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Saturday, September 18, 2010

[ALOCHONA] PM’s jumbo entourage and some questions



PM's jumbo entourage and some questions
 
THE prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, left Dhaka on Saturday for New York on a 10-day tour, during which she will attend the 65th United Nations General Assembly and several 'crucial' bilateral and multilateral meetings on the sidelines. According to a report front-paged in New Age on Saturday, her reasonably loaded itinerary includes a dinner to be jointly hosted by Bangladesh and the Maldives for the climate-vulnerable countries, a high-level plenary meeting on Millennium Development Goals, a breakfast meeting of the heads of state of the least developed countries, a meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to review climate changes impacts on MDGs in the region and, of course, her address to the UNGA session on September 27.

   There is little doubt that the prime minister's tour is high profile and so it should be. What is, however, eminently questionable is the size of her entourage, which is about 100 strong and even features three poets. Interestingly, the three poets—Nirmalendu Goon, Moahadev Saha and Dr Muhammad Samad—have shown the concern that the government should have shown vis-à-vis the cost involvement in the tour. According to media reports, the three declined the government offer for them to travel with the prime minister in business class and settled for economy tickets, thereby saving the public exchequer around Tk 12 lakh. Reports have it that the government allocated Tk 5,70,476 each for their business class travel; if that is the minimum, the travel expenses for the entire entourage alone must be more than Tk 5 crore. Put together with accommodation and other expenses for members of the prime minister's entourage, the total cost of the prime minister's trip could run into crores of takas.

   The most important question that needs to be asked is if it was actually necessary to tag so many people with the prime minister on her trip to the United States. In other words, had the size of the entourage been, say, a third of what it is now, would it have in anyway defeated the purpose of the prime minister's visit? The question is all the more justified when countries across the world, even the developed ones, are sweating it out to cut down on expenditure. Importantly still, Bangladesh certainly does not have the financial strength or the economic stability to undertake such extravagant ventures. Certainly, there are ways that the money allocated for the trip could have been better spent.

   It needs to be pointed out, however, that such penchant for extravaganza is not particular to the Awami League-led government, although the entourage of the current prime minister is bigger than any in the past. Previous elected and unelected governments of the country have also not hesitated to spend lavishly on similar ventures. However, the profligacy of the previous governments in no way justifies the incumbents' decision to go on such a spending spree, not least because they are the ones who have trumpeted tirelessly their commitment to usher in positive changes in governance. Hence, the government certainly has some explaining to do, especially to the parliament, so as to prove that it is after all a necessary undertaking, and not a pleasure trip to keep its cronies happy.
 
 
 
PM's big entourage with many non-performers
 


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[ALOCHONA] China’s Threat Perception



China's Threat Perception
 
RSN Singh, Associate Editor IDR and author of the book Asian Strategic and Military Perspective and The Military Factor in Pakistan. His latest book is The Unmaking of Nepal.
 
In its early years, the Chinese communist leadership was apprehensive of a counter-revolution. China's bitter history beginning in the 19th century and extending up to World War II, wherein it was humiliated by Russia, Japan, Britain, Portugal and France, had left an indelible scar on the national psyche.
 
The ascendance of the Communist Party was after a bitter internal struggle, which cost millions of lives. For the new People's Republic of China, the consolidation of the revolution was an overwhelming priority. Since the revolution was a mass movement in which the People's Liberation Army (PLA) played an important role, the mass revolutionary approach persisted in matters of governance, policies, doctrines and methods of warfare.
 
The military posturing of China in the initial years was defensive i.e. maintenance of territorial integrity. Towards this it relied on the sheer size of the PLA and the country as such. It sought to compensate the qualitative military disadvantage by quantity and the impetus of revolutionary zeal. It, therefore, embarked on an appropriate strategy of 'luring the enemy deep' and defeating the enemy by a mix of guerrilla and conventional warfare in the areas of its own choosing. The PLA had a great deal of experience in this kind of warfare. In fact, the PLA's existence predates the formation of the state.
 
It was founded in 1927, more than 20 years before Mao declared the People's Republic on the Tiananmen Square in 1949. The Chinese military assistance to North Korea in 1950 was more out of its own security concerns rather than any ideological reasons.
 
China's eastern flank in its security perception presents formidable challenges. It is not only the issue of Taiwan but also of China's strategic interface with Japan, Korea, and by implication the US.After the breakdown of a very intimate Sino-Soviet relationship in early 1960, China began to view the Soviet Union as its principal military opponent. The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the build up of Soviet Forces in the Far East raised Chinese suspicions. The two countries clashed along the Ussuri River.
 
China perceived that USSR's strategic reach-out to Vietnam, India and Afghanistan was aimed at encircling China. In April 1979, the two countries finally abrogated the 30-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, under which the Soviet Union aided the PLA formally. Later, other Soviet moves like the acquisition of a naval base at Camranh Bay (Vietnam), sale of MiG-23 aircraft to North Korea, and acquisition of over-flight and port calling facilities from North Korea, caused further estrangement between the two countries.
 
It was during this period of the Cold War that the rapprochement between the US and China began. In the '80s, approximately 470,000 Soviet ground troops (53 divisions) were deployed in the Sino-Soviet border region including Mongolia, while the Chinese forces numbered about 1.5 million (68 divisions). However, in terms of technology, mobility, firepower, and anti-aircraft capability, the Soviet forces were far superior.
 
After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia and China began to build bridges and today Russia has emerged as a major arms supplier to China. It is estimated that Russian arms supplies to China are US $ one billion a year and there are some 1,500 Russian experts employed in China's military-industrial complex.
 
Notwithstanding the current bonhomie between Russia and China, which is being dictated by prevailing geo-strategic imperatives, the fact that the two countries share an extremely long border of 3,645 km; and that both are competing for world power status and influence is a geo-political reality. The difference is that Russia is trying to revive the strategic dominance that it once enjoyed; and China is aiming and incrementally moving towards that position. At some point of time, it is possible that their interests may clash. The exponential increase in the Chinese population in the Russian Far East has also become a bitter issue, particularly for the Russians residing in that area.
 
Central Asia, after the fragmentation of the Soviet Union is in a flux. Strategically, it is one of the most vulnerable regions in the world with competing influences of Russia, China and the US. Both US and Russia have military bases in some of the Central Asian States like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The US also has a large base at Khanabad in Uzbekistan. The US presence and influence in Central Asia adds another security dimension to China's western flank.
 
China's eastern flank in its security perception presents formidable challenges. It is not only the issue of Taiwan but also of China's strategic interface with Japan, Korea, and by implication the US. In addition, there are too many flash points, wherein China has direct stakes. The Taiwan issue requires a delicate internal and external balancing act by Chinese leadership. No Chinese leader can afford to repudiate the avowed aim of reunification of Taiwan but the US patronage of Taiwan is a major strategic constraint.
 
The moot question is as to how long China is willing to wait and accept the US primacy in the region. China is also very apprehensive of a resurgent Japan, which apart from economic predominance in the region, has the capability to switchover to assertive military posture whenever it decides to. China, therefore, sees the US presence in Japan as a restraining factor in the volatile Asia Pacific region.
 
There are analysts who opine that China is not very comfortable with the prospects of a unified Korea, as that would entail the loss of a friendly buffer state i.e. North Korea. The amalgamation of economically strong South Korea and North Korea with its manpower intensive military may add another dimension to China's security. The presence of forces of a more powerful united Korea along the Yalu River (border between North Korea and China) is pregnant with potential for conflict due to the vast natural resources and ownership disputes over numerous islands. Otherwise, North Korea and China have a great deal of historical amity. North Korea had lent invaluable support to the communists against their struggle with the Kuomintang forces and China's military assistance was responsible for the preservation of the entity of North Korea in the 1950s.
 
In the '70s, the relations between China and Vietnam began to deteriorate sharply after Vietnam signed an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1978. China branded Vietnam as the 'Cuba of the East'. The relations became inimical after Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978 and ousted the Chinese supported Pol Pot regime. 'To teach Vietnam a lesson', China attacked all along the Sino-Vietnamese border in February 1979 with 20 to 26 divisions. The Chinese have admitted that 2,000 PLA personnel were killed / wounded during the war. The war, which was limited in scope, lasted for over two months.
 
Consequently, the war resulted in a further strengthening of relationships between the USSR and Vietnam. Vietnam procured a large quantity of arms from the USSR and provided access to the harbours at Danang and Camranh Bay to Soviet ships. Soviet aircraft were permitted to use Vietnamese airfields for reconnaissance missions. During the '80s, low intensity conflict continued unabated in the mountainous border region between the two countries. Vietnam and China had deployed 28 and 32 divisions respectively along their common border during this period. The rapidity of shift in the global order had its impact on Vietnam-China relations.
 
After the withdrawal of Vietnamese military forces from Cambodia and Laos, Vietnam-China relations were on the mend. By 1987, the hostilities between the two countries had ceased along their border. China, however, began to make cogent forays into the Spratly Islands, which resulted in a clash between Chinese and Vietnamese naval vessels in the vicinity of Johnson Reef where several Vietnamese vessels were sunk and about 70 sailors killed or drowned. China took possession of the reef and four other similar features.
 
In March 1997, another flare-up occurred when a Chinese oil rig began drilling on the Vietnamese continental shelf less than 65 nautical miles from Vietnam's coastline. Maritime issues continue to be extremely contentious between the two countries, especially for Vietnam, for whom the issue involves not only its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but also its continental shelf as such. This ongoing Sino-Vietnamese maritime rivalry has prodded Vietnam to provide access to US naval vessels at its ports as a move to countervail China. Therefore, Sino-Vietnam relations continue to be full of imponderables.
 
The Chinese posturing with regards to the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands has unnerved not only those ASEAN countries which are directly involved, but also countries like Singapore, which are entirely dependent on the security of the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) for their survival. These countries have adopted a hedging policy to maintain a balance of power in the Asia Pacific. They continue to facilitate US presence in the region by providing various kinds of assistance and facilities. Singapore has recently upgraded its Changi Naval Base to accommodate US aircraft carriers.
 
Also, the 'Five Power Defence Agreement', which involves UK, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia, continues to be operative, with greater strength, serving, and serves as a deterrent to China. Singapore and Malaysia also maintain credible defence forces and are continually modernising and upgrading them. The US makes no territorial claims in Asia but has very high stakes in the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Japan imports 90 per cent of its oil, which has to transit through the South China Sea. Therefore, the stability in the Asia Pacific region may be imperiled by any miscalculation by any of the protagonists.
 
China's burgeoning industrial and economic centres lie close to its eastern coast, thus creating a strategic vulnerability, especially when seen in the context of a volatile Asia Pacific region. With the rapid increase in China's economic development, this will become even more pronounced and may compel China to adopt a more assertive maritime posture in search of strategic depth for its industrial and economic heartland. The eastern part of China is bristling with Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBM) and combat aircraft which are, therefore, not only for intimidation or defence against Taiwan but have a vital role in terms of security to its economic centres. The opening of the Chinese economy has also conferred economic leverages to global economic giants like the US and Japan.
 
China's main internal security concerns are:
 
•     The festering of Uygur pro-independence movement in the Xinjiang autonomous region, despite the fact that Beijing has improved ties with Muslim countries bordering the region. Arms and other supplies continue to flow into this region from sympathisers in Islamic countries.
 
•     The pro-independence and anti-regime groups in Tibet, though contained, continue to engage the concern of Beijing due to their tentacles in the form of a Tibetan Diaspora in different parts of the world. These groups have been successful in highlighting human rights abuses by the Beijing regime in international fora.
 
•     As a result of the modernisation drive in China a large number of workers have been laid-off. These workers have formed separate trade unions and are becoming increasingly strident in their opposition to the government's policies.
 
•     In a repeat of China's 19th century history, the country's leadership is deeply concerned with a mushrooming underground Church movement and conversions. The newly converted Chinese include not only westernised urban intellectuals but government officials and rural residents as well.
 


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