Banner Advertiser

Saturday, December 4, 2010

[ALOCHONA] Shafik Rehman's column



Shafik Rehman's column
 
 


__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

[ALOCHONA] Not an auspicious sign



`Not an auspicious sign'

Courtesy New Age 3/12/10

I MUST agree with everything Gopal Sengupta said in his recent letter (New Age, November 30). I would help my learned friend by easing some of his disappointment. Our disappointment at the failure of our current crop of lawmakers, on all sides, to reform their traditional practice is misguided. We cannot reasonably expect the same people, on all sides, to come to power and change their conduct when they feel no need to do so. They do not understand what they should change and what they should become. Rather, this very expectation lies at the root of our problems.
   In fact, our disappointment should be directed at our failure as an electorate to physically replace these very same people. Alas, the law abiding electorate can only vote for those who are put on the ballot by those who abuse the same laws. What good is the well-intentioned and respectful chastisement of our politicians, on all sides, when these same politicians provide shelter under which rapists, murderers and extortionists thrive?
   Our politicians do not mock our complaints for they do not even register them in the first place. My friend and I both admire Winston Churchill and I shall twist the great man's words to make a point regarding our political parties and partisan members of our bureaucracy, police, armed forces and intellectual commentators: `Never in the course of human history has so little been owed by so many to so few.' Why look for auspicious signs when we have no reason to expect any?
   Ezajur Rahman
   Kuwait



__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

[ALOCHONA] Honesty is the best policy



Honesty is the best policy

Courtesy New Age 2/12/10

It is with great relief that I welcome the strike called by Khaleda Zia. It is with equal relief that welcome Sheikh Hasina saying that her opponent cried more for her house than for her slain husband. We have a stunning return to previous form by both ladies. The uneasy truce, born of personal convenience, is hopefully now over. The illusion of change, muddy at the best of times, is hopefully now done with. The veil of stability, so carefully painted, is hopefully now tossed aside. Let us see ourselves as we are and as we remain. Let us debate our true condition and no longer pretend, however tempting it maybe, to speak as if matters have improved in recent times. Above all let us recognize, for God's sake, that it is unfair to expect our leaders to change a lifetime of bad habits, poor judgments and delusions of grandeur. Let the next wave of carnage within our body politic run freely so we may measure our ailments more accurately. Honesty is, after all, the best policy.
   Ezajur Rahman
   Kuwait



__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

Re: [ALOCHONA] Bangladesh Fooled By Indian Tansit Deal--Says who?



You are ofcourse the arbiter of what is good for Bangladesh. Excuse me how did you come to that conclusion. Oops I forgot you are all sugar and spice and everything that
is nice!!!


 

-----Original Message-----
From: Wazed Khondkar
Sent: Dec 4, 2010 3:36 AM
To: alochona@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [ALOCHONA] Bangladesh Fooled By Indian Tansit Deal--Says who?

 

So, this is your mentality - you have to be a slave to somebody - either India or Pakistan. Have you ever considered being free - think freely and be a Bangladeshi for a change? I am assuming that you are Bangladeshi but who knows, in the cyber world any Tom, Dick or Harry could be Bangladeshi. Or could it be that your brain has been conditioned by your masters (whoever they are) just to think shallow like you do?

This a forum run by the Bangladeshies for the good of Bangladesh and not India or Pakistan. Lets discuss the issues that would be benifitial to Bangladesh.

--- On Sun, 28/11/10, ANDREWL <turkman@sbcglobal.net> wrote:

From: ANDREWL <turkman@sbcglobal.net>
Subject: [ALOCHONA] Bangladesh Fooled By Indian Tansit Deal--Says who?
To: alochona@yahoogroups.com
Date: Sunday, 28 November, 2010, 20:11

 

Okay, okay. We would tell Indian Inverters, ...
.
* ... they are not allowed to buy any Profitable Industries of B.D.
* ... they are allowed to buy only Non Profitable and Junk Industries so they can lose their hard-earned money because this is what all Foreign Investors are supposed to do.
.
We would also tell BD Industry owners to stop being un-patriotic. You would be arrested and tried for Treason if you sell any of your Profitable Industry to Indian Investors.
.
But now please tell us, when are you going to bring in your Pakistani Masters to buy our industries?

--- In alochona@yahoogroups.com, "Wazed" <wkkhondkar@...> wrote:
>
> Mr. Ezajur,
>
> You see foreign ownership of industries in BD (especially by India) can not be considered FDI. India is buying successful (I mean profitable) industries in BD that has been built up by Bangladeshis - they are not investing in new sectors of industries such as the IT sector because they know that Bangladesh will become a competitor of India! Telecoms is not a manufacturing sector - it is a service sector.
>
> As you have said - so far FDI from India is virtually zero. Whatever FDI they have made is in the "service" sector - that does not manufacture anything that use raw material and labour of BD and exported from BD to other countries.
>
> Lets face it those cheap goods they dump in BD's market needs local distributors, agents etc. But that is hardly a job creation scheme in BD! The real jobs comes from FDI that creates factories, use local raw materials and local labour force. In the last 20 years India has done none of that. Those who have no interest in our well being - we should not have any interest in helping.
>
> We all remember the proposed investment of billions by Tata that never materialised because the price for a unit of gas Tata was willing to pay was much below whole sale market price - our gas is a very precious commodity. And quite rightly the previous BD government did not pursue this any further.
>
> This discussion thread has shown one important thing about us educated bangladeshis - we are vey naieve and stupid to think that India is going to help us to prosper and become richer. In a globalised world - everybody is looking after their own interest. But who is looking after our interest - if we don't look after ourselves?
>
> What I have seen so far I do not have much faith in present government to look after our interest - they are more busy to make India richer. I wish I had a friend like Bangladesh - I can dump cheap goods in her market, choke her growth and ask for free transit to export my goods to the rest of the world, and transport machinery and powerplants through BD to industrialise other parts of my country and become richer.
>
> Many thanks for your response.
>
> Salam
>




__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

[ALOCHONA] UPROOTED



UPROOTED

The propensity in Bangladesh politics of upheaval has been to uproot political power bases. From the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and that of Ziaur Rahman, down to the exile of Tarique Rahman and then the eviction of Khaleda Zia from the cantonment, this trend continues…

 

by IRTIZA NASIM ALI

Begum Zia's eviction from her cantonment residence is likely to become another thorny turning point in the history of Bangladesh's politics. There never existed any working relationship between the two major opposing political rivals, Bangladesh Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party. There was no talking terms between the two ladies heading their respective parties. The only event where they sat side by side or exchanged perfunctory pleasantries was on the Armed Forces Day on November 23 of each year. With this eviction that too will become, or has become, history, one can assume.

The latest move by the ruling Awami League (technically the Cantonment Board) to evict Begum Zia from the residence, given to her by the Cantonment  Board after her husband and former President Ziaur Rahman's killing, and where she stayed as First Lady and three time Prime Minister, has dealt her a severe blow, both politically and emotionally. Already shattered by the treatment meted out to her two sons during the 1/11 rule, and by a disorganised political party and bad election results haunting her, she simply could not take this and in an uncharacteristic manner made a public display of her emotions. With limited options in hand for BNP, confrontational politics and hartals have made a comeback. The hope of a smooth-running of democracy is fast fading.

But why this move? Obviously, the publicity propagated about Begum Zia occupying a large piece of land and a big house -- a misuse of state property -- cannot be the issue. There is a deeper meaning and deeper implications than that.

Awami League has long referred to BNP as a party "born in Cantonment". Historically, late President Ziaur Rahman floated BNP as his political front while he was still staying in this house. The initial discussions and meetings were held here. Ziaur Rahman moved into this house when he was Deputy Chief of the Army Staff. After his death Begum Zia became party chief and continued staying in this house at Mainul Hossain Road. In its initial stage BNP was perceived as a party that drew its "strength" from the military. Begum Zia's background itself provided all necessary ingredients for a strong support base among the armed forces. Her first cabinet of 1991 had seven ministers from the army while Sheikh Hasina's 1996 cabinet had only two.

At a later stage, to counterbalance Begum Zia, Sheikh Hasina also started wooing retired army personnel and many joined her party. Surprisingly enough, both Sheikh Hasina's father Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and President Ziaur Rahman, were killed by some wayward officers of the army.

The move to evict Begum Zia from her cantonment residence is not a fresh one and it was in AL's agenda for quite some time. During Awami League's last stint in power in 1996, the then Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azad brought the issue to the forefront though it remained confined mostly to media statements. At that time, fresh in power after twenty-one years and unsure of its footing in the army, Awami League choose not to meddle with this.

Awami League never felt at ease with Begum Zia's clout and influence within the forces. Moreover, the dominance of retired army officers in BNP and Begum Zia's physical presence inside the cantonment made AL to feel all the more uncomfortable.

However, it is to be seen whether Begum Zia's support base within the forces was a reality or a myth. Analysts feel that BNP's nationalistic politics gelled well with the outlook of the armed forces. Moreover, Zia's image played an important role in building a strong support base for her. But, with the passage of time and with officers from the post-Bangladesh period coming to the forefront, things gradually started changing. The army's exposure in the international arena as peacekeepers also contributed to this change of heart. The army became apolitical and more professional.

Tarique Zia's entry into active politics was also not viewed well. His association with the likes of Giasuddin Al Mamun did not go down well with the rank and file. Surprisingly, Tarique failed to make any inroads within the armed forces. Begum Zia also made no effort to bridge this gap. She left army matters to be handled by her brother Major (retd) Syed Iskander. With many qualities of his father absent in him, Tarique virtually became an outsider in the cantonment. All this created a chasm in the already waning support base. This became obvious in the treatment that was meted out to Tarique during 1/11. Forces outside also played a great role in creating the division.

Army was made to understand that it should maintain its area as a neutral zone. By accommodating a particular political leader, people may question its neutrality. It was also said that people in general perceive the army as a balancing factor and the cantonment cannot be a centre of politics. All this led to uprooting of Begum Zia from her cantonment residence. But the question remains whether she can be politically uprooted.

 

The impact

Begum Zia and her party were well aware of the move for her eviction but the timing put them off guard. The party was not prepared with any combat strategy and came up with a traditional hartal programme. The time chosen for hartal immediately before the Eid was criticised by many. The media in general did not extend any helping hand. However, the people were sympathetic towards Begum Zia in this regard and, despite its timing, the hartal was a success. Some recalled that during 1/11, Begum Zia had vehemently protested against the manner in which Hasina had been manhandled by the law-enforcers. Hasina seems to have forgotten this, given the manner in which Khaleda Zia was forcefully turned out of her home.

The eviction incident reintroduced politics of confrontation. And as the situation unfolds it seems there is no looking back. As it is, BNP was boycotting the parliament, but now it seems the party might gradually move towards resignation from the parliament. Begum Zia, though, remained silent when two anxious ambassadors met her separately to know her views on the matter.

On the other hand, the government is apparently not in a compromising mood. It would pursue the money laundering case of Koko, Begum Zia's younger son, and elder son Tarique would also not be left alone. The government may implicate him in the August 21 grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina or the "ten truck arms case".

All ingredients necessary for confrontation are on the plate. BNP might resign from the parliament around March next year. In that scenario, the government is likely to go for by-elections where, as things stands now, Ershad's Jatiya Party is likely to fill in the BNP gap and emerge as the opposition in parliament. Moreover, there is likely to be a split in BNP on the issue of resignation. So, as a whole, BNP would be facing troubled times ahead.

Any attempt to totally eliminate BNP from politics would have grave consequences on Bangladesh politics. This is likely to give rise to fundamental rightist forces. Anti-Awami League forces with nowhere to go will naturally join hands with the extreme rightists. The western world would not want this to happen and if BNP plays it cards well, it can make a comeback. So it's not all that grim for BNP. However, all will depend solely on Begum Zia. As it is, BNP repents for its decision to join the election under Fakhruddin-Moeenuddin. One hopes BNP would not make yet another mistake by resigning from the parliament. There may be plenty of provocation from within and outside the party in this regard. Historically, attempts to "uproot" never succeeded in Bangladesh. In most cases, things simply bounce back with time. 

 

History of "uprooting"

 

The history of "uprooting" in Bangladesh is nothing new. Conspiracies to banish or uproot political leaders have always been an active ingredient of Bangladesh politics. The physical elimination of Bangabandhu in 1975 was not enough. The fear was there that his death might not be the end of him and so for total "uprooting", his body was not buried with the others in Dhaka. It was flown far to Tungipara, as if distance matters, and was buried there.

That was not the end. As he had stayed for so long at the house on Dhanmondi Road 32 where he held so many political meetings with the party leaders, and it was steeped in so much history, Road 32 became synonymous with Sheikh Mujib. Hence, again there was a move to eliminate the Road 32 fame and a project was taken up during Ershad's time to change the existing road numbers of Dhanmondi. Road 8 became Road 9, Road 27 became Road 16 but somehow road 32 could not be changed in the people's mind. It is still 32, or Batrish Number, as commonly referred to in Bengali.

When Zia was assassinated, his killers decided to dump his body from the high hills of Rangamati. But finally his grave was established at Sher-e-Bangla Nagar near Crescent Lake. This area was then rechristened Zia Uddyan and now has reverted to its old name Chandrima Uddyan. When Awami League came to power in 1996, the then Communication Minister Anwar Hossain Manju removed the pontoon bridge that connected Zia's Mazar with Manik Mia Avenue to hinder people from showing respect, an almost literal burning of bridges. Not only that, Awami League members of this parliament have gone as far as to claim that Zia's body isn't even in the grave.

This trend of uprooting continued when the Fakhruddin-Moeenuddin caretaker government tried to uproot both Sheikh Hasina and Begum Zia by forcing them to leave the country. This was not successful as Hasina's exile was short lived and Khaleda refused to budge from the country.

In the meantime, Tarique Rahman has emerged as an effective leader for BNP, reorganising the party from scratch. The caretaker government picked him up and he was physically tortured to the extent of serious physical harm. The Awami League government has shown no sign of relenting either, and this son of Ziaur Rahman has literally been uprooted and now lives in exile in London.

Changing names of prominent structures and institutions is another form of uprooting. For example, the main airport's name changed from ZIA (Zia International Airport) to Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport, yet another attempt at eliminating the presence of a past personality.

However, the one lesson that doesn't seem to have been learnt is that these attempts at uprooting never really work out. After all, history is not a physical presence but an intangible reality.
 


__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

[ALOCHONA] Covert war against Iran's nuclear aims



Covert war against Iran's nuclear aims takes chilling turn
 
Sophisticated cyber-worms, motorcycling assassins: but who is behind the increasingly sinister campaign against the Iranian energy programme?
 
Iranian police beside the car in which Majid Shahriari was killed 
Iranian police beside the car in which Majid Shahriari was killed in a bomb attack. Photograph: -/AFP/Getty Images

Tehran's streets at the height of the morning rush hour resemble a vast, sprawling car park. Bumper-to-bumper traffic, much of it stationary, the acrid steam of a thousand exhausts hanging in the cold winter air. If you wanted to kill someone, this would be the moment to do it: when they are stuck in their cars – sitting targets.

At 7.40am last Monday, in north Tehran's Aghdasieh district, a motorcycle threaded its way through the long lines of cars on Artesh Boulevard. It edged up to a silver Peugeot 405, hesitating alongside for moment, before moving off into the maze of vehicles. A few seconds later there was a bang from the side of the Peugeot, as a small bomb stuck on to the window detonated, killing one of the men inside. The driver and a woman passenger were wounded.

At the same time, a few kilometres to the west, an identical attack was under way. A motorcycle came up beside another Peugeot and then moved on, but this time a man immediately jumped out of the car, ran around to let a woman out on the other side, and both of them managed to scramble a couple of metres from the car before the bomb went off. They were bloodied, but survived.

The dead man was Majid Shahriari, a senior Iranian nuclear scientist. The head of Iran's nuclear programme, Ali Akbar Salehi, who attended his funeral, said Shahriari had been "in charge of one of the great projects" at Iran's atomic energy agency – a project he did not describe any further.

The wounded man, Fereydoun Abbasi, was a 52-year-old nuclear scientist working for Iran's defence ministry, one of "Iran's few experts on fissile isotopes and the ministry's laser expert". He is also named in a UN security council sanctions resolution as working on "banned nuclear activities" with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the scientist suspected by inspectors at the International Atomic Energy Agency of running Iran's secret nuclear weapons programme. The wives of both scientists were wounded in the attacks.

The attacks had clear echoes of the unsolved assassination in January this year of one of their colleagues, particle physicist Masoud Alimohammadi. He was killed in north Tehran on his way to work, at about the same time of the morning, by a bomb strapped to a motorcycle. After his death, to the surprise of many of his students, it was reported that he also had links with Iran's nuclear programme.

If there were any doubts after Alimohammadi's killing back in January, there could be none after last week's double attack. Someone is trying to kill nuclear scientists linked to Iran's defence establishment – the people most likely to be involved in the covert side of Iran's nuclear programme, the making of nuclear weapons.

In the febrile atmosphere of Iranian underground politics, speculation quickly spread that the dark forces of the state were at work against would-be dissidents, leakers or defectors, but those rumours quickly evaporated. The Islamic Republic has many other ways of taking people it suspects out of circulation. It has little to gain by sacrificing the nation's must strategic asset – its nuclear know-how, the teachers of a new generation of atomic scientists. After last week, that new generation must be wondering whether to change career.

The Tehran regime itself had little doubt over who was to blame. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quickly pointed the finger at "western governments and the Zionist regime".

Ahmadinejad blames almost every national setback on the same culprits, but in this case there were no snorts of derision from the security analysts and intelligence experts in the west, but rather murmurs of assent.

There is general agreement that the nature of the simultaneous attacks was too sophisticated to be entirely home-grown – the work of the handful of groups who harry the Islamic Republic around its ethnic edges, like the Sunni Jundullah group, the Kurdish rebels in the north-east, or the People's Mujahedin (which has vowed to give up violence to win removal from the US state department's list of terrorist organisations).

The assassination had the hallmark of well-practised professionals. The explosives were shaped to focus the blast and fire a hail of projectiles into the car at an individual target, with minimal "collateral damage". The targets were obviously carefully chosen and the attack would have required weeks of surveillance. So even if local assassins were involved, the questions of who trained and funded them and assigned the targets would remain.

Time magazine last week claimed to have been given details of the attack from "a western intelligence expert with knowledge of the operation" and asserted that it "carried the signature of Israel's Mossad".

It is certainly true that, while the discovery of any involvement in the killings of civilian scientists would be career-endingly embarrassing for the CIA or MI6, the Mossad is known for such exploits. It is widely believed to have killed scientists working on Iraq's nuclear programme in the 1980s.

The outgoing Mossad director, Meir Dagan, has stepped up the use of assassinations against Israel's enemies, and has won plaudits for doing so. The Israel Hayom news website remarked on the occasion of Dagan's retirement: "[He] will be leaving an organisation that is far sharper and more operational than the organisation he received, and all of the accusations from Tehran yesterday are a good indication of that. Iran will be the focal point for the next Mossad director, too."

If it does indeed turn out that the Mossad was involved, the bloodshed in the middle of Tehran represents a bloody episode in a secret war over Iran's nuclear programme that has been under way for years.

It has come at a time when diplomacy is at a standstill. Officials from six major powers – the US, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany – are due to meet Iranian chief negotiator Saeed Jalili in Geneva tomorrow for the first time in more than a year. But expectations are low. Iran has shown no interest in complying with UN demands to cease the enrichment of uranium, despite four sets of sanctions. Tehran has also turned down a deal to swap some of its stock of low-enriched uranium for ready-made fuel rods it urgently needs for a medical research reactor.

Military action has been contemplated for years, in Washington and Tel Aviv, but both have concluded that air strikes on nuclear sites would have an uncertain and far from fatal impact on Iran's programme, would unleash years of unpredictable, painful reprisals, and would probably spur Tehran on in the quest to develop nuclear weapons.

The Pentagon has contingency plans, but there is no real likelihood of the US starting a third war in the region any time soon. Israel is another matter. Israeli officials say they are well aware of the downsides of military action, but they insist that none compares with the "existential threat" posed to their country by a nuclear-armed Iran.

Without giving a green light, the US has supplied the tools Israel would need to do the job. One of the US cables made public by WikiLeaks describes a meeting of a US-Israeli joint political military group in November last year. It said: "The GOI [Government of Israel] described 2010 as a critical year – if the Iranians continue to protect and harden their nuclear sites, it will be more difficult to target and damage them. Both sides then discussed the upcoming delivery of bunker-busting bombs to Israel, noting that the transfer should be handled quietly to avoid any allegations that the US is helping Israel prepare for a strike against Iran."

The bombs duly arrived a few months later. The WikiLeaks cables also underpin a prediction made by western military officials earlier this year, that if Israel flew above Saudi Arabia to reach Iranian targets Saudi radar operators would somehow "fail to see them".

Yet Israel has hesitated. It is not the first time a year it deemed "crucial" has come and gone. Iran has now accumulated 3,000kg of low-enriched uranium – enough for two weapons, if further enriched. And this year Iranian scientists have stepped up the level of enrichment they are working on to 20%, which in terms of the technical obstacles that need to be overcome, is well on the way to 90% weapons-grade purity.

With each milestone passed, Iran has flaunted its achievements, yet Israel's sword has remained sheathed. It is clear that war is the last resort. Given diplomacy's ineffectiveness and the unknowable but terrible consequences of air strikes, it is easy to see why covert action is the least bad option; most of the successes and failures in this war will remain unsung, but some have made news.

In September last year, Barack Obama announced the discovery of a secret enrichment plant burrowed into a mountain near the city of Qom. It had been under satellite surveillance for some time. Western officials say that it was information from defectors and agents on the ground that confirmed the nature of the facility. Iran subsequently allowed IAEA inspectors into the site, but withheld blueprints which would have given away more of its ultimate purpose.

In June 2009, an Iranian nuclear scientist called Shahram Amiri disappeared while making the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. Three months later, the Iranian government claimed he was being held by the US – a claim echoed by several western reports that Amiri had defected and was living somewhere in America under a new identity. However, in July this year the scientist turned up at the Iranian interests section of the Pakistani embassy, claiming he had been held against his will and wanted to go home. Amiri returned to a hero's welcome in Iran, while back in the US he has been portrayed as a defector who lost his nerve.

Ahmadinejad admitted last week that Iran's uranium enrichment plant had been affected by the Stuxnet computer worm, which targeted the industrial management software that Iran uses to run its centrifuges. Like most computer viruses and worms, Stuxnet does not bear fingerprints, but a western military source recently told the Observer that it was an Israeli creation.

Ahmadinejad claimed that the damage caused by Stuxnet had been overcome, but the enrichment programme clearly has major problems that cannot be easily fixed. The IAEA reported last week that enrichment ceased altogether in mid-November. The centrifuges at the Natanz plant continued to spin, but no uranium gas was fed into them, a very rare stoppage that suggested there was a fault in the system.

The main centrifuge the Iranians are using, known as the P-1, is rudimentary and outdated and prone to crash, so that may be part of the problem.

But the US, Israel and other western spy agencies have also spent years slipping faulty parts into black market consignments of equipment heading to Iran – each designed to wreak havoc inside the delicate machinery requirement for enrichment.

Last week's events suggest that, as Iran continues to built up its stock of enriched uranium despite such difficulties, finesse is giving way to more brutal methods in this secret war.

Its first victim may have been Ardeshir Hassanpour, another top nuclear scientist, who co-founded Iran's nuclear technology centre in Isfahan. Officially, Hassanpour died from radiation poisoning in 2007. But some reports, yet to be confirmed, claimed he was killed by the Mossad. If that is true, the toll so far is three scientists dead, one wounded.

The front line in the war of Iran's nuclear project is not where most expected it to be drawn – at the enrichment plant in Natanz, or the mountain cavern at Qom, or the Revolutionary Guard bases where Iran tests its missiles. Instead it runs through university faculties and the leafy suburbs of north Tehran where Iran's academic elite make their homes. It is a covert war, with very high stakes, in which civilians are the primary targets, and Majid Shahriari is unlikely to be the last victim.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/05/iran-nuclear-experts-killings



__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

[ALOCHONA] Promises, promises



Promises, promises
 
 
 
 


__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

[ALOCHONA] Fwd: [KHABOR] What Badruddin Umar Say on Declaration of Independence in his book





---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Shahadat Hussaini shahadathussaini@hotmail.com
 

Chapter Forty-Nine

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

 

 

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman carried the constitutional movement for East Pakistan's regional autonomy to its utmost limit. Regional autonomy, as visualized and demanded by the Awami League, could not really be achieved within the framework of the Pakistan state, the movement for it's achievement reached a stage in the month of March when it was no longer possible to push it further on the constitutional path. Or, in other words, there was a breakdown and collapse of the Awami League's constitutional movement for self-determination and autonomy.

 

But the movement, independent of the Awami League, leapt forward and broke all barriers in its way. This trend began more vigorously from 1 March 1971 after Yahya's broadcast postponing the National Assembly session scheduled for 3 March.

 

After 7 March the Awami League took control of the provincial administration, including the police and jail administration, without a formal summoning of the provincial assembly. This was done in the name of a democratic right, and in such a way that it could hardly be characterized as constitutional. With this move, the constitutional movement was stretched beyond the limits of constitutionalism and for a constitutional party, it was an exceptional achievement.

 

Had the Awami League not been a constitutional party and one whose programme was limited to autonomy within the framework of the Pakistan state, it could have declared independence on 7 March using the show of massive popular support as justification. At that time the Bengalis were in the majority in the army in East Pakistan and the Bengali officers and men were willing to mutiny against the Pakistan state and the West Pakistan army. They only needed a call from the Awami League leader Sheikh Mujib.

 

The Awami League did not move in that direction, because they had not thought of such a plan. Instead, they were entrenched on the constitutional path of non-cooperation when the whole country was seething with anger against the Pakistan government and would have risen as one in defence of an independent Bangladesh government had it been proclaimed by the Awami League. However, the Awami League, particularly Sheikh Mujib, got cold feet and, in spite of much rhetoric and bombast they remained stuck in one position and were incapable of taking the final vital step forward.

 

This crisis of nerve weakened the position of the Awami League, in spite of their control of the civil government of East Pakistan. The turbulence of the people, including the students, who were openly clamouring for independence, a stand which was noticed by the Pakistan army authorities, President Yahya Khan and also Bhutto. It was, therefore, not difficult for them to embroil the Awami League leadership in a quagmire of negotiations buying time to re­enforce the armed strength in East Pakistan as quickly as possible.

 

An in-depth study of the course the dialogue took, shows that with every passing day the bargaining power of the Awami League was on the decline and the government's negotiating team tightened its coils around the Awami League. On the evening of 24 March the dialogues broke down.

 

The military crackdown began on the night of 25 March for which the Awami League was completely unprepared and, as such, it was not possible for them to formulate a new plan.

 

War was unleashed on the people of East Bengal by the Pakistan government and the people took up the challenge. In fact, there was no need to formally declare a war or proclaim independence. The crackdown on the 25th night automatically and inevitably led the people to a war which was nothing short of a war of independence.

 

In the initial stage of the war, the principal leader of the Awami League, Shiekh Mujibur Rahman, surrendered to the Pakistan army and a number of his party men and followers fled to India 'as fast as their legs could carry them'.

 

These cowardly acts of the Awami League leaders clearly demonstrate that they had no plan whatsoever to declare and organize a war of independence in the eventuality of the failure of the dialogues.

 

Sheikh Mujib was not able to act in accordance with his reputation but nevertheless, in 1971, he had become a symbol of Bengali nationalism and the hero of East Bengal's struggle for autonomy. For this reason, in the absence of a better alternative

and at the critical moment of the military crackdown, he continued to be the central rallying figure.

 

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's surrender to the Pakistani army was so incredible that for quite some time the people and even a large number of Awami League workers, did not believe that he had not stayed with them in their struggle and was, instead, safe in the custody of the Pakistan government in far away West Pakistan.

 

Rehman Sobhan said in a public lecture1 in April 2002 that

 

The post-liberation debate over who declared independence of Bangladesh is thus a largely irrelevant debate. It is self-evident to anyone with common sense that the operative issue is not who declared independence but when Bangladeshis asserted their own independence, which they did during the month of March 1971.

 

This observation was curiously preceded by the statement that

 

The proclamation of independence by Bangabandhu on 26 March in response to the military assault on the Bengalis ordered by Yahya Khan, was a juridical act recognizing a de facto and legitimate authority.2

 

In spite of Rehman Sobhan's statement about the irrelevance of the debate on who declared independence, it was actually the Awami Leaguers who opened this debate after 1971 by claiming that Sheikh Mujib had declared the independence of Bangladesh on 26 March.

 

Rehman Sobhan says that Sheikh Mujib had done so `in response to the military assault on the Bengalis ordered by Yahya Khan.' This assault began on the night of 25 and 26 March and `in response to that' Sheikh Mujib is supposed to have declared the independence of Bangladesh. So, according to Rehman Sobhan, the declaration of independence happened on the spur of the moment in response to the assault on the people and it was not in accordance with any previous decision of the Awami League or in accordance with any plan worked out by them. Explaining this curious position he says, 'By the 25 March 1971 Bangladesh was already a sovereign state in the minds of its citizens'3 and proclamation of independence by Sheikh Mujib was a mere 'juridical act recognising a de facto legitimate authority.'

 

It has now been clearly established that this so-called `juridical act' of Sheikh Mujib did not take place because he was taken prisoner at midnight on 25 and 26 March. Moreover, it could not have happened for the very important reason that in spite of the fact that `By the 25 March 1971 Bangladesh was already a sovereign state in the minds of its citizens' there is nothing to show that in recognition of that fact, either the Awami League organization or its supreme leader ever discussed the question of independence in their central committee meetings or even as late as on the eve of the military crackdown on 25 March.

 

It was clear to everyone by 24 March and definately by 25 March that a military action was imminent. In the face of such an eventuality, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did not speak to anybody, including Rehman Sobhan, who met him on the afternoon of 25 March about a declaration of independence. Nor did he have any discussion with Tajuddin Ahmed, Amirul Islam or Kamal Hossain on the subject, with all of whom he was in constant touch.

 

On the afternoon of 25 March Rehman Sobhan said,

 

Bangabandhu told us that the army had decided to go for a crackdown. He went on to say, I quote from memory, 'Yahya thinks that he can crush the movement by killing me. But he is mistaken. An independent Bangladesh will be built on my grave.' Bangabandhu appeared to have a rather fatalistic attitude to what he seemed to accept as his imminent death. He suggested that a new generation would carry on the liberation struggle.4

 

The picture of Sheikh Mujib which Rehman Sobhan has portrayed on the eve of the military crackdown was certainty not the picture of a man who could possibly declare a war of independence 'in response to the military assault' about which, by that time, he seemed to have certain knowledge. An act like the declaration of independence of a country was, in effect, a declaration of war against an enemy armed to the teeth and it could not have been the act of a man who 'appeared to have a rather fatalistic attitude to what he seemed to accept as his imminent death.' It was the attitude of a man whose personal and organizational leadership had completely collapsed.

 

The declaration of independence is a highly political matter and it can happen as a result of a peoples' long struggle and the collective and formal decision of an organized party or forces which represent the will of the people. As such it cannot be an act of any particular individual, whoever he may be.

 

It had been claimed by certain Awami League leaders (though not by all of them) and intellectuals close to the Awami League, that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared independence in the early hours of 26 March 1971, in response to the military crackdown. It is, therefore, necessary first to follow the story as narrated by his followers.

 

In this connection it is interesting to note that the 'declaration of independence' story did not originate from Dhaka, though all the top leaders of the Awami League and the closest associates of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were with him on 25 March. Some of them, like Kamal Hossain and Amirul Islam, stayed at his residence till 10:30 p.m. on the 25th night. There is no evidence to show that the declaration of independence was ever discussed in the Awami League Central Working Committee or even unofficially by Awami League leaders like Tajuddin Ahmed, Kamal Hossain, Amirul Islam, Syed Nazrul Islam, Mushtaq Ahmed or any other.

 

The story of Sheikh Mujib's 'declaration of independence' originated in Chittagong and was circulated by the leaders of Chittagong Awami League. Yet it is difficult to establish, even from their evidence, that Sheikh Mujib ever committed himself to that position.

 

In March 1971, M.R. Siddiqui was the president of the Chittagong district Awami League and a member of the National Assembly. It is helpful to quote Siddiqui at some length.

While describing the situation at the time, M.R. Siddiqui said,

 

One ship MV. Swat carrying arms, ammunition, explosives and soldiers arrived in Chittagong. Being alerted, Awami League Action Committee urged the port workers not to unload the ship. Army tried to force the workers at gunpoint, but without success. They asked the EPR Jawans to shoot, which they refused. Then the army shot 7 EPR Jawans on the spot. Then they ordered the army in the cantonment to clear the ship. Brig. Majumdar asked for advice as to what he should do. I could not take a decision as refusal to obey would amount to mutiny and open confrontation with Pak army.5

 

So in spite of the Bengali officers of the Pakistan army and port workers being prepared for military and open confrontation in that critical situation, the Awami League leadership had no contingency for that.

 

Continuing his narration Siddiqui said,

 

I straightaway drove to Dhaka on 23 March for consultation with Bangabandhu and for his instruction. I met him in his house. He said he was hoping there will be a satisfactory conclusion of the dialogue and he does not think there will be a war as long as Yahya was there as president.6

 

Amazingly it appears from the statement of M.R. Siddiqui, who was one of the top leaders of the Awami League in Chittagong and later a member of Mujib's Awami League cabinet, that Sheikh Mujib reposed complete confidence in the goodwill as well as the capability of Yahya Khan to come to a 'satisfactory conclusion of the dialogue'.

Mujib spoke about Yahya in these terms when, according to all available evidence, the latter had already approved and signed the action codenamed Operation Searchlight.

 

In spite of Sheikh Mujib's complete confidence in Yahya, Siddiqui felt differently. He said,

 

I told him that war has started in Chittagong and I see all preparation for a full-scale attack. He asked me to hurry back to Chittagong to mobilize all forces there and defend Chittagong. In case of an attack he will escape to Chittagong and join us in the fight.7

 

A man who told Siddiqui on 23 March that in case of an attack in Dhaka he would run to Chittagong and join in the fight, had told Amirul Islam and Kamal Hossain at 10:30 p.m. on 25 March that if he left his house then the army would kill everybody in Dhaka and he could not let that happen and so had decided to stay in his house to surrender to the Pakistan army.

 

Judged in this light, Sheikh Mujib did not at all mean what he said to Siddiqui about his intention to join the fight. Moreover, the way he switched from a position of having complete confidence in President Yahya to his instruction to Siddiqui to hurry back to Chittagong and mobilize all forces there for resistance, hardly gives what he said to Siddiqui any credibility.

 

On hearing about Mujib's intention to fight, Siddiqui continued, 'I enquired when to give the green signal to Army, EPR, police and civil administration. He was not sure.'8 This was obvious, because he had never seriously considered resistance.

 

Then

 

Col. Osmani was called in for consultation and he suggested that when the Radio stops broadcasting we should take that as the zero hour. But I said that it could happen due to power failure. Then he said when they try to disarm Bengalis we should take that the war has started and resist. However, I rushed back to Chittagong but too late.9

 

Choosing the radio stopping its broadcasting as the signal was odd, because if the attack began at midnight or after, there would, in any case, be no radio, because the broadcast stopped at midnight. To say that the Bengalis should only begin to resist when Pakistani army made a move to disarm Bengalis, amounted to saying that up till a full-scale and all-out attack on the people and the Bengali army men happened, there should be no resistance. This was particularly strange in the context of M.R. Siddiqui's report to Sheikh Mujib in which he said that the Pakistan army had, in fact, shot seven Bengali jawans of the EPR because of their refusal to shoot the rebellious port workers.10

 

M.R. Siddiqui, while continuing his narration, said,

 

Twenty-fifth situation was very tense in Chittagong. We did not know what was happening in Dhaka. At around 7 p.m. I managed to contact Sheikh Saheb through his neighbour Mr Mosharraf Hossain and Mr Naeem Gauhar. He asked them to tell me that talks had failed. Ask Army, EPR and police not to surrender arms and give a call to people to give resistance. After this all communication with Dhaka was cut off.11

 

So it appears that there was no attempt from any Awami League leaders, including Sheikh Mujib, to contact Chittagong on the critical evening of the 25th. When contacted by M.R. Siddiqui through Mujib's neighbours he indirectly received a message from Sheikh Mujib who asked them to organize a resistance.

 

This kind of talk about 'resistance' by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was nothing new. He talked about it in his Race Course Maidan speech on 7 March 1971 as he talked about a freedom war. But next day he launched a programme of civil nor,-cooperation and engaged himself and his party colleagues in a dialogue with Yahya Khan and his negotiating team.

 

According to M.R. Siddiqui, he received another message supposedly sent by Sheikh Mujib:

 

On 26th morning at about 6-30 a.m. my wife Latifa received a phone call from Mr Moinul Alam [Ittefaq correspondent in Chittagong] who gave her a message from Bangabandhu received through wireless operators of Chittagong. The message read 'Message to the people of Bangladesh and to the people of the world. Rajarbagh police camp and Peelkhana EPR suddenly attacked by Pak Army at 2400 hours. Thousands of people killed. Fierce fighting going on. Appeal to the world for help in our freedom struggle. Resist by all your means. May Allah be with you. Joy Bangla. Message from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.' This message was passed on to me immediately.12

 

So this is the 'declaration of independence' where the independence of Bangladesh is not actually declared! There is talk of resistance and an appeal to the world for help in 'our freedom struggle.'

 

Is the declaration of independence of a country such a petty affair that this obtuse message can be taken, in all seriousness, as a declaration of independence? Why this obscure method, instead of an announcement to the country and to the world through the Dhaka Radio and Television. Why transmit to an unknown wireless operator quietly to be passed on only to M.R. Siddiqui through the local correspondent of a Dhaka daily newspaper? This is a pertinent question because the Dhaka Radio and Television centre were under the control of Bengalis at least till 10 p.m. on 25 March. That declaration should have been made by Sheikh Mujib himself. It could have easily been recorded in his residence with a simple recording machine in the presence of his party colleagues when the breakdown of the dialogue became known, and the military crackdown inevitable.

 

The likelihood of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman transmitting such a message was almost zero, because he had no means of sending such a message through the wireless. According to all available evidence, long before midnight, he became incommunicado, and he had no means to communicate with others. M.R. Siddiqui himself said that it was close to 7 p.m., after he received Mujib's message through his neighbours, that all communication with Dhaka was cut off.

 

Thus it is highly probable that the so-called message was a fake, one manufactured and passed on by some well-meaning and desperate individuals in Chittagong wanting to do something in that critical situation.

 

For the leaders of the Awami League in Chittagong, it was like a straw to a drowning man, and they held on to it firmly, taking it as a declaration of independence by their leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

 

M.R. Siddiqui passed on the message to the Chittagong Sangram Parishad (Committee of Action) on the morning of 26 March. According to him,

 

The Sangram Parishad immediately discussed the message and decided to announce the appeal over the radio. By this time the radio station at Agrabad was already inaccessible because of the presence of Pak army. We collected Belal Chowdhury, Sultan Ali and other staff of Radio Pakistan, Chittagong who suggested broadcasting the message from Kalurghat relay station.13

 

Interestingly the 'message of Sheikh Mujib' to the nation was in English! So

 

A draft of the announcement was made in Bengali by Dr Abu Jafar and others and it was decided that M.A. Hannan, general secretary of district Awami League, would read out the announcement. Accordingly, on 26 March at 2:30 p.m. Mr Hannan read out the historical announcement in the name of Sheikh Mujib which is known as the Declaration of Independence.14

 

On this M.A. Hannan said,

 

After return from Kalurghat it was decided that Bangabandhu's declaration of independence will have to be announced through the radio. According to that decision I, on behalf of Bangabandhu, declared independence from the Kalurghat transmission centre. In this I was helped by Rakhal Chandra Banik of the radio office and M.P. and M.N.A. Abu Mansur, Ataur Rahman Kaiser and Mosharraf Hossain.15

 

Professor A.R. Mallick, vice chancellor of Chittagong University, said that he heard Hannan's announcement, made from Chittagong Radio. 16 Others heard it in Chittagong, but there was no reports from outside that it was heard anywhere else. In any case, the announcement failed to have any impact on the people. The reason could be the vagueness of the message as a declaration of independence, and secondly, the inconsequentiality of the man who announced it. It could have galvanized the people effectively if it had been announced by any central leader of consequence from Dhaka.

 

On 27 March Major Ziaur Rahman of the East Bengal Regiment made another declaration of independence and from all available evidence, it is not clear what made him do so. He had had some contact with the Awami League leaders like Hannan, Ataur Rahman Kaiser and M.A. Mannan near the Chittagong Cantonment and in Boalkhali on the 26th, but Hannan does not mention any discussion held with him about the declaration of independence or about the message which reached them. It was, however, decided that Major Zia would come to Kalurghat on the 27th.17

 

After that there was no contact between the Awami League leaders and Major Zia, who went to Kalurghat on 27 March and having access to the radio transmission centre made a 'Declaration of Independence' on his own behalf-a declaration in which he styled himself as the president of the country!

 

Thus two declarations of independence were made, by separate individuals, from the same Kalurghat transmission centre.

 

On Major Zia's 'Declaration of Independence' M.R. Siddiqui said,

 

Major Zia and his troops were placed to guard the Kalurghat Radio Station. Next day on 27 March Zia went on the air and declared himself the President and gave a call for freedom fight. This confused the Awami Leaguers and the public. A.K. Khan who heard the news said that it will be interpreted as an Army coup and there will be no support nationally or internationally. He made out a new draft in English. Major Zia realized the mistake and read out the new draft saying Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the President and the call was on his behalf.18

 

Unlike the previous announcement, both announcements of Major Zia were heard by people all over the country and it had a tremendous impact on them.

 

Faruk Aziz Khan, later Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed's secretary in Calcutta, was stationed in Kaptai, a small town in the district of Rangamati in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. He described Major Zia's declaration in his book Spring `71 which was slightly different.

 

On receiving the news of the army action in Dhaka and elsewhere Major Zia immediately left the city and proceeded towards Cox's Bazar and on the way camped near Kalurghat radio station... Some Awami League activists and Chittagong radio station employees who thought that a radio broadcast made by an army officer would greatly help mobilise the armed forces against the Pakistani action approached Major Zia to make a proclamation that they had drafted and Major Zia readily agreed and the proclamation was made by him on 27 March in the evening that made him an instant hero. Major Zia's broadcast of 27 March 1971 is of historic significance. But it also increased the risk of our democratic movement against dictator Yahya being misunderstood by the rest of the world as an army rebellion. The recorded proclamation was repeated next day; this time a revised version which I learnt much later.19

 

Faruk Aziz Khan further said,

 

On 27th evening .... we heard the declaration of Major Zia on the Chittagong radio proclaiming himself as the acting President of independent Bangladesh. Next day the proclamation was repeated several times. He said that with the approval of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman he was proclaiming himself as the acting President of 'Swadhin Bangladesh'.20

 

Major Zia made a declaration of independence over the Chittagong radio on 27 March and it is an indisputable fact that, at that time, it was his declaration, and not Hannan's, which was heard throughout the country and created a huge impact. In the absence of any announcement from Dhaka, either by Sheikh Mujib or any other Awami League leader of consequence, people had nothing to hold on to at the critical hour of the Pakistani military aggression. Major Zia's proclamation created considerable enthusiasm among the people and particularly among those who were waiting to actively join the forces of resistance.

 

Major Zia's proclamation, in fact, was a chance incident. After the military crackdown on the night of 25 March the spirit of rebellion and resistance was aroused in the people throughout Bangladesh, including the Bengali men and officers of the Pakistani

armed forces. So, like Major Zia, there were many others who immediately opted for resistance. In Chittagong, Brig. Majumdar would have begun the resistance on the 23 March if he had not been prevented from doing so by the Awami League leaders of Chittagong. Major Khaled Mosharraf, Major Showkat Ali, Major Abu Taher, Major Shafiullah, Captain Jalil and others immediately decided to go to war. Even a retired army officer like Major Kazi Nuruzzaman actively joined the resistance forces. If they had had the same opportunity and access to a radio, some of them could have acted in the same way that Major Zia did.

 

However, it was Major Zia who made the historical proclamation on 27 March and it helped the resistance forces organize at a moment when the political leadership had collapsed. The civilians felt confident that the Bengali officers of the army would actively join the ranks of the resistance. The army men who were scattered in different parts of the country felt that a new opportunity had opened up for them to organize and participate in the war of independence. This was the basic historical significance of the proclamation of Major Zia on 27 March 1971.

 

It would be entirely wrong to conclude that in the absence of Major Zia the war of resistance would not have begun or that Ziaur Rahman suddenly emerged from being an unknown army officer to become the leader of the nation, one who could command the people to go to war against the Pakistani state. Such magic does not take place in history.

 

In a written public lecture Rehman Sobhan rightly said,

 

In the Bangladesh of 1971 it was unreal to imagine that an unknown army officer could proclaim independence for 75 million Bangladeshis without any authority to do so and could be expected to be taken seriously by anyone. Indeed, such anonymous declarations could only generate apprehension in the international arena that Bangladesh was degenerating into anarchy. At that time the only person who was invested with the credibility to declare independence in the legally acceptable sense of the term was Bangabandhu because he enjoyed both electoral legitimacy and had a total political mandate from the people of Bangladesh to speak for them.21

 

However, the fact was that in spite of being invested with the necessary authority, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman failed to rise to the occasion and instead of declaring independence chose to surrender to the enemy. In that situation, being under wanton armed attack, millions of people felt the urge to resist and declared to themselves the independence of Bangladesh. This urge was what was reflected in the proclamation of Major Zia and it was for this reason that it created such a great impact on the minds of the people-people who were under army attack and millions of others who felt the urge to join the war of independence.

 

Here it is important to note, that in spite of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's cold feet and his failure to act as the brave leader of his people in the face of the gravest crisis in the life of the nation, he continued, in the absence of a better alternative, to be a rallying figure and a political authority of the highest importance. This necessitated that his name be associated with the proclamation made by Major Zia, though in the first announcement it was done without any reference to him.

 

A lot of confusion was created from the beginning between the formal 'declaration of independence' and formal declaration of `the war of independence'. Obviously, they are not the same as real independence comes at the end of the war of independence, when the enemy is completely vanquished. So, first there has to be a war of independence and that beginning was made by the people themselves in response to the army crackdown on the night of 25 March 1971, without waiting for any leader's formal declaration. The announcement by Major Zia could not be classified as a declaration of independence. It was, in fact, a declaration of the `war of independence'. Real independence had to wait till 16 December 1971, when the Pakistani army formally surrendered to the so-called joint command of the Indian and Bangladeshi armed forces at Dhaka.       

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOTES

 

1. Rehman Sobhan, Bangabandhu and the Emergence of Independent        Back to main text

Bangladesh, public lecture-4, Institute of Liberation, Bangabandhu and

Bangladesh Studies, 2nd print, 21 April 2000, p. 20.

2. Ibid.        Back to main text

3. Ibid.        Back to main text

4. Rehman Sobhan, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 390.        Back to main text

5. M.R. Siddiqui, BFWD, Vol. 15, p. 182.        Back to main text

6. Ibid.        Back to main text

7. Ibid.        Back to main text

8. Ibid.        Back to main text

9. Ibid.        Back to main text

10. Ibid.        Back to main text       

11. Ibid., p. 183.        Back to main text

12. Ibid., p. 183.        Back to main text

13. Ibid., p. 183.        Back to main text

14. Ibid., p. 183.        Back to main text

15. M.A. Hannan, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 191.        Back to main text

16. A.R. Mallick, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 4.        Back to main text

17. M.A. Hannan, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 191.        Back to main text

18. M.R. Siddiqui, BFWD, vol. 15, pp. 183-4.        Back to main text

19. Faruq Aziz Khan, op. cit., p. 85.        Back to main text

20. Faruq Aziz Khan, op. cit., p. 85.        Back to main text

21. Rehman Sobhan, lecture, p. 2.        Back to main text

 

 

 

Source: Badruddin Umar's "The Emergence of Bangladesh", published by Oxford University Press.




__._,_.___


[Disclaimer: ALOCHONA Management is not liable for information contained in this message. The author takes full responsibility.]
To unsubscribe/subscribe, send request to alochona-owner@egroups.com




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___