------ Forwarded message ----------
From: Zoglul Husain <zoglul@hotmail.co.uk>
Date: Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 4:20 AM
Subject: RE: Six-Points Programme or Independence?
To: Isha Khan <bdmailer@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 4:20 AM
Subject: RE: Six-Points Programme or Independence?
To: Isha Khan <bdmailer@gmail.com>
There is no set framework for a confederation. There can be looser confederations as well as tighter ones resembling federations, depending on circumstances. For example, the present day European Union is considered by many as a confederation or even by some as a federation.
The most important point is that Mujib took 6-points to mean confederation. He maintained his position that he wanted confederation, and not independence, until his surrender to the Pakistan army on the night of 25 March 1971.
I refer to the following article:
(Please click to read the Probe News Magazine March 23-29 2012 Liberation War Revisited by Parvez Halim)
http://www.probenewsmagazine.com/index.php?index=2&contentId=7078
-----------------------------
The most important point is that Mujib took 6-points to mean confederation. He maintained his position that he wanted confederation, and not independence, until his surrender to the Pakistan army on the night of 25 March 1971.
I refer to the following article:
(Please click to read the Probe News Magazine March 23-29 2012 Liberation War Revisited by Parvez Halim)
http://www.probenewsmagazine.com/index.php?index=2&contentId=7078
-----------------------------
> Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2012 18:50:07 +0600
> Subject: Six-Points Programme or Independence?
> From: bdmailer@gmail.com
> To:
> Subject: Six-Points Programme or Independence?
> From: bdmailer@gmail.com
> To:
>
> Six-Points Programme or Independence?
>
> It is widely believed by a large number of people of all political
> persuasions that the Six-Points Programme was a demand for autonomy of
> East Pakistan in a conventional sense within a federation of two
> regions of East and West Pakistan.
>
> However, the details of the programme, when elaborated, turn out to be
> very radically different from autonomy of East Pakistan within a
> federation as generally understood. The programme postulated that the
> only subjects which would fall within the purview of the federal
> government would be defence and foreign affairs. The tariffs on and
> regulations of foreign trade, the monetary and banking policies and
> institutions, fiscal policy (including revenues and public
> expenditures) and foreign exchange resources would be under the
> control of each region. There should take place no flight of capital
> or transfer of resources from one region to the other even though
> there could be one currency. Even the subject of transport and
> communications of all kinds which linked East and West Pakistan would
> be under the purview of the two regional governments.
>
> From the above, it was obvious that the Six-Points Programme did not
> provide for a customs union or a monetary union. Each region would
> have different levels and structure of import taxes/regulations.
> Although free movement of domestic goods was to be allowed between the
> regions, re-export of foreign goods imported by one region to another
> region was not to be allowed. This is because re-export from the low
> tariff region to the high tariff region would not only entail a loss
> of revenue for the latter but also nullify or negate any protection
> provided to its domestic industries. Moreover, the access of the
> domestic products of one region to another region can be subverted by
> the latter region allowing the imports of cheaper goods from the third
> countries. Also, in case one region was to protect its infant
> industries against competition from the established industries of the
> other region, it could subsidise either the inputs/outputs of its own
> industries as if each region was an independent country. Thus, each
> region could effectively insulate whatever sector of the economy it
> chose from access to or competition from the activities of the other
> region.
>
> To ensure that foreign exchange resources earned by each region should
> be under its ownership and control, the surplus/deficit in the balance
> of payments between the regions was to be met in foreign exchange.
> Otherwise, if the deficit region was to pay in common currency, it
> would imply a transfer of resources from the surplus to the deficit
> region. Such a transfer of resources was explicitly ruled out in the
> Six-Points Programme.
>
> Similarly, with one common currency but with different monetary and
> interest rate policies in different regions, the residents in the high
> interest region could not be allowed to borrow in the low interest
> region and thus to subvert the restrictive interest/monetary policies
> of their region. Accordingly, each region would be required to
> maintain, and monitor a detailed balance of payments accounts,
> including not only trade in goods and services but also all kinds of
> financial transfers, foreign as well as interregional, such as
> transfers to different enterprises or branches of the same enterprises
> located in different regions. Under the above circumstances, one
> currency becomes operationally meaningless, except in name. That the
> maintenance of no currency had no practical significance was also
> apparent from the fact that in case one region had deficit in its
> external balance of payments while the other region had no deficit or
> had even surplus so that different regions would need to have
> different exchange rates. This would result in the breakdown of the
> one-currency arrangement since each region could not have
> independent/separate exchange rate. The current crisis in the Euro
> zone, with a common currency and monetary policy but different fiscal
> policies in member countries, abundantly illustrates this untenable
> situation.
>
> There are two other aspects of the Six-Points Programme, which
> aggravated the weaknesses and endangered the viability of the federal
> government. One was the arrangement for the financing of the
> expenditures of the federal government; the other related to the
> creation of regional paramilitary forces. The federal government would
> not have any independent sources of revenue and would have to rely on
> the financial contributions of the two regions in such proportions as
> would be incorporated in the constitution by mutual agreement.
>
> However, there was a loophole in the arrangement. What would have
> happened if East wanted to opt out and defaulted on its contributions?
> The federal government did not have the capability of enforcing the
> constitutional provision and to keep the regions together if one
> region wanted to break away. This was due to several and not
> frequently noted features of the Six-Points Programme.
>
> First, the institutions of the federal government (both legislative
> and executive) were to have regional representation on the basis of
> population and, therefore, decision-making authority would be
> dominated by East Pakistan with its majority. This would not only
> imply that East Pakistan would have a major share -- if not a dominant
> share to start with -- in the participation in the armed forces but
> also dominate the decisions to determine the size, the composition and
> strength of the army as well as its use/employment in particular
> circumstances. Thus, they could prevent any possible employment of the
> military force, let us say, against East Pakistan in caseit wanted to
> break away. Second, East Pakistan was to have its own militia or
> paramilitary force of a size, composition, and strength determined
> exclusively by it and would be in a position to resist an eventuality
> of federal intervention.
>
> Thus, seen from whatever angle -- economic, political, or strategic --
> the Six-Points Programme, basically proposed a loose confederation of
> two sovereign states with links between them so tenuous that they
> could be snapped by a region if it wanted to.
>
> In popular perception and in a broad sense, the Six-Points Programme
> was a programme for autonomy of East Pakistan to allow a control over
> its foreign trade and exchange earnings, as well as over the
> government revenues and expenditures. The operational details and
> implications of its economic provisions, as elaborated above, were
> highly technical and were not and could not be so easily
> apparent/obvious to the non-experts that they meant in fact a very
> small step from independence.
>
> The task of elaboration of the principal implications of the
> Six-Points Programme which Bangabandu wanted to be incorporated in the
> post-1971 Constitution of Pakistan was assigned to me by him, in
> association with a few of my colleagues. With a few of his close
> associates, he was very actively involved in approving the practical
> policy and institutional implications of the Six-Points Programme,
> which coincided with his objective of creating an easy to dissolve
> confederation of almost independent states.
>
> On the other hand, the Pakistan military and civilian leaderships,
> aided by their experts, fully understood, right from the beginning,
> what the programme was for in reality, i.e. one country in name but a
> very small step for independence of East Pakistan. That is why when
> the Six-Points Programme was announced by Bangabandu in 1966, Ayub,
> the President of Pakistan, declared in response that he would meet the
> Six-Points Programme with one point, i.e. at gun point. Thus, having
> made up their mind to suppress East Pakistan, the Pakistani leaders
> were making military preparations following the election of 1970 until
> March 1971 for the crackdown on East Pakistan under the facade of
> so-called negotiations for a political settlement.
>
> The writer is a former Deputy Chairman, First Planning Commission
> (1972-75), and Research Fellow Emeritus, International Food Policy
> Research Institute, Washington D.C.
>
> http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=227686
> Six-Points Programme or Independence?
>
> It is widely believed by a large number of people of all political
> persuasions that the Six-Points Programme was a demand for autonomy of
> East Pakistan in a conventional sense within a federation of two
> regions of East and West Pakistan.
>
> However, the details of the programme, when elaborated, turn out to be
> very radically different from autonomy of East Pakistan within a
> federation as generally understood. The programme postulated that the
> only subjects which would fall within the purview of the federal
> government would be defence and foreign affairs. The tariffs on and
> regulations of foreign trade, the monetary and banking policies and
> institutions, fiscal policy (including revenues and public
> expenditures) and foreign exchange resources would be under the
> control of each region. There should take place no flight of capital
> or transfer of resources from one region to the other even though
> there could be one currency. Even the subject of transport and
> communications of all kinds which linked East and West Pakistan would
> be under the purview of the two regional governments.
>
> From the above, it was obvious that the Six-Points Programme did not
> provide for a customs union or a monetary union. Each region would
> have different levels and structure of import taxes/regulations.
> Although free movement of domestic goods was to be allowed between the
> regions, re-export of foreign goods imported by one region to another
> region was not to be allowed. This is because re-export from the low
> tariff region to the high tariff region would not only entail a loss
> of revenue for the latter but also nullify or negate any protection
> provided to its domestic industries. Moreover, the access of the
> domestic products of one region to another region can be subverted by
> the latter region allowing the imports of cheaper goods from the third
> countries. Also, in case one region was to protect its infant
> industries against competition from the established industries of the
> other region, it could subsidise either the inputs/outputs of its own
> industries as if each region was an independent country. Thus, each
> region could effectively insulate whatever sector of the economy it
> chose from access to or competition from the activities of the other
> region.
>
> To ensure that foreign exchange resources earned by each region should
> be under its ownership and control, the surplus/deficit in the balance
> of payments between the regions was to be met in foreign exchange.
> Otherwise, if the deficit region was to pay in common currency, it
> would imply a transfer of resources from the surplus to the deficit
> region. Such a transfer of resources was explicitly ruled out in the
> Six-Points Programme.
>
> Similarly, with one common currency but with different monetary and
> interest rate policies in different regions, the residents in the high
> interest region could not be allowed to borrow in the low interest
> region and thus to subvert the restrictive interest/monetary policies
> of their region. Accordingly, each region would be required to
> maintain, and monitor a detailed balance of payments accounts,
> including not only trade in goods and services but also all kinds of
> financial transfers, foreign as well as interregional, such as
> transfers to different enterprises or branches of the same enterprises
> located in different regions. Under the above circumstances, one
> currency becomes operationally meaningless, except in name. That the
> maintenance of no currency had no practical significance was also
> apparent from the fact that in case one region had deficit in its
> external balance of payments while the other region had no deficit or
> had even surplus so that different regions would need to have
> different exchange rates. This would result in the breakdown of the
> one-currency arrangement since each region could not have
> independent/separate exchange rate. The current crisis in the Euro
> zone, with a common currency and monetary policy but different fiscal
> policies in member countries, abundantly illustrates this untenable
> situation.
>
> There are two other aspects of the Six-Points Programme, which
> aggravated the weaknesses and endangered the viability of the federal
> government. One was the arrangement for the financing of the
> expenditures of the federal government; the other related to the
> creation of regional paramilitary forces. The federal government would
> not have any independent sources of revenue and would have to rely on
> the financial contributions of the two regions in such proportions as
> would be incorporated in the constitution by mutual agreement.
>
> However, there was a loophole in the arrangement. What would have
> happened if East wanted to opt out and defaulted on its contributions?
> The federal government did not have the capability of enforcing the
> constitutional provision and to keep the regions together if one
> region wanted to break away. This was due to several and not
> frequently noted features of the Six-Points Programme.
>
> First, the institutions of the federal government (both legislative
> and executive) were to have regional representation on the basis of
> population and, therefore, decision-making authority would be
> dominated by East Pakistan with its majority. This would not only
> imply that East Pakistan would have a major share -- if not a dominant
> share to start with -- in the participation in the armed forces but
> also dominate the decisions to determine the size, the composition and
> strength of the army as well as its use/employment in particular
> circumstances. Thus, they could prevent any possible employment of the
> military force, let us say, against East Pakistan in caseit wanted to
> break away. Second, East Pakistan was to have its own militia or
> paramilitary force of a size, composition, and strength determined
> exclusively by it and would be in a position to resist an eventuality
> of federal intervention.
>
> Thus, seen from whatever angle -- economic, political, or strategic --
> the Six-Points Programme, basically proposed a loose confederation of
> two sovereign states with links between them so tenuous that they
> could be snapped by a region if it wanted to.
>
> In popular perception and in a broad sense, the Six-Points Programme
> was a programme for autonomy of East Pakistan to allow a control over
> its foreign trade and exchange earnings, as well as over the
> government revenues and expenditures. The operational details and
> implications of its economic provisions, as elaborated above, were
> highly technical and were not and could not be so easily
> apparent/obvious to the non-experts that they meant in fact a very
> small step from independence.
>
> The task of elaboration of the principal implications of the
> Six-Points Programme which Bangabandu wanted to be incorporated in the
> post-1971 Constitution of Pakistan was assigned to me by him, in
> association with a few of my colleagues. With a few of his close
> associates, he was very actively involved in approving the practical
> policy and institutional implications of the Six-Points Programme,
> which coincided with his objective of creating an easy to dissolve
> confederation of almost independent states.
>
> On the other hand, the Pakistan military and civilian leaderships,
> aided by their experts, fully understood, right from the beginning,
> what the programme was for in reality, i.e. one country in name but a
> very small step for independence of East Pakistan. That is why when
> the Six-Points Programme was announced by Bangabandu in 1966, Ayub,
> the President of Pakistan, declared in response that he would meet the
> Six-Points Programme with one point, i.e. at gun point. Thus, having
> made up their mind to suppress East Pakistan, the Pakistani leaders
> were making military preparations following the election of 1970 until
> March 1971 for the crackdown on East Pakistan under the facade of
> so-called negotiations for a political settlement.
>
> The writer is a former Deputy Chairman, First Planning Commission
> (1972-75), and Research Fellow Emeritus, International Food Policy
> Research Institute, Washington D.C.
>
> http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=227686
__._,_.___
