| The U.S. perspective in 1971 Asif Mahfuz
RECENTLY, after almost 35 years of independence of Bangladesh, the National Security Council (NSC) of America declassified some very interesting documents relating to the Liberation War of Bangladesh. They clearly show America's policy during the war of Bangladesh in 1971.
The available documents offer many useful insights into how and why Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger made important decisions during the war of 1971. They show in detail how U.S policy, directed by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, followed a course that became infamously known as "The Tilt."
The first part of the documents, from March '71 to the end of May is a record of the genocide. These documents highlight some particular issues, mainly the brutal details of the genocide conducted in East Pakistan in March and April of 1971. It reveals that, in one of the first "dissent cables" questioning U.S. policy and morality, Archer Blood, as consulate general in Dhaka, wrote: "Unfortunately, the overworked term genocide is applicable."
The documents show the role that Nixon's friendship with Yahya Khan and his interest in China played in U.S. policymaking, leading to the tilt towards Pakistan. They expose George Bush Senior's view of Henry Kissinger, and the illegal American military assistance approved by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to Pakistan following a formal aid cutoff by the U.S. The refugee situation was also known to the U.S government, as an estimated ten million Bengalis had fled across the border to India by May 1971.
The second part of the documents shows the desperate effort of Nixon to give military aid to Pakistan and the international ties among the countries supporting Pakistan. In this part, the U.S first recognises the mukti bahini (freedom fighters) as a force to reckon with.
By using what Nixon and Kissinger called quiet diplomacy, the administration gave the green light to the Pakistanis. In one instance, Nixon declared to a Pakistani delegation that "Yahya is a good friend." Rather than express concern over the ongoing brutal military repression, Nixon explained that he "understands the anguish of the decisions which (Yahya) had to make."
As a result of Yahya's importance in the China initiative and his friendship with Nixon and Kissinger, Nixon declares that the U.S. "would not do anything to complicate the situation for President Yahiya or to embarrass him." In a handwritten letter on August 7th, 1971, to President Yahya, Nixon writes: "Those who want a more peaceful world in the generations to come will forever be in your debt."
Not only did the U.S publicly pronounce India as the aggressor in the war, but also sent the nuclear submarine U.S.S. Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal, and authorised the transfer of U.S. military supplies to Pakistan, despite the apparent illegality of doing so and, though both the countries were under an arms embargo, U.S sent arms to Pakistan via Iran and Jordan.
Excerpts of important documents are placed according to the date so that readers may understand the flow of information and the relevancy of the message at that time.
(Documents gleaned by the author.)
March 28, 1971: U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Selective Genocide: Consul General Archer Blood reports they are "mute and horrified by a reign of terror by the Pakistan military" in East Pakistan. Blood indicates that evidence is surfacing suggesting that Awami League supporters and Hindus are being systematically targeted by the Martial Law Administrators (MLA). He also reports that Prof. Dev, Prof Fazlul Haque , Prof. Abedin, along with many DU teachers and MPA's have been killed.
March 28, 1971, Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, Situation in Pakistan: NSC official Sam Hoskinson tells Kissinger that events in East Pakistan have taken a turn for the worse. It also acknowledges both American recognition of the "reign of terror" conducted by West Pakistan and the need to address the new policy issues that have been created as a result of the terror.
U.S. Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, Selective Genocide: Ambassador Keating (U.S consular of India) expresses his dismay and concern at repression unleashed by the MLAs with the use of American military equipment. He calls for the U.S. to "promptly, publicly, and prominently deplore" the brutality.
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Killings at University: A. Blood reports an American's observation of the atrocities committed at Dacca University. "Students had been shot down in rooms or mowed down when they came out of building in groups." In one instance, the MLAs set a girls dormitory on fire and then the girls were "machine-gunned as they fled the building."
March 31, 1971. U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable Extent of Casualties in Dacca, & Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties Elsewhere: Archer Blood reports that an estimated 4,000-6,000 people have "lost their lives as a result of military action" since martial law began on March 25. He also indicates that the MLAs are now focusing on predominantly Hindu areas. Another Cable reports atrocities in DU, that naked female bodies in Rokeya hall DU were found "hanging from ceiling fans with bits of rope," after apparently being "raped, shot, and hung by heels" from the fans. "Mass graves reported by workmen who dug them" "numerous reports of unprovoked planned killing."
April 6, 1971. U.S. Department of State Cable, USG Expression of Concern on East Pakistan: During a conversation with Assistant Secretary Sisco, Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly said: "The army had to kill people in order to keep the country together."
The first "cable of dissent" by A. Blood, April 6, 1971. U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan: Blood transmits a message denouncing American policy towards the South Asia crisis. The transmission suggests that the U.S is "bending over backwards to placate the West Pakistan [sic] dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them." The cable goes on to question U.S. morality at a time when "unfortunately, the overworked term genocide is applicable."
April 28, 1971. Memorandum for the president, Policy Options toward Pakistan: (Secret, 6 pp.) (Nixon's handwritten note.) Kissinger presents Nixon with U.S. policy options directed towards the crisis in East Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger both feel that the third option is the best as it, as Kissinger writes "would have the advantage of making the most of the relationship with Yahya, while engaging in a serious effort to move the situation toward conditions less damaging to US and Pakistani interests." At the end of the last page Nixon writes: "To all hands: Don't squeeze Yahya at this time."
May 10, 1971. Memorandum of Conversation (3:05 - 3:30 p.m.) between U.S. and Pakistani officials including Henry Kissinger Agha Hilaly: They discuss the potential for a political solution in East Pakistan. Kissinger indicates Nixon's "high regard" and "personal affection" for Yahya and that "the last thing one does in this situation is to take advantage of a friend in need." On the same day (4:45 - 5:20 p.m.), in a meeting of the president and the Pakistani officials including Agha Hilaly, Nixon expresses sympathy for Pakistan by indicating that "Yahiya is a good friend," and in response to the genocide in the East, says he "could understand the anguish of the decisions which [Yahya] had to make." Nixon also declares that the U.S. "would not do anything to complicate the situation for President Yahiya or to embarrass him."
May 26, 1971. Department of State, Memorandum for the President, Possible India-Pakistan War: This memorandum denotes three causes that may lead to an India-Pakistan war and also formally recognises the mukti bahini: (1) Continued military repression in the East, (2) the refugee flow into India, and (3) Indian cross-border support to Bengali guerillas (the mukti bahini).
June 3, 1971 (4:00 P.M.). In a Meeting Kissinger indicates that Nixon wants to give Yahiya a few months to fix the situation, but that East Pakistan will eventually become independent. Kissinger points out that "the President has a special feeling for President Yahiya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of life."
July 19, 1971 Memorandum for Dr, Kissinger, Military Assistance to Pakistan and the Trip to Peking: Saunders discusses U.S. aid to South Asia, noting the connections between U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and Pakistan's role in the China initiative. Kissinger writes: "But it is of course clear that we have some special relationship with Pakistan."
August 7, 1971. Handwritten Letter from President Nixon to President Yahya: Nixon writes to personally thank Yahya for his assistance in arranging contacts between the U.S. and China. At a time when West Pakistani troops were engaging in a repression of East Pakistan, Nixon told Yahiya that "those who want a more peaceful world in the generation to come will forever be in your debt."
August 11, 1971. Meeting of the president, Henry Kissinger and the NSC Senior Review Group: Nixon says that the Indians are more "devious" than the "sometimes extremely stupid" Pakistanis, the U.S. "must not, cannot, allow" India to use the refugees as a pretext for breaking up Pakistan. Despite the conditions in the East, which Ambassador Blood described as "selective genocide," Nixon states that "we will not measure our relationship with the government in terms of what it has done in East Pakistan."
November 15, 1971. Memorandum for General Haig, Pakistan/India Contingency Planning: The U.S. sends the nuclear aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise, into the Bay of Bengal; representing possible American involvement in the conflict, especially if it expanded to a superpower confrontation.
December 4 and December 16, 1971. White House, Telephone Conversations between Nixon and Kissinger: These records, in Haig's words "confirm the president's knowledge of, approval for and, if you will, directive to provide aircraft to Iran and Jordan" so that these countries will provide aircraft to Pakistan. Nixon express his desire to, "get some PR out to put the blame on India. It will also take some blame off us."
December 7, 1971. Jordanian Transfer of F-104's to Pakistan National Security Council Memorandum for Henry Kissinger. Includes State Department Cable to Jordan and U.S Embassy (Amman) cable: First page has a handwritten Kissinger note in which he suggests "that title should have been omitted." It expresses that "by law," the U.S. "cannot authorise" any military transfer unless the administration was willing "to change our own policy and provide the equipment directly." This would rule out any transfer of American military equipment for Pakistan, supplied by the U.S. or any third party like Jordan.
December 10, 1971. Event Summary by George H.W. Bush, (later president of U.S): UN Ambassador Bush describes a meeting between Kissinger and the Chinese delegation to the United Nations. Kissinger reveals that the American position on the issue was parallel to that of the Chinese. Kissinger disclosed that the U.S. would be moving some ships into the area, and also that military aid was being sent from Jordan, Turkey, and Iran. Some of this aid was illegally transferred because it was American in origin. Bush also reports that Kissinger gives his tacit approval for China to provide militarily support for Pakistani operations against India. Bush expresses his personal doubts about Kissinger's style, in one instance calling him paranoid and arrogant.
December 9, 1971. Department of State Cable, Pakistan Request for F-104s. The transfer of F-104 planes to Pakistan from both Jordan and Iran is under review at "very high level of USG."
December 14, 1971. Department of State, Situation Report #41, Situation in India-Pakistan as of 0700 hours (EST): The State Department notes that eleven Jordanian F-104 fighter aircraft have possibly been sent to Pakistan.
December 15, 1971. Department of State, Situation Report #44, Situation in India-Pakistan as of 0700 hours (EST): Heavy fighting is turning in favour of the Indians, while cease-fire plans continue to be in the works.
Same day. U.S Embassy (Islamabad) Cable: "The present trickle of Mig-19's and F-104's will not hold off the Indians." Writing next to Mig-19's notes "China" and next to F-104's notes "Jordan."
December 16, 1971. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, India-Pakistan Situation Report (As of 1200 EST): India has ordered a unilateral cease fire upon the unconditional surrender of West Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Fighting continues "between Bengalis and scattered "Mujahid/Razakar/West Pakistani elements." Also, the CIA reports that a squadron of American origin, Jordanian F-104's was delivered to Pakistan on December 13 despite an American embargo on military supplies to both India and Pakistan.
December 29, 1971. U.S Embassy (Tehran), Cable, F-5 Aircraft to Pakistan: The embassy in Iran reports that three F-5A fighter aircraft, reportedly from the U.S, had been flown to Pakistan to assist in the war efforts against India. A Northrop official matches the aircraft to a group of planes originally slated for sale to Libya, This information suggests that not only did Washington look the other way when Jordan and Iran supplied U.S. planes to Pakistan, but that despite the embargo placed on Pakistan, it directly supplied Pakistan with fighter planes.
Asif Mahfuz works for Winrock International.
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