh started in 1973 in India. In an interview with the BBC in 2001, Chittaranjan Sutar, who was an Awami League MP and the main organiser of the movement, denied any existence of the movement at that time. The movement became active again in 2003 when it declared the independence of Hindu Republic of Bangabhumi. Hindu extremist groups in India, especially the VHP, championed the cause of the Bangabhumi.
Many Bangladeshis are apprehensive of another unlikely event, Indian annexation of their country, very similar to what happened to Hyderabad, Kashmir, Goa and Sikkim, which could lead to the return of millions of Hindu Bengali refugees and their descendants to Bangladesh to reclaim their abandoned (or sold at nominal prices) and stolen properties from their present Bangladeshi Muslim owners. Bangladeshis also do not want to compete with the better-educated Hindu Indians in the not-so-competitive job market in Bangladesh, which they apprehend would be the outcome of an Indian annexation of their country. Thousands of Indian professionals have already been working illegally in the private sector of Bangladesh, especially in the garment, NGO and IT sectors.
While water is a very big issue between the two neighbours, which is likely to aggravate further in the coming years as India will need more water for its dry and populous state of West Bengal, the lack of mutual trust, and most importantly, the lack of resolve to resolve the problem on both sides, are the stumbling blocks towards bringing the two countries closer to each other. The perpetual sense of deprivation and helplessness on part of Bangladesh vis-à-vis Indian highhandedness will not do any good to the parties. Tense Indo-Bangladesh relationship is also at the roots of many transnational security problems in the sub-region.
Surprisingly, there are some minor issues that have been dogging the relationship between the two neighbours for decades. One may mention the issue of the Bangladeshi enclaves in India at Angarpota and Dahagram. Although Bangladesh transferred the Indian enclave of Berubari in Bangladesh to India in 1974 by linking it to the Indian mainland, India has not yet reciprocated the same rights to the Bangladeshi nationals in the enclaves of Angarpota and Dahagram. Despite so many "agreements", India has not allowed free and uninterrupted 24-hour access to the Bangladeshis in the enclaves to the mainland of Bangladesh. There is a narrow corridor of Indian Territory called "Tin Bigha" that links the enclaves to the mainland of Bangladesh. India does not allow 24-hour access to the corridor. Consequently the Bangladeshis in the enclaves do not get access to law enforcers, hospitals, shopping centres, schools and other facilities in Bangladesh. They live in abject poverty, without access to gas and electricity. Then again, apparently there was a breakthrough as India and Bangladesh came to some agreements on the boundary agreement (over the enclaves) and India promised that no unilateral actions would be taken to deprive Bangladesh from its due share of Teesta water in 2011.
The Cold War impacted the Indo-Bangladesh relations in the post-Mujib era up to the end of the Cold War (1975-1990) – While the Soviet Union and its East European satellites favoured India, the West and its Arab allies and Pakistan favoured Bangladesh. The emergence of the "Neo Cold War" between America and China (and its clients in the Muslim World) is fast polarizing the Muslim and the Western worlds. America's promoting India as a bulwark against China – and against Pakistan in the long run – has direct bearings on the Indo-Bangladesh relationship. Hillary Clinton's telling India on 20th July 2011 in Chennai "it's time to lead" and "exercise political influence to match its fast-growing economic muscle" in South Asia, is not re-assuring for Bangladesh and Pakistan. India and Pakistan are also engaged in their proxy war over Kashmir in Afghanistan. Significantly, Bangladeshi political parties are not maintaining positive neutrality towards the Indo-Pak conflict in and around Afghanistan.
America's and the Israeli Lobby's not-so-hidden agenda to de-nuclearise Pakistan may be considered a catalyst in the new Big Game within and beyond Afghanistan. Thus Bangladesh has become a not-so-insignificant pawn in this game and has also become a battlefield of the Indo-Pakistan proxy war. While Pakistan has been keen on promoting Bangladesh as a destabilizing factor for India by its surreptitious support of Indian insurgents, Bangladesh under "pro-Pakistani" BNP-Jamaat coalition government responded favourably to Pakistan against India, the "common enemy".
Impediments and Bottlenecks to Good Relationship
There are several bilateral, sub-regional and global issues hindering the onset of normal relationship between the two neighbours. The bilateral issues include border security, boundary demarcation, trade, and transit rights, water management, travel and tourism. As reported in the media, on 7 July 2011, Indian and Bangladeshi foreign ministers, S.M. Krishna and Dipu Moni, "expressed firm optimism about signing of an interim agreement on water sharing of the common rivers Teesta and Feni, and a framework deal on land border during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Dhaka on September 6-7". We also read in the media that more deals on transit, import of power from India, joint venture power generation, cooperation in security, education, culture, and trade liberalisation, etc. were in the offing; details of which were being worked out, and both countries were expecting to complete the remaining task before the Indian Prime Minster's visit to Bangladesh in September 2011.
During the Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna's visit to Bangladesh in May 2012, two accords were signed between the two countries. One was on the transit rights to Bhutanese vehicles to Bangladeshi ports through India; and the other one was on the ratification of the Indo-Bangladesh agreement on promotion and protection of investments. As Indian BSF's shooting down dozens of Bangladeshi intruders into India in the recent past enraged Bangladesh, Mr. Krishna assured his Bangladeshi counterpart that in the future India would not shoot at Bangladeshi intruders and would only use "non-lethal weapons" to deal with border intruders from Bangladesh. Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dipu Moni co-chaired the first Bangladesh-India Joint Commission meeting with Indian External Affairs Minister SM Krishna. The Joint Commission was formed under the Framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development signed during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Dhaka on September 6-7, 2011. The reports of the Joint Commission noted that under India's $1 billion credit agreement inked two years ago, Bangladesh bought fifty double-decker buses from India. It is noteworthy that neither the Hasina-Manmohan MOU in 2010 nor the Krishna-Dipu Moni agreement in 2012 resolved the more pressing issues dogging the Indo-Bangladesh relations besides the issue of granting transit rights to India through Bangladesh to the former's Northeastern provinces.
However, as of October 2013, excepting the import of power from India and the inauguration of the environmentally hazardous coal-run joint power generation plant at Rampal in southwestern Bangladesh in close proximity to the Sundarbans, there has been no substantial improvement in the bilateral relationship between the two neighbours. On 5 October 2013, Sheikh Hasina and Manmohan Singh jointly unveiled the foundation plaque of the controversial coal-fired power plant at Rampal despite green groups' protest and bitter criticism of all major opposition parties and civil society in Bangladesh. One wonders if Manmohan Singh did the right thing by jointly sponsoring this highly controversial and unpopular power plant. This move is likely to further embitter the existing acrimonious relationship between the two neigbours. Some top BNP leaders and other opponents of the Rampal power plant single out Indian "vested interest" as the main factor behind the project, as they think, "only India will benefit from it".
Meanwhile, West Bengal's Chief Minister Mamata Bannerjee had raised objection to implementing the boundary agreement signed between India and Bangladesh without her and West Bengal's approval. As Bannerjee has been intransigent on implementing any boundary agreement with Bangladesh without her consent, so is Jaswant Singh of the Hindu rightist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Singh reveals that the BJP is not willing to amend the Indian Constitution to implement the boundary agreement. Sections of Indian politicians and media are, however, willing to fulfill India's commitment to Bangladesh to resolve all bilateral issues, including the Teesta Treaty and the Land Boundary Agreement. Interestingly, BJP's MP Varun Singh, son of Sanjay and Menoka Gandhi, supports the Teesta and Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh. Despite Varun Gandhi's positive gesture towards Bangladesh, influential BJP leaders, including Sushma Swaraj of the BJP, and Mamata Banerjee's Trinamul Congress in West Bengal are totally unwilling to concede anything to Bangladesh, which they think would adversely affect the best interests of India in general, and West Bengal in particular. It is noteworthy that in a recent survey conducted by the IBN, CNN and The Hindu, Bangladesh came on top as the most trusted country among Indians, ahead of even Russia. Analysts impute this to the collective guilt of Indians over New Delhi's "failure to be fair to Bangladesh". The seven Northeastern states of India, who would benefit most through the transit facilities to Chittagong port, are more pro-disposed to Bangladesh than elsewhere in India. In short, Indian politicians and policy makers in general are least interested in normailising the Indo-Bangladesh relationship. They seem to be totally disinterested neither in resolving the problem of BSF killing of Bangladeshi nationals at the Indo-Bangladesh borders, nor ratifying the Teesta Water and the Land Boundary Agreement. One cannot agree more with a Bangladeshi analyst that: "If India thinks that these two acts [stopping BSF killing of Bangladeshis at the border and punishing the BSF soldier who killed Felani] would be immense favour from her [to Bangladesh] … they [sic] are wrong. India's Bangladesh policy needs serious revision, pragmatic thinking and a dignified approach".
As several retired Bangladeshi diplomats have observed, India should do more towards normalizing its relationship with Bangladesh. India could have reciprocated Bangladesh's allowing the transportation of heavy equipments through its territory to build a power plant in Tripura state in 2011 and 2012. Bangladesh has also promised to transship 10,000 tonnes of food grains without any charge under "yet another 'special transit' facility" to India. As one retired Bangladeshi diplomat puts it, India has promised a lot to Bangladesh and signed several agreements, which have not yet been fully or partially implemented; and not only that, but India's promises are also fading. As India has failed to amend its constitution to implement the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement, it has only managed to grant 24-hour access to the Angarpota-Dahagram residents to the mainland of Bangladesh on a temporary basis, which can be withdrawn by India at a moment's notice. The Teesta Agreement is also unlikely to be implemented shortly. India has done very little to make Bangladesh happy during the last five years, 2008 to 2013. "No step has been taken to address the key issues on which substantive matters can be resolved. These include sharing of the waters of all the common rivers, peaceful management of the border as well as cross border investments" observes on retired Bangladeshi diplomat. In sum, India has lost historical opportunities to improve the Indo-Bangladesh relationship in the last few years. Last but not least, "Bangladesh did the tango with India gracefully and in harmony. But this may not always be the same in the future. In fact, political leaders in Bangladesh would be wary of giving India any leverage without a reciprocating gesture from India. Indian internal politics need to change dramatically to cope up with Bangladesh's new regional posturing".
Conclusions
In the backdrop of the unfriendly relationship between India and Bangladesh, which is a by-product of various historical, economic, cultural and political factors, one should not expect rapid normalization of the relationship overnight. Policy makers in both the countries should also realize that any sensitive issue, if not addressed to promote mutual trust, interest and understanding, might backfire to further embitter the fragile relationship. It is essential to keep in mind that it is difficult to get rid of the historical hangover induced by the age-old communal antagonism between Hindus and Muslims and the bitter memories of the Partition on both sides of the Indo-Bangladesh border. Then again, it is also not that easy to convince India to divert river waters from the arid lands in West Bengal to Bangladesh. It is equally difficult to contain the outflow of the illegal immigrants from the border districts of Bangladesh where the land-man ratio is gradually becoming untenable for the sustenance of the landless poor.
Again, what is most unfortunate is the political use of both avoidable and unavoidable issues that damage good friendly relationship between the two neigbours, by vested interest groups in both within and outside South Asia. Communally motivated politicians on both sides of the border make capital of the imaginary Hindu-Muslim fault line. Thus the BJP and members of the Hindu extremist Sangh Parivar in India and their counterparts in Bangladesh, such as the BNP, Jamaat-i-Islami and their ilk, love to play the communal card or the Muslim and Hindu bogeymen for political leverage, respectively. It is quite surprising that some so-called "Leftist/Progressive" leaders on both sides of the border also use the communal card for sheer political benefits. The age-old cold war between India and Pakistan, especially since the creation of Bangladesh with direct Indian involvement, also adversely affects Indo-Bangladesh relationship, as Pakistan has not totally abandoned the policy of using Bangladesh as its battlefield in its proxy war against India.
Leaders and members of the civil society in India and Bangladesh fail to educate, enlighten and "decommunalize" people for the sake of better Hindu-Muslim understanding and good relationship between the two neighbours. Some of them overtly or covertly play the agent provocateur role to tarnish the image of their neighbouring country out of political expediency and communal prejudice. The promotion of Taslima Nasrin and her controversial fiction Lajja, for example, by sections of the Indian politicians, media and intellectuals was simply counterproductive. Given the opportunity, their Bangladeshi counterparts would not shy out from promoting turncoats from India for political gains and communal gratification. It seems, while "Blame thy Neighbour" is the cornerstone of India's Bangladesh policy since the 1980s, "India Factor" is the most essential element in Bangladesh's relationship with countries in the region and beyond, especially the U.S. and China.
Bangladeshis in general, including politicians, analysts and members of the civil society, believe that India's hegemonic attitude is at the roots of its apparent intransigence and stubbornness towards Bangladesh. Most Bangladeshis still consider India a malevolent neigbour, if not an impending threat to their country's sovereignty and geographical integrity. A re-appraisal of some of the contentious issues, especially what Bangladesh in general thinks about them, is essential for understanding why the Indo-Bangladesh relationship is not on the even keel. What a minister in the Awami League Government (which is broadly known as "pro-Indian" to its predicament) has pointed out in September 2013 is very significant. He said: "India must keep in mind that we too are accountable to our people. Friendship isn't one-sided. Both sides have to come forward." This is significant because even some "pro-Indian" politicians in Bangladesh realize that Indian intransigence and unwillingness to normalize the Indo-Bangladesh relationship would further strengthen the anti-Indian Islamist and "communal" forces in Bangladesh, which would be also detrimental to the long-term geo-political and security interests of India, especially in the Northeast and West Bengal. Mahfuz Anam, the editor of a leading daily (Daily Star) in Bangladesh has rightly pointed out that good relations between India and Bangladesh are fundamental to the prosperity of the two nations. "India should help Bangladesh from a point of view of India's self-interest, as an economically prosperous Bangladesh will add to the peace and stability of the region and be a more attractive trading partner of India", he observes.
As bitter historical memories, geographical exigencies, and shifting global politics have adversely affected Indo-Bangladesh ties, so has the inept big brotherly attitude of India towards its smaller neighbours. Kuldip Nayar is quite instructive in this regard:
India needs to reflect on why all the neighbouring countries have distanced themselves from it. No doubt its size deters them. But more than that, their feeling is that New Delhi is becoming increasingly conscious of itself as an emerging world power. It tends to throw its weight about in such a manner that the neighbours are having doubts about its bona fides.
Last but least, India should realize that good relationship with Bangladesh is mutually beneficial to both the countries. It should pay heed to what retired Indian diplomat-turned-politician Mani Shankar Ayar thinks about the dysfunctional Indo-Bangladesh relationship, which is full of bad experience, mutual mistrust and apprehension. He thinks India has "failed to deliver" what Bangladesh has been expecting since long. He also believes that "benefits will not flow to the North Eastern region [of India] unless Bangladesh becomes a natural country of transit that will connect the region with the rest of India".
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* Dr Taj Hashmi is professor of security studies at Austin Peay State University in Tennessee, US. He taught at various other universities in Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Singapore and the US. He has authored several books and scores of academic papers, book chapters and popular articles. His major publications include Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia (Westview Press, 1992); Women and Islam in Bangladesh (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2000); Islam, Muslims and the Modern State (Palgrave-Macmillan, 1994). Sage is publishing his next book (January 2014), Global Jihad and America: The Hundred-Year-War beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.
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