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The Curious Case of the 195 War Criminals
Syeed Ahamed looks back at how justice eluded our grasp
MUNIR UZ ZAMAN/DRIKNEWS
As soon as the trial of war criminals began, questions were raised from different quarters as to how and why the 195 Pakistani soldiers were released in 1974 without any trial. It has also been argued that those 195 Pakistanis were the main war criminals and their release questions the merit of the current trial process.1
This article investigates the news reports that were published in international media from December 16, 1971 to April 15, 1974 to understand how and why those 195 Pakistanis were accused and released. It also explores the avenues the post-1971 Bangladesh government pursued to put Pakistani and local war criminals on trial.
To remain true to the fact, the article mostly cites news reports and avoids opinion pieces. Also, to remain consistent, the article mainly cites the New York Times, though similar news was published in other newspapers.
Relocation of POWs to India
Saving the Pakistani soldiers from the resentment of the Bangladeshis, who endured the most horrific genocide of that time,2 became a major challenge once Pakistan's defeat was imminent. Though it was argued that "given a few more months the Bangladesh guerrillas might well have won on their own,"3 India's direct involvement not only reduced Bangladesh's sufferings, but also came as a saviour for the failing Pakistanis. India being a signatory of the Geneva Convention had an obligation to treat the Pakistani POWs lawfully.
Hence, in the second week of December, Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi sent a request to the Indian high command for ceasefire. On December 15, 1971 Gen. Sam Manekshaw, Indian chief of staff, rejected Niazi's call and asked him to surrender by the next day. He however assured that safety of Pakistan's military and para-military forces would be guaranteed.4
When the Pakistani force made the rare public surrender to the Joint Command of India and Bangladesh on December 16, 1971, the "Instrument of Surrender" particularly highlighted this issue:
Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora gives a solemn assurance that personnel who surrender will be treated with dignity and respect that soldiers are entitled to in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention and guarantees the safety and well-being of all Pakistan military and para-military forces who surrender.5
Hence, when sporadic post-war clashes erupted in different parts of Bangladesh, India became concerned about the safety of the 90,000 POWs. Indian Maj. Gen. Dalbir Singh, who accepted the surrender of some 8,000 Pakistanis in Khulna, mentioned that their main concern at that time was to move the POWs to Indian camps and withdrawal of Indian troops. He also added that, since the collaborators were not covered by the Geneva Convention on POWs, "they will be the responsibility of the Bangladesh government."6
Trial of War Criminals
On December 24, 1971, Bangladesh's Home Minister A.H.M. Kamaruzzaman announced that Bengali authorities had already arrested 30 top Pakistani civilian officials and would soon put them on trial for genocide.
On December 26, widows of seven Bangladeshi officers killed by the Pakistanis asked India to help Bangladesh try the Pakistani soldiers for their crimes. In response, Indian envoy Durga Prasad Dhar, with an apparent reluctance, said: "India is examining its responsibilities [towards the POWs] under international law."7
The leader of the liberation movement Sheikh Mujibur Rahman -- soon after his return from captivity -- initiated a formal process of war crimes trial.
On March 29, 1972, Bangladesh government announced a formal plan to try some 1,100 Pakistani military prisoners -- including A.A.K. Niazi and Rao Forman Ali Khan -- for war crimes.8
The government offered a two-tier trial process -- national and international jurists for some major war criminals (probably for the high command of Pakistan army); and all-Bangladeshi court for the rest of the war criminals.9
Initially, India agreed to hand over all military prisoners against whom Bangladesh presented "prima facie cases" (essentially, presenting evidence) of atrocities.10
On June 14, 1972, India agreed to initially deliver 150 POWs, including Niazi against whom Bangladesh gathered evidence of atrocities, to Bangladesh for the trial.11
On June 19, 1972 -- ten days before the meeting between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi -- Sheikh Mujibur Rahman reaffirmed his commitment to try the Pakistanis.
It is important to note here that, contrary to popular belief, the India-Pakistan Simla Agreement signed on July 2, 1972 had nothing to do with the Pakistani POWs that Bangladesh wanted to prosecute.12
Pakistan Takes Bangladeshis Hostage
Many of the 400,000 Bangladeshis who lived in West Pakistan essentially became hostages at the hands of Pakistan government, who wanted to use them as bargaining chips to free the accused Pakistani war criminals. 16,000 Bangladeshi civil servants were discharged from Pakistan and were barred from leaving the country. Bangladesh alleged that many of its army officers were put in "concentration camps."13
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) also reported that many Bangladeshis were arrested in Pakistan just for their "alleged intent to leave Pakistan," and thousands were jailed without any charge. It also reported that the civilian Bangladeshis in Pakistan were facing serious discrimination and harassment and were being treated as "niggers."14
Facing widespread torture, hundreds of Bangladeshis began to escape Pakistan through the inaccessible "lawless tribal territory of Afghanistan."15 However, Pakistan government even placed a bounty of 1,000 rupees on each Bangladeshi seized while trying to leave Pakistan.16
The China Card
In a press conference on August 10, 1972, Bhutto said that Bangladesh believed "it had a kind of veto over the release of our prisoners," but "there is a veto in our hands also."17 Later on he confirmed that Pakistan had formally requested China to use its veto power to bar Bangladesh from becoming a member of the United Nations.18
Bhutto knew how critical it was for the war-torn Bangladesh to get the membership of United Nations and he used his friendship with China over this. When Bangladesh applied to the United Nations, China cast its veto on August 25, 1972 for the first time in the Security Council to bar Bangladesh's membership.19 Bangladesh was refused United Nations membership for wanting to try the war criminals.
The Trial-Repatriation Deadlock
Bhutto kept on insisting that Pakistan would only recognise Bangladesh after its prisoners were released. In November 1972, Bangladesh and India decided to repatriate some 6,000 family members of Pakistani POWs and, in response, Pakistan agreed to release some 10,000 Bangladeshi women and children held in Pakistan.20 However, the fate of most Bangladeshis trapped in Pakistan remained uncertain.
On April 17, 1973, after four days of bilateral talks Bangladesh and India announced a "simultaneous repatriation" initiative to end the prisoner-deadlock. Under this proposal, India would repatriate most of the 90,000 Pakistani POWs. In return, Pakistan would release the 175,000-200,000 stranded Bangladeshis and take back 260,000 non-Bangalis (Biharis) from Bangladesh.21
Bangladesh, however, made it clear that India would not release 195 of the initially accused Pakistani POWs and Bangladesh would try them, along with its local collaborators, for war crimes.
Pakistan accepted the proposal in principle, but agreed to take back only 50,000 Biharis. Bhutto however furiously refused Bangladesh's position to try the accused Pakistanis in Bangladesh. He threatened that if Bangladesh carried out the trial of the 195 Pakistanis, Pakistan would also hold similar tribunals against the Bangladeshis trapped in Pakistan. In an interview on May 27, 1973, Bhutto said:
"Public opinion will demand trials [of Bangladeshis] here … We know that Bangalis passed on information during the war. There will be specific charges. How many will be tried, I cannot say."22
To prove that it was not just an empty threat, Pakistan government quickly seized 203 Bengalis as "virtual hostages" for the 195 soldiers.23 Bhutto also argued that, if Bangladesh tried its POWs, Pakistanis who were already "terribly upset" would topple Pakistan's political leadership, and he claimed that his government had already arrested some top-ranking military officials for such conspiracy.24
Meanwhile, on August 28, 1973, India and Pakistan signed the Delhi Accord, which followed the Bangladesh-India "simultaneous repatriation" proposal. This allowed the release of most of the stranded Bangalis and Pakistanis held in Pakistan and India respectively for almost two years.
The tripartite repatriation began on September 18, 1973 and some 1,468 Bangalis and 1,308 Pakistanis were repatriated within the first week.26 Pakistan and India agreed that the issue of 195 accused Pakistanis would be settled between Bangladesh and Pakistan.27 Pakistan kept the 203 Bangladeshis out of this repatriation process.
Legal Preparations
Though a tripartite diplomatic impasse clouded the trial of the Pakistani POWs, the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order 1972 was announced to try the local war criminals. Bangladesh also continued to amend its legal system in preparation for the trials of both Pakistanis and local collaborators.
On July 15, 1973 Bangladesh amended its constitution for the first time to ease the process of the war crimes trials. Article 47 (3) of our national constitution, added under the first amendment, states that:
47 (3) [N]o law nor any provision thereof providing for detention, prosecution or punishment of any person, who is a member of any armed or defence or auxiliary forces or who is a prisoner of war, for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and other crimes under international law shall be deemed void or unlawful."28
On July 20, 1973, the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 was announced "to provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international law."29
Interestingly, though the trials of the collaborators were abandoned, Article 47(3) and the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 -- which offers the trial of war criminals including the "auxiliary" forces for their crimes against humanity -- were not cancelled by any government and are still applicable.
Simultaneous trial and Pakistan's apology
In response to Bangladesh's desire to keep the 195 Pakistanis out of the simultaneous repartition process, Pakistan government in the last week of April 1973 issued a statement saying:
Pakistani government rejects the right of the authorities in Dacca to try any among the prisoners of war on criminal charges, because the alleged criminal acts were committed in a part of Pakistan by citizens of Pakistan. But Pakistan expresses its readiness to constitute a judicial tribunal of such character and composition as will inspire international confidence to try the persons charged with offenses.30
After about one year, Bangladesh finally accepted Pakistan's proposal, fearing for the fate of 400,000 Bangalis trapped in Pakistan and to gain the much-needed access to the United Nations. With faith that Pakistan would hold the trial of the 195 Pakistanis involved in the wartime atrocities, Bangladesh withdrew its demand for trying the Pakistanis in Dhaka. Upon the formal understanding, the last group of 206 detained Bangladeshis was allowed to return home on March 24, 1974.31 It is clear that the 195 Pakistanis were not freed without charges, rather they were handed over to Pakistan so they could be prosecuted by the Pakistani authorities.
Bangladesh's position was then formalised on April 10, 1974 through a tripartite agreement among Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. It was reported internationally that Pakistan government offered apology to Bangladesh on the same day.32
Article 14 of the tripartite agreement noted that the prime minister of Pakistan would visit Bangladesh in response to the invitation of the prime minister of Bangladesh and "appealed to the people of Bangladesh to forgive and forget the mistakes of the past in order to promote reconciliation."
At that time, Bangladesh continued the trial of local collaborators and hoped that Pakistan would keep its promise and try those soldiers for the horrific crimes they committed against humanity.
1 Pro-BNP, Jamaat lawyers threaten to resist trial of war criminals, The Daily Star, April 17, 2010
2 For details on genocide and atrocities committed by the anti-liberation forces, see www.genocidebangladesh.org
3 Yohn, T. (2001) Letters to the Editor: Who Cares About the Bengali People? The New York Times, Dec 31, 1971; pg. 18
4 Text of Indian Message, The New York Times, Dec 16, 1971; pg. 16
5 Reuters, (1971), "The Surrender Document" published in the New York Times, Dec 17, 1971, pg. 1
6 Rangan, K. (1971). "Bengalis Hunt Down Biharis, Who Aided Foe", The New York Times, Dec 22, 1971, pg. 14
7 India Weighs Bengali Plea To Try Pakistani Officials, The New York Times; Dec 27, 1971; pg. 1
8 Bangladesh Will Try 1,100 Pakistanis, The New York Times, Mar 30, 1972; pg. 3
9 ibid
10 India opens way for Dacca trials. The New York Times; Mar 18, 1972; pg. 1
11 India to Deliver 150 P.O.W.'s To Bangladesh to Face Trial, The New York Times, Jun 15, 1972, pg. 11
12 For Text of the Agreement, see http://mea.gov.in/jk/sim-ag.htm
13 Pakistan Denies Charge, The New York Times, Apr 17, 1972; pg. 6
14 Official Reports 2,000 Bengalis Held in Pakistani Jails, The New York Times, Dec 13, 1972, pg. 3
15 Wave of Bengalis fleeing Pakistan, The New York Times, Nov 12, 1972, pg. 10
16 Official Reports 2,000 Bengalis Held in Pakistani Jails, The New York Times, Dec 13, 1972, pg. 3
17 Transcript of President Bhutto's Press Conference on Aug 10, 1972. cited in Burke, S.M. (1971). "The Postwar Diplomacy of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971". Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 11 (Nov., 1973), pp. 1039
18 Weekly Commentary and Pakistan News Digest, Nov. 24, 1972. cited in Burke (1971). ibid
19 A Veto By Peking, The New York Times, Aug 27, 1972; pg. E3
20 Pakistan to Allow 10,000 to Return to Bangladesh, The New York Times, Nov 23, 1972; pg. 15
21 India and Bangladesh Offer Plan For End of Deadlock on Prisoners, The New York Times, Apr 18, 1973, pg. 97
22 Bhutto Threatens to Try Bengalis Held in Pakistan, The New York Times, May 29, 1973; pg. 3
23 India-Pakistan Talks Reach Impasse, The New York Times, Aug 26, 1973; pg. 3
24 Bhutto Threatens to Try Bengalis Held in Pakistan, ibid
25 Bengalis and Pakistanis Begin Exchange Today, The New York Times, Sep 19, 1973; pg. 6
26 600 Bengalis, Pakistanis Freed and Flown Home; The New York Times, Sep 24, 1973; pg. 9
27 India to release 90,000 Pakistanis in peace accord. The New York Times, Aug 29, 1973; pg. 1
28 The Constitution of the People's Republic Of Bangladesh. See www.pmo.gov.bd/constitution
29 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 (ACT NO. XIX OF 1973). 20th July , 1973. Government of Bangladesh.
30 Pakistan Affairs, May 1, 1973. cited in Burke (1971) ibid pp. 1040
31 Repatriation Is Completed For Bangladesh Nationals. The New York Times, Mar 25, 1974; pg. 8
32 Pakistan Offers Apology to Bangladesh, The New York Times, Apr 11, 1974; pg 3.
By ISRAEL SHAMIR
Our real-life Neo did it again! In this new installment of Wiki-Matrix, the intrepid Julian Assange assaults the Empire while being pursued by ravenous Pentagon generals, shadowy CIA agents and overheated Swedish feminists.
Excuse me if I'm sounding like a teenager's comic book, but this story has so many twists and plots it makes my head swim. I haven't been this dizzy since my first days as an anti-Zionist writer, hounded and alone. One day I was approached by a venerable Hassidic man; I instinctively cringed, expecting an ugly scene. Instead of condemnation I was deluged with goodwill, and at that same moment an orchestra next door suddenly struck up an old Jewish wedding tune. This ancient blessing seemed to rocket me up, up and away from the modern nationalist cult of brutal force, up to a place where old traditions still had value and relevance. Or was that just Clark Kent doing his thing again?
The digital generation prefers the Matrix's Neo to Superman, but the dynamics remain the same. As Neo wanders Moebius' spaceship, he stumbles upon a group of down-to-earth, eager, sweet kids dedicated to the destruction of the Matrix. Hard as steel yet perfectly humane, these young men and women enjoy the camaraderie of an elite troop awaiting the signal to attack. They follow their leader simply because he is the best and the brightest. I felt this same esprit de corps on a recent visit to one of Wikileaks' safe-houses somewhere in Europe. This confluence of hackers and journalists was assembled in preparation to launch what will be known to history as Cablegate, or perhaps Megaleaks.
Here were Malena from Brazil, Joseph from Sweden, Sara from New Zealand, James from England, and numerous others no less important and valuable, all lounging on mats and sofas, laptops on laps and eyes peering into the heart of the Matrix. One quarter of a million secret and confidential US Embassy cables sit like so many digital wasps waiting to be released into cyberspace. They will strike at the tender underbelly of the empire, the flattering self-delusions that maintain the imperial armies. It just might be enough to turn the tide in the battle to recover our evaporating freedoms.
These dirty little cables throw a bright light upon the murky policies of the American Imperium, on their methods of collecting information, of delivering orders, of subverting politicians and robbing nations. Yet before we lapse into a comfortable and reflexive anti-Americanism, let us never forget that this, arguably the greatest revelation of criminal wrongdoing in history, was only made possible because brave and honest Americans were willing to risk life and limb to leak the truth.
Tensions run high when you dare oppose the awesome power of the Matrix. These bright, young cyber-warriors are willing to put their lives on the line for us. Will they survive the launch, or will some evil clones round them up and break them down? In any case, spirits are high and the weather is fit for such a daring enterprise: glorious high skies, a brilliant sun, and bright stars to guide us through the restless nights. Whatever happens I shall be forever grateful for these days, for the company of these charming young men and women, and for the inspiration of their charismatic leader. It is impossible not to admire Julian Assange. He is forever kind, quiet, gentle, and even meek; like the Tao, he leads without leading, directs without commanding. He never raises his voice; he hardly needs to speak and the way becomes clear. Our Neo is guided by the ideal of social transparency. Bright light is the best weapon against conspiracies.
On board the good ship Megaleaks, I leaf through the latest reports from the front line. There seem to be three main themes, all of which are centered on our plucky hero, Julian Assange. There is the "traitor" theme (which shrouds a globalist empire in patriotic colors), the "rapist" theme (in which a spurned lover is revenged upon our hero because he failed to produce a contraceptive device at the critical moment), and finally there is the "Zionist plot" theme (which is oddly tied up with the rape theme since one of his accusers has absconded to Israel). As in all well-designed disinformation campaigns, there is something for everyone: conservatives can jump on board with the traitor theme, liberals are fans of the rape theme, and the lunatic fringe can get excited about another Zionist plot. Let's do our best to liberate the enslaved name of "Zion" from the apartheid state and restore it to where it belongs: the good ship Megaleaks and the spotlight of truth. It is simply too good a name to leave to Zionists.
The full set consists of 251,288 documents dating from the 28th of December 1966 to the 28th of February 2010, originating from 274 embassies. Each one of these documents is either a secret diplomatic cable that was sent to the USA, or a communiqué from the Secretary of State to US bases. They show the orders given around the world, the intelligence the US government wants gathered and the information to be fed back; what diplomats discover about the places they are working, detailed notes of meetings with members of other governments and the opinions of the sender regarding those with whom they meet. The 261,276,536 words that constitute these cables would, if printed, fill over 3,000 books. These cables clearly depict the tentacles of US worldwide command and control.
The preliminary analysis reveals bad news as well as good news. Bad news: they are insidious. The files show US political infiltration of nearly every country, even supposedly neutral states such as Sweden and Switzerland. US embassies keep a close watch on their hosts. They have penetrated the media, the arms business, oil, intelligence, and they lobby to put US companies at the head of the line. The cables show that the United States is already maintaining a global empire.
And now the good news: they are not omnipotent. The cables prove that they encounter resistance on every level. They always push, but they don't always get their way. Russia is relatively free, so are Iran and Turkey; even the tamest European state does not always placidly submit. The cables add to our own intimate knowledge of the grassroots opposition in the UK and the US; online magazines like CounterPunch are beacons in a sea of fog.
The files reveal some brazen cases of interference. Many of the most recent are connected to Iran, which has become an obsession within the US leadership. For instance, just before the speech of President Ahmadinejad at the UN General Assembly, the State Department ordered the Europeans to leave the room at a certain cue. In fact, the European powers did jump to the US whistle that day, just as the obedient soviet satellites once leapt to Stalin's tune. There was only one country that violated the order: Sweden. The terrified representative had accidentally missed the cue and frantically sent distressed signals to the Americans for further instruction.
Consider the small and poor state of Tajikistan, who merely changed masters. It supposedly became "independent" in 1991, but what really happened? Nowadays, they jump to US orders just as they once did Soviet orders. An ambassador's cable says tersely: "the US called upon president Rahmonov to dismiss [the Drug Authority chief] Mirzoev and he fulfilled this request". Who shall save our poor little Tajikistan from the clutches of the Matrix? The ambassador gives us a clue: "We believe Russia is exerting consistent and strong pressure on Tajikistan to reduce the U.S. and Western role and presence. Moscow's pressure is beginning to take a toll."
Or consider Azerbaijan, where American influence has waned and the power of Israel has waxed to such an extent that a cable from the Baku embassy compares Israeli-Azeri relations to an iceberg with nine-tenths unseen.
It appears that American power peaked in 1990s, and now it has begun to slowly decay. Megaleaks is not so much a cause as a symptom of decline. With any luck, people of good will around the world can work together to gracefully degrade the machinery of foreign domination. Americans have benefited least of all from the violent and intrusive politics of globalism. Heroic figures like Julian Assange lead us toward genuine local control and away from a Matrix-like network of conspiracies.
Israel Shamir can be reached at adam@israelshamir.net
Sunday, 10. February 2008, 17:49