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Sunday, April 1, 2012

[ALOCHONA] The truth of OBL's death



Ex-Pakistani soldier searches for the truth of Osama bin Laden's death

Shaukat Qadir    Mar 16, 2012 

A note from the author: I started my efforts to discover the truth behind Osama bin Laden's execution in July 2011. Eight months have now passed since I commenced that work and I am still not finished. My adventures could easily fill a book, but I do not have the patience to write one, although my research and writing is large enough to qualify to be called a monograph. My thanks to The National for printing these extracts

On May 2, 2011, I was in Islamabad when, in the small hours of the morning, I got a call from a friend, enquiring as to whether I had heard of the military operation in Abbottabad. I hadn't. I called another friend there, who told me that something was definitely going on: some explosions had been heard in the night and there had been considerable movement of troops since the explosion, but the entire operation appeared very hush-hush.

A couple of hours later, the story broke. We, in Pakistan, followed events with a variety of emotions: shock, dismay, betrayal, shame, disbelief but most of all, a sense of having been let down by our armed forces, our intelligence services, by our allies and especially by the Americans, for the insult they offered us in the accusation that the US couldn't trust us with the information.

Like many others, I was tracking the news as it unwound and numerous contradictions soon became apparent. Nobody seemed to have the real story of what happened that night. Conspiracy theories emerged from a variety of sources. Nobody in either the US or Pakistan seemed to accept the official versions, although the Pakistani people and the media were still baying for the army's blood.

But what, I wondered, was the truth?

•••

The story begins in August 2003, in a small village south of Gandamak in the province of Nangarhar, Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden (OBL) had been ailing physically and mentally for more than a year. Ayman Al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda's number two, had been running the day-to-day affairs, including receiving donations and distributing monies, weapons, and overseeing the drug- and gun-running operations of the organisation.

I have, over the years, made extensive contacts and friends in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. As far back as 2003, my friends there were divided in their opinions as to whether OBL was still alive. However, even then, those who held the view that he was were insistent that he was ill and had become largely irrelevant to Al Qaeda.

Various options of where OBL should be permanently housed were considered by the hierarchy, all of which were within Pakistan. It was decided that OBL should live a secluded family life, without armed guards to protect him (since they would draw attention to him), in a city not too far from the tribal areas, so as to remain in communication.

Mustafa al-'Uzayti, a Libyan, better known as Abu Faraj Al Libi, and at that point Al Qaeda's number three, favoured the location of Mardan, a small cantonment in the heart of the Pashtun-dominated region. Arshad Khan - a Kuwaiti-born Pakistani also known as Abu Ahmed Al Kuwaiti, who maintained good relations with all of Al Qaeda's senior figures - believed that Mardan was too dangerous a location for OBL to take up permanent residence. Mardan was always under the eye of intelligence agencies because it was known to house some pro-Al Qaeda elements. He suggested Abbottabad as a better option.

Abbottabad is also a military cantonment, but a far larger one than Mardan. It is a small town, nestled in the Orash valley, has a pleasant climate and a picturesque setting. It lies a mere 90 kilometres from Islamabad, and just over 120km from Peshawar.

Al Libi sought OBL's approval for the move to Mardan, who insisted that a house be constructed on purchased land, not rented, and that it be built according to his requirements. Al Libi would later be captured in Mardan in 2005. Just as Al Kuwaiti had predicted, the town was unsafe for a prolonged stay for an Al Qaeda operative.

While Al Libi was being detained, Arshad Khan and his younger brother, Tariq Khan, who was also a member of Al Qaeda (though not as trusted as his elder brother) purchased three adjacent plots in Bilal Town, a wealthy suburb of Abbottabad, totalling approximately 3,000 square metres, and submitted draft plans for approval to the Abbottabad Development Authority. Liberal bribes were paid, and the appropriate permits were granted within days. Work commenced at breakneck speed.

•••

Many questions have been raised by the western media about the house's high barbed wire-topped boundary walls and the sheer size of its compound. How, they wondered, could this house fail to draw the attention of intelligence agencies? But this line of inquiry betrays a lack of knowledge of the Pashtun. Even the moderately wealthy prefer a large dwelling and, for such a house it would be unusual not to have a high perimeter wall.

Similar residences abound in Mardan, Charsadda and even the suburbs of Peshawar, although it would be hard to make the case that this was a "grand residence" or a mansion, as it has sometimes been referred to. For sure, it was a large compound, but the rooms inside the dwellings were fairly small in comparison to other Pashtun residences.

The locals describe Arshad as "affable, friendly, easy going, and easy to get along with". Though nobody saw the male member of the "family" living with the brothers - who was reputedly infirm and was said to be an uncle of the brothers - his veiled wives and children were seen by many, and there was deemed to be nothing remarkable about them. That the children, except Khalid, were not too fluent in Urdu was put down to their Pashtun origin. During all religious and national festivals, home-cooked food was routinely distributed by them to the poor, just as any other upper-middle class Pashtun would do. In other words, there was nothing extraordinary about the whole situation.

People here don't usually pry into their neighbours' backgrounds. However, at some point in late 2007, for some reason, Arshad volunteered that he had made some money off some business ventures in Dubai, before returning home and, due to family disputes in Charsadda, his hometown, he had opted to move to Abbottabad. He said that his current occupation was as a "money changer" dealing in foreign currencies in Peshawar, and that he also had some interests in real estate.

This piece of information, willfully surrendered by Arshad, came to the attention of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) sometime around the end of 2007 or possibly in early 2008, and was passed on to their detachments in Peshawar and Charsadda.

Since these were "low priority enquiries", everybody took their time. There was nothing the least bit alarming about this since Arshad is a common first name in Urdu. However, the Peshawar detachment of ISI soon reported that they could not find any money changer or affiliate who lived in Abbottabad and bore his name.

In June 2010, it was established that Arshad travelled every month or so to Peshawar for a day or two to buy medical supplies before returning to Abbottabad. By this time, authorities in all major cities had reported that they could find no trace of Arshad the money changer from Abbottabad. Again, this in itself was nothing particularly worrisome, but clearly it piqued someone's curiosity.

So much so, in fact, that in July 2010, the ISI made a request to the CIA for satellite surveillance of Arshad's Abbottabad residence.

•••

While it is credible that the CIA discovered Arshad's identity, what is incredible is why it should have taken them until 2007 to do so. The CIA did know that Arshad (or Al Kuwaiti as he was also known) was a close confidante of Al Libi, who had been captured and handed over to the CIA two years earlier. But how was Al Libi not questioned regarding Al Kuwaiti's real identity? If he was, is it possible, especially now that we are familiar with the methods of interrogation used at Guantanamo Bay (where he had been taken) that he did not tell them? And to carry this reasoning one step further, if the CIA did finally learn of Arshad's identity in 2007, why should it take two long years to establish where he was residing; and then, another two years to discover that "he was housing a high-value target, probably OBL"?

On the other hand, if my version is correct, two significant CIA falsehoods are relevant to the story: firstly, that like the ISI, the CIA was really unaware of the intimate relations between Al Libi and Al Kuwaiti despite a number of Al Qaeda leaders in their custody who knew exactly who and where Al Kuwaiti was, and secondly, their insistence that the ISI did not provide the lead that ultimately took them to OBL's hideout.

And, the questions I raise lend credence to the likelihood that the CIA was, in fact, telling lies and, in all probability, actually began tracking OBL only in 2010, perhaps after receiving the lead provided to them by the ISI.

•••

Khairee, one of OBL's wives, joined him in Abbottabad in early 2011 after a prolonged absence. She and five of her children had been in custody in Iran since 2003.

In November 2008, Hashmatullah Atharzadeh, a cultural attache at the Iranian Consulate in Peshawar, was kidnapped by the Taliban. After lengthy negotiations, his release was arranged in exchange for Suleman Abu Ghaith, a Kuwaiti preacher and a spokesman for Al Qaeda, who rose to prominence when he announced post-9/11 that there would be further attacks on Americans in the US. His Kuwaiti citizenship was subsequently revoked and, by 2002, he was living in Iran under a kind of loose house arrest.

While Ghaith's release and exchange made news, the freeing of Khairee and her five children, who were let go at the same time, did not. Ironically, it is uncertain whether Iranian authorities were even aware of her real identity before March 2010, when another of OBL's sons made a public appeal for the release of his stepmother and his siblings.

She was, at the time, the eldest of OBL's wives, and was known to be extremely jealous of Amal, the youngest. She had good reason to be. We know that by this time, OBL was only sleeping with Amal. But why should Khairee choose to brave another hazardous journey to rejoin a husband she had been separated from for many years and no longer had any relationship with?

According to my sources, she applied to Attiya Abdur Rahman for help (who was then Al Qaeda's chief of operations) after being released by the Iranians in September 2010, but he was so suspicious of her intentions that he had her strip searched and checked for homing devices. Even after that, he kept her incarcerated for months until finally OBL told him to send her to Abbottabad in early 2011.

Or was it the other way round? Did Attiya actually keep Khairee long enough to reassure OBL that she could be trusted? Did the same Shoora that had decided on the need to "retire" OBL also determine that his retirement should be made permanent? Was Khairee being held to reassure OBL while she was being trained in communications? Was there a deliberate "leak" somewhere so as to enable the CIA to track Khairee to OBL's lair?

From here onwards, there is little dispute about what transpired. Whether a "routine request" from the ISI in July 2010 prompted them to investigate, or their own diligent pursuit of Arshad took so long, or whether Al Qaeda was deliberately leading them to OBL, according to the CIA's own version, it took from August 2010 until early April 2011 for Pakistanis working for the CIA to follow Arshad and locate his house. After which, through satellite surveillance, they reached their conclusions and "Operation Geronimo" was successfully undertaken.

•••

My narrative of Geronimo and its aftermath basically does not contradict the official US version as to most of the details of the operation. A little after 11pm on the night of May 1, two MH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, accompanied by two Chinooks, took off from Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan and headed for Abbottabad. The Blackhawks were carrying two assault teams of US Navy Seals numbering 28 (or 24, depending on which newspaper you refer to), 14 in each helicopter; the Chinooks carried another 30 troops as back-up.

According to the CIA's own version, all they were certain of, even as the raid was launched, was that there was "a high-value target housed in the compound, possibly OBL". Even after identifying Arshad, according to their own version, it took two years to discover his lair, another two years to discover that he was housing a "high-value" target and another nine months thereafter to confirm that the target was, in fact, very high value and, might even be OBL himself. Even when the operation was launched, the CIA was not certain of the identity of their target.

The official explanation for undertaking such a venture, without sharing it with the Pakistan government or military brass was that "we apprehended a possible leak".

Viewing this accusation from a historical perspective, it seems to have little validity. Pakistan's capture and rendering of senior Al Qaeda operatives to the US is almost unparalleled. Starting with Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, another Kuwaiti, believed to be Al Qaeda's operational chief, in 2003, continuing with Al Libi, Umer Patek and even Younas Al Mauritania in August 2011, well after OBL's execution, Pakistan has handed over many dozens of senior Al Qaeda operatives and a similar number of junior ones to the US. Nor was there any love lost between OBL and Pakistan.

Moreover, the US administration could not have been blind to the domestic repercussions in Pakistan resulting from such an attack. The embarrassment that the Pakistani government, but more particularly, that which the army and ISI would suffer, the feeling of humiliation and betrayal that the people of Pakistan would (and did) endure; the surge of anti-Americanism in Pakistan that was guaranteed to follow and, of course, the possible loss of a valuable ally.

•••

The first response was the sound of helicopters flying at around 12.20am on May 2. Both Lt Col Naseem, the commanding officer of the infantry unit, and the OC ISI Det (the officer commanding the intelligence services detachment) assumed that there was only one helicopter and, believing it to be Pakistani, ordered enquiries through their respective channels.

The OC ISI Det, who was also informed of the possibility of the helicopter having landed somewhere, set off to investigate. They came across each other close to the entrance to Bilal Town at about 12.55am, just as they heard a huge explosion.

Alarmed but expecting to be heading for the site of a helicopter crash (one of their own), Naseem called for the fire brigade and the entire party reached the scene at about 1:05am.

This times the event almost exactly: helicopters hovering to drop troops (and going silent thereafter) at about 12.35am and the explosion of the downed Blackhawk, followed by helicopters departing at 12.55am. A grand total of 20 minutes for the whole operation.

By about 1.20am, the officers realised that the helicopter was not a Pakistani one at all and, through their respective channels, conveyed this information to relevant superiors for onward submission.

Closer to 2am, Naseem and the OC ISI Det moved towards the compound. No lights were on, so the officers used torches to light their way. When they approached the compound's annex, they could see a body lying in the entrance at the door to the bedroom on the right hand side. This was when they realised that the operation had been a "hit". They also heard voices murmuring in the left-hand bedroom. Since the main door was locked, Naseem stayed there, while the OC ISI Det circled the house to enter it from a door on the left side which also opened into the left-hand bedroom. There he found Maryam, Al Kuwaiti's wife, and three children huddled together.

In the meantime, Naseem called for reinforcements. The OC ISI Det opened the main door and they both entered the house. The dead body was unarmed and later identified as being that of Tariq Khan. Oddly, he had an AK-47 leaning against the wall next to the door inside his bedroom, whereas he was lying dead outside the room.

Naseem asked the OC Quick Response Force to send a couple of men to guard the annexe, while they moved to the wide-open main door of the house. On entering the house, they heard sounds in the bedroom on the left. They found two bodies, a male and a female, later identified as Arshad and his brother's wife, Bushra, on the floor. Arshad was also unarmed but had an AK-47 in the bedroom opposite. Two adult females, Khairee and Seeham, and 11 of OBL's children and grandchildren, ranging in age from 20 years old down to three, as well as Arshad's four children, were also huddled in a corner.

Khairee, the only one who was fluent in English, asked permission to retrieve some of her clothing. When she was granted that request, she asked that Seeham be allowed to as well.

Going upstairs, Seeham, Khalid's mother, saw her son's dead body on the landing and, merely glancing at him, passed by. However, after collecting her belongings, she paused beside her son's body and said a brief prayer. Seeham spoke only in Arabic, but it was in this moment that she identified her son. Pointing at him, she said, "Khalid bin Laden". It was only then, at almost 3.00am, that the OC ISI Det learnt the identity of the "high-value" target that had been the objective of the raid.

Shaukat Qadir is a retired Pakistani infantry officer and a columnist for The National.

http://www.thenational.ae/lifestyle/ex-pakistani-soldier-searches-for-the-truth-of-osama-bin-ladens-death#full



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[ALOCHONA] Research and Analysis Wing



Research and Analysis Wing

Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW or RAW)[1] is India's external intelligence agency. It was formed in September 1968, after the newly independent Republic of India was faced with 2 consecutive wars, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the India-Pakistani war of 1965, as it was evident that a credible intelligence gathering setup was lacking. Its primary function is collection of external intelligence, counter-terrorism and covert operations. In addition, it is responsible for obtaining and analyzing information about foreign governments, corporations, and persons, in order to advise Indian foreign policymakers. Until the creation of R&AW, the Intelligence Bureau handled both internal and external intelligence.[2][3][4]

The R&AW has its headquarters on Lodhi Road in New Delhi. The current director of the organization is Sanjeev Tripathi, a 1973 Uttar Pradesh batch IPS officer, who later shifted to R&AW Allied Service (RAS) cadre.[5]

History

Foreign intelligence failure during the Sino-Indian war (October 20 - November 21, 1962) led then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to order a dedicated foreign intelligence agency to be established, which became the Research and Analysis Wing.[2][4]

Prior to its inception, intelligence collection was primarily the responsibility of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which was created by the British. In 1933, sensing the political turmoil in the world which eventually led to the Second World War, the Intelligence Bureau's responsibilities were increased to include the collection of intelligence along India's borders. In 1947, after independence, Sanjeevi Pillai took over as the first Indian Director of IB. Having been depleted of trained manpower by the exit of the British, Pillai tried to run the bureau on MI5 lines. In 1949, Pillai organized a small foreign intelligence operation, but the Indian debacle in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 showed it to be ineffective. After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, Indian Chief of Army Staff General Jayanta Nath Chaudhury called for more intelligence-gathering.[2][3]

Around the end of 1966 the concept of a separate foreign intelligence agency began to take concrete shape. In 1968, after Indira Gandhi had taken over, it was decided that a full-fledged second security service was needed. R. N. Kao,[6] then a deputy director of the Intelligence Bureau, submitted a blueprint for the new agency. Kao was appointed as the chief of India's first foreign intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing. The R&AW was given the responsibility for strategic external intelligence, human as well as technical, plus concurrent responsibility with the Directorate-General of Military Intelligence for tactical trans-border military intelligence up to a certain depth across the LOC[clarification needed] and the international border.[2][4]

The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), under the Cabinet Secretariat, is responsible for co-ordinating and analyzing intelligence activities between R&AW, the Intelligence Bureau and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In practice, however, the effectiveness of the JIC has been varied.[7] With the establishment of the National Security Council in 1999, the role of the JIC has been merged with the NSC. R&AW's legal status is unusual, in that it is not an "Agency", but a "Wing" of the Cabinet Secretariat. Hence, R&AW is not answerable to the Parliament of India on any issue, which keeps it out of reach of the Right to Information Act.[8][9]

Formation


The framework of Indian intelligence

R&AW started as a wing of the main Intelligence Bureau with 250 employees and an annual budget of 2 crore (US$434,000)). In the early seventies, its annual budget had risen to 30 crore (US$6.5 million) while its personnel numbered several thousand. In 1971, Kao had persuaded the Government to set up the Aviation Research Centre (ARC). The ARC's job was aerial reconnaissance.[citation needed][10] It replaced the Indian Air Force's old reconnaissance aircraft and by the mid-70s, R&AW, through the ARC, had high quality aerial pictures of the installations along the Chinese and Pakistani borders. Presently, the budget of R&AW is speculated to be as high as US$150 million[11][12] to as low as US$31 million.[13] Slowly other child agencies like The Radio Research Center and Electronics & Tech. Services were added to R&AW in 70s and 80s. In 1990s the Special Frontier Force became the paramilitary wing of R&AW, providing the requisite muscle for covert military operations. In 2004 Government of India added yet another intelligence agency called the National Technical Facilities Organisation (NTFO), also known as National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), believed to be functioning under R&AW, although it remains autonomous to some degree. While the exact nature of the operations conducted by NTRO is classified, it is believed that it deals with research on imagery and communications using various platforms.[2][3][3]

Objectives

The present R&AW[14] objectives include, and are not limited to:

  • Monitoring the political and military developments in adjoining countries, which have direct bearing on India's national security and the formulation of its foreign policy.
  • Secondly, molding international public opinion with the help of the strong and vibrant Indian diaspora.[2][3]

In the past, following the Sino-Indian war and due to what were volatile relations between India and Pakistan, R&AW's objectives had also consisted the following:

  • To watch the development of international communism and the schism between the two big communist nations, the Soviet Union and China. As with other countries, both these powers had direct access to the communist parties in India.
  • To control and limit the supply of military hardware to Pakistan, from mostly European countries, America and more importantly from China.[2][3]

Organization


Organizational structure of R&AW.

R&AW has been organized on the lines of the CIA.[15] The Director of R&AW is designated "Secretary (Research)" in the Cabinet Secretariat. Most of the previous Directors have been experts on either Pakistan or China.[citation needed] They also have the benefit of training in either the USA or the UK, and more recently in Israel.[16] The "Secretary (R)", although is under direct command of Prime Minister, reports on an administrative basis to the Cabinet Secretary, who reports to the Prime Minister (PM). However, on a daily basis the "Secretary (R)" reports to the National Security Advisor. Reporting to the "Secretary (R)" are:[17][18]

  • An Additional Director responsible for the Office of Special Operations and intelligence collected from different countries processed by large number of Joint Secretaries, who are the functional heads of various specified desks with different regional divisions/areas/countries: Area one - Pakistan; Area two - China and Southeast Asia; Area three - the Middle East and Africa; and Area four - other countries. Two Special Joint Secretaries, reporting to the Additional Director, head the Electronics and Technical Department which is the nodal agency for ETS, NTFO and the RRC.
  • The Director General of Security having two important sections the Aviation Research Centre headed by one Special Director and the Special Services Bureau controlled by two Special Secretaries.

The internal structure of the R&AW is a matter of speculation, but brief overviews of the same are present in the public domain. Attached to the Headquarters of R&AW at Lodhi Road, New Delhi are different regional headquarters, which have direct links to overseas stations and are headed by a controlling officer who keeps records of different projects assigned to field officers who are posted abroad. Intelligence is usually collected from a variety of sources by field officers and deputy field officers; it is either preprocessed by a senior field officer or by a desk officer. The desk officer then passes the information to the Joint Secretary and then on to the Additional Secretary and from there it is disseminated to the concerned end user. R&AW personnel are called "Research Officers" instead of the traditional "agents". There is a sizable number of female officers in R&AW even at the operational level. In recent years, R&AW has shifted its primary focus from Pakistan to China and have started operating a separate desk for this purpose.[17]

Secretaries

Most of the Directors of Research and Analysis Wing have been Indian Police Service (IPS) officers. RN Kao and Sankaran Nair belonged to the Imperial Police (IP), of the British colonial days which was renamed as the Indian Police Service after Indian Independence in 1947. N.F.Suntook had served in the Indian Navy, then in the Indian Police Service and in the Indian Frontier Administration Service. Vikram Sood was from the Indian Postal Service. A.S.Dulat was an Indian Police Service officer deputed from the Intelligence Bureau, while K.C.Verma is an ex-Intelligence Bureau officer. All the Directors have been experts on China or Pakistan except for Ashok Chaturvedi, who is an expert on Nepal.[21] Sanjeev Tripathi is the first Director of R&AW from the RAS cadre.

Designations

Gazetted and Non Gazetted ranks

  • Senior Field Officer (Gazetted)
  • Field Officer
  • Deputy Field Officer
  • Assistant Field Officer

Recruitment

Initially, R&AW relied primarily on trained intelligence officers who were recruited directly. These belonged to the external wing of the Intelligence Bureau. In times of great expansion, many candidates were taken from the military, police and other services. Later, R&AW began directly recruiting graduates from universities. Today, R&AW has its own service cadre, the R&AW Allied Service (RAS) to absorb talent. Recruitment is mostly by deputation from the Armed Forces or Civil Service Officers. The Civil and Defense Service Officers permanently resign their cadre and join the RAS. However, according to recent reports, officers can return to their parent cadre after serving a specific period in the agency if they wish to.[22] Most of the Directors have been officers from the IPS. R&AW also employs a number of linguists and other experts in various fields.[23] Recruitment in R&AW is taken in the name of NATI (National Aptitude Test in Intelligence).[citation needed]

Basic training

Basic training commences with 'pep talks' to boost the morale of the new recruit. This is a ten-day phase in which the inductee is familiarized with the real world of intelligence and espionage, as opposed to the spies of fiction. Common usages, technical jargon and classification of information are taught. Case studies of other agencies like CIA, KGB, Chinese Secret Agency and ISI are presented for study. The inductee is also taught that intelligence organisations do not identify who is friend and who is foe, the country's foreign policy does. Basic classroom training to R&AW officers are imparted at R&AW's Training Institute in Gurgaon.[24][25]

S.S.Uban receiving the guard of Honor at Chakrata Mountain Training Facility of SFF

Advanced training

After completing 'Basic Training' the recruit is now attached to a Field Intelligence Bureau (FIB). His/her training here lasts for 1–2 years. She/he is given firsthand experience of what it was to be out in the figurative cold, conducting clandestine operations. During night exercises under realistic conditions, she/he is taught infiltration and exfiltration. She/He is instructed to avoid capture and, if caught, how to face interrogation. She/He learns the art of reconnoiter, making contacts, and, the numerous skills of operating an intelligence mission. At the end of the field training, the new recruit is brought back to the school for final polishing. Before his deployment in the field, he is given exhaustive training in the art of self-defense, an introduction to martial arts and the use of technical espionage devices. She/He is also drilled in various administrative disciplines so that he could take his place in the foreign missions without arousing suspicion. She/He is now ready to operate under the cover of an Embassy to gather information, set up his own network of informers, moles or operatives as the task may require. Field training is provided in the Indian Military Academy Headquarters at Dehradun.[4][26]

Functions

The primary mission of R&AW includes aggressive intelligence collection via espionage, psychological warfare, subversion and sabotage.[citation needed] R&AW maintains active collaboration with other secret services in various countries. Its contacts with FSB of Russia, KHAD, the Afghan agency, Israel's Mossad, the CIA and MI6 have been well-known, a common interest being Pakistan's nuclear programme.[citation needed] R&AW has been active in obtaining information and operating through third countries like Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Myanmar and Singapore.[2]

R&AW obtains information critical to Indian strategic interests, both by overt and covert means. The data is then classified and filed with the assistance of the computer networks. International media centers can easily absorb R&AW operatives and provide freedom of movement.[2][3]

Major operations

  • ELINT operations in Himalayas:[28] After China tested its first nuclear weapons on October 16, 1964, at Lop Nur, Xinjiang, India and the USA shared a common fear about the nuclear capabilities of China.[29] Owing to the extreme remoteness of Chinese testing grounds and strict secrecy surrounding the Chinese nuclear programme, it was almost impossible to carry out any HUMINT operation. So, the CIA in the late 1960s decided to launch an ELINT operation along with R&AW and ARC to track China's nuclear tests and monitor its missile launches. The operation, in the garb of a mountaineering expedition to Nanda Devi involved celebrated Indian climber M S Kohli who along with operatives of Special Frontier Force and the CIA - most notably Jim Rhyne, a veteran STOL pilot - was to place a permanent ELINT device, a transceiver powered by a plutonium battery, that could detect and report data on future nuclear tests carried out by China.[30] The monitoring device was near successfully implanted on Nanda Devi, when an avalanche forced a hasty withdrawal.[31] Later, a subsequent mountain operation to retrieve or replant the device was aborted when it was found that the device was lost. Recent reports indicate that radiation traces from this device have been discovered in sediment below the mountain.[32] However, the actual data is not conclusive.
  • Creation of Bangladesh and aftermath:[33][34] In the early 1970s the army of Pakistan prosecuted a bloody military crackdown in response to the Bangladesh independence movement.[35][36] Nearly 10 million refugees fled to India. The R&AW's Bangladesh operation began in early 1970 by sowing discord among the disgruntled population of Bangladesh (then called East Pakistan), suffering repression by the Pakistani political establishment. This led to the creation of the Mukti Bahini. RAW was responsible for supplying information and heavy ammunition to this organization. However within months of independence of Bangladesh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated at his residence. R&AW operatives claim that they had advance information about Mujib-ur-Rahman's assassination but Sheikh Mujib tragically ignored[6] R&AW's inputs. He was killed along with 40 members of his family. R&AW thus failed to prevent the assassination which led to the loss of a charismatic leader who had a soft corner for India after all they had done for his country's independence. However, R&AW has successfully thwarted plans of assassinating Sheikh Hasina Wazed, daughter of Mujibur Rahman, by Islamist extremists and the ISI.[37]
  • Operation Smiling Buddha: Operation Smiling Buddha was the name given to India's nuclear programme. The task to keep it under tight wraps for security was given to R&AW.[38] This was the first time that R&AW was involved in a project inside India. On 18 May 1974, India detonated a 15-kiloton plutonium device at Pokhran and became a member of the nuclear club.[3]
  • Amalgamation of Sikkim: Bordered by Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and West Bengal in the Eastern Himalayas, Sikkim was ruled by a Maharaja. The Indian Government had recognized the title of Chogyal (Dharma Raja) for the Maharaja of Sikkim. In 1972, R&AW was authorized to install a pro-Indian democratic government there. In less than three years, Sikkim became the 22nd State of the Indian Union, on April 26, 1975.[3]
  • Kahuta's Blueprint:[39][40] Kahuta is the site of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory as well as an emerging center for long-range missile development. The primary Pakistani fissile-material production facility is located at Kahuta, employing gas centrifuge enrichment technology to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). R&AW first confirmed Pakistan's nuclear programs by analyzing the hair samples snatched from the floor of barber shops near KRL; which showed that Pakistan had developed the ability to enrich uranium to weapons-grade quality. R&AW agents knew of Kahuta Research Laboratories from at least early 1978,[41] when the then Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, stopped R&AW's operations on Pakistan's covert nuclear weapons program. In an indiscreet moment in a telephone conversation one day, Morarji Desai informed the then Pakistan President, Zia-ul-Haq, that India was aware of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. According to later reports, acting on this "tip-off", Pakistani Intelligence eliminated R&AW's sources on Kahuta, leaving India in the dark about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program from then on.[3][4][42]
  • Operation Meghdoot: RAW received information from the London company which had supplied Arctic-weather gear for Indian troops from Northern Ladakh region some paramilitary forces that Pakistan too had bought similar Arctic-weather gear[43]. This information was shared with Indian Army which soon launched Operation Meghdoot to take control of Siachen Glacier with around 300[43] acclimatized troops were airlifted to Siachen before Pakistan could launch any operation resulting in Indian head start and eventual Indian domination of all major peaks in Siachen[43].
  • Kanishka Bombing case:[44][45][46] On 23 June 1985 Air India's Flight 182 was blown up near Ireland and 329 innocent lives were lost. On the same day, another explosion took place at Tokyo's Narita airport's transit baggage building where baggage was being transferred from Cathay Pacific Flight No CP 003 to Air India Flight 301 which was scheduled for Bangkok. Both aircraft were loaded with explosives from Canadian airports. Flight 301 got saved because of a delay in its departure. This was considered as a major set back to R&AW for failing to gather enough intelligence about the Khalistani terrorists.[47][48]
  • Special Operations: In the mid 1980's, R&AW set up two covert groups, Counterintelligence Team-X(CIT-X) and Counterintelligence Team-J(CIT-J), the first directed at Pakistan[49] and the second at Khalistani groups. Rabinder Singh, the R&AW double agent who defected to the United States in 2004, helped run CIT-J in its early years. Both these covert groups used the services of cross-border traffickers to ferry weapons and funds across the border, much as their ISI counterparts were doing. According to former R&AW official and noted security analyst B. Raman, the Indian counter-campaign yielded results. "The role of our cover action capability in putting an end to the ISI's interference in Punjab", he wrote in 2002, "by making such interference prohibitively costly is little known and understood." These covert operations were discontinued during the tenure of IK Gujral and were never restarted.[50] B Raman the former RAW cabinet secretary, such covert operations were successful in keeping a check on ISI and were "responsible for ending the Khalistani insurgency".[51] He also notes that a lack of such covert capabilities, since they were closed down in 1997, has left the country even more vulnerable than before and says that developing covert capabilities is the need of the hour.[52]
  • Sri Lanka:[54][55] R&AW started training the LTTE to keep a check on Sri Lanka, which had helped Pakistan in the Indo-Pak War by allowing Pakistani ships to refuel at Sri Lankan ports. However, the LTTE created a lot of problems and complications and the then Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi was forced to send the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1987 to restore normalcy in the region. The disastrous mission of the IPKF was blamed by many on the lack of coordination between the IPKF and R&AW. Its most disastrous manifestation was the Heliborne assault on LTTE HQ in the Jaffna University campus in the opening stages of Operation Pawan. The site was chosen without any consultation with the R&AW. The dropping paratroopers became easy targets for the LTTE. A number of soldiers were killed. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi is also blamed as a fallout of the failed R&AW operation in Sri Lanka.[56]
  • Operation Chanakya:[57] This was the R&AW operation in the Kashmir region to infiltrate various ISI-backed Kashmiri separatist groups and restore peace in the Kashmir valley. R&AW operatives infiltrated the area, collected military intelligence, and provided evidence about ISI's involvement in training and funding Kashmiri separatist groups.[58][59] R&AW was successful not only in unearthing the links between the ISI and the separatist groups, but also in infiltrating and neutralizing the militancy in the Kashmir valley.[60][61][62] R&AW is also credited for creating a split in the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.[63] Operation Chanakya also marked the creation of pro-Indian groups in Kashmir like the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen, Muslim Mujahideen etc. These counter-insurgencies consist of ex-militants and relatives of those slain in the conflict. Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen leader Kokka Parrey was himself assassinated by separatists.[2]
  • Help to the Northern Alliance: After the rise of Pakistan and American backed Taliban in Afghanistan, India decided to side with the Northern Alliance and the Soviet Union[64] By 1996, R&AW had built a 25 bed military hospital[65] at the Farkhor Air Base.[66] This airport was used by the Aviation Research Centre, the reconnaissance arm of R&AW, to repair and operate the Northern Alliance's aerial support. This relationship was further cemented in the 2001 Afgan war. India supplied the Northern Alliance high altitude warfare equipment worth around US$8–10 million.[67][68] R&AW was the first intelligence agency to determine the extent of the Kunduz airlift.[69]
  • Kargil War: R&AW was heavily criticized in 1999, following the Pakistani incursions at Kargil. Critics accused R&AW of failing to provide intelligence that could have prevented the ensuing ten-week conflict that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of a full-scale war. While the Army has been critical of the information they received,[69] R&AW has pointed the finger at the politicians, claiming they had provided all the necessary information. However, R&AW was successful in intercepting a telephonic conversation between Pervez Musharraf, the then Pakistan Army Chief who was in Beijing and his chief of staff Lt. Gen. Mohammed Aziz in Islamabad.[70] This tape was later published by India to prove Pakistani involvement in the Kargil incursion.[70][71]
  • Operation Leech: Surrounded by Arakans and dense forest, Myanmar had always been a worrisome point for Indian intelligence. As the major player in the area, India has sought to promote democracy and install friendly governments in the region. To these ends, R&AW cultivated Burmese rebel groups and pro-democracy coalitions, especially the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). India allowed the KIA to carry a limited trade in jade and precious stones using Indian territory and even supplied them weapons. It is further alleged that KIA chief Maran Brang Seng met the R&AW chief in Delhi twice. However, when the KIA became the main source of training and weapons for all northeastern rebel groups, R&AW initiated an operation, code named Operation Leech, to assassinate the leaders of the Burmese rebels as an example to other groups. Six top rebel leaders, including military wing chief of National Unity Party of Arakans (NUPA), Khaing Raza, were shot dead and 34 Arakanese guerrillas were arrested and charged with gunrunning.[3][72]
  • War on Terror: Although R&AW's contribution to the War on Terror is highly classified, the organization gained some attention in the Western media after claims that it was assisting the United States by providing intelligence on Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban's whereabouts. Maps and photographs of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan along with other evidence implicating Osama bin Laden in terrorist attacks were given to US intelligence officials. R&AW's role in the War on Terror may increase as US intelligence has indicated that it sees R&AW as a more reliable ally than Pakistani intelligence. It has further come to light that a timely tip-off by R&AW helped foil a third assassination plot against Pakistan's former President, General Pervez Musharraf.[4][73]
  • 2008 Mumbai attacks: About 2–6 months before 26/11 Mumbai attacks R&AW had intercepted several telephone calls through SIGINT[74] which pointed at impending attacks on Mumbai Hotels by Pakistan based terrorists,[75] however there was a coordination failure and no follow up action was taken.[76] Few hours before the attacks, a R&AW technician monitoring satellite transmissions picked up conversations between attackers and handlers, as the attackers were sailing toward Mumbai. The technician flagged the conversations as being suspicious and passed them on to his superiors. R&AW believed that they were worrying and immediately alerted the office of the National Security Advisor. However the intelligence was ignored.[77] Later, just after the terrorists had attacked Mumbai, R&AW technicians started monitoring the six phones used by the terrorists and recorded conversations between the terrorists and their handlers.[78] On January 15, 2010, in a successful snatch operation R&AW agents nabbed Sheikh Abdul Khwaja, one of the handlers of the 26/11 attacks, chief of HuJI India operations and a most wanted terror suspect in India, from Colombo, Sri Lanka and brought him over to Hyderabad, India for formal arrest.[79]
  • Snatch operations with IB: In late 2009, investigative journal The Week ran a cover story on one of India's major clandestine operations that the R&AW ran with Intelligence Bureau to nab terrorists infiltrating India, via Nepal and other neighboring countries.[80] In order to bypass the lengthy extradition process, R&AW conducts snatch operations to nab suspects from various foreign countries. The suspect is brought to India, interrogated and is usually produced before a court. With emergence of Nepal as a terror transit point R&AW and the IB started closely monitoring the movement of suspected terrorists in Nepal. According to The Week in last decade there has been close to 400 successful snatch operations conducted by R&AW and/or IB in Nepal, Bangladesh and other countries. Some famous snatch netted Bhupinder Singh Bhuda of the Khalistan Commando Force, Lashkar militant Tariq Mehmood, Sheikh Abdul Khwaja, one of the handlers of the 26/11 attacks etc. most of the suspects are kept at Tihar Jail.

Controversies

From its inception R&AW has been criticised for being an agency not answerable to the people of India (R&AW reports to Prime Minister only). Fears arose that it could turn into the KGB of India. Such fears were kept at bay by the R&AW's able leadership (although detractors of R&AW and especially the Janata Party have accused the agency of letting itself be used for terrorising and intimidating opposition during emergencies). The main controversy which has plagued R&AW in recent years is over bureaucratization of the system with allegations about favoritism in promotions, corruption, ego clashes, inter-departmental rivalry etc.[81][82][83] R&AW also suffers from ethnic imbalances in the officer level. Noted security analyst and former Additional Secretary B.Raman has criticised the agency for its asymmetric growth; "while being strong in its capability for covert action it is weak in its capability for intelligence collection, analysis and assessment. Strong in low and medium-grade intelligence, weak in high-grade intelligence. Strong in technical intelligence, weak in human intelligence. Strong in collation, weak in analysis. Strong in investigation, weak in prevention. Strong in crisis management, weak in crisis prevention."[84][85]

  • In the February 8, 2010 edition Outlook Magazine reported on former RAW Chief, Ashok Chaturvedi, utilizing Government of India funds to take his wife along on international trips. After retirement, Chaturvedi had a diplomatic passport issued for himself and his wife. Per Outlook Magazine: "Only grade 'A' ambassadors—usually IFS officers posted in key countries like the UK and US—are allowed to hold diplomatic passports after retirement. The majority, who do not fit that bill, hold passports issued to ordinary citizens. In fact, all former RAW chiefs Outlook spoke to confirmed they had surrendered their diplomatic passports the day they retired. And their spouses weren't entitled to diplomatic passports even while they were in service."[86]
  • In September 2007, R&AW was involved in a controversy due to a high profile CBI raid at the residence of Major General (retired) V K Singh, a retired Joint Secretary of R&AW who has recently written a book on R&AW where it was alleged that political interference and corruption in the intelligence agency has made it vulnerable to defections. One of the instances of corruption mentioned in the book was the preference given by R&AW departments towards purchasing intelligence from the 'Rohde and Schwarz' company.[87] A reason for such corruption as explained by the author is that "...R&AW was not answerable to any outside agency - the control of the Prime Minister's Office was perfunctionary, at best - many officers thought that they were not only above the law but a law unto themselves."[88] A case under the Official Secrets Act has also been filed against V K Singh.[89]
  • R&AW was in the middle of a controversy when a Director level employee, head of the R&AW Training Institute in Gurgaon from 2005[90] tried to commit suicide in front of Prime Minister's Office on August 19, 2008, alleging inaction and wrong findings to a sexual harassment complaint filed against a Joint Secretary, who was on deputation to R&AW.[91][92]
  • Another controversy erupted for the agency when a senior technical officer was arrested by the CBI on graft charges, on February 4, 2009. The scientist, a Director level employee, worked in the division that granted export licenses to companies dealing in "sensitive" items, including defence-related equipment. He was accused of demanding and accepting a bribe of Rs.1 lakh from a Chennai based manufacturer for obtaining an export license.[93][94]
  • In September 2009, seven Additional Secretaries from the RAS cadre had gone on protest leave after A. B. Mathur, an IPS officer, superseded them to the post of Special Secretary.[95][96] Over the years the tussle between the RAS cadre and officers on deputation from IPS cadre has caused friction in the working of the agency.[97]

Defections and spy scandals

In recent years, there have been few high profile defections and scandals which have tarnished its image as an efficient agency.

  • In 2004, there was spy scandal involving the CIA.[98] Rabinder Singh, Joint secretary and heading R&AW's South East Asia department, defected to America on June 5, 2004. R&AW had already become suspicious about his movements and he was under surveillance and his telephones were also tapped. He was confronted by Counter Intelligence officials on 19 April 2004. Despite all precautions, Rabinder Singh managed to defect with 'sensitive files' he had allegedly removed from R&AW's headquarters in south New Delhi. This embarrassing fiasco and national security failure were attributed to weak surveillance, shoddy investigation and lack of coordination between the Counter-Intelligence and Security (CIS), IB and R&AW.[99] According to unconfirmed reports, Singh has surfaced in Virginia, USA.[100] Recently in an affidavit submitted to the court, R&AW deposed that Singh has been traced to New Jersey.[4][101]
  • In 2007, there was a spy scandal involving Bangladesh.[102] A Bangladeshi DGFI agent concealed his nationality, and was known by the name of Diwan Chand Mallik. He was known to have some important documents which were damaging for national security. He joined in 1999 and used to live in East Delhi. A case of cheating and forgery was filed at the Lodhi Colony police station on the basis of a complaint by a senior R&AW official.[103]

In popular culture

Unlike the more widely known intelligence services, R&AW gets little attention from the populace, which seems unaware of the existence of such an organisation or even India's internal intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau. However, efforts have been made to explain the activities of RAW in various movies. However, these films are directed to the more serious film-goer. Unlike Hollywood, which has portrayed FBI, CIA, MI6 etc. in various films, Bollywood has been shy to explore the area of espionage, especially R&AW on the silver screen. Excessive secrecy surrounding activities and rare declassification of information are blamed as the main reason behind this. However there are films from Bollywood which refers to agents, espionage, terrorism etc. but till recently none of them openly mentioned R&AW. One of the earliest Indian films portraying espionage was Prem Pujari starring Dev Anand in 1970. In 1973, just after the war with Pakistan came Hindustan Ki Kasam (Starring Raaj Kumar, Priya Rajvansh). However, films like The Hero: Love Story of a Spy (Starring Sunny Deol, Preity Zinta and Priyanka Chopra),[104] Aankhen (1968, Ramanand Sagar Production, Starring Dharmendra, Mala Sinha),[105] Such a Long Journey (1998, UK Canada Co-production, Directed by Sturla Gunnarsson, starring Naseeruddin Shah),[106] 16 December (Starring Milind Soman, Sushant Singh, Dipanita Sharma),[107] Hindustan Ki Kasam (1999, starring Ajay Devgan in double role, Amitabh Bachchan), Asambhav (2004), starring Arjun Rampal as Army Captain and Jammel Khan essaying the role of a fictional RAW agent Atul Bhatnagar[108] etc. have openly mentioned R&AW and its allied units. Popular Hindi movie Veer-Zaara has mentioned the intelligence agency R&AW, when the lead character Veer (portrayed by Shahrukh Khan) was accused by Pakistani police of being an undercover spy for R&AW. In Mission Istanbul, model actress Shweta Bhardwaj played the role of Lisa Lobo, a R&AW agent in Istanbul, who helps journalist Vikas Sagar, played by Zayed Khan, in foiling the anti - India terrorist attempts by a terror group. In Maan Gaye Mughal-e-Azam Rahul Bose plays a R&AW officer (Arjun Rastogi) who attempts to thwart explosives delivery in the city. In Chamku R&AW is shown as undertaking a covert program much in the lines of the Bourne series to build up an assassination team.

Apart from Bollywood, the other film industries of India have also cashed in on the patriotic appeal of espionage. Telugu movie star Krishna's film titled Goodachari No. 1 explores the life of an undercover agent working to thwart ISI activities in India. Cine star Bala Krishna's latest film in the direction of Swarna Subba Rao, titled Vijayendra Varma is based on a real life story of a R&AW agent, where he donned the role of the R&AW officer in the film.[109] The Tamil movie Ottran casts Arjun Sarja as a R&AW officer. A 1990's Malayalam film Highway portrays Suresh Gopi as a R&AW agent investigating a bomb blast. Kamal Hasan in a film titled Dasavathaaram and later a dubbed Hindi version titled Dashavatar[110] essayed the role of a Telugu (in original film)/Bengali(in Hindi version) R&AW operative.[111][112]

The thriving entertainment channels in India have also started to tap into the theme of Intelligence agencies. Time Bomb 9/11, a series aired on Zee TV, features Rajeev Khandelwal in the role of a R&AW field officer who attempts to defuse a nuclear bomb set in India, as well as saving the life of the Indian Prime Minister. Zee Bangla also featured a serial named Mohona where the chief protagonist is a R&AW officer.

In Anthony Horowitz's book Crocodile Tears, Alex is assisted multiple times by R&AW agent Rahim.

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Further reading

External links


http://www.enotes.com/topic/Research_and_Analysis_Wing


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