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Tuesday, May 3, 2011

[ALOCHONA] Burkha ban and its French Kiss

Thanks for letting us know, you are for Mollaa Forced Borqaa, not freedom of choice of your Mother, Sister, Daughter, Grand Daughters, great-grand-daughters and so on. What a Tyrant ...!

--- In alochona@yahoogroups.com, Farida Majid <farida_majid@...> wrote:
>
>
> I had written the following 2 yrs ago:
>
> Call for a ban on Hijab is not the answer
>
> A knee-jerk reaction to Aqsa Pervez's tragic death in Mississauga, Canada, would be a gross dishonor to this young rebel and her free spirit. Professor Taj Hashmi has made an impassioned plea calling for a ban on hijab in Canada. The antidote to a stupid, inhuman and falsely constructed religious dictum is not another dictum that in turn can have multiple undesirable consequences.
> Hijab ban in Turkey has caused social disruptions, dysfunction at educational institutions and workplaces, and strengthened the resolve of the Islamists. The story is not dissimilar in France, a ban that I opposed at the time protesting against the claim that it was a "religious" symbol of the Muslims on the same par as the Star of David of the Jews. In Germany the hijab-ban for State teachers has served as a stick in the hands of old German racial supremacists. Now I hear Belgium has banned the hijab.
> I have always taken a stand against a State imposed ban on hijab or any other article of women's clothing for the simplest of reasons: Other than trends, local culture or "fashion" as she deems it, a woman needs no higher authority to dictate her in matters of clothing or the manner in which she dresses herself.
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
> Before I answer today's impassioned arguments about 'conditioning of minds' of women who wear hijab voluntarily, I would draw attention to my concern for politicization of the whole issue. To which extent the modern societal pressure to wear a hijab as an elevated status-symbol is entirely patriarchal has not yet been fully psychoanalyzed. The Islamist women peddling hijab are not a meek lot. They have an agenda. To a political junkie like me, if it walks like and quacks like politics, then it is POLITICS.
>
> Any politics that involves a heady combination of women and religion is super-potent! Look at the unabated and unabashed power of "Abortion Politics" in the U.S.A.!
>
> In Bangladesh the Supreme Court has made a recent rule against imposition of any dress-code, other than normal institutional identification 'uniform' types, against the wish and comfort of women. Nevertheless, dirty politics revolving around women and Islam is keeping the srteets heated with violent protests against the Govt. women's development policies.
>
> The blogger, Marvi Sirmed, wrote:
>
> Major disagreements exist on whether or not Burqa is an injunction of Quran. Even if it proves to be in the holy scriptures, it needs to be reviewed in the context of modern world where men are expected to have at least little hold on their libido, where women are not just sex objects whose unveiled presence in society would be dangerous for public morality.
>
> I totally agree with her sentiments, but I would not re-visit Abul 'ala Moududi's premise in order to express them. But then, why blame Moududi alone? I had hard time only the other day convincing an Indian Muslim Association leader who resides in Washington DC that women running around in the streets of Manhattan in Beach Volleyball outfits in the dead of winter is an impossibility and happens only in his lurid fantasy.
>
> The point I am anxious to make is that the "context of modern world" is far more complex than what Moududi had envisioned or women like Marvi Sirmed is imagining. Patriarchy has updated its various political masks. We have not figured out all the 'political' ways of dismantling them. Some of the old, sensible arguments need to be revitalized in order to be effective.
>
> Farida Majid
>
>
>
>
> To: bangla-vision@yahoogroups.com; GreenLeft_discussion@yahoogroups.com; greenyouth@googlegroups.com
> From: sukla.sen@...
> Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2011 22:14:29 +0530
> Subject: [india-unity] Burqa got a befitting French kiss
>
>
>
>
> http://www.sacw.net/article2015.html
>
>
>
> Burqa got a befitting French kiss
> by Marvi Sirmed Saturday 16 April 2011
>
>
>
>
> From: LUBP
> The burqa debate: "Burqa got a befitting French kiss"
> Before reading this argument on recent Burqa-ban by France, you need to know who I am. Raised in an orthodox Muslim Deobandi family, I've been educated in Pakistan's Punjab where urban middle class used to be too sensitive about purdah in 1980s and 90s – the decades when I went to school and then university. Being first generation migrated out of the village in a big city, my father was a part of purdah sensitive educated middle class professional class. But my mother, raised and educated in a secular and Sufist Sindh, fought against Burqa throughout her life in order to save me from this `curse' as she would put it.
> Mom succeeded in this battle to the best of my luck and now no one expects her or me in Burqa or purdah in general. Despite being thoroughly religious, mildly ritualistic and overwhelmingly humanist in her viewpoint, I never saw he[r] observing strict purdah. She would cover her head, although, while meeting with my father's friends and serve them tea – a practice completely absent in my orthodox and backward paternal family. It's because of her struggle that the family elders were never able to impose either Burqa or hijab – or even a chaddar – on me. All they required of me was to cover my head with traditional dopatta when I stepped out of house. My honest confession: I often cheated on them by just wearing it in their presence. But seeing my aunts and grandmother, I kept wondering all through my childhood, how must it feel to be continually imprisoned in a horrible thing called Burqa.
> It has been and is my biggest relief to be among people who are sane enough to be against this practice of subjugating women through veil. But finding so many friends and fellow rights' activists among those protesting France's ban on Burqa is shocking and disappointing both. The anti-ban crowd comprises a range of viewpoints – from ardent Islamic, to moderate, to new-age Islam, to seculars, to antitheists and so on. Most heard argument from almost all of them has been their unflinching `concern' for women's choice and freedom to choose what they want to wear.
> To me, this strong sounding argument remains flawed, inconsistent and self-contradictory. How could a choice to commit suicide be that widely accepted? If your suicidal tendency is the result of certain frame of mind, experiences in life, is self-destroying and criminal, so is Burqa. When the society conditions your mind to willingly get subjugated and considering yourself `safe' by hiding behind the veil, how is it a `free choice'? Most of the women passionately protesting the Burqa ban are heard saying they do it of their own free will because they feel safe. Well you can feel safe in Guantanamo Bay if you're conditioned to feel safe that way.
> It is a slap on the face of a society where a woman can only feel safe if she hides herself, if she is invisible from public eye, if she conceals herself from the male eye. Stepping on the soil of any Muslim country in a dress of your choice save Burqa, is herculean for any woman. You want to wear a sleeveless top on a hot summer day and go out on the streets of Lahore or Dhaka, it would be appalling if not impossible like it is in most of middle eastern countries. Things would, however, be starkly different in Kathmandu, Kandy or Mumbai even if you put east versus west argument.
> There's a wide gulf between for and against Burqa arguments within Islamic scholars. Major disagreements exist on whether or not Burqa is an injunction of Quran. Even if it proves to be in the holy scriptures, it needs to be reviewed in the context of modern world where men are expected to have at least little hold on their libido, where women are not just sex objects whose unveiled presence in society would be dangerous for public morality.
> At the risk of sounding Islamophob or racist against Muslims in west, I would strongly suggest to those who seem too concerned about women's "freedom" to choose Burqa for themselves, to kindly go back to their countries of origin and fight for women's choices there. A lot of women in these countries don't have right to choose their spouse or profession let alone dress. Let us all fight for a free Muslim world where women are free to not wear Burqa. A polite reminder to all the women's rights activists, of sickening bars on women's choices in Muslim countries where they are coerced into adopting a life style no sensible male would ever choose for himself. Burqa can never be a free choice of anyone. Had it been, this choice would have been available to men also.
>
> Marvi Sirmed
> Columnist / Independent Blogger,
> Founder Editor of Baaghi:
>
> http://www.marvisirmed.com
>


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[ALOCHONA] Low and disorder



Mayhem as 5 cops caught for 'robbery'

At least 30 hurt in clash after angry villagers besiege police rescue team, assault DC


Angry villagers set afire a police van in Kaharol upazila of Dinajpur yesterday morning after an alleged robbery incident. Inset, Deputy Commissioner of Dinajpur Jamal Uddin Ahmed talks over the mobile phone to higher authorities. Photo: STAR

Five policemen allegedly fleeing after committing a robbery were seized by locals at Kaharol upazila in Dinajpur early yesterday and kept in confinement all daylong.Angry villagers also held nine other cops, who came to their colleagues' rescue.They even assaulted Dinajpur deputy commissioner as he tried to calm the angry mob.


http://www.thedailysangbad.com/?view=details&type=gold&data=Islam&pub_no=702&menu_id=13&news_type_id=1&val=65243

The confinement triggered a clash between locals and police that ended with suspension of seven police personnel as "they failed to maintain law and order".At least 35 persons were injured in the fight while a man running for a cover was crushed dead under a microbus. Identity of the dead could not be known immediately.However, the 14 policemen, including the five caught after the robbery, were released around 3:15pm.

Mostafizur Rahman, Dinajpur superintendent of police (acting), told The Daily Star that all those rescued were members of police.According to the villagers, some eight people broke in the tin-roofed house of Rajendranath Devnath, a paramedic, in Ghasiara village of Kaharol around 1:30am yesterday.


http://amardeshonline.com/pages/details/2011/05/04/79746

"Hearing the sound of breaking the front door, I rushed out of my room... Without saying a word, the intruders hit me with sharp weapons," said Rajendranath, aged about 55.
He has been admitted to Dinajpur Medical College Hospital with injuries to the head and right hand. One of his relatives also came under attack.

The gang, who went there in a white microbus, looted Tk 3 lakh, gold ornaments weighing eight to 10 tolas and six cell phones, said Kishore Devnath, Rajendra's nephew.Half an hour later, the robbers exploded cocktails to make their way out as locals came in their pursuit.The mob, however, managed to stop the microbus, blocking the highway at Boleya Bazar.


http://www.bhorerkagoj.net/content/2011/05/04/news0845.php

Introducing themselves as policemen of Birganj Police Station, gang members asked the locals to let them go. As the latter did not comply, they fired three gunshots, locals said.The villagers caught five of them while the rest escaped. The five were confined to a room in Rajendra's house. People set fire to the microbus.

When ASP (Birganj Circle) Khairul Islam went to visit the spot early morning, angry locals also confined him.Around 8:30am, Kaharol OC Shahidullah went there with eight policemen and became engaged in a furious argument with villagers, who at one stage overturned the pickup truck that had carried the OC and his team.

As the law enforcers fired rubber bullets at the crowd, villagers caught the cops and also confined them to the same room and torched the vehicle.Getting the news, people from other villages of Birganj and Kaharol brought out processions and gathered in front of the house.

Two other groups laid siege to Birganj and Kaharol police stations.They set fire to different rooms of Birganj Police Station and burnt three motorcycles there.

Birganj police said they had fired at least 100 rubber bullets and lobbed 60 teargas canisters during the clash and five of their colleagues were injured.Dinajpur Deputy Commissioner Jamal Uddin Ahmed and Kaharol UNO Azim Uddin went to Ghasiara and called for calm.However, the locals did not listen to them and threw stones at the DC.

Lutfar Rahman Khan, additional deputy inspector general (Rangpur region), rushed to Birganj around 12:30pm and announced suspension of seven policemen and closing of ASP (Birganj Circle) Khairul Alam and 18 constables of Birganj upazila.

The suspended are: Kaharol OC Shahidullah, who was among the captives; Birganj OC Aktaruzzaman Prodhan, sub-inspectors Md Shajahan, Md Monsur Ahmed and Fazlul Haque, ASIs Sukumar Roy and Jabed Islam of Birganj Police Station.Afterwards, following a home ministry order, Border Guard Bangladesh men from Thakurgaon and Dinajpur sectors rushed there to control the situation.Around 3:30pm, the captives left the place heavily guarded by Rab and BGB members.

OC (investigation) Anisur Rahman of Dinajpur Police station has been appointed the acting OC of Birganj Police Station.A four-member team, headed by Additional District Magistrate Azizul Islam, has been formed to investigate the incidents, the DC said. The committee has been asked to submit its report in 10 days.He, however, denied any role of police in the robbery but said, "People suspect that some policemen were involved."He claimed to have rescued only eight policemen and the microbus driver, Shahidul Islam, although 15 persons were freed in presence of journalists and hundreds of locals.

On March 8, villagers attacked a robber while he was leaving after robbery in Doptoir village of Biral upazila. The robber was later found to be a policeman of the upazila.

The next day, SP Shiddiqui Tanjilur Rahman and ASP (Dinajpur sadar circle) Mokbul Hossain with two platoon riot police baton-charged the villagers for attacking the policeman.Rajshahi DIG Shiddiqur Rahman visited spot later and begged apology to the villagers for the atrocities. The SP, ASP, two OCs were closed in this connection.

http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=184169

http://jugantor.us/enews/issue/2011/05/04/news0322.htm


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[ALOCHONA] Osama bin Laden: A Creation of the CIA



From Ronald Reagan and the Soviet-Afghan War to George W Bush and September 11, 2001



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[ALOCHONA] Bin Laden Hoax to Expand War: A case against Pakistan



Bin Laden Hoax to Expand War

Globalist think-tanks are already building a case against Pakistan
by Tony Cartalucci

Bangkok, Thailand May 3, 2011 - Foundation for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) scribe and all around intellectually dishonest propagandist, Bill Roggio of the "Long War Journal," has dedicated his life to perpetuating the entirely fake "War on Terror," abandoning all objectivity with the very name of his now officially government funded, Neo-Conservative establishment affiliated blog. The term "Long War" of course is a throwback to the Bush era and constant reassurances by the president that indeed the "War on Terror" will be endless.

"Osama's mansion:" Looking more like an LA crack house, it is more
likely that it was a CIA building hosting an "exercise" that went
"live" at the cost of multiple, unsuspecting lives. Of course, this is
just as credible as government claims which are based on evidence
either photoshopped, burned to the ground or at the bottom of the sea.


FDD and their doppelganger organization Foreign Policy Initiative - essentially the reincarnation of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) - were amongst the first in the wake of Obama's announcement to begin implicating Pakistan for harboring Bin Laden leading up to his death. These calls have only intensified.

Roggio's recent article, "Pakistani complicity in sheltering Osama bin Laden is evident" lays out what appears to be a convincing argument that not only was Pakistan aware of Bin Laden's presence in the city of Abbotabad, the center of Pakistan's military and intelligence community, but were complicit in providing him with sanctuary. Roggio is quick to remind readers of Pakistan's "vast links to terrorist groups."

Despite arguing that Pakistan was knowingly harboring the most notorious fugitive in human history, Roggio suggests that the US kept the operation a complete secret from Pakistani intelligence until the operation itself was underway - and even then - the US did not reveal the location of the operation because of a supposed lack of trust. Unfettered, Roggio skips past this lapse of logic either out of his own lack of imagination or his utter contempt for his readership. Of course, if Osama Bin Laden was actually in Abbotabad, and Pakistan was providing him sanctuary, wouldn't the compound itself be under constant watch? At the very least, after the operation was announced to Pakistani officials, wouldn't they already know the exact location?

Roggio's poorly contrived narrative, like the entire Bin Laden hoax itself, along with FDD and FPI's entire existence is not meant to advance our understanding of the world but rather advance the agenda of the corporate-financier interests that drive these nefarious organizations. In this case, Pakistan stands as an obstacle on the war path that begins in the Middle East with the engineered, US-funded "Arab Spring" and stabs outward through Eastern Europe, Central Asia and as far as Moscow and Beijing.

Tensions in Pakistan have been rising dramatically as of late. Open calls from corporate-financier funded think-tanks have been made to literally carve Pakistan into smaller states via a US-funded insurrection in the province of Baluchistan. This is in direct response to Pakistan's growing relationship with China and its increasing defiance against serving American interests in the region.

Globalist scribe Selig Harrison of the Soros funded Center for International Policy has published two pieces regarding the overarching importance of Pakistan in a broader geopolitical context and ways to bring about favorable "change." Harrison's February 2011 piece, "Free Baluchistan," in name alone indicates yet another "freedom movement" contrived and fueled to give a favorable outcome to his corporate-financier patrons. He explicitly calls to "aid the 6 million Baluch insurgents fighting for independence from Pakistan in the face of growing ISI repression." He continues by explaining the various merits of such meddling by stating, "Pakistan has given China a base at Gwadar in the heart of Baluch territory. So an independent Baluchistan would serve U.S. strategic interests in addition to the immediate goal of countering Islamist forces."

Harrison would follow up his call to carve up Pakistan by addressing the issue of Chinese-Pakistani relations in a March 2011 piece titled, "The Chinese Cozy Up to the Pakistanis." He begins by stating, "China's expanding reach is a natural and acceptable accompaniment of its growing power—but only up to a point. " He then reiterates his call for extraterritorial meddling in Pakistan by saying, "to counter what China is doing in Pakistan, the United States should play hardball by supporting the movement for an independent Baluchistan along the Arabian Sea and working with Baluch insurgents to oust the Chinese from their budding naval base at Gwadar. Beijing wants its inroads into Gilgit and Baltistan to be the first step on its way to an Arabian Sea outlet at Gwadar."

Considering that Baluchi rebels are already being funded and armed to wage war inside of Iran, it is more than likely similar aid is being rendered to them to confront the ISI and Pakistan's government. After a recent show of defiance by Pakistan calling on the US to halt all drone operations within its borders, the CIA responded with multiple attacks, the latest of which killed at least 22, including woman and possibly children, seemingly just to spite and incense this reassertion of national sovereignty.

Now, finding "Osama Bin Laden" in the heart of Pakistan's intelligence and military community serves as an overt threat to Pakistan, with cheerleaders like Roggio already waving the accusing finger particularly at the ISI and leaving it for now, to our and Pakistani officials' imaginations as to what the next logical course of action will be.

Pakistan is faced with two choices. Remain complicit with the West as it sets out to dominate the planet to Pakistan's own detriment, or call the United States' bluff - a bluff they have no way of making good on. Life is going to be miserable in Pakistan for the foreseeable future no matter what decision they make as they serve as a point of convergence for the West's designs on Iran, China, and Russia.

Concurrently, while Washington poses as India's ally, the sole purpose of this relationship is to manage the growth of competition in both China and across the entirety of Central and South Asia - including India. Perhaps India as well has been getting cold feet, unwilling to play its part against Pakistan and China, necessitating another convenient precision release from Wikileaks targeting the Indian government for rampant corruption - which in turn has generated an "anti-corruption movement."

While India seems to hope the announcement of Bin Laden's latest death will finally give America the excuse to make a graceful exit from the region, the warmongers who started and perpetuated the war, including FDD, FPI, and propagandists like Bill Roggio suggest it will only serve as an impetus to stay longer and expand operations further. Perhaps now would be a good time for India, Pakistan and China together to abandon this strategy of tension that ultimately serves none of their best interests and eject the West once and for all from their borders and the region as a whole. At the very least, it is most certainly time for individuals to claim back their personal and national sovereignty from a ruling elite that has clearly lost its mind.

http://landdestroyer.blogspot.com/2011/05/bin-laden-hoax-to-exapand-war.html


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[ALOCHONA] Bin Laden's Death and the Implications for Jihadism Read more: Bin Laden's Death and the Implications for Jihadism | STRATFOR



Bin Laden's Death and the Implications for Jihadism

By Scott Stewart

U.S. President Barack Obama appeared in a hastily arranged televised address the night of May 1, 2011, to inform the world that U.S. counterterrorism forces had located and killed Osama bin Laden. The operation, which reportedly happened in the early hours of May 2 local time, targeted a compound in Abbottabad, a city located some 31 miles north of Islamabad, Pakistan's capital. The nighttime raid resulted in a brief firefight that left bin Laden and several others dead. A U.S. helicopter reportedly was damaged in the raid and later destroyed by U.S. forces. Obama reported that no U.S. personnel were lost in the operation. After a brief search of the compound, the U.S. forces left with bin Laden's body and presumably anything else that appeared to have intelligence value. From Obama's carefully scripted speech, it would appear that the U.S. conducted the operation unilaterally with no Pakistani assistance — or even knowledge.

As evidenced by the spontaneous celebrations that erupted in Washington, New York and across the United States, the killing of bin Laden has struck a chord with many Americans. This was true not only of those who lost family members as a result of the attack, but of those who were vicariously terrorized and still vividly recall the deep sense of fear they felt the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, as they watched aircraft strike the World Trade Center Towers and saw those towers collapse on live television, and then heard reports of the Pentagon being struck by a third aircraft and of a fourth aircraft prevented from being used in another attack when it crashed in rural Pennsylvania. As that fear turned to anger, a deep-seated thirst for vengeance led the United States to invade Afghanistan in October 2001 and to declare a "global war on terrorism."

Because of this sense of fulfilled vengeance, the death of bin Laden will certainly be one of those events that people will remember, like the 9/11 attacks themselves. In spite of the sense of justice and closure the killing of bin Laden brings, however, his death will likely have very little practical impact on the jihadist movement. More important will be the reaction of the Pakistani government to the operation and the impact it has on U.S.-Pakistani relations.

Foundations

To understand the impact of bin Laden's death on the global jihadist movement, we must first remember that the phenomenon of jihadism is far wider than just the al Qaeda core leadership of bin Laden and his closest followers. Rather than a monolithic entity based on the al Qaeda group, jihadism has devolved into a far more diffuse network composed of many different parts. These parts include the core al Qaeda group formerly headed by bin Laden; a network of various regional franchise groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); and last, a broad array of grassroots operatives who are adherents to the jihadist ideology but who are not formally affiliated with the al Qaeda core or one of the regional franchises.

The al Qaeda core always has been a fairly small and elite vanguard. Since 9/11, intense pressure has been placed upon this core organization by the U.S. government and its allies. This pressure has resulted in the death or capture of many al Qaeda cadres and has served to keep the group small due to overriding operational security concerns. This insular group has laid low in Pakistan, and this isolation has significantly degraded its ability to conduct attacks. All of this has caused the al Qaeda core to become primarily an organization that produces propaganda and provides guidance and inspiration to the other jihadist elements rather than an organization focused on conducting operations. While bin Laden and the al Qaeda core have received a great deal of media attention, the core group comprises only a very small portion of the larger jihadist movement.

As STRATFOR has analyzed the war between the jihadist movement and the rest of the world, we have come to view the battlefield as being divided into two distinct parts, the physical battlefield and the ideological battlefield. The post-9/11 assault on the al Qaeda core group hindered its ability to act upon the physical battlefield. For the past several years, they have been limited to fighting on the ideological battlefield, waging a war of propaganda and attempting to promote the ideology of jihadism in an effort to radicalize Muslims and prompt them to act. The danger has always existed that if pressure were taken off this core, it could regroup and return to the physical struggle. But the pressure has been relentless and the group has been unable to return to its pre-9/11 level of operational capability. This has resulted in the grassroots and franchise groups like AQAP taking the lead on the physical battlefield.

As we noted in our annual forecast of the jihadist movement, the al Qaeda core group not only has been eclipsed on the physical battlefield, over the past few years it has been overshadowed on the ideological battlefield as well. Groups such as AQAP have begun setting the tone on the ideological realm — as in its call for Muslims to assume the leaderless resistance model rather than traveling to join groups — and we have seen the al Qaeda core follow the lead of AQAP rather than set the tone themselves. We believe this deference to AQAP is a sign of the al Qaeda core's weakness, and of its struggle to remain relevant on the ideological battlefield. There also have been many disagreements among various actors in the jihadist movement over doctrinal issues such as targeting foreigners over local security forces and attacks that kill Muslims.

The Emir is Dead, Long Live the Emir

While the al Qaeda core has been marginalized recently, it has practiced good operational security and has been able to protect its apex leadership for nearly 10 years from one of the most intense manhunts in human history. It clearly foresaw the possibility that one of its apex leaders could be taken out and planned accordingly. This means keeping bin Laden and his deputy, Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, in different locations and having a succession plan. There is also very little question that al-Zawahiri is firmly in command of the core group. Even prior to bin Laden's death, many analysts considered al-Zawahiri to be the man in charge of most of the operational aspects of the al Qaeda group — the "chief executive officer," with bin Laden being more of a figurehead or "chairman of the board." That said, the intelligence collected during the operation against bin Laden could provide leads to track down other leaders, and this may make them nervous in spite of their efforts to practice good operational security.

Certainly, bin Laden was an important person who was able to raise much funding and who became an international icon following 9/11; because of this, it will be hard to replace him. At the same time, the jihadist movement has weathered the loss of a number of influential individuals, from the assassination of Abdullah Azzam to the arrests of the Blind Sheikh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Yet in spite of these losses, the ideology has continued, new members have been recruited and new leaders have stepped up to fill the void. Ideologies are far harder to kill than individuals, especially ideologies that encourage their followers to embrace martyrdom whether their leaders are dead or alive. This means that we do not believe the death of bin Laden will result in the death of the global jihadist movement: A man is dead but the ideology lives on.

The Threat

The survival of the ideology of jihadism means the threat of terrorist attacks remains. The good news is that as one moves down the jihadist pyramid from the al Qaeda core to the regional franchises to the grassroots, the level of terrorist tradecraft these individuals possess diminishes and the threat they pose is not as severe. Certainly, grassroots terrorists can and will continue to kill people, but they lack the ability to conduct dramatic, strategic attacks. Thus, though the threat becomes more widespread and harder to guard against, at the same time it becomes less severe.

There obviously will be some concerns regarding some sort of major attack in retribution for bin Laden's death. Indeed, jihadists have long threatened to conduct attacks over the arrests and deaths of key figures. Analytically, however, the idea that al Qaeda or one of its regional franchise groups has some sort of superattack on standby for activation upon bin Laden's death is simply not logical. First, the al Qaeda core group has attempted to conduct many attacks against the U.S. homeland following 9/11, as have franchise groups like AQAP. While these plots did not succeed, it was not for lack of trying. Jihadists have also made many empty threats regarding a follow-on to the 9/11 attacks — only to be embarrassed by their inability to follow through. Third, so many plots have been thwarted over the past decade that if the core al Qaeda group or a franchise group had a plan primed and ready to go, it would not sit on it and run the risk of its being discovered and compromised. Instead, it would execute such an attack as soon as it was ready. Furthermore, jihadists — especially those at the grassroots and regional franchise levels — have not demonstrated the sophisticated apparatus required to conduct off-the-shelf planning exhibited by groups like Hezbollah. They generally tend to work on attack plans from scratch and execute those plans when ready.

Undoubtedly, there were jihadists planning attacks on the United States before the death of bin Laden, and there are jihadists planning attacks today. However, these individuals probably would have carried out this planning and any eventual attack — if possible — regardless of bin Laden's fate. Will groups conducting future attacks claim they were acting in retribution for bin Laden? Probably. Would they have attempted such an attack if he were still alive? Probably.

The potential for low-level impulsive retribution attacks by unprepared individuals or groups directed at American or other Western targets does exist, however. This type of impromptu attack would be more likely a shooting rather than an attack using an explosive device, so there is good reason for the U.S. government to increase security measures around the globe.

The result of all this is that the threat from the global jihadist movement will continue in the short term with no real change. This means that pressure needs to be maintained on the al Qaeda core so it will not have the chance to recover, retool and return to attacking the United States. Pressure also needs to be maintained on the jihadist franchise groups so they cannot mature operationally to the point where they become transnational, strategic threats. Finally, efforts must continue to identify grassroots jihadists before they can launch attacks against soft targets. But these same imperatives also were valid last week; nothing has really changed at the tactical level.

Where the big change may be happening is at the political level. That bin Laden was located in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province) did not come as a surprise — STRATFOR has discussed this likelihood since 2005. We have also discussed the distrust and suspicion between the U.S. and Pakistan — which was clearly evidenced by the unilateral U.S. action in this case. The significant thing to watch for is the reaction of the Pakistani government and public to the raid. In the past, the Pakistani government has found creative ways of displaying its displeasure with the actions of the U.S. government — like manipulating the Pakistani public into the November 1979 sacking and destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. While the average Pakistani may not care too much about bin Laden, public sentiment is running very high against U.S. operations in Pakistan, and this operation could serve to inflame such sentiments. These two elements mean that the coming weeks could be a very tense time for U.S. diplomatic and commercial interests in that country.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110502-bin-ladens-death-and-implications-jihadism?utm_source=SWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110503&utm_content=readmore&elq=2d6f944fa0bd4062a209db38c2c5d446



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[ALOCHONA] The Long Road to Abbottabad



Osama and Al Qaeda

The Long Road to Abbottabad

By SHAUKAT QADIR

Al Qaeda took birth in late 1982 (not 1988/89, as usually stated, because 1989 was when it actually acquired the militant traits it is now famous for) in Kuwait, the birthplace of Osama bin Laden's (its founder; OBL) father, ostensibly as a charitable organization to assist Muslims suffering all over the world. Very quickly, however, OBL realized that the way to 'help' oppressed Muslims was to arm them to rebel against the oppressor(s). Since 1989 witnessed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and OBL was one source for funneling arms to Afghan freedom fighters, Al Qaeda suddenly began to receive massive funding from all over the Arab World. He also swiftly entered the arena of gun-running.

Many Americans have accused the CIA of training Osama. My view is that the accusation is not merited. However, there is little doubt that he received encouragement, support, funding and even arms for Afghan freedom fighters and that he was a CIA collaborator for some years.

OBL also actively collaborated by providing crucial intelligence obtained from Al Qaeda personnel in Kuwait, during 'Desert Storm'. However, with continued American presence in Saudi Arabia, post Desert Storm, plus American arrogance demonstrated by their ignorance of, and lack of concern with, local customs and sensitivities were the beginning of the change in him. He began to find Americans offensive and the King (Abdullah) began to be viewed as an American lackey.

OBL began to gravitate towards the small group of dissidents who held the view that a King was un-Islamic and sought a return to the ancient Islamic democracy; the Khilafat. He became increasingly active with the passage of time and, when confronted with it, freely admitted to his activities. Due to his family connections, he was not imprisoned but his citizenship of Saudi Arabia revoked.

It was during his period in Sudan that he began focusing on the US as the object of his enmity. While his anti-US activities are on record, it is significant to note that there was considerable increase in contributions to Al Qaeda, including contributions by members of the royal family of Saud.

It was also in this period that OBL began to develop a strategic 'world view'. He saw all governments of Muslim majority countries as American lackeys and referred to them as Kafirs (infidel). He began to think of himself as a man with a mission; he was going to bring revolutions in all Muslim countries to revert them into one united Caliphate and, simultaneously bring to its knees that giant of all Evil; the US.

It is important to point out that for any such strategic vision to work, it is essential to have undisputed control over a spatial territory; preferably a country. A nation state governed under strict and 'true' Islamic law, setting an example to the rest, a command, control, and communication infrastructure, where funds can flow in, where training can be provided for warriors to sally forth and instigate revolutions in other Muslim majority countries. He was going to be the Muslim Che Guevara. But how?

While he was considering his choice of country, fate took a hand and, without details irrelevant to this narrative, he found himself in Afghanistan for him; the Promised Land

How did Al Qaeda work?

In 1980, OBL offered to join the Afghan freedom struggle, but this was a stage when the Afghan struggle was still 'pure', unadulterated by non-Afghan fighters, except the Pashtun from Pakistan. Osama's contributions in weapons and financial support were welcomed; he was not. Soon he began to realize that his person was too precious to waste. At some stage Abu Ayoub Al-Iraqi, joined Al Qaeda. He remained so far in the background that few know his name and few are aware of his contribution; but it was he who gave the practical shape to Al Qaeda's role on Osama's World Vision.

Al Qaeda's function has been described as "centralized decision and decentralized execution"; I see it as a multi-national that has exported instability so as to create Caliphate(s) in Muslim majority countries through 'outsourcing'. Al Qaeda has recruited Muslims from all parts of the world and sends out small bands of advisers; these could number from three to a dozen or so. While Osama retained the title of Amir, the leader, and was advised by a council, called Shoora, the real power has been wielded by the second tier leadership, responsible for planning and tasking. The second tier has traditionally been Arab, mostly Egyptians, with one known exception, the Pakistani, Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, credited with the 9/11 attack; but could he have planned it alone?.

9/11 as an example

Many journalists have written about the complications involved in planning this attack. Let us refresh our memory a little. Nineteen individuals from various Arab countries entered the US in four different groups. None of these groups were aware of the others or their role, except the coordinator, who also led one of the groups, Muhammed Atta.

For the attack(s) to create the impact envisioned, without a timely reaction, it was necessary to hijack four aircrafts taking off from different airports. The planes selected, had to take off within a total time interval not exceeding forty five minutes, from the first to the last, to preempt a timely response. For them to cause the destruction to the WTC, Pentagon, and (maybe) the White House, they had to be carrying a certain minimal payload of fuel otherwise the explosion would have been insufficient.

Khalid, the one credited with the 9/11 attack, was a mechanical engineer with a masters from North Carolina. He could certainly have helped work out the fuel payload requirements for the planes that were to turn into aerial bombs, but their flight direction, how far each could deviate from its flight path and for how long, before it would arouse suspicion, the level of training required in flying that would suffice for the hijackers, the kind of weapons that would get through the airport search machines all point to more than one 'expert'; each one with the requisite knowledge of airport security, of flight schedules, flight paths and patterns, the time taken to arouse suspicion, the delay in scrambling aircrafts to respond to this threat.

There were so many factors to be vectored in for this attack to succeed that it is impossible for it not to have been planned by a group of at least three individuals, perhaps more whose variety of expertise could create the (near) perfect plan.

It is not only a probability but a virtual certainty that they never came together, nor did they provide the information knowing what it was for. They were all probably paid cash to provide bits and pieces from their own area(s) of expertise. And yes, with their help, even Khalid Sheikh could have masterminded the plan, though my gut feeling is still that the mastermind had to be a specialist and a purchasable commodity. But Khalid is claiming sole credit and, therefore, we will never know the truth.

But this isn't an example of outsourcing! For that, we need to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Examples could also be taken from other Muslim majority countries, but I will confine myself to the area I know.

Afghanistan

1996, when Osama landed in Afghanistan, Taliban was broke and also needed weapons. In early '90s, Eric Margolis reported that a kilo of paste fetched the Afghan farmer $ 1000. At Karachi it was worth $ 50,000, offshore New York, $ 250,000 and would be cut and recut to be sold in New York at a street value ranging from 3 to 5 million. Al Qaeda was already into gun running and moving into drug smuggling was no problem. Pakistan was, at that time, a staunch supporter and the CIA was also prepared to turn a blind eye, the US still had hopes of Taliban and UNOCAL with George H. W. Bush on its board was still investing in Taliban in hope of oil from Central Asia.

And so, Osama offered Taliban 50 per cent of the profits from drug smuggling and weapons at near cost price. Mullah Omer could not look a gift horse of this kind, in the mouth. In return, Osama got the country he had been craving for, an unchallenged base for Al Qaeda operations, and the country where stringent Islam would be practiced in letter and spirit, as a shining example for Muslim majority countries.

9/11 changed everything. Suddenly Pakistan became a US supporter, a US invasion was imminent and, when it came, Taliban, Osama, and Al Qaeda were on the run.

It might be of interest to draw the reader's attention to some less well known facts. Post 9/11, the US demanded that Taliban hand over Osama, the Taliban reportedly refused, because when they asked the US to provide concrete evidence of Osama's guilt, the US refused. The US refused, because there was no concrete evidence of his guilt. There never can be. Although Osama, in a video released to Al-Jazeera TV accepted responsibility for this attack, but that was in the future; and the video was never authenticated either, so no one is certain of his guilt.

Such operations are ordered through numerous cut-offs and conduits and if any of the hijackers had been captured alive, he certainly could not have gone beyond the curtain of Khalid Sheikh and Khalid has never pointed the finger at Osama. He claims sole responsibility. Most of the FBI and CIA knowledge of the functioning of Al Qaeda has come courtesy Jamal Al Fadl, a Sudanese who defected from Al Qaeda after embezzling $110,000, which he confessed before a court in the US. How much credence can be given to his testimony, is for the reader to judge

There were selective portions of al-Fadl's testimony that I believe was false, to help support the picture that he helped the Americans join together. I think he lied in a number of specific testimony about a unified image of what this organization was. It made al-Qaeda the new Mafia or the new Communists. It made them identifiable as a group and therefore made it easier to prosecute any person associated with al-Qaeda for any acts or statements made by bin Laden.[26]

What has gone virtually unreported is the fact that on a suggestion by a Pakistani official, Taliban agreed to hand over Osama to Saudi Arabia, but the King refused to accept him. The Taliban might even have agreed to hand him over to the International Criminal Court, but when the 'war-time' vacuous US president Bush was informed of the option, he just ordered the charge.

For the initial years Musharaf continued to play both sides against the middle but the US was pressing hard and something had to give. Periodically, he would throw the US a bone to keep them off his back for a while. One such 'bone' for the US was the murder of Nek Muhammed in 2004, a member of the Wazir tribe, a veteran of the anti-Soviet war, who rose to prominence as a leader of his tribesmen amongst the Afghan Freedom Fighters, fighting once again to reclaim their country from another army of occupation, their erstwhile ally, the US. (Those readers interested in what happened in Pakistan can look up "Understanding the insurgency in FATA" under 'selected articles' on www,shaukatqadir.info.

This turned out to be disastrous and instigated the revolt in our tribal areas. However, it was not till Musharaf, bedeviled by another self-created judicial crisis by filing a reference against the Chief Justice, which was unanimously rejected by the Supreme Court, created another crisis to divert the attention of the international community; the 'Lal Masjid' (Red Mosque) episode in Islamabad in 2007, when Osama announced that, "Al Qaeda's enemy number one was no longer the US; it was now Pakistan".

By this time, Afghan Freedom Fighters had embraced the title of Taliban. Forgetting the oppression they had suffered in the last years of the Taliban, Taliban became the symbol of the Muslim David to the American Goliath; however, Taliban had divided into numerous factions; all loosely linked to Al Qaeda but not fully subservient to the so-called 'mother' organization.

Consequently, without going into details of the causes, only two Pakistani factions of the Taliban; Maulana Fazlullah's in Swat and Baitullah Mahsud's in South Waziristan responded to Osama's call, while none of the Afghan Taliban did.

Since Swat shared no borders with Afghanistan, it was South Waziristan that became the base for Al Qaeda's anti-Pakistan operations; though Fazlullah also received considerable support since, if the area under Al Qaeda could extend to the boundaries of Swat, they would be virtually within spitting distance of Islamabad.

This is where the example of 'outsourcing' begins!

Anticipating that Afghan Taliban might not be tied to his apron strings after witnessing how their Afghan brethren turned against them for obeying Osama's Islamic injunctions, Osama was looking at a home in Pakistan, preparatory to taking it over; the only Muslim nuclear capable country in Osama's lap, what a prize to aspire to!

Very carefully, under the skillful guidance of Ayman Al Zwahiri (in all likelihood, Ayoub Al-Iraqi remains the strategic brain of the organization, while Zwahiri has assumed operational control), roles were divided between the two Pakistani factions. To Fazlullah, closer to Islamabad fell the task of guerrilla warfare. To this end, a team of ten, under a Jordanian known only as Jabber was dispatched to Swat and over 1000 Tajik and Uzbek veterans followed as reinforcements.

Baitullah formed the base camp. This was the operating HQ, the command, communication, and control center, the safe haven through which monies, weapons, and explosives flowed, and the training area for acts of terrorism. Volunteers, usually young students of Madrassas (seminaries) were indoctrinated and brought here for training, many of them from as far as Southern Punjab. To Baitullah were dispatched twenty advisers, the leader's name remains a mystery, though he is described as a tall, educated Arab, with a towering personality.

It was soon discovered that the Al Qaeda representation in Baitullah's region was overkill. Baitullah was the astute leader but he was ably assisted by three very capable henchmen; Qari Raees, Hakeemullah (who later succeeded him), and Waheed. Very soon these three had divided responsibilities of different training camps, and administration, indoctrination as well as recruitment. The leader of the Al Qaeda advisers left after six months or so, and left behind three representatives for advice on tricky operations.

Baitullah was a wily individual who is reputed to always hedge his bets. Among the Mahsuds, his tribesmen, he was reputed to be a CIA agent. They offer the following facts as evidence: a) he had far more ready cash in dollars than any other, but this is inconclusive; b) that he had very sophisticated communication equipment---a question mark; c) that for many months the US drones would hit only those Mahsud militants who operated against the US in Afghanistan and opposed Baitullah's decision to attack Pakistan; and that those hit by drones had invariable been visited by Baitullah on a pacifying mission (these stupid tribesmen aren't that stupid, even they know about homing devices). Finally, the ISI had, on numerous occasions provided accurate actionable intelligence on Baitullah to the CIA requesting a hit, which never materialized. Until finally, he outlived his usefulness and was wiped out, long with his wife, by a drone.

When the Pakistan army recaptured Swat from Fazlullah they captured diaries of some Taliban leaders; among them was a diary of Muslim Khan, the spokesman for Fazlullah, the leader of the Taliban in Swat. I managed to lay my hands on some of them, including a diary of someone who styled himself as "Khalid bin al Walid" - an obvious pseudonym. While most of the diaries typically related the events of the day, a portion of each diary was dedicated as a training manual. And this is what made them so interesting. The diaries contain detailed instructions on how to conduct urban and rural guerrilla warfare. They included instructions on carrying out an ambush, how to evade one if possible and how to fight through one. They listed combatants under loose command structures for certain operations. The diaries included analyses of the successes and failures of operations, with notes on the casualties taken and inflicted. They record why a commander has been changed, occasionally for his inefficiency, but more frequently to find the most appropriate individual for each task.

Details of each operation and the instructions on how to reorganize after success or failure provide fascinating insight into their training and understanding of guerrilla operations. Occasional glimpses of Sun Tzu and Che Guevara's teachings come through. But what the diaries resemble most are the "training manuals" captured from the rebel Contras that Nicaragua took before the International Court of Justice to present its case against the US.

While fascinating, the diaries might not be a cause for surprise; except to wonder how they received such detailed training. The remaining instructions contained in the diaries of leaders as well as "soldiers" is certainly cause for concern. These instructions are exquisite in their detail on how to make explosive devices; many with the most innocuous components like sugar, cooking oil, aluminium, Vaseline, coffee, charcoal, salt and even black seed. In each case, other explosive components are included and in each case all composites are spelt out in milligrams - frequently with diagrams. Instructions on the use of TNT, RDX, and plastique are also included with a ratio for each component.

Instructions also detail how improvised explosive devices (IEDs) can be triggered; methods range from conventional fuses to improvised ones from rope soaked in fuel, to those made from a hand-wound wrist watch, an alarm clock and even a mobile phone. Instructions also include which devices can be used for which type of IED. They include how charges can be shaped for maximizing effect in a given direction and even instructions on biological precautions if there is prolonged exposure to certain chemicals - when to drink a glass of milk or a quart of yogurt. Needless to say, instructions also include details on the sensitivity of each kind of IED, what might trigger each prematurely and its lifespan. Everything necessary has been covered in the minutest detail imaginable, many of which were unknown to me until I read the diaries.

While all this information is available on the internet, it requires a specialist to understand and synthesize it. Often the diaries necessitate knowledge of chemistry, physics and biology and a combination of that knowledge would be developed for a specific purposes: training people to operate behind enemy lines and make do with whatever is available. Such information could also be gathered by a scientist in the pay of an organization like al Qa'eda. But even a chemist would need to be pointed in the right direction to collect the relevant information on physics and biology. This information had to come from an intelligence agency.

Similar material was recovered from South Waziristan, though in far lesser quantity, since the Mahsuds managed to escape across the Durand Line in far greater numbers. All captured Taliban from both areas tell the same story: "These were brought by a handful of people from Afghanistan (Al Qaeda advisers), photocopied and distributed to us. Our day started with a recitation of the Holy Quran and was followed by a two hour training session in combat and weapons. The rest of the day we studied these books (training manuals) and practiced them as well."

I am certain that CIA has been guilty of many dubious acts and I have frequently accused them of such acts. However, it is my considered opinion that the CIA would, under no circumstances release such documents to a terrorist organization. There are, however, numerous ex-CIA Black Ops personnel sitting unemployed who might be for sale. There are also ex-CIA Black Ops operatives employed by Private Security Agencies like Xe. And Xe is for sale to the highest bidder. Take your pick!

How relevant is Al Qaeda today and in the future?

It seems however, that events in the Arab countries have overtaken us. The fire is spreading and, while it can be suppressed by force but only for a breathing space. It seems that Arab peoples want their freedom and their own brand of representative government; which might not be the Anglo-Saxon democracy but one that suits their psyche.

With this storm rising, there appears to be a growing concern in the west and particularly in the US that this will give birth to Islamic extremism. After years of accusing Pakistan of harboring Al Qaeda (only months ago, Ms. Clinton made another damning accusation while in Islamabad), we now hear that it is back in force in Yemen, Bahrain, and Iraq! Only on Iraq, I must point out that, while Saddam was a Sunni despot, there was never any question of Al Qaeda taking root there during his rule. It is there indeed, but only post the US invasion.

Numerous other fears are being expressed in relation to the gathering storm among Arab nations: it could fuel a sectarian war; it could give birth to Islamic extremism, and most of all, where would our flow of oil come from?

All these apprehensions have some grains of possibility. It is entirely possible that Islamists could take over. It is also possible that Iran, watching all this with hungry eyes might grab an opportunity that could trigger  sectarian strife all over the Arab turbulent region. And any turbulence will hinder the flow of oil, though not for long. Oil is their sole source of income.

However, in my view, if there is a real fear of an Islamists takeover, it is confined to Saudi Arabia; which is why King Abdullah has ordered an immediate intervention in Bahrain and is pleading with Jordan to turn down demands for reform to a democratic kingdom. Saudi Arabia has hordes of OBLs still in hiding!

In this emerging scenario, how relevant is Al Qaeda? After all, its raison d'etre was based on two premises: that the present governments in all Muslim countries, beginning with Arabs are un-Islamic/oppressive and that they are pro-US. The revolution(s) sweeping across Arabia and Africa are based on the same reasons and, whichever form of government emerges in each country; Islamic or some form of representative democracy, it is certainly not going to be opening doors to Al Qaeda.

Our Taliban in Pakistan will make us sweat for some years yet and, if (rather when) reformation finally does sweep across the region, there might be a reformative revolution in Pakistan as well.

It seemed to me that even before Osama's elimination, Al Qaeda has been in its dying throes; because of forces beyond its control. All the more reason then, for the US to pack up and quit Afghanistan. Their basic apprehension that a Taliban return in Afghanistan might herald the return of Al Qaeda seems to have disappeared. Other ghosts and specters now loom on the American horizon. Time to go chase them!

Shaukat Qadir is a retired brigadier and a former president of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute. He can be reached at shaukatq@gmail.com

http://www.counterpunch.org/qadir05022011.html

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