Dissecting the agreements
If the 2010 January Joint Communiqué contained three agreements and two MOUs, the 2011 September Joint Communiqué contained as many as ten MOUs, protocols, and protocols to past MOUs. In Bangladesh, we have been so much taken up with the disappointment of not having a deal on Teesta, that not many have gone into the other agreements and protocols signed between the two countries in any great details, save a few.
As far as the Teesta is concerned, without sounding pessimistic and, in spite of the assurances of many Indians who should know what is happening in the South Block, it seems that we are in for a long haul. And just as one had assumed, there are many more persons than Mamata Banerjee who are responsible for the Teesta embarrassment for Manmohan Singh. And it was not a last minute volte-face by the Chief Minister of Paschimbanga, as many would have us believe. However, what is ridiculous in this regard is that neither our foreign office nor the two ubiquitous PM advisors were willing to acknowledge that the situation had changed, till the last. Whether it was Providence or their Indian counterparts or their own capacity to convince the Indians that they were putting their faith on, we do not know. But whatever it was, they and the country have been badly let down.
Our renewed uneasiness about Teesta stems from a report appearing on Wednesday in our leading Bangla daily that India has asked for statistics of Teesta runoff of the last 10-15 years from 1995-96. That being so, there is all the possibility that the three-month time assurance of our finance minister will be greatly overrun as some of our experts predict. Having said that, one wonders what the substance of the proposed Teesta water sharing document was in the first place, and what was the basis on which the share of water was worked out, till it fell through at the last moment. Are we starting from square one, one might ask.
But we shall leave Teesta aside for now and look only at two of the agreements/protocols signed on September 7, 2011, namely the Framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development, and the Protocol to the Agreement Concerning the Demarcation of the Land Boundary. We shall dwell on the former last, since it requires close and objective scrutiny. It has come under severe criticism from a section of our intellectuals, so much so that it has been termed as worse than the 25 Years Treaty of Friendship between Bangladesh and India of March 1972.
The Protocol to the Agreement Concerning the Demarcation of the Land Boundary has not come a day soon, come as it did more than 27 years after the original Agreement was signed. The protocol operationalises the Mujib-Indira LBA of 1974. It is a landmark achievement in some respects since it has at last managed to address the 6.4 kilometres of un-demarcated border in three stretches. It has also addressed the issue of the enclaves and land in adverse possession (APL). The only shortcoming of the protocol is that no timeframe has been fixed for the exchanges to be completed. It is hoped that one of the main causes of border tensions and sporadic clashes on the borders, the APL, would be removed permanently. What we are looking for is how quickly the exchanges can take place.
The Framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development has managed to raise the ire of some analysts. The two criticisms that I have come across are by reputed scholars in their own rights, who, in one broad brush, have called it a replication of the 25 Years Treaty, and only more so. The similarity is not merely that both the documents contain twelve articles but certain other provisions which they feel will severely impinge upon the country's sovereignty.
Detractors take umbrage at Article 9 of the Framework Agreement which enjoins the parties to cooperate on, "security issues of concern to each other while fully respecting each other's sovereignty and that neither party shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the other."
This is indeed a security matter and Bangladesh too needs assurance that Indian soil will not be used to carry out hostile and anti-Bangladeshi activities. It needs no reminding that not very long ago Bangladeshi insurgent groups had operated against us from Indian soil, but is it fair to call the proviso a euphemism for "security cooperation" as the critics have averred.
What however lends itself to further explanation is the term "security." One would hope that the "security issues of concern" are indeed of mutual interest because it will be unrealistic to assume that Bangladesh's security concerns will always be coterminous with India's.
In the same vein, the pious hope that Article 8 holds out, of cooperating on matters relating to the national interests of the two countries may remain pious only because it would also do us well to keep in mind that national interest of countries collide, and even within a country there is difference of opinion on what the vital interests of the country are.
The writer is Editor, Defence & Strategic Affairs, The Daily Star.
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