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Friday, December 3, 2010

[ALOCHONA] From Copenhagen to Cancun: low expectation prevails



From Copenhagen to Cancun: low expectation prevails
 
Farhad Mazhar
 
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The COP 16 of 2010 UNFCCC climate conference began in Cancun from 29th November and will go on for 12 days though amidst much lower expectation of achieving significant commitment from the developed countries on decreasing carbon emissions. After the failed climate conference, COP 15 held in Copenhagen, Denmark, last year, there is not much to expect from Cancun. In Copenhagen, the struggle of environmental activists and delegates of the developing countries resulted only in a non-binding agreement and a compromised and questionable text drafted late night. So far, climate change conference results have been anything but positive; same may be repeated in Cancun.

For countries like Bangladesh, climate conferences have essentially been reduced to negotiation for climate fund. Decision to create a new climate fund in the UNFCCC under the authority of the Conference of Parties is now being negotiated. This is the least Cancun may offer although details of the fund would still have to be worked out later; but Cancun can at least decide the process.

The UNFCCC meetings in Cancun include the 16th session of the Conference of Parties (COP16), the 6th session of the Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP6), and meetings of subsidiary bodies — the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWGLCA), the Ad-hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWGKP), the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice. (SBSTA).

Two issues are important. One is whether developed countries will commit sincerely to cut greenhouse gas emissions, and the other is, commitment of funds to developing countries — a commitment most developing countries including Bangladesh is looking forward to. Given the experience so far, there is hardly any possibility of a binding commitment to reduce greenhouse gas. The funding assurance may end up only in promises and papers. It is feared that the non-transparent small group drafting process that was followed in Copenhagen might be repeated in Cancun. We can only pray that Cancun seashore resort has better chance of seeing more sunshine than that of ice-cold Copenhagen.

The negative impact of the Copenhagen COP 15 is that although all predicted and unpredicted disasters and climate changes had happened in different parts of the world, due to non-binding agreement there was hardly any responses from developed nations. There have been many catastrophic natural disasters including floods in Pakistan which are linked to climate change. As it seems, in just one year the climate issue has become much stale in the global agenda. On the other hand, the elites of developing countries and particularly the environment ministries who were dreaming of getting billions of dollars as their share of the adaptation to climate disasters became dejected. No money finally came.

In the global economic crisis and intense competition for growth ability of Cancun conference to bring out a global climate change agreement has much reduced even compared to Copenhagen. Experts feel the chances are not bright at all. The unfinished tasks of Copenhagen do not attract the world leaders to take initiative to solve the problems; rather pre-Cancun meetings show lack of interest among the politicians. One of the major global actors, the US administration, is reluctant to make any commitment to cut emissions following the Kyoto Protocol. It is almost clear that the Congress will not adopt a comprehensive climate bill. Following the US, the other developed countries are also taking advantage of delaying their commitments in the Kyoto Protocol's second period that is to start in 2013. Countries like Japan are not even interested to extend Kyoto Protocol from its first period which will end in 2012 and if it is extended then it will start in 2013. But it is learnt that Japan itself may oppose Kyoto extension at COP 16. It seems that other developed countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada will support Japan as they are also against Kyoto's second period. European Union may prefer to shift to a new system. Among the developed countries, only Norway agrees to a second Kyoto period.

It means that in COP 16, the Kyoto Protocol may see its demise which was the only scope for the developing countries to create pressure on the developed nations. The demand is to cut emissions by more than 40 percent by the developed countries as a group by 2020 (compared to 1990). The figures have to be re-calculated to fit 2013-2017 as the second period proposed by the G77 and China.

The arrogant attitude of the developed nations is revealed by top climate scientists in a new UN environment programme which shows that instead of reducing emissions by at least 25-40 percent below 1990 level, by 2020, developed countries will actually increase their emission by 6 percent. Developing countries were demanding reduction by more than 40 percent. This is being anticipated if their pledge is low and loopholes in the protocol are used. A better scenario could be like emission cut by 16 percent if their pledges are higher and they restrain from using the loopholes. The calculations are based on the pledges the developed countries made under the Copenhagen Accord.

These pledges, together with the figures from announcements made by some developing countries, show that the world is moving in the direction of a global temperature increase between 2.5 to 5 degrees Celsius before the end of this century, according to the UNEP report. This is far removed from the 1.5 or 2 degree "safe limit", and is a recipe for disaster. This means in Cancun, one of the major and very difficult problems to solve will be the U-turn in the attitude of most developed counties towards their own emission reduction.

On the other hand new obligations are proposed on developing countries to enhance their mitigation actions; those actions that are internationally supported to be subjected to measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) as agreed in Bali. The finance and technology support provided by developed countries would also be subjected to MRV. The mitigation actions that developing countries fund themselves do not have to be subjected to an international MRV system.

While developed countries are not following their own obligations to Kyoto Protocol, they are pushing developing countries to newer obligations called the 'Bali-Plus obligations'. These proposed obligations include an "international consultation and analysis" (ICA) system to be applied to mitigation actions that are unsupported, and a much more rigorous system of reporting on overall mitigation actions through national communications (once in four years) and supplementary reports (once in two years). It may be recalled that the Copenhagen Accord was not signed by all the developing countries and those who signed did not necessarily agree with the 'imposed' text. So those countries, which did not sign the Copenhagen Accord, the need to undertake ICA does not apply to them, and those countries associated with the Accord do not agree with the stringent MRV and ICA systems proposed by the developed countries. Another obligation that developed countries are seeking to place on developing countries is to give the latter a large contributory role in the overall meeting of long-term global emission goals, such as a 50 percent global cut by 2050 compared with 1990. So the situation is much more complex in a more detailed way and it is unlikely that the twelve-day Cancun summit is enough to resolve these issues.

There is also difference of opinions between the developed and the developing countries. This difference emerged with regards to the creation of the new climate fund in the UNFCCC and under the authority of the Conference of Parties (COP). The Developing countries are willing to enhance their mitigation actions and to prepare more detailed reports. But to accomplish these commitments, they need funds and affordable access to new technologies to. The US has become the major obstacle in reaching an acceptable outcome. For the US to agree to that, there are conditionalities attached. They are demanding that there must be a Cancun agreement on mitigation with stringent obligations on reporting and international analysis on the part of the developing countries, and in which developed countries undertake a pledge and review system. The United States has clearly indicated that for it no agreement is possible without agreement on the entire package of elements as contained in the Copenhagen Accord, although these elements were actually 'not adopted' in Copenhagen but only 'taken note of'. But since the draft was actually presented by the US, it sticks to it as if it is the Agreement by all parties. This presents a major obstacle in achieving good outcomes in Cancun, such as the establishment of a new climate fund and of the technology mechanism.

Bangladesh is participating in the COP 16, as one of the highest top ranking countries according to Global Climate Risks Index (GCRI) 2009, among 193 countries of the world. It is one of the most affected by the adverse impacts of climate change such as rising sea level, floods and heat waves. The other countries in this list are Myanmar, Honduras, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Haiti, India, Dominique Republic, the Philippines and China. The Global Climate Risks Index (GCRI) 2009 conducted by Germanwatch on an annual basis since 2007, reported that on average 8,241 people are to die annually in Bangladesh because of climate-change effects. Bangladesh incurs an annual financial loss of 2,189 million US dollars, which puts 1.81 percent negative impact on the country's Gross Domestic Products (GDP). The sea levels in the Bay of Bengal rose about 3 millimetres a year until 2000, but have been rising about 5 millimetres annually over the last 10 years. According to the report, Bangladesh had to suffer both from significant number of deaths as well as direct economic losses exceeding 10 billion US dollars (in Purchasing Power Parties) among the countries most affected in 1998-2007 period. While analysing the impacts during the last decade (1998-2007) Honduras, Bangladesh and Nicaragua ranked highest.

The GCRI in its report analysis blamed a total of 37 industrialised countries for the ongoing climate change impact. So the solution does not only lie in getting more climate funds but to pressurise the developed countries to reduce their emissions to 40 percent. Reality tells us that there is lack of ability for the developing countries as well as inbuilt weakness within the conference process to assert that pressure. Climate Fund without pledges of emission cuts from the developed countries will be like giving treatment to the patient who is already dead. Unfortunately, our government delegates are not strong enough in putting pressures, but more efficient in asking for money.

Reference: TWN Cancun News Update No.1 & 2: 29 November 2010

————————-
Farhad Mazhar is a poet, social and human rights activist and the leading exponent of biodiversity-based ecological agriculture and lifestyles affirming joy of living within the community. He is also the Managing Director of UBINIG (Policy Research for Development Alternative).

http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2010/12/02/from-copenhagen-to-cancun-low-expectation-prevails/



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[ALOCHONA] Little Bangladesh must grow into its name



Little Bangladesh must grow into its name
 
The community worked more than a year to gain the official designation, but most stores in the L.A. neighborhood cater to a Latino or Korean clientele.
 
 
A new sign hangs at the corner of 3rd Street and New Hampshire Avenue in Central Los Angeles: Little Bangladesh.
 
Just behind it is a small shopping plaza with a Salvadoran restaurant, a pizza joint, a former Korean cigarette shop and a restaurant that serves teriyaki chicken, burritos and boba drinks. Across the street are more Korean- and Mexican-themed businesses.
 
The nearest store with a clear connection to Bangladesh, Bengal Liquors, is a block away. All told, there are fewer than a dozen shops owned by or catering to Bangladeshis along this working-class commercial strip flanked by apartment buildings.
 
Muhammad "Shamim" Hussain, a leader of the local Bangladeshi community, said that although the sign is significant, the community must work to make the idea behind it a reality. "The sign is the symbol," said Hussain, who came to the U.S. in 1981.
 
Community leaders applied for the neighborhood recognition more than a year ago. At first, the goal was much grander: to designate a 56-square-block area from 3rd to Wilshire Boulevard and from Western Avenue to Vermont Avenue — an area generally considered part of Koreatown — as Little Bangladesh.
 
The Korean community, which had not previously sought an official designation for the area, countered with its own application. And when the City Council voted on the matter in August, the Bangladeshis got only a four-block stretch of 3rd Street between Alexandria and New Hampshire avenues as their own.
 
But that strip doesn't yet have the look or feel of a Little Bangladesh. Most stores in the area cater to a Korean or Latino clientele, and many of the dozen or so Bangladeshi stores are blocks away. Aside from a handful of restaurants and grocery stores, the neighborhood features almost no other Bangladeshi shops or services: no clothing boutiques selling salwar kameez, the traditional two-piece attire worn by both men and women; no jewelry shops for bangles; no souvenir shops; no salons offering henna and threading services. And since it closed about a year ago, no community center either.
 
Since they began their effort, local Bangladeshis have been trying, with limited success so far, to open and relocate businesses to the area, both to show their presence and to provide needed services for the thousands of lower- to middle-income Bangladeshi immigrant families who live there. On any given day, women in brightly colored traditional dress can be seen walking the tree-lined residential streets, often pushing strollers or accompanied by small children. On the weekends, they are joined by men also wearing salwar kameez, but in white or beige.
 
Although the number of Bangladeshi businesses in the area hasn't risen quickly, the neighborhood designation is an acknowledgment of the local Bangladeshi presence and recognition that it has been positive, said Manju Kulkarni, executive director of the South Asian Network, a cultural and advocacy group with an office nearby.
 
The network estimates the current Bangladeshi population in the area at more than 20,000, based on a community mapping project it did five years ago.
 
"Now the people, they are going to say, 'This is my place, I have to build it up' … because this is the biggest news of our history in the U.S.," said Maminul "Bachu" Haque, who owns a travel agency a few blocks away and is interested in relocating to the new district. He moved from Bangladesh to the U.S. in 1983.
 
Councilman Tom LaBonge, who represents the area, led the effort to forge a compromise between the Bangladeshi and Korean communities. LaBonge said he had initially wanted to designate a stretch of 3rd Street as an "international mile" because of its Korean, Salvadoran, Oaxacan and Bangladeshi shops and restaurants. But the Bangladeshis were insistent, he said.
 
Chang Lee, Koreatown development chairman for the L.A. Korean American Chamber of Commerce, was among those from the Korean and Bangladeshi communities who toured the area with LaBonge a year ago to decide on the boundaries for the new neighborhood designation. He said he expected it to take a while for the relative newcomers to establish as many businesses as his compatriots have during their 40-year presence in the area.
 
"Their stay in that area is not that long, so it will take some time," Lee said of the Bangladeshis. "It's their responsibility to turn that into Little Bangladesh, not just having the name for the name's sake."
 
There are some signs of progress. The new owner of the 99-cent store at 3rd and Ardmore Avenue plans to open a halal butcher shop next door, catering to the area's new Muslim residents. And a halal butcher nearby is looking to open a restaurant. Other Bangladeshi merchants are looking at every open storefront but say the rents are too high.
 
The community regards Little India in Artesia as a model. Although Little India, unlike Little Bangladesh, doesn't have an official county designation, it is known across the region as the place to go for saris, gold jewelry and Indian food. The new neighborhood must work to establish that kind of recognition, its leaders said.
 
When people come to the area, Hussain said, they should enjoy a full Bangladeshi experience.
 
On Dec. 16, the anniversary of Bangladesh's 1971 victory over Pakistan in its war of independence, residents hope to close several blocks of 3rd Street for a celebration. By then, they hope the Bangladeshi-owned businesses along the strip — even those catering to a Latino clientele — will feature signs in Bangla.
 
In a cramped second-floor apartment one block north of 3rd, Taslimah Parveen sells formal and casual salwar kameez she brings back from annual trips to Bangladesh. When customers arrive, she brings out large plastic bins full of the folded two-piece outfits, many of them beaded.
 
For the last few years, Parveen has been looking for a small shop where she could open a boutique instead of selling the clothing in her living room or driving to Little India.
 
Many of the Bangladeshi women she knows make the drive to Artesia for such things as threading, a hair removal method, or henna at an accommodating salon. Many end up "spending $20 on gas to do a $5 threading," her daughter, Mahajabeen Mahtab, said.
 
Parveen has looked at four or five stores, but rents that were already too expensive at $2.50 per square foot have risen to $3 and higher, her daughter said. The area's comparatively high rents were the reason for the closure last year of the community center that had stood for several years near Deshi, a popular grocery and restaurant featuring Bangladeshi and Indian food, Hussain said.
 
"I think we need the whole boutique thing, the culture," Mahtab said. "I think they can do a lot better. I think they can get a lot more stores. But it's tough."
 
 



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[ALOCHONA] Fwd: Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad: An Interpretive Study





---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Zoglul Husain zoglul@hotmail.co.uk


Thank you. In 1971, we wanted independence for one reason, but India wanted to divide Pakistan for another reason. The observers, who see one aspect and not the other, will invariably fall into the trap of tunnel vision. Mujib regime massacred thirty thousand patriots and caused the man-made famine in which three- to five hundred-thousand people perished. His regime was fully under Indian control. Rakkhi Bahini was raised and commanded by India and the Army was made powerless in the cantonment as per India's 7-point agreement with Tajuddin, which stipulated that Bangladesh would have no Army, but would have National Guard only for internal law and order. 
 
How could the writer have missed these, unless he wanted to cover up Indian hegemonism?? However, he recognised the reign of terror of Mujib regime to some extent.
 

Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2010 10:27:04 +0600
Subject: Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad: An Interpretive Study
From: bdmailer@gmail.com


Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad: An Interpretive Study
 
by Lawrence Ziring
 
 
In the first twenty years following independence, Bangladesh experienced almost constant trauma. Hundreds of thousands, possibly millions of Bengalis perished in the creation of Bangladesh. Thousands more died as a consequence of the violent political struggle in the years after independence. Bangladesh's ethos is also its legacy. The country has yet to find a formula, an acceptable political system that can provide it with the tranquility it so desperately needs to effectively confront its enormous human dilemma. Bangladesh is a country challenged by contradictions; nevertheless, it is a national entry with a particular and historic heritage. Cultural fusion had succeeded in Bangladesh prior to the formation of the state. The Bengalis were a community prior to their demand for self-determination. No over-arching ideology was necessary to bind them to one another. National yearnings were a direct result of cultural intimacies. But despite this apparent harmony of interests, the search for a political system has been full of pitfalls. The story of this search is the story of Bangladesh's political leaders and their roles in administering to a new nation. The first twenty years of Bangladesh were dominated by political personalities, who although seeking to articulate the sentiments of their people, failed to establish the rapport needed to achieve their goals.
 
Excerpts:

"Mujib believed he was Bangladesh, more so that he was good for the country and that it could not manage without him. Those who reinforced Mujib's impression of himself and his role did so because it benefited them politically or materially, not because they truly believed in his leadership." (p. 93)

"Mujib's bitter struggle with the army high command is illustrated by the decision to construct the Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini or National Security Force.…The Rakhi Bahini had quickly developed a reputation for intimidation and wanton aggression against the Bengali nation. Opinion was strong that that the para-military organization was no different from Hitler's Brown Shirts or the Gestapo. To informed observers as well as to a large segment of the population, Mujib and the Rakhi Bahini, not the Bangladesh army, posed the more significant threat to the country. The Bangladesh army, therefore, began to think of itself as the nation's salvation, the 'true' friend of Bengal." (pp 97 – 98)

"Unrestrained by law or law enforcement, defiant of the formal military establishment, gangs of toughs, many identified with the Rakhi Bahini even if they were without any official affiliation, roamed the countryside, looting the poor villagers and committing bodily harm on those resisting their demands. In the name of protecting society, the Rakhi Bahini, Bangabandhu's own, was viewed employing methods no different from the other anarchic groups." (p 98)

"In point of fact, Mujib exerted little if any control as the Rakshi Bahini assumed a life of its own and took upon itself the responsibility of eliminating Mujib's adversaries." (p 98)

"By 1974, several thousand local politicians had paid with their lives for their defiance or support of Mujibur Rahman. [Footnote: The environment of violence contributed to the events that ultimately took Mujib's life.] (p 99)."

"The momentum of violence had shifted from non-governmental to quasi-governmental contingents. Mujib, therefore, could not avoid the responsibility for the climate of fear and terror that gripped the country. Many of those allegedly killed by the Rakhi Bahini were rural leaders who had defeated Awami League candidates in the local polls that followed the parliamentary election (p 99)."

"Famine, always a threat, spread through the countryside in the summer of 1974, and no one, in or outside the government, seemed capable or willing to effectively grapple with the situation. Mujib was forced to acknowledge the starvation deaths of almost 30,000 people, and that was known to be a very low estimate (p 99)." [According to the Britannica, the figure was around 50,000, and there was food in the country, but the food was exported to India: see 'famine', Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th edition.]

"Thus, rather than starve in their remote villages, tens of thousands of peasants trekked to the towns and cities in search of relief….The task of keeping the famine-stricken outside the city limits was given to the Rakhi Bahini which showed little sympathy for their plight. The popular reaction to this callous display, this apparent breaking of a sacred promise, was predictable. Mujib was held accountable and he finally could not talk himself out of a hopeless situation. Empty words and gestures were exposed and the 'Friend of Bengal' witnessed the fading of his beleaguered popularity (p 100)."

"By the end of 1974, four thousand Awami Leaguers were reported murdered, including five members of parliament. There was reason to believe that many of the Awami League deaths had been cased by the Rakhi Bahini, which sensing a declining government apparatus and the loss of Mujib's prestige, sought to advance as well as protect itself….Mujib's fear had reached panic levels and he understood that this crisis would not pass. In a fateful move, he tried to back away from his reliance on the Rakhi Bahini, publicly attacked their violent excesses, and called upon the regular army to contain and control the smugglers and criminal elements in and outside the government (p 100)."

"Mujib found himself entangled in a web of his own making. His first order exposed the Bangladesh army to the magnitude of the national problem. His second order proved to be more fateful. On 28 December 1974, Mujib proclaimed a 'State of Emergency' in the country. These acts implied a form of martial law imposed by civilians rather than the military. Mujib had swept aside the constitution. Eventually the parliament was itself dissolved and the Awami League was transformed into a non-entity. Mujib had already laid plans for his new functional organization that he said better reflected his goals and hopes for the nation. BAKSAL was the inevitable outcome of these manoeuvres, but it was to be short-lived. Mujib sealed his own fate when he abandoned the three-year-old constitution and publicly condemned it as a legacy of colonial rule….But Mujib's coup did not have army support (p 101)."

"In January 1975, Mujib had himself sworn in as the country's president….Mujib, not the Bangladesh army, had removed the constraints on the arbitrary uses of power (p 102)."

"Having reached a moment when the only instruments of government lay in the utilization of violence, the question that emerged centred on where the violence would be directed. Mujib must have believed he could punish his enemies, i.e., anyone who challenged his supremacy. Indeed, Bhutto shared that thought two years later. But Mujib, as Bhutto was to learn, had the violence visited upon himself (p 102)."

"Mujib presided over a court corrupted by power. It acted as though it could shelter itself from the realities of Bangladesh. But the license that might have been ignored in some other societies, could not be ignored in a country overrun by self-styled enforcers, gouged by profiteers, and raped by government officials. With literally hundreds and thousands dying from hunger, with millions more threatened, high living in Bangladesh could only be equated with debauchery and hedonism, with irresponsibility and indifference. To anyone with a grudge or a sense of national purpose, the conclusion was the same. Deliberate efforts had to be made to reverse course, and the only option for such a reversal lay with a new team, and the only team capable of making the manouevre was the Bangladesh army (p 103)."

"BAKSAL was not only a coercive assembly, it was predicated on the elimination of other organizations. BAKSAL was Mujib's way of expressing his One-Party State. Thus in a more significant way, BAKSAL was meant to serve the purpose of the Bangabandhu's personal dictatorship, not the cause of national development and unity. BAKSAL was proof positive that Mujib intended to convert the country into a personal fiefdom for himself and his family members, and his many detractors did not need convincing that their once respected leader, not they, was the real threat to the nation's 'democratic' future (p 105)."
 
 
Larry Ziring received his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1962. His present research interests center on the changing character of international relations and organization. He has most recently published on the geopolitical dimensions of international relations in the post Cold War era. Other publications include Pakistan in the Twentieth Century (1997), The International Relations Dictionary (1995), Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad (1992), and The Middle East: A Political Dictionary (1992). His teaching interests included American Foreign Policy, International Relations, The United Nations, and International Law.
 



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[ALOCHONA] What Badruddin Umar Say on Declaration of Independence in his book



Chapter Forty-Nine

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

 

 

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman carried the constitutional movement for East Pakistan's regional autonomy to its utmost limit. Regional autonomy, as visualized and demanded by the Awami League, could not really be achieved within the framework of the Pakistan state, the movement for it's achievement reached a stage in the month of March when it was no longer possible to push it further on the constitutional path. Or, in other words, there was a breakdown and collapse of the Awami League's constitutional movement for self-determination and autonomy.

 

But the movement, independent of the Awami League, leapt forward and broke all barriers in its way. This trend began more vigorously from 1 March 1971 after Yahya's broadcast postponing the National Assembly session scheduled for 3 March.

 

After 7 March the Awami League took control of the provincial administration, including the police and jail administration, without a formal summoning of the provincial assembly. This was done in the name of a democratic right, and in such a way that it could hardly be characterized as constitutional. With this move, the constitutional movement was stretched beyond the limits of constitutionalism and for a constitutional party, it was an exceptional achievement.

 

Had the Awami League not been a constitutional party and one whose programme was limited to autonomy within the framework of the Pakistan state, it could have declared independence on 7 March using the show of massive popular support as justification. At that time the Bengalis were in the majority in the army in East Pakistan and the Bengali officers and men were willing to mutiny against the Pakistan state and the West Pakistan army. They only needed a call from the Awami League leader Sheikh Mujib.

 

The Awami League did not move in that direction, because they had not thought of such a plan. Instead, they were entrenched on the constitutional path of non-cooperation when the whole country was seething with anger against the Pakistan government and would have risen as one in defence of an independent Bangladesh government had it been proclaimed by the Awami League. However, the Awami League, particularly Sheikh Mujib, got cold feet and, in spite of much rhetoric and bombast they remained stuck in one position and were incapable of taking the final vital step forward.

 

This crisis of nerve weakened the position of the Awami League, in spite of their control of the civil government of East Pakistan. The turbulence of the people, including the students, who were openly clamouring for independence, a stand which was noticed by the Pakistan army authorities, President Yahya Khan and also Bhutto. It was, therefore, not difficult for them to embroil the Awami League leadership in a quagmire of negotiations buying time to re­enforce the armed strength in East Pakistan as quickly as possible.

 

An in-depth study of the course the dialogue took, shows that with every passing day the bargaining power of the Awami League was on the decline and the government's negotiating team tightened its coils around the Awami League. On the evening of 24 March the dialogues broke down.

 

The military crackdown began on the night of 25 March for which the Awami League was completely unprepared and, as such, it was not possible for them to formulate a new plan.

 

War was unleashed on the people of East Bengal by the Pakistan government and the people took up the challenge. In fact, there was no need to formally declare a war or proclaim independence. The crackdown on the 25th night automatically and inevitably led the people to a war which was nothing short of a war of independence.

 

In the initial stage of the war, the principal leader of the Awami League, Shiekh Mujibur Rahman, surrendered to the Pakistan army and a number of his party men and followers fled to India 'as fast as their legs could carry them'.

 

These cowardly acts of the Awami League leaders clearly demonstrate that they had no plan whatsoever to declare and organize a war of independence in the eventuality of the failure of the dialogues.

 

Sheikh Mujib was not able to act in accordance with his reputation but nevertheless, in 1971, he had become a symbol of Bengali nationalism and the hero of East Bengal's struggle for autonomy. For this reason, in the absence of a better alternative

and at the critical moment of the military crackdown, he continued to be the central rallying figure.

 

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's surrender to the Pakistani army was so incredible that for quite some time the people and even a large number of Awami League workers, did not believe that he had not stayed with them in their struggle and was, instead, safe in the custody of the Pakistan government in far away West Pakistan.

 

Rehman Sobhan said in a public lecture1 in April 2002 that

 

The post-liberation debate over who declared independence of Bangladesh is thus a largely irrelevant debate. It is self-evident to anyone with common sense that the operative issue is not who declared independence but when Bangladeshis asserted their own independence, which they did during the month of March 1971.

 

This observation was curiously preceded by the statement that

 

The proclamation of independence by Bangabandhu on 26 March in response to the military assault on the Bengalis ordered by Yahya Khan, was a juridical act recognizing a de facto and legitimate authority.2

 

In spite of Rehman Sobhan's statement about the irrelevance of the debate on who declared independence, it was actually the Awami Leaguers who opened this debate after 1971 by claiming that Sheikh Mujib had declared the independence of Bangladesh on 26 March.

 

Rehman Sobhan says that Sheikh Mujib had done so `in response to the military assault on the Bengalis ordered by Yahya Khan.' This assault began on the night of 25 and 26 March and `in response to that' Sheikh Mujib is supposed to have declared the independence of Bangladesh. So, according to Rehman Sobhan, the declaration of independence happened on the spur of the moment in response to the assault on the people and it was not in accordance with any previous decision of the Awami League or in accordance with any plan worked out by them. Explaining this curious position he says, 'By the 25 March 1971 Bangladesh was already a sovereign state in the minds of its citizens'3 and proclamation of independence by Sheikh Mujib was a mere 'juridical act recognising a de facto legitimate authority.'

 

It has now been clearly established that this so-called `juridical act' of Sheikh Mujib did not take place because he was taken prisoner at midnight on 25 and 26 March. Moreover, it could not have happened for the very important reason that in spite of the fact that `By the 25 March 1971 Bangladesh was already a sovereign state in the minds of its citizens' there is nothing to show that in recognition of that fact, either the Awami League organization or its supreme leader ever discussed the question of independence in their central committee meetings or even as late as on the eve of the military crackdown on 25 March.

 

It was clear to everyone by 24 March and definately by 25 March that a military action was imminent. In the face of such an eventuality, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did not speak to anybody, including Rehman Sobhan, who met him on the afternoon of 25 March about a declaration of independence. Nor did he have any discussion with Tajuddin Ahmed, Amirul Islam or Kamal Hossain on the subject, with all of whom he was in constant touch.

 

On the afternoon of 25 March Rehman Sobhan said,

 

Bangabandhu told us that the army had decided to go for a crackdown. He went on to say, I quote from memory, 'Yahya thinks that he can crush the movement by killing me. But he is mistaken. An independent Bangladesh will be built on my grave.' Bangabandhu appeared to have a rather fatalistic attitude to what he seemed to accept as his imminent death. He suggested that a new generation would carry on the liberation struggle.4

 

The picture of Sheikh Mujib which Rehman Sobhan has portrayed on the eve of the military crackdown was certainty not the picture of a man who could possibly declare a war of independence 'in response to the military assault' about which, by that time, he seemed to have certain knowledge. An act like the declaration of independence of a country was, in effect, a declaration of war against an enemy armed to the teeth and it could not have been the act of a man who 'appeared to have a rather fatalistic attitude to what he seemed to accept as his imminent death.' It was the attitude of a man whose personal and organizational leadership had completely collapsed.

 

The declaration of independence is a highly political matter and it can happen as a result of a peoples' long struggle and the collective and formal decision of an organized party or forces which represent the will of the people. As such it cannot be an act of any particular individual, whoever he may be.

 

It had been claimed by certain Awami League leaders (though not by all of them) and intellectuals close to the Awami League, that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared independence in the early hours of 26 March 1971, in response to the military crackdown. It is, therefore, necessary first to follow the story as narrated by his followers.

 

In this connection it is interesting to note that the 'declaration of independence' story did not originate from Dhaka, though all the top leaders of the Awami League and the closest associates of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were with him on 25 March. Some of them, like Kamal Hossain and Amirul Islam, stayed at his residence till 10:30 p.m. on the 25th night. There is no evidence to show that the declaration of independence was ever discussed in the Awami League Central Working Committee or even unofficially by Awami League leaders like Tajuddin Ahmed, Kamal Hossain, Amirul Islam, Syed Nazrul Islam, Mushtaq Ahmed or any other.

 

The story of Sheikh Mujib's 'declaration of independence' originated in Chittagong and was circulated by the leaders of Chittagong Awami League. Yet it is difficult to establish, even from their evidence, that Sheikh Mujib ever committed himself to that position.

 

In March 1971, M.R. Siddiqui was the president of the Chittagong district Awami League and a member of the National Assembly. It is helpful to quote Siddiqui at some length.

While describing the situation at the time, M.R. Siddiqui said,

 

One ship MV. Swat carrying arms, ammunition, explosives and soldiers arrived in Chittagong. Being alerted, Awami League Action Committee urged the port workers not to unload the ship. Army tried to force the workers at gunpoint, but without success. They asked the EPR Jawans to shoot, which they refused. Then the army shot 7 EPR Jawans on the spot. Then they ordered the army in the cantonment to clear the ship. Brig. Majumdar asked for advice as to what he should do. I could not take a decision as refusal to obey would amount to mutiny and open confrontation with Pak army.5

 

So in spite of the Bengali officers of the Pakistan army and port workers being prepared for military and open confrontation in that critical situation, the Awami League leadership had no contingency for that.

 

Continuing his narration Siddiqui said,

 

I straightaway drove to Dhaka on 23 March for consultation with Bangabandhu and for his instruction. I met him in his house. He said he was hoping there will be a satisfactory conclusion of the dialogue and he does not think there will be a war as long as Yahya was there as president.6

 

Amazingly it appears from the statement of M.R. Siddiqui, who was one of the top leaders of the Awami League in Chittagong and later a member of Mujib's Awami League cabinet, that Sheikh Mujib reposed complete confidence in the goodwill as well as the capability of Yahya Khan to come to a 'satisfactory conclusion of the dialogue'.

Mujib spoke about Yahya in these terms when, according to all available evidence, the latter had already approved and signed the action codenamed Operation Searchlight.

 

In spite of Sheikh Mujib's complete confidence in Yahya, Siddiqui felt differently. He said,

 

I told him that war has started in Chittagong and I see all preparation for a full-scale attack. He asked me to hurry back to Chittagong to mobilize all forces there and defend Chittagong. In case of an attack he will escape to Chittagong and join us in the fight.7

 

A man who told Siddiqui on 23 March that in case of an attack in Dhaka he would run to Chittagong and join in the fight, had told Amirul Islam and Kamal Hossain at 10:30 p.m. on 25 March that if he left his house then the army would kill everybody in Dhaka and he could not let that happen and so had decided to stay in his house to surrender to the Pakistan army.

 

Judged in this light, Sheikh Mujib did not at all mean what he said to Siddiqui about his intention to join the fight. Moreover, the way he switched from a position of having complete confidence in President Yahya to his instruction to Siddiqui to hurry back to Chittagong and mobilize all forces there for resistance, hardly gives what he said to Siddiqui any credibility.

 

On hearing about Mujib's intention to fight, Siddiqui continued, 'I enquired when to give the green signal to Army, EPR, police and civil administration. He was not sure.'8 This was obvious, because he had never seriously considered resistance.

 

Then

 

Col. Osmani was called in for consultation and he suggested that when the Radio stops broadcasting we should take that as the zero hour. But I said that it could happen due to power failure. Then he said when they try to disarm Bengalis we should take that the war has started and resist. However, I rushed back to Chittagong but too late.9

 

Choosing the radio stopping its broadcasting as the signal was odd, because if the attack began at midnight or after, there would, in any case, be no radio, because the broadcast stopped at midnight. To say that the Bengalis should only begin to resist when Pakistani army made a move to disarm Bengalis, amounted to saying that up till a full-scale and all-out attack on the people and the Bengali army men happened, there should be no resistance. This was particularly strange in the context of M.R. Siddiqui's report to Sheikh Mujib in which he said that the Pakistan army had, in fact, shot seven Bengali jawans of the EPR because of their refusal to shoot the rebellious port workers.10

 

M.R. Siddiqui, while continuing his narration, said,

 

Twenty-fifth situation was very tense in Chittagong. We did not know what was happening in Dhaka. At around 7 p.m. I managed to contact Sheikh Saheb through his neighbour Mr Mosharraf Hossain and Mr Naeem Gauhar. He asked them to tell me that talks had failed. Ask Army, EPR and police not to surrender arms and give a call to people to give resistance. After this all communication with Dhaka was cut off.11

 

So it appears that there was no attempt from any Awami League leaders, including Sheikh Mujib, to contact Chittagong on the critical evening of the 25th. When contacted by M.R. Siddiqui through Mujib's neighbours he indirectly received a message from Sheikh Mujib who asked them to organize a resistance.

 

This kind of talk about 'resistance' by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was nothing new. He talked about it in his Race Course Maidan speech on 7 March 1971 as he talked about a freedom war. But next day he launched a programme of civil nor,-cooperation and engaged himself and his party colleagues in a dialogue with Yahya Khan and his negotiating team.

 

According to M.R. Siddiqui, he received another message supposedly sent by Sheikh Mujib:

 

On 26th morning at about 6-30 a.m. my wife Latifa received a phone call from Mr Moinul Alam [Ittefaq correspondent in Chittagong] who gave her a message from Bangabandhu received through wireless operators of Chittagong. The message read 'Message to the people of Bangladesh and to the people of the world. Rajarbagh police camp and Peelkhana EPR suddenly attacked by Pak Army at 2400 hours. Thousands of people killed. Fierce fighting going on. Appeal to the world for help in our freedom struggle. Resist by all your means. May Allah be with you. Joy Bangla. Message from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.' This message was passed on to me immediately.12

 

So this is the 'declaration of independence' where the independence of Bangladesh is not actually declared! There is talk of resistance and an appeal to the world for help in 'our freedom struggle.'

 

Is the declaration of independence of a country such a petty affair that this obtuse message can be taken, in all seriousness, as a declaration of independence? Why this obscure method, instead of an announcement to the country and to the world through the Dhaka Radio and Television. Why transmit to an unknown wireless operator quietly to be passed on only to M.R. Siddiqui through the local correspondent of a Dhaka daily newspaper? This is a pertinent question because the Dhaka Radio and Television centre were under the control of Bengalis at least till 10 p.m. on 25 March. That declaration should have been made by Sheikh Mujib himself. It could have easily been recorded in his residence with a simple recording machine in the presence of his party colleagues when the breakdown of the dialogue became known, and the military crackdown inevitable.

 

The likelihood of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman transmitting such a message was almost zero, because he had no means of sending such a message through the wireless. According to all available evidence, long before midnight, he became incommunicado, and he had no means to communicate with others. M.R. Siddiqui himself said that it was close to 7 p.m., after he received Mujib's message through his neighbours, that all communication with Dhaka was cut off.

 

Thus it is highly probable that the so-called message was a fake, one manufactured and passed on by some well-meaning and desperate individuals in Chittagong wanting to do something in that critical situation.

 

For the leaders of the Awami League in Chittagong, it was like a straw to a drowning man, and they held on to it firmly, taking it as a declaration of independence by their leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

 

M.R. Siddiqui passed on the message to the Chittagong Sangram Parishad (Committee of Action) on the morning of 26 March. According to him,

 

The Sangram Parishad immediately discussed the message and decided to announce the appeal over the radio. By this time the radio station at Agrabad was already inaccessible because of the presence of Pak army. We collected Belal Chowdhury, Sultan Ali and other staff of Radio Pakistan, Chittagong who suggested broadcasting the message from Kalurghat relay station.13

 

Interestingly the 'message of Sheikh Mujib' to the nation was in English! So

 

A draft of the announcement was made in Bengali by Dr Abu Jafar and others and it was decided that M.A. Hannan, general secretary of district Awami League, would read out the announcement. Accordingly, on 26 March at 2:30 p.m. Mr Hannan read out the historical announcement in the name of Sheikh Mujib which is known as the Declaration of Independence.14

 

On this M.A. Hannan said,

 

After return from Kalurghat it was decided that Bangabandhu's declaration of independence will have to be announced through the radio. According to that decision I, on behalf of Bangabandhu, declared independence from the Kalurghat transmission centre. In this I was helped by Rakhal Chandra Banik of the radio office and M.P. and M.N.A. Abu Mansur, Ataur Rahman Kaiser and Mosharraf Hossain.15

 

Professor A.R. Mallick, vice chancellor of Chittagong University, said that he heard Hannan's announcement, made from Chittagong Radio. 16 Others heard it in Chittagong, but there was no reports from outside that it was heard anywhere else. In any case, the announcement failed to have any impact on the people. The reason could be the vagueness of the message as a declaration of independence, and secondly, the inconsequentiality of the man who announced it. It could have galvanized the people effectively if it had been announced by any central leader of consequence from Dhaka.

 

On 27 March Major Ziaur Rahman of the East Bengal Regiment made another declaration of independence and from all available evidence, it is not clear what made him do so. He had had some contact with the Awami League leaders like Hannan, Ataur Rahman Kaiser and M.A. Mannan near the Chittagong Cantonment and in Boalkhali on the 26th, but Hannan does not mention any discussion held with him about the declaration of independence or about the message which reached them. It was, however, decided that Major Zia would come to Kalurghat on the 27th.17

 

After that there was no contact between the Awami League leaders and Major Zia, who went to Kalurghat on 27 March and having access to the radio transmission centre made a 'Declaration of Independence' on his own behalf-a declaration in which he styled himself as the president of the country!

 

Thus two declarations of independence were made, by separate individuals, from the same Kalurghat transmission centre.

 

On Major Zia's 'Declaration of Independence' M.R. Siddiqui said,

 

Major Zia and his troops were placed to guard the Kalurghat Radio Station. Next day on 27 March Zia went on the air and declared himself the President and gave a call for freedom fight. This confused the Awami Leaguers and the public. A.K. Khan who heard the news said that it will be interpreted as an Army coup and there will be no support nationally or internationally. He made out a new draft in English. Major Zia realized the mistake and read out the new draft saying Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the President and the call was on his behalf.18

 

Unlike the previous announcement, both announcements of Major Zia were heard by people all over the country and it had a tremendous impact on them.

 

Faruk Aziz Khan, later Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed's secretary in Calcutta, was stationed in Kaptai, a small town in the district of Rangamati in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. He described Major Zia's declaration in his book Spring `71 which was slightly different.

 

On receiving the news of the army action in Dhaka and elsewhere Major Zia immediately left the city and proceeded towards Cox's Bazar and on the way camped near Kalurghat radio station... Some Awami League activists and Chittagong radio station employees who thought that a radio broadcast made by an army officer would greatly help mobilise the armed forces against the Pakistani action approached Major Zia to make a proclamation that they had drafted and Major Zia readily agreed and the proclamation was made by him on 27 March in the evening that made him an instant hero. Major Zia's broadcast of 27 March 1971 is of historic significance. But it also increased the risk of our democratic movement against dictator Yahya being misunderstood by the rest of the world as an army rebellion. The recorded proclamation was repeated next day; this time a revised version which I learnt much later.19

 

Faruk Aziz Khan further said,

 

On 27th evening .... we heard the declaration of Major Zia on the Chittagong radio proclaiming himself as the acting President of independent Bangladesh. Next day the proclamation was repeated several times. He said that with the approval of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman he was proclaiming himself as the acting President of 'Swadhin Bangladesh'.20

 

Major Zia made a declaration of independence over the Chittagong radio on 27 March and it is an indisputable fact that, at that time, it was his declaration, and not Hannan's, which was heard throughout the country and created a huge impact. In the absence of any announcement from Dhaka, either by Sheikh Mujib or any other Awami League leader of consequence, people had nothing to hold on to at the critical hour of the Pakistani military aggression. Major Zia's proclamation created considerable enthusiasm among the people and particularly among those who were waiting to actively join the forces of resistance.

 

Major Zia's proclamation, in fact, was a chance incident. After the military crackdown on the night of 25 March the spirit of rebellion and resistance was aroused in the people throughout Bangladesh, including the Bengali men and officers of the Pakistani

armed forces. So, like Major Zia, there were many others who immediately opted for resistance. In Chittagong, Brig. Majumdar would have begun the resistance on the 23 March if he had not been prevented from doing so by the Awami League leaders of Chittagong. Major Khaled Mosharraf, Major Showkat Ali, Major Abu Taher, Major Shafiullah, Captain Jalil and others immediately decided to go to war. Even a retired army officer like Major Kazi Nuruzzaman actively joined the resistance forces. If they had had the same opportunity and access to a radio, some of them could have acted in the same way that Major Zia did.

 

However, it was Major Zia who made the historical proclamation on 27 March and it helped the resistance forces organize at a moment when the political leadership had collapsed. The civilians felt confident that the Bengali officers of the army would actively join the ranks of the resistance. The army men who were scattered in different parts of the country felt that a new opportunity had opened up for them to organize and participate in the war of independence. This was the basic historical significance of the proclamation of Major Zia on 27 March 1971.

 

It would be entirely wrong to conclude that in the absence of Major Zia the war of resistance would not have begun or that Ziaur Rahman suddenly emerged from being an unknown army officer to become the leader of the nation, one who could command the people to go to war against the Pakistani state. Such magic does not take place in history.

 

In a written public lecture Rehman Sobhan rightly said,

 

In the Bangladesh of 1971 it was unreal to imagine that an unknown army officer could proclaim independence for 75 million Bangladeshis without any authority to do so and could be expected to be taken seriously by anyone. Indeed, such anonymous declarations could only generate apprehension in the international arena that Bangladesh was degenerating into anarchy. At that time the only person who was invested with the credibility to declare independence in the legally acceptable sense of the term was Bangabandhu because he enjoyed both electoral legitimacy and had a total political mandate from the people of Bangladesh to speak for them.21

 

However, the fact was that in spite of being invested with the necessary authority, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman failed to rise to the occasion and instead of declaring independence chose to surrender to the enemy. In that situation, being under wanton armed attack, millions of people felt the urge to resist and declared to themselves the independence of Bangladesh. This urge was what was reflected in the proclamation of Major Zia and it was for this reason that it created such a great impact on the minds of the people-people who were under army attack and millions of others who felt the urge to join the war of independence.

 

Here it is important to note, that in spite of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's cold feet and his failure to act as the brave leader of his people in the face of the gravest crisis in the life of the nation, he continued, in the absence of a better alternative, to be a rallying figure and a political authority of the highest importance. This necessitated that his name be associated with the proclamation made by Major Zia, though in the first announcement it was done without any reference to him.

 

A lot of confusion was created from the beginning between the formal 'declaration of independence' and formal declaration of `the war of independence'. Obviously, they are not the same as real independence comes at the end of the war of independence, when the enemy is completely vanquished. So, first there has to be a war of independence and that beginning was made by the people themselves in response to the army crackdown on the night of 25 March 1971, without waiting for any leader's formal declaration. The announcement by Major Zia could not be classified as a declaration of independence. It was, in fact, a declaration of the `war of independence'. Real independence had to wait till 16 December 1971, when the Pakistani army formally surrendered to the so-called joint command of the Indian and Bangladeshi armed forces at Dhaka.       

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOTES

 

1. Rehman Sobhan, Bangabandhu and the Emergence of Independent        Back to main text

Bangladesh, public lecture-4, Institute of Liberation, Bangabandhu and

Bangladesh Studies, 2nd print, 21 April 2000, p. 20.

2. Ibid.        Back to main text

3. Ibid.        Back to main text

4. Rehman Sobhan, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 390.        Back to main text

5. M.R. Siddiqui, BFWD, Vol. 15, p. 182.        Back to main text

6. Ibid.        Back to main text

7. Ibid.        Back to main text

8. Ibid.        Back to main text

9. Ibid.        Back to main text

10. Ibid.        Back to main text       

11. Ibid., p. 183.        Back to main text

12. Ibid., p. 183.        Back to main text

13. Ibid., p. 183.        Back to main text

14. Ibid., p. 183.        Back to main text

15. M.A. Hannan, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 191.        Back to main text

16. A.R. Mallick, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 4.        Back to main text

17. M.A. Hannan, BFWD, vol. 15, p. 191.        Back to main text

18. M.R. Siddiqui, BFWD, vol. 15, pp. 183-4.        Back to main text

19. Faruq Aziz Khan, op. cit., p. 85.        Back to main text

20. Faruq Aziz Khan, op. cit., p. 85.        Back to main text

21. Rehman Sobhan, lecture, p. 2.        Back to main text

 

 

 

Source: Badruddin Umar's "The Emergence of Bangladesh", published by Oxford University Press.



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