Daily Online Alochona: Dec 30, 2007

Sunday, December 30, 2007

[mukto-mona] Hereditary politics, democracy, and assassination in South Asia

Dear Sir/Mam,

I wish you Happiness and Joy and Blessings for the New Year

Thanks for publishing my previous write ups.

This is an article about "Hereditary politics, democracy, and assassination in South Asia". I will be highly honoured if you publish this article. I apprecite your time to read this article.

Thanks

Happy New Year

With Best Regards

Ripan Kumar Biswas
New York, U.S.A

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Hereditary politics, democracy, and assassination in South Asia

Ripan Kumar Biswas

Ripan.Biswas@yahoo.com

Assassinations are motivated by many factors including issues involving politics, religions, and differing ideologies. Groups, who have power, assassinate individuals threatening their way of life or the status quo, and groups who do not have power, assassinate individuals in positions of power to provoke immediate change for the betterment of their life circumstances or to establish their own ideology.

Threatened and accomplished assassination of political leaders has become increasingly frequent in public life these days throughout the world. Assassinations of hereditary politicians are designed to illustrate the vulnerability of the regime and inspire the public to believe individuals ideology and overthrow the state. Nations part of South Asia, are now in political turmoil, such a phenomenon has occurred earlier too, but, this time around its profound and no nation have political stability.

Assassination as a strategy to rid the World of a tyrant hasn't proven all that successful a tactic, instead bringing down a wave of militarism and increased tyranny. The historical response to hereditary assassinations in South Asia, were not popular uprisings not even to demolish monarchy, dictatorship or imperialism, but draconian measures. According to her mother Benazir Bhutto's will, Bilawal Bhutto, 19-year-old student of the Oxford University is going to follow the same footsteps of many other politicians in South Asia.

"It was not the life I planned, but it is the life I have. My husband and children accept and understand that my political responsibilities to the people of Pakistan come first, as painful as that personally is to all of us. I didn't choose this life. It chose me," Benazir Bhutto expressed these poignant words in the New York based The Huffingtonpost.com on September 1, 2007. But death chose her, in a violent burst on December 27, 2007, as it has done in the past for so many others thrust into political prominence in South Asia.

Historically, the political and government culture in South Asia is a strong product of its past that links to the pre-partition British Rule. What Pakistan's leaders or the leaders of other South Asian nations knew best from this inheritance was the so-called vice regal system that made little or no provision for popular awareness or involvement. In fact, what the British bequeathed was often a contradiction between theories of governance and their practices. Ideals of representative government and equality before the law were incomplete transformations.

In an immediate press conference after becoming the chairman of the Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Bilawal Bhutto quoted one of his mother comments that democracy is the best revenge to any political turmoil. But the most dangerous manifestation of this retreat from democracy has been a growing sense of hopelessness of the people of Pakistan, and a total disillusionment with the political system's ability to address their daily problems. And as people's sense of disillusionment has grown, there has been a corresponding growth in the spread of religious and political extremism.

Rioting subsided so far in Pakistan after destruction that left at least 44 dead and caused tens of millions of dollars in damage, but bitterness remained over the government's response to the gun and suicide attack that killed Benazir Bhutto.

Two months before her death, Bhutto sent an e-mail to her U.S. adviser Mark Siegel, saying that if she were killed, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf would bear some of the blame as because she had been made to feel insecure by his minions. Although according to the Pakistan's present ambassador to the U.S., Mahmud Ali Durrani, both Musharraf and Benazir were being targeted by the terrorists and extremists, Benazir had been given unprecedented security whereas she was two time elected prime minister.

It is now widely believed that al-Qaida or other religious extremist groups who don't believe in democracy were behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. But this is what is so sad and demoralizing. For all the talk of democracy and economic boom, assassination, the medieval means of settling political differences is repeatedly chosen over other political discourse.

Whether done for a specific political end, because of a general political difference, or because of a politically realized more personal discontent, what's so demoralizing about this kind of violence is its endless effectiveness at silencing more moderate voices and derailing political processes. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal have experienced more political and dynastic killings and attempted assassinations of national leaders (and their family members) than the rest of the world combined. Violence is at last cease to be an easy and common currency of political dialogue in South Asia.

The bloody saga of assassinations in South Asia has been started since the end of British rule six decades ago while Mahatma Gandhi, who believed in non violence, had been killed. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was killed by two of her Sikh body guards at her official residence in New Delhi on October 30, 1984 while her successor Rajiv Gandhi died when a LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) woman suicide bomber blew up at an election rally he was about to address near Chennai May 21, 1991.

Pakistan

's first Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, was shot twice in the chest while attending a public meeting in Rawalpindi - the same city where Bhutto was killed. Zulifkar Ali Bhutto, Benazir's father, was hanged to death April 4, 1979 on the orders of President Zia-ul-haq died in a plane crash on Aug 17, 1988 whose cause still a mystery today. Sri Lanka witnessed its first major political assassination when a Buddhist monk shot dead President S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike on September 26, 1959 in Colombo while a May Day rally in 1993, President Ranasinghe Premadasa was killed by a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber.

There is no denying that things in Bangladesh today are not the way they ought to be, let alone what they promised to be. After the bloody war of independence which secured an independent state from West Pakistan, the nation's first top two executives — Sheikh Mujibur Rahman along with his most family members and Ziaur Rahman were assassinated on August 15, 1975 and May 29, 1981 respectively. Nepal's King Birendra, his wife, and several family members were killed in a controversial killing on June 1, 2001 when Crown Prince Dipendra opened fire at them during a family get-together before killing himself.

These assassinations were not opportunities for fair governance, true democracy or vibrant civil society rather than encouraging non-democratic elements including the army or political or religious extremism. Even after half a century, nation in South Asia could not get cleaned from the feudal, tribal or non-democratic systems and sectarian segregations and the public has been left untutored in the kind of vigilance usually needed to hold political leaders accountable. The repeated dismissal or overthrow of elected regimes, alterations in the constitutions that suit to existing ruler, leaves no positive memory and little chance for institutions to adapt and supportive values to root.

Assaulting political parties, manipulating judicial systems, forcing political leaders into exile or arresting them, ignoring democratic values or women's rights, suspending freedom of speeches or press, or promoting political or religious extremism is the reminder of common dangers in this region. The recent assassination of Benazir Bhutto is nothing but a process to collapse all natural activities of a democratic country.

December 31, 2007, New York

Ripan Kumar Biswas is a freelance writer based in New York

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[mukto-mona] Happy New Year

Let the New Year bring all of us the happiness and courage to fight

fundamentalism and give us the opportunity to be united and solve the problems of

democratic forces in Bangladesh once for all. Thanks.

Sitangshu Guha. Jan 1, 2008.

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[vinnomot] Soldiers of good fortune : How Pakistan’s military came to dominate the state

Soldiers of good fortune : How Pakistan's military came to dominate the state

Ayesha Siddiqa.

The military is the major problem in Pakistan.Businesses and financial ventures in Pakistan, big and small, are run by and for the military. It controls at least 30% of

the economy and much real estate, its dealings are opaque and unaccountable,

and it isn't going to relinquish its privileges any time soon

A major newspaper in Pakistan recently claimed, on the basis of a survey, that most big businessmen prefer military to civilian rule. That is not surprising. Big business and the rest of Pakistan's elite have grown comfortable with a powerful military, one of the pillars of power. Pakistan's military considers itself responsible for disciplining rowdy and unpatriotic civilians, and tried to do so again on 2 November 2007, when Pervez Musharraf suspended the constitution and declared martial law, which he calls "emergency plus."

He claimed this was necessary to protect the integrity of the state and save it from religious extremists and terrorists. But it might also have been to protect the extraordinary political and economic power of the armed forces, often referred to as the largest political party. They account for at least 6-7% of gross national product, which makes them among the largest stakeholders in the economy.

Although generals have often suspended civilian governments and imposed martial law, this is the first time a general has done it twice: Musharraf came to power on 12 October 1999, by removing the civilian prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. This time he only had to impose military rule. The government has revised the 1952 act authorising military courts to try civilians: The army will not now have to seek civilian authority to try civilians and such trials will not be open.

Musharraf claims extraordinary power is necessary to help the military fight terrorism and religious extremism. In the past few months suicide bombings and attacks on the military have increased. Musharraf's main problem was with the senior judiciary, whom he accused of cultivating extremists by freeing them from prison. It was claimed that they allowed access to justice to 61 terrorists picked up by the intelligence agencies. The president saw the Supreme Court's decision to summon heads of intelligence agencies and senior police officials as demoralising.

But did Musharraf and his army impose its rule to fight terrorism? Musharraf has not told the truth to anyone: that fighting terrorism is just an excuse to repress the judiciary and civilian freedoms. The militants fighting the security forces in the tribal areas in North and South Waziristan or in Swat were created by the military's intelligence agencies. These violent extremists thrive because of their strategic significance to the army, not because of the judiciary. What Musharraf did not say in his 3 November speech is that the military's tactical approach to militancy has increased the threat of extremism to the armed forces.

The state of emergency is all about enhancing the military's power. After years of subordination the Supreme Court had started to reassert itself and was struggling to become independent of the military. This started after Musharraf sacked the chief justice of the Supreme Court on 8 March 2007. The lawyers' movement, secular and middle class, started in an attempt to rescue the chief justice; civil society began to be a little more free politically.

Who can challenge Musharraf?

Since the emergency and the resultant crisis, civil society and the political parties are struggling for their independence. Many hope Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) or the army will rescue them from Musharraf. Bhutto, who returned to Pakistan after striking a deal with Musharraf, now seems to be challenging his decisions. Her party has enough support to allow her to start a popular movement. But many people feel uncomfortable that she has been tainted by corruption and fear that she may sell out; it has been claimed that she negotiated with Musharraf to protect her from legal suits.

And it is hard to believe that anyone can challenge Musharraf, other than the military. The general-president has already checkmated Bhutto by putting her under house arrest to stop her from leading a procession against martial law. The regime is using repressive methods to pressure civil society and political parties. On 12 November, police were ordered to arrest 40 Islamabad students marching peacefully in silence.

The army would have a key role in deposing Musharraf. It has removed three unpopular generals including two army chiefs. General Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first military dictator, was removed in 1969 after he elevated himself to field marshal, and left the position of army chief because he became unpopular with the people. In 1971 the army's most senior officers told army chief General Yahya Khan to surrender power to a civilian politician, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (father of Benazir). General Zia-ul-Haq died in a mysterious air crash in August 1988. It is hoped that the army will respond to public opinion and find a way to remove Musharraf. But it may just suppress public opinion, due to a fundamental change in its character: It has now become a substantial financial player, and leading generals have huge stakes in the economy. Musharraf has bolstered the ability of the officer cadres to exploit national resources beyond the defence budget.

The current battle in the streets of Pakistan is not just about Musharraf. It is also about strengthening civilian institutions such as the judiciary and building the capacity to challenge the power of the military. But the officer cadre does not want to compromise its power, which it has held since 1958. After a humiliating defeat at the hands of India, which diminished the military's moral authority and ability to rule, army rule was briefly replaced in 1971 by civilian government under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The army chose to back him because he shared its rightwing nationalist agenda even though he talked about Islamic socialism. But his questionable policies brought back the military in July 1977. General Zia-ul-Haq then ruled until his death in 1988.

This civilian interlude under Bhutto did not strengthen democracy because of the military's interventions and the willingness of the civilian leadership, part of the ruling elite, to stay engaged with the army. The political instability that resulted, partly encouraged by the army, led to Musharraf's military takeover in October 1999.

The generals claim they had to intervene to save Pakistan from disaster at the hands of inept politicians. But their first intervention (martial law in 1958) was driven by greed for personal power and later for political and economic power. The powerful military junta has become a primary arbiter of national resources. Its power is critical in distributing resources to the officer cadre, especially senior officers, and civilian cronies.

Visible in every place and sector

A stroll through towns and cities shows the visibility of the army. Besides the huge monuments of ballistic missiles in the urban centres, there are local markets full of products made by factories controlled by the military; as well as tanks, aircraft and guns, they manufacture cereals, bleach, mineral water, cement, fertiliser and knitwear. There is even a bank. The military operates in agriculture, service and manufacturing industries. Military capital engages in the formal, informal and illegal economies, directly and indirectly. The army attracts a far larger share of national resources than any other state institution.

The military's economic power is an extension of its political power. Its ability to claim more national resources increases its net power against other domestic players. This huge share of resources dates back to just after independence in 1947, which led to the first war with India and resulted in the allocation of 75% of the budget to defence. Since then, the military has acquired an average of 30% of GNP, including pensions.

The military has built up a significant and mostly undocumented presence in the private corporate sector and uses many methods to exploit national resources with the help of retired and serving personnel. Corporate ventures are conducted with the involvement of the armed forces. Although most of the military is professional, these operations are like the Chinese-Indonesian model, in which serving personnel may engage in business ventures. This economy operates at three levels. In Pakistan there are hundreds of small cooperative-type businesses and three main organisations: the Frontier Works Organisation (the largest contractor for highways, dams and other construction), the National Logistics Cell (highway toll collection, largest cargo transporter, major construction projects), and the Special Communication Organisation (telecommunications in the northern areas and Kashmir).

These use their association with the military to get government resources and contracts. Most major road contracts are given to the FWO and NLC because they are reputed to be less corrupt and more efficient than civilian organisations. On the highways there are signs praising the FWO and the army, and urging people to feel grateful towards the company for doing a great job of constructing a good road. Such advertising is meant to hide the corruption and lack of professionalism in these companies, which are beyond accountability. A bridge constructed by the NLC in Karachi collapsed a week after it was inaugurated, killing seven people. The FWO, established in 1966 to construct the Karakoram Highway connecting Pakistan and China, will construct the Laih expressway: The contract, worth 18.8bn rupees, was awarded without open bidding. While the FWO takes 1.8bn rupees per km to construct this road, its main work of maintaining the Karakoram Highway is neglected.

The military also runs hundreds of garages, bakeries, commercial markets, restaurants, and even beauty parlours. These use state assets and are not even documented.

The five subsidiaries

Then there is a second level, the five subsidiaries of the military: the Fauji Foundation -- a tri-service welfare foundation controlled through the defence ministry; the Army Welfare Trust (AWT) -- controlled by the army; the Shaheen Foundation -- controlled by the air force; the Bahria Foundation -- controlled by the navy; and the Pakistan Ordnance Factories Foundation. These run over 100 major business ventures -- cement, fertiliser, cereal and pharmaceutical production, airlines, banks, finance, insurance, real estate, information technology and education. The production ventures bolster the military's share in heavy manufacturing to one-third of the total.

Most senior officers do not admit the military's association with these companies and claim they are civilian and only employ retired officers. These subsidiaries resemble the Turkish military foundation Oyak, which runs hundreds of businesses through investments from pension funds. However, these ventures are more than just the reintegration of ex-combatants; the military's political influence is being used to build a commercial empire, which is not transparent. Public sector accountability procedures do not apply to these businesses, even though they secretly draw funds from the government. Several audits published by the Department of the Auditor-General indicate the cost of resource misuse by military companies. For example, Askari Aviation, an AWT company that provides helicopters for hire, uses army craft without paying any money to the government.

These foundations are worth about 250bn rupees. The nature of the companies makes them relatively transparent; nine companies related to the foundations are listed on the stock exchange and so, inadvertently, are more visible than other areas of the military economy.

There is another level of the military economy that is very opaque: benefits for individual members of the military. The state provides billions of rupees worth of land and other resources to officers as welfare and post-retirement benefits. Personnel get rural and urban land and post-retirement job opportunities. Top-ranking officers are the greatest beneficiaries. Retired generals have house staff, such as butlers and drivers.

But the more important benefits have to do with land. Most senior officers own six or seven properties in different locations. Musharraf owns some eight properties, all expensive and obtained through his association with the army. More morally astute officers settle for one or two properties.

Then there are hundreds of jobs for officers in government departments, military-controlled companies and the private sector. Since Musharraf took over, some 1,200 senior officers have been employed by the public sector in key management positions. Nine of the 12 electricity supply companies have officers in senior management positions, so they are run by the military. Senior officers are appointed as ambassadors and even vice-chancellors of public universities. These jobs are in addition to opportunities in the companies mentioned earlier.

The private sector is keen to employ military officers who are seen as a way to get contracts using influence and contacts with comrades and government friends. This is an extension of the illegal economy, in which officers receive financial kickbacks. Many senior retired officers become defence contractors. Others use their influence to benefit their personal commercial ventures, a practice that dates back to the 1960s when General Ayub Khan made his son a business tycoon. General Zia-ul-Haq and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman (chief of the ISI during the Afghan operation) both had sons worth millions of dollars. The problem with military capital, which is justified as welfare, is that it tends to become predatory. It is natural for a powerful organisation known for its lack of transparency to use its influence to divert resources for the benefit of individuals.

Perks and privileges are part of the social contract between military personnel and the organisation. They are meant to make the military into a closely-knit community which defends its interests. We should not be surprised to see the military defending its political power and capacity to dominate the state. The military got into economic ventures because of its political power; now that it has so much to lose, it is not keen to transfer power to civilians. This balance has to be corrected.

A New Feudalism

In the desert town of Bahawalpur, 20 landless peasants told me how the local government was trying to force them off state land that they have occupied for a decade. The land had just been transferred to military personnel who wanted control of it, and the government did not care where the peasants went after eviction. "If they don't have room for us then why don't they push us across the Indian border," a woman complained.

Pakistan has more than 20 million landless peasants but no policy to distribute 93m acres of state lands among them. Instead, the land is given to powerful individuals and groups such as the military, which currently controls about 12% of total state land. Out of the 11.58m acres controlled by the military, approximately 6.9m go to military personnel. Distributing state land is a colonial practice started by the British to create friendly communities and reward the military. Unlike India, Pakistan has continued giving state land to officers and soldiers. The officers get more land than soldiers, as well as extra subsidies such as access to water and farm-to-market roads. These constitute indirect subsidies whose value is not even calculated.

The officers also get urban land, which soldiers don't. The military has converted state land into housing schemes in towns and cities; there are some two dozen housing schemes for officers. This state land includes military parade and exercise grounds and firing ranges. The military also use their influence to acquire private land at subsidised or low rates, and develop it with military resources. This brings huge financial dividends, and profits from real estate have made most generals multi-millionaires.

A conservative estimate is that the total worth of rural land given to military personnel is about 1,400bn rupees; the value of urban land is harder to calculate because of the lack of complete data. But the Defence Housing Scheme built on 720 acres in Rawalpindi, which earned its stakeholders a profit of 24bn rupees, gives some idea. In Lahore, the military authorities paid 11bn rupees for 3,375 acres, which they later sold for 135bn rupees.

Ayesha Siddiqa is a military analyst with a PhD in war studies from King's College, London, and author of Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy, Pluto, London, 2007.

http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=23391

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[mukto-mona] Soldiers of Good Fortune by Ayesha Siddiqa.

Soldiers of good fortune : How Pakistan's military came to dominate the state

Ayesha Siddiqa.

The military is the major problem in Pakistan.Businesses and financial ventures in Pakistan, big and small, are run by and for the military. It controls at least 30% of

the economy and much real estate, its dealings are opaque and unaccountable,

and it isn't going to relinquish its privileges any time soon

Who can challenge Musharraf?

Visible in every place and sector

The military also runs hundreds of garages, bakeries, commercial markets, restaurants, and even beauty parlours. These use state assets and are not even documented.

The five subsidiaries

A New Feudalism

Ayesha Siddiqa is a military analyst with a PhD in war studies from King's College, London, and author of Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy, Pluto, London, 2007.

http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=23391

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[vinnomot] Fwd: General Aurora and the looting by Indian Soldiers

Mr Isha Khan,

many thanks.you are really large hearted and patriotic man like the great Isha Khan.

Note: forwarded message attached.

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[vinnomot] Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto by Ayesha Siddiqa

Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto

Ayesha Siddiqa

Pakistan's opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was killed by an assassin on 27 December 2007 in Rawalpindi, just after making a speech to supporters of her Pakistan People's Party (PPP). This makes her the fourth in the Bhutto family to have died violently. Her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged in 1979, following his overthrow by the military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq. Benazir's younger brother Shahnawaz was murdered in 1985, and her second brother Murtaza killed in Karachi in 1996 (during her second tenure as prime minister). Many believe that both brothers were killed by Pakistan's intelligence agencies, just as they are ready to see some covert hand in Benazir's assassination.

Benazir Bhutto's political career began in 1977 after her father, prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was sacked. The death of Zia ul-Haq himself in an air crash in August 1988 opened the way to her own accession to power. Her own politics were far from radical; in any case, once in power she soon realised the strength of the military, which was instrumental in twice ousting her from the prime ministership (which she held December 1988-August 1990 and July 1993-November 1996).

After years in exile during the rule of Pakistan's military president, Pervez Musharraf, Benazir returned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007. The dangers were immediately apparent in an attack on her motorcade in Karachi which killed more than 140 people and narrowly missed Benazir herself. She threw herself into the effort to secure a return to power by mobilising her forces in the campaign for the elections scheduled for January 2008.

The lesson of tragedy

It was always going to be a tough struggle against many odds. For many urban and educated Pakistanis, Benazir Bhutto's political career was finished in 1996 when for a second time a government she led was overthrown. the grounds for her removal - charges of corruption - were never proved. Moreover, the political deal she had struck with Pervez Musharraf (no longer a general, but still Pakistan's president) meant that cases against her in the Swiss, Spanish and British courts were in the process of being withdrawn.

Among openDemocracy's many articles on Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf:

Ehsan Masood, "Pakistan: the army as the state" (12 April 2007)

Anatol Lieven, "At the Red Mosque in Islamabad" (4 June 2007)

Paul Rogers, "Pakistan's peril" (19 July 2007)

Maruf Khwaja, "The war for Pakistan" (24 July 2007)

Irfan Husain, "Pakistan's poker-game" (14 September 2007)

Shaun Gregory, "Pakistan: farewell to democracy" (29 October 2007)

Irfan Husain, "Pervez Musharraf's desperate gamble" (5 November 2007)

Iftikhar H Malik, "Pakistan: misgovernance to meltdown" (19 November 2007)

Irfan Husain, "Pakistan: the election and after" (10 December 2007)Many people in Pakistan criticised Benazir's decision to negotiate and forge an agreement with the military dictator. However, many others approved of her political move. They argued that since the military in Pakistan cannot be wished away, political forces have to negotiate their way to power with the defence forces and then try to change the system from within. This was termed the country's "transition to democracy".

Others disagreed; they believed that such a transition was not possible without some basic changes in Pakistan's governance structures - including the military's withdrawal from politics. The country could not transit to democracy unless a fresh balance was established among the various institutions of the state (especially between military and civilian institutions). Those who embraced the first view (transition without transformation) laughed at those who supported the second.

Sadly, Benazir Bhutto's tragic death proves that no transition to democracy is possible without some fundamental changes in the political system. The negative forces are too strong to allow any political player to establish himself or herself.

The day after the assassination - which in the accompanying suicide-bombing that followed took around sixteen more lives, and has been followed by violence across the country that (at the time of writing) has seen nineteen people killed - is one of intense speculation about the identity of the Benazir Bhutto's murderers. But a clear political judgment can already be made: that in the end, it was not necessarily the religious extremists but a different set of equally intolerant forces - what I call the political fundamentalists - who took her life.

In any case, "al-Qaida" is just a name which can be used to mean everything or nothing. It will now be difficult to find out who exactly killed Benazir - especially when the government made sure they washed away all forensic evidence in the twelve hours after the murder.

But this is not just an individual's death; it is also the killing of the only national party in the country. The fact that Benazir had held the Pakistan People's Party together also means that the party - in a condition emblematic of Pakistan as a whole - suffered from over-centralisation and over-personalisation. This combination of institutional and political failure underlines how important it is that politicians and civil society in Pakistan now carefully consider their options. The military and its cronies have to be forced to withdraw before democracy takes root in the country. As long as they refuse, the path of politics in Pakistan will remain extremely bloody.

http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/conflicts/india_pakistan/benazir_bhutto

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[mukto-mona] Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto by Ayesha Siddiqa

Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto

Ayesha Siddiqa

The lesson of tragedy

http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/conflicts/india_pakistan/benazir_bhutto

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[vinnomot] Re: [khabor.com] Despicable Indians raise rice export price to $500 per ton

we all should hate the inhuman act.again they proved that they are not a real friend or good neighbor

"M.B.I. Munshi" <MBIMunshi@gmail.com> wrote:

Dear All,

I thought I should share this as it confirms my comments in my earlier
email on Indian exports of rice to Bangladesh and its attempts to
influence political events in Bangladesh. The immediate effect of the
Indian actions will be to cause suffering to the people of Bangladesh
and raise the political temperature in the country in the coming
months. The question is why did not the interim Government take
precautions against this Indian duplicity –

India raises rice export price to $500 per ton

The New Nation – December 31, 2007

India in a surprised move has raised export price of rice to
Bangladesh to US$ 500 per ton, equivalent to Tk 35kg, rendering the
import from the neighbouring country uncertain.

Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) of Indian Commerce Ministry
in a notification that came into force on Sunday said no rice can be
exported to Bangladesh at price less than US$ 500 per ton.

Customs officials at the Benapole land port told UNB that India jacked
up the rice export price for the third time during this year - first
in February to 315 dollars, the second in October to 425 dollars and
now to 500 dollars per ton.

No consignment of rice purchased under L/Cs at previous price was
allowed to pass through the Petrapole land port. Barely 1,000 tons for
which L/C was opened before October and the Indian authorities agreed
to release arrived at Benapole port today.

Importers declined to open fresh L/C for import of rice at the
abnormal high price. They estimated that the landing cost of Indian
rice at the enhanced price would come to around Tk 38 or 39 per kilogram.

Mohammad Nasiruddin of Kazi Enterprise at Jessore, a rice importer,
viewed the Indian action as "an indirect pressure upon Bangladesh". He
said exporters in Burdwan, West Bengal, informed him that they could
easily sell quality rice to Bangladesh at 450 dollars per ton.

A senior customs official said no consignment of five lakh tons of
rice Indian pledged to sell has arrived till today. Indian External
Affairs Minister Pranob Mukherjee visiting Bangladesh in the wake of
November 15 devastating cyclone had committed that his government
would sell 5 lakh tons of rice to Bangladesh as a gesture of goodwill.

http://nation.ittefaq.com/issues/2007/12/31/news0963.htm

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Sunday, December 30, 2007

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[vinnomot] Re: [khabor.com] Despicable Indians raise rice export price to $500 per ton

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