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Saturday, May 14, 2011

[ALOCHONA] ISI :The Double Mirror



The Double Mirror

By David Ignatius Thursday, May 12, 2011



In the days after the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad — when the whole world was wondering whether the Pakistanis had known all along that he was there — I found myself reviewing my correspondence with officers of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. That's just one of the unlikely facts about Pakistan's fearsome intelligence service: its top operatives answer their e-mail.

The notes brought back to me the strange duality of the ISI, which I encountered in my first meetings in Pakistan with its senior leaders in 2009. They proved to be passionate correspondents. With their public face, they wanted to be understood — liked, even. But their private face was coldly ruthless, to the point of silently condoning attacks on U.S. soldiers by their allies. (See why the U.S. is stuck with Pakistan.)

I found that I couldn't capture ISI's nuances in newspaper columns. So my eighth novel, Bloodmoney, is set largely in Pakistan; it centers on a fictional ISI and a CIA whose operations inside Pakistan have spun out of control. I describe the director general of my imaginary ISI this way: "To say that the Pakistani was playing a double game did not do him justice; his strategy was far more complicated than that."

This Janus-like quality is true of all intelligence services, I suppose, but I have never seen an organization quite like the ISI. It is at once very secretive and very open, yet ISI officials get especially peeved at the charge of duplicity: "I cannot go on defending myself forever, even when I am not doing what I am blamed for," wrote one of my ISI contacts, after I had written a column noting the organization's "double game" with the U.S. "I shall do what I think is good for PAKISTAN, my country. I am sure you will do the same for US."

What this official wanted me to understand was that Pakistan was suffering under its own onslaught of terrorism. An ISI briefer almost shouted at me in 2010: "Mr. David Ignatius! Look at the casualties we have suffered fighting terrorism!" We're in alongside the U.S., ISI officials insist. Yet they are caught in the backwash of an anti-American rhetoric they help create. The ISI's press cell feeds Pakistani newspapers constantly; presumably, it thinks its U.S.-bashing leaks will hide the reality of the ISI's cooperation. But the puppeteer has gotten caught in the strings. Anti-Americanism has taken a virulent form that threatens the ISI too.

In late 2009, after an especially gruesome Taliban bombing that killed some of his colleagues, one of my ISI pen pals wrote: "WE MUST WIN, if we want our children to be living a life of THEIR CHOICE AND BELIEF and NOT OF THESE BEASTS. We want to get our beautiful and peaceful Country back from their vicious clutches. We can not allow them to destroy our future. They can kill me but NEVER my spirit, NEVER my free soul!!!" Who could dislike a man with such passionate punctuation? And yet back in the U.S., when I asked top CIA and military officers what the intelligence showed about the ISI's activities, they would become visibly angry. If you could just read the intercepts, they would say ... if you could see the double-dealing — how they take U.S. intelligence, for example, and pass it along to U.S. enemies in the Haqqani network.

And now, the very worst: we learn that bin Laden had been living for at least six years in Abbottabad, a city that is virtually a military cantonment. It seems implausible that the ISI wouldn't have known, but CIA officials say there's no evidence yet of direct Pakistani-government knowledge. The ISI's core problem is that it created paramilitary forces it can't control. In the ISI's case, the problem is the forward-deployed assets of the S (for strategic) wing, which were sent out to the tribal areas and Afghanistan to form what became the various Taliban factions and to Kashmir to create covert weapons against India. The S wing and its partner the R wing (which manages operations) are the tail that wags the ISI dog. The current ISI leadership has tried to bring them under control, but only halfheartedly.

This is the two-way mirror that shattered on May 1. And it has been a duplicitous game on both sides, it must be said. The U.S. has demanded the ISI's cooperation in fighting al-Qaeda but refused to disclose the scope of its operations. Our drones have operated from a Pakistani air base, for example, but we provide only "concurrent" notification of the targets — meaning after the Hellfire missiles have been fired. Like the Pakistanis, we want it both ways: operate as allies when it suits our purpose; operate unilaterally when it doesn't. The Pakistanis, for their part, fight the Taliban and other killers when it suits them, but they maintain a network of secret contacts with these same groups. They sup with the devil, claiming they're debriefing him.

In my novel, the CIA and ISI come to a deal in the end. Their war is resolved through the ancient tribal code that demands a balance of mutual respect, symbolized by a payment of blood money. I suspect something similar will happen eventually in real life. Even after all the recent recriminations, we will keep working with the ISI. And we will eventually negotiate with the Taliban.

What could make things with Pakistan worse — much worse, in fact? Confirmation of U.S. suspicions that the ISI knew where bin Laden was and sheltered him. President Obama says bin Laden had "some sort of support mechanism" in Pakistan. The cache of other material taken from bin Laden's compound will surely reveal the nature of that support network.

You have to hope the suspicion of ISI complicity isn't true. If it turns out they were hiding him, we won't have a double game anymore but a single one — an unambiguous and deeply dangerous confrontation.

Ignatius, a novelist, is a foreign-affairs columnist at the Washington Post.

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2070997,00.html


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[ALOCHONA] Why US is stuck with Pakistan



Why We're Stuck with Pakistan

By Aryn Baker / Islamabad Thursday, May 12, 2011

When the U.S. confronted Pakistan after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, there were no discussions of common goals and shared dreams. There was just a very direct threat: you're either with us or against us. Pakistan had to choose between making an enemy of the U.S. and taking a quick and dirty deal sweetened with the promise of a lot of cash. In the end, Pakistan's cooperation was a transaction that satisfied the urgent needs of the day, brokered by a nervous military dictator, Pervez Musharraf, who failed to explain the value of the U.S. relationship to his people. That allowed a theme to become fixed among Pakistanis: the war on terrorism was America's war. When Pakistani soldiers started dying in battles with militant groups, when suicide bombers began killing Pakistani civilians, it was America's fault because it was America's war.

So as Pakistanis processed the mission that killed Osama bin Laden, many concluded that they had been betrayed by their supposed ally. How dare the Americans sneak into the country without so much as a warning and conduct a military operation just 75 miles (120 km) from the capital? But they felt betrayed too by their military. How could it be that Pakistan's armed forces, which claim a lion's share of government spending, were clueless about the presence, a mere mile from the country's most prestigious defense academy, of the world's most wanted terrorist? Cyril Almeida, one of Pakistan's best-known opinion writers, summed up the national anguish in a column: "If we didn't know [bin Laden was in Abbottabad], we are a failed state; if we did know, we are a rogue state."

Pakistan is a bit of both. It's not hard to detect dysfunction in a state where the military controls foreign policy, national security and an intelligence network so pervasive that no dinner guest at a foreign journalist's house goes unscrutinized. The civilian government, hobbled by incompetence and corruption, has no power and, even worse, no backbone. In tea shops and on street corners, Pakistanis' frustration with their leadership collides with their inability to change it. Instead they lash out at the U.S. for reminding them of their failure as a nation.

The consequence is what Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, in an interview with TIME, calls a "trust deficit" with the U.S. Gilani insists that he can't mend the relationship with a wave of his hand. "I am not an army dictator. I'm a public figure," he tells TIME. "If public opinion is against [the U.S.], then I cannot resist it to stand with you. I have to go with public opinion." In a May 9 speech to Parliament on the Abbottabad raid, Gilani accused the U.S. of violating Pakistan's sovereignty and warned that Pakistan had the right to retaliate with "full force" against any future incursions. Others are more blunt: "To hell with the Americans," says retired Brigadier General Shaukat Qadir, a popular columnist and regular guest on TV talk shows. "We need to reconsider our relationship."

In Washington, that sentiment is echoed in Congress, where lawmakers are demanding to know why a country that has received more than $20 billion in U.S. aid over the past decade shelters and arms enemies of the U.S. even as it purports to hunt them down. "I think this is a moment when we need to look each other in the eye and decide, Are we real allies? Are we going to work together?" said Speaker of the House John Boehner.

It's not just the rhetoric that's heating up. Each side seems eager to poke the other in the eye. The U.S. has launched drone strikes at several sites in Pakistan since the Abbottabad operation, knowing full well that these will infuriate the Pakistani military, which sees them as a violation of sovereignty. For their part, Pakistani officials have told ABC News that they may give China parts of a destroyed U.S. stealth helicopter left behind at bin Laden's compound.

Yet for all the anger in Islamabad and Washington, neither nation has much of a choice. However duplicitous and volatile it may be, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is central to the interests of both countries. The U.S. needs Pakistan's help to be successful in Afghanistan. Pakistan provides, among other things, a vital transit link for goods destined for coalition troops in the landlocked country. But even without Afghanistan, the U.S. would need Pakistan to be stable. The alternative — a collapsing nation awash with terrorist groups and possessing a nuclear arsenal — is too awful to consider. How real is that prospect? "Pakistan is passing through one of the most dangerous periods of instability in its history," warns Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "[It] is approaching a perfect storm of threats, including rising extremism, a failing economy, chronic underdevelopment and an intensifying war, resulting in unprecedented political, economic and social turmoil."

Flaws in the Foundation
The relationship, in truth, has never been about trust. It was and is a strategic alliance founded on complementary interests: Pakistan's desire for military assistance and its fear of becoming a pariah state, and the U.S.'s need for regional support in the Afghanistan war. While Pakistan and the U.S. share similar long-term goals — economic partnership, stability in the region — their short-term needs rarely intersect. That is why the question of whose side Pakistan is on is so galling to most Pakistanis and so infuriating to most Americans. "Pakistan is on Pakistan's side," says Tariq Azim, an opposition Senator and Deputy Information Minister under Musharraf.

Carved from the newly independent India in 1947, Pakistan has never fully resolved the quandary with which its founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, wrestled: Is it a Muslim state or a state for Muslims? While his Indian counterpart, Jawaharlal Nehru, ruled for nearly two decades — long enough to realize his vision of a secular state — Jinnah died a year after Pakistan's founding. A succession of weak civilian governments and military dictatorships followed. In that period, India and Pakistan fought three wars, mainly over the contested territory of Kashmir. In 1971, Indian military support for separatists in East Pakistan led to the creation of Bangladesh. That humiliation informs Pakistan's actions still and its belief that India constitutes an "existential threat" capable of destabilizing and further dismembering Pakistan. That fear of India, in turn, explains Islamabad's quest for nuclear weapons, which was realized with a test in 1998.

For the first three decades of Pakistan's existence, its leaders, both military and civilian, ran a largely secular state. That changed in 1977, when General Zia ul-Haq took power in a military coup. He cemented his rule by instituting Islamic law and revising the educational curriculum in an effort to promote nationalism and an Islamic identity. Had it not been for the 1979 Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan, Pakistan's secular elite might have rebelled. Instead the country rallied in support of its neighbor, out of fear that it might be next.

Fearing the same thing, the U.S. supported Pakistan as it armed and trained Afghan mujahedin to take on the Soviets. This required both subterfuge and a certain amount of denial: since U.S. law forbade aid to a nation pursuing nuclear weapons, Washington chose to pretend Pakistan was doing no such thing. When Soviet forces pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan was left with more than 3 million Afghan refugees and a generation brought up with the culture of jihad. Then, in 1990, Pakistan's nuclear program was finally recognized, and the U.S., which had already cut aid, imposed sanctions on Islamabad. "You used us, and then you dumped us," says Qadir, the retired general, echoing national sentiment. "And Pakistanis are convinced you are going to do it again."

Uniform Power
The U.S.-Pakistan alliance in the 1980s vastly empowered the Pakistani military and its Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). American aid flowed through them, swelling their sense that they alone could safeguard the nation's interests. When Pakistan returned to civilian rule in 1988, the military retained effective control of national security and foreign policy, redirecting Islamist fervor against India in a protracted guerrilla war. Civilian rule lasted barely a decade. By the end of 1999, Musharraf, another general, had seized power in a coup.

The U.S. didn't seem that concerned. After 9/11, sanctions were lifted and aid restarted, with the Pakistani military again serving as the main conduit. In exchange, Islamabad would enable the free flow of supplies to NATO troops in Afghanistan, allow covert U.S. operations against terrorist groups sheltered in Pakistan and mop up any groups that threatened U.S. interests. Musharraf's replacement by a civilian government in 2008 didn't change the terms of the deal, but it coincided with growing concern in the U.S. that the Pakistanis were not keeping up their end of the bargain. While Pakistan was indeed doing battle against some terrorist groups, it also seemed to allow others to thrive: the Haqqani network, a group affiliated with al-Qaeda and which has attacked U.S. and NATO positions in Afghanistan, has safe haven in Pakistani territory. In the past two years, a succession of top U.S. officials have openly suggested that some of the most wanted terrorists were being sheltered by elements of the Pakistani establishment.

Since the killing of bin Laden, the Obama Administration has been careful not to finger Pakistan's government or military leadership. But the bargain struck in 2001 seems to have broken down. "Clearly, from an operational perspective, the fact that the U.S. executed this raid unilaterally suggests that there's not a lot of faith in that relationship anymore," says Stephen Tankel, a visiting fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's South Asia program. "So this seems to me an opportunity to try to engage with a longer-term view toward promoting civilian governance in Pakistan."

Many Pakistanis would like that as well but know from history not to hold their breath. "This is a golden opportunity for the civilian leadership to assert themselves," says Talat Masood, a retired lieutenant general who has long campaigned to get the military out of government. But, he adds, "knowing their capabilities, in all likelihood they will not. And that is the tragedy of Pakistan."

The Military Mind-Set
Why is Pakistan's civilian leadership so weak? The military is at least partly to blame. For the past two decades it has engaged in a campaign of divide and conquer, setting political parties at odds with one another. It has bought media complicity — either through intimidation or by threatening to cut lucrative advertising from military-owned enterprises. When politicians persist in criticizing the military, they are quickly silenced. One parliamentarian, who asked not to be named, says he received a series of harassing text messages within moments of criticizing the military. "A known pro-ISI journalist came up to me and said, 'Sir, they are going to make an example out of you,' '' says the parliamentarian. And then the text messages arrived: "According to news reports, you frequent a gay club in New York," the first one read. Then: "Hey, I just saw gay videos of you on YouTube." And finally, "Hi, I remember we had good times together. Love Boris."

All of which poses an obvious question: How could an organization that so closely monitors all aspects of Pakistani life not have known that bin Laden was hiding in Abbottabad? One explanation: it wasn't looking. "The fight against al-Qaeda was part of the larger effort to play a role in the war on terror, but you didn't have a dedicated al-Qaeda unit in the ISI monitoring activities in Pakistan," explains military analyst Rifaat Hussain. "It was a classic case of not paying attention to something under your nose." Pakistanis, in truth, are less concerned that bin Laden was in their midst than about the fact that the U.S. was able to find him there and enter Pakistani territory without the military's knowledge. "This leads one to a more serious question: Are our nuclear assets safe?" asked Pakistan's former ambassador to Afghanistan Ayaz Wazir in an opinion piece in the News, an English daily. (The notion that the U.S. is after Pakistan's nuclear weapons — more than 100 bombs, by some estimates — is one of many conspiracy theories trotted out on nightly TV talk shows.)

Yet if the raid in Abbottabad has taken some of the shine off the military brass, the generals can be relied upon to stoke anti-American sentiment as a diversion. The military is adept at making even good news look bad. In the autumn of 2009, when the civilian government cheered the prospect of U.S. legislation tripling nonmilitary aid, the generals stepped in to denounce its conditions as humiliating. The Kerry-Lugar bill marked the first time Washington had addressed the dire socioeconomic problems of Pakistan and the need to reinforce democracy there, but the military rightly perceived as a threat a rider stipulating that funds would cease in the event of a coup.

From outrage over drone attacks to hysteria over the CIA contractor who killed a pair of Pakistanis in what appeared to be a legitimate case of self-defense, anti-U.S. rage is the military's dependable standby. "Pakistan doesn't have positive leverage over us," says Christine Fair, a Pakistan expert at Georgetown University. "So [the military] creates bilateral fiascoes through their media wing and uses that to temper what Pakistan will or will not do."

One thing the military won't do is take on militants in North Waziristan, which serves as a haven for the Haqqani network. To retired ambassador Tanvir Khan, who served in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the cost of taking on the Haqqanis would be too high for Pakistan to bear. You have to pick your battles, he says. "If the army does in North Waziristan what the Americans want it to do, overnight the Haqqanis become enemies of Pakistan," he says. Already the military is battling insurgents elsewhere in the tribal areas. The Haqqanis "would be a much harder nut to crack," says Khan. And if the military were to dedicate its army to combatting militants on its western border, it would risk leaving its eastern flank vulnerable to attack from India.

Given Pakistan's fear of India, that is a lot to ask. That fear may have been fanned by a military establishment attempting to justify its outsize expenditures, but India has done little to assuage the paranoia. Indeed it contributes, massing troops on the border and, according to Western diplomats in Islamabad, sending agents into Baluchistan province, where a long-simmering ethnic separatist movement invites memories of Bangladesh. And it is India — not Pakistan — that has a deal with the U.S. for the peaceful exploitation of civilian nuclear power. "From the Pakistani point of view, we are the ones playing a double game," says Pakistan expert Fair. "We reject their security concerns, saying they are not relevant. Then we ask them to move their entire military in order to wage a deeply unpopular war, and meanwhile we give India a nuclear deal. No wonder they don't trust us."

Can't Live Without 'Em
Still, the awkward truth remains: The U.S. needs Pakistan. U.S. officials believe that bin Laden's death offers an opportunity to peel the Taliban away from al-Qaeda. And when that happens, Pakistan will be perfectly poised to offer its assistance. Though routinely denied by Pakistani officials, it is hardly a secret that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar has been using Pakistan as a base of operations ever since he fled the U.S. invasion in 2001.

With the target date for turning over responsibility for Afghan security to the Afghan army in 2015 approaching, there is near universal agreement that the Taliban will have to be involved in some sort of political reconciliation. "The Americans need the Pakistanis to negotiate in Afghanistan," says a senior Western diplomat in Islamabad. In Pakistani eyes, that justifies the policy of maintaining relations with the Taliban, says Senator Azim. "We are the only ones who are accused of keeping close ties, so Pakistan is the only country that [the West] can rely on."

Officials' knee-jerk denials of Pakistani support for the Taliban have turned into crowing triumphalism as leaders see a decade's worth of subterfuge bear fruit. Still, Azim makes it clear that his nation's interests will stay at the fore of any reconsidered relationship. Pakistan will protect its Taliban sources even as the U.S. demands greater intelligence sharing. So for Washington, says Azim, the question boils down to this: "A decision has to be made. Can you use Pakistan, with all its warts? My submission is that you don't have anyone else, so you might as well use us. Not by twisting our arm or accusing us. You know, do it nicely by sitting down with us and listening to our point of view. Our objective is to have a friendly government in Afghanistan. Americans want a safe, honorable exit. Let us help you."

Gilani, too, insists that the relationship can be put back on track. For example, "a drones strategy can be worked out," he says. "If drone strikes are effective, then we should evolve a common strategy to win over public opinion. Our position is that the technology should be transferred to us." And, he adds, he is prepared to countenance a strategy in which the CIA would continue to use drone strikes "where they are used under our supervision" — a departure from Pakistan's publicly stated policy of condemning drone strikes as intolerable violations of sovereignty.


What Gilani really wants is some love. Washington, he told TIME, needs to provide his people with a visible demonstration of support if it hopes to rebuild trust. The U.S., the Prime Minister says, "should do something for the public which will persuade them that it is supportive of Pakistan." As an example, he cites — of course — the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement of 2008. "It's our public that's dying, but the deal is happening there," he says in a wounded tone. "You claim there's a strategic partnership? That we're best friends?"

Then, casting his eyes up at his chandeliered ceiling, Pakistan's Prime Minister reaches for a verse. "When we passed each other, she didn't deign to even say hello," he intones, quoting the Urdu poet Mirza Ghalib. "How, then, can I believe that our parting caused her any tears?"

— With reporting by Omar Waraich / Islamabad and Mark Benjamin, Massimo Calabresi and Mark Thompson / Washington





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[ALOCHONA] Bin Laden & The 911 Illusion: Secret Societies & Masterminds



Bin Laden & The 911 Illusion: Secret Societies & Masterminds

by Dean Henderson



(Excerpted from Chapter 20: Big Oil & Their Bankers…)

 

The Secret Handshake

 

The Eight Families banking cartel and their Four Horsemen progeny find Islamic fundamentalism quite compatible with the global monopoly capitalism from which they derive their immense wealth.  Both ideologies advocate centralized control, intolerance of opposition, rule by decree and a return to feudalistic rule by monarchy.  They share common enemies in nationalism and socialism, which seek to redistribute ill-gotten wealth and power. 

 

Throughout history the "Illuminati bankers" have created Islamist provocateurs to terrorize popular nationalist movements that aimed to wrest control over their nations from the bankers' IMF/World Bank program of global domination.  The most recent examples of this are playing out in both Libya and Syria.  But this is an ancient alliance.

 

The Knights Templar worked with the Muslim Brotherhood Assassins to carry out Crusade-era plots against Saracen Muslim nationalists.  The founder of the Assassins was Hasan bin Sabah, who shares names with the Kuwaiti ruling Hashemite clan.  The latter had been employed by the British to repel the Turks from the oil-rich Persian Gulf region by the end of the 18th Century. 

 

After WWII CIA Director Allen Dulles- cousin of the Rockefellers- cut a deal with the Muslim Brotherhood-Benoist-Mechin- whose power center lies within the Wahhabist House of Saud.  The deal was cut in Lausanne, Switzerland. (1)

 

The Eight Families and their surrogate intelligence agencies backed Islamic fundamentalists during the CIA overthrow of the leftist Sukarno government in Indonesia in 1964. [2] 

When the Shah of Iran was deposed, the CIA and British intelligence provided fundamentalist Ayatollah Khomeini with a list of leftist Tudeh Party leaders whom they wished exterminated. 

In Afghanistan, the CIA launched its biggest covert operation since Vietnam, a $3.8 billion campaign which backed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezbi-i Isbmi acid-throwing extremists in their proxy war against a succession of socialist governments in Kabul.  These Frankensteins were then deployed throughout Central Asia and the Balkans to terrorize governments unfriendly to Four Horsemen and Eight Families hegemony.

 

Israeli Mossad used the fundamentalist Hamas as a fifth column against the nationalistic Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and has funded Egyptian Islamic Jihad along with fundamentalists in Jordan. [3] 

Former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat- a staunch banker ally- encouraged Islamists in his country as a counterbalance to pro-Nasser leftist groups. 

CIA-backed Islamists in Somalia tore that country apart for Big Oil.  The House of Saud finances most of these efforts. 

 

In 1996, according to the London Observer, British MI6 used al Qaeda operatives in Libya in an attempt to assassinate nationalist President Mohamar Qaddafi. 

 

Osama bin Laden supervised the building of CIA terrorist training camps at Khost and held accounts at BCCI.  He did so as an emissary of the Muslim Brotherhood House of Saud, once stating, "To counter these atheist Russians, the Saudis chose me as their representative in Afghanistan.  I set up my first camp where these volunteers were trained by Pakistani and American officers.  The weapons were supplied by the Americans, the money by the Saudis."[4]

 

Is it any wonder that 15 of the 19 hijackers on 911 were Saudi?  Or that 24 members of the bin Laden family were allowed to fly on private jets to a "secret assembly point in Texas" shortly after 911, when all other air traffic in the US was grounded, so that the family could evacuate to Saudi Arabia.  Raytheon even provided a jet which carried Saudi royals from Tampa to Lexington, KY.  No Saudis were held for questioning by the FBI.  On the evening of 911, Saudi Prince Bandar- House of Saud point man in funding CIA covert operations for decades- stood smoking a cigar on the White House balcony alongside President Bush. [5]

 

Agha Khan is the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose modern-day tentacles include the House of Saud, Hamas, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Shi'ite Ismaili sect, Louis Farrakhan's Muslim Brotherhood and al Qaeda.  The House of Saud serves as financier to all of these neo-Crusaders.  
 

The Eight Families emerged from a tangle of secret societies- Freemasons, Knights Templar, Teutonic Knights, Rosicrucians, Cabalist Order of Melchizidek, Knights of Malta and Knights of St. John's Jerusalem.  These groups also descend from the Sumerian and Egyptian Brotherhood of the Snake, later carrying out the political machinations of the Genoese banking families who funded the expansion of the Roman Empire and who now control the City of London.

 

The fortunes of the Muslim Brotherhood House of Saud became intertwined with those of the "Illuminati Bankers" when ARAMCO discovered oil in the Kingdom in 1938.  From this moment forward the old Crusader pals reunited, working together to control the world using oil as their centerpiece.  While the House of Saud represents the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi branch of Freemasonry is concentrated among ARAMCO executives and the SAMA "White Father" bankers.  Other Gulf State Hashemite rulers were cut into the Illuminati/Muslim Brotherhood global petro-hegemony scheme in 1981 with the formation of the GCC.

 

In late November 2002 Newsweek reporter Michael Isakoff broke a story revealing that Princess Haifa- wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar- had written checks to two Saudi intermediaries, who delivered the proceeds to two of the alleged 911 hijackers.  Within days of the revelations, the two Saudis were allowed to leave the US before a credible investigation of the money trail had even gotten under way.  Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) accused the Bush Administration of protecting the House of Saud by blocking a meaningful investigation into Saudi involvement in 911.  Leaders of a Joint Congressional Task Force investigating 911 accused both the FBI and CIA of withholding classified documents from their probe.

 

It was Bandar who twenty years earlier had personally donated $20 million to the Nicaraguan contras.  Were his wife and the other wealthy Saudis with whom the al Qaeda money trail was intertwined, simply playing the same paymaster role the Saudis have played for the CIA for decades?

 

The Masterminds

 

Ex-Naval Intelligence officer William Cooper- author of Behold a Pale Horse- did a radio talk show in Phoenix in October 2001.  Cooper lost both his legs when he was run off the road after exposing various elements of Illuminati plans for a New World Order.  Now he suggested CIA and Israeli Mossad involvement in 911, naming Mossad operative Josie Hadas as the handler of the Arab patsies involved in the hijackings.  Internet and cable feeds from the broadcast were immediately cut.  A few days later Cooper was gunned down at 1:00 AM in his home by Maricopa County deputies. [7]

 

While Bush propagandists hammered home the "Arab terrorist" thesis, serving up photos of 911 "hijackers" within hours and conveniently "finding" Mohamed Atta's passport in the WTC rubble, several US agencies were quietly tracking down leads concerning Mossad spy rings active in the US on and since 911. 

 

Israelis were detained in Detroit, Albuquerque and an unnamed West Coast city.  A Ryder truck full of Israelis was caught casing Whidbey Island Naval Station in Washington.  According to a May 13, 2002 Fox News report, the truck tested positive for TNT and RDX military-grade explosives.  US intelligence also investigated a mysterious ring of "Israeli art students" who had infiltrated US law enforcement facilities and military bases over the past two years.

 

In early 2002 a group of Israelis was stopped in a Philadelphia suburb in a truck containing surveillance footage of the Sears Tower in Chicago.  On 911 a group of five Israelis were detained in Hoboken, NJ for suspicious behavior. [8]  The Jewish weekly Forward fingered them as Mossad agents.  ABC News reported in June 2002 that a woman with an apartment near ground zero witnessed several Israelis in a white van videotaping the planes as they hit the WTC and celebrating the event. 

 

Der Spiegel reported that a group of Mossad agents had rented an apartment near the one used by alleged 911 hijackers Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi in Hollywood, FL just prior to 911.  The Israelis conducted round-the-clock surveillance on the flight schools where Atta and al-Shehhi trained and neglected to inform US intelligence of their presence or of their activities.

 

Was Osama bin Laden working for Mossad or the CIA- as University of Ottawa Economics Professor Michel Chossudovsky has stated?  According to John Trochmann of the Militia of Montana, bin Laden carried a "CIA-issue RC 58 Harris satellite phone" and his family was a primary backer of the CIA's Iridium satellite tracking consortium.  Did elements of the CIA and Mossad deploy 19 modern-day mind-controlled Assassins, of which 15 just happened to be from the Muslim Brotherhood Kingdom of Saudi Arabia- whose point man in funding the Afghan mujahadeen, which constitute the core of al Qaeda, was CIA agent Osama bin Laden?

 

What did 911 fall guy Zaccarias Mousaui mean when he told the judge at his July 25, 2002 arraignment that he was not involved in 911, but that the US government had another person in custody who was involved and that "the government knew all about 911 plans" before the tragedy took place?  Why did the CIA refuse to hand over a key al Qaeda operative to the Mousaui prosecution?  What don't they want him to tell the court?

 

When Osama bin Laden died is irrelevant.  What matters is that he died.  Dead men don't talk. 

 

Did the CIA- using its Carlyle Group channel headed by ex-CIA Director George Bush- hatch this brutal attack to further insert US forces into Central Asia to protect the Four Horsemen Caspian Sea black goldmine, giving Israeli butchers another pretext in their occupation of Palestinian lands and promoting a new Clash of Civilizations WWIII Crusade against pesky nationalist Muslims- beginning with an invasion of oil-rich Iraq?  What of the timing of the bin Laden family investments via Carlyle?  Was Osama really the black sheep of the bin Laden family?

 

According to the French newspaper Le Figaro, the CIA met with Osama bin Laden on numerous occasions in the months before 911.  In July 2001 bin Laden underwent kidney treatment at the American Hospital in Dubai, where he was visited frequently by a CIA agent.  He was also visited regularly by his Saudi extended family, who apparently had not disowned Osama as Western media had us believe.

 

According to the Washington Post, Qazi Hussein Ahmed- leader of the Pakistan-based Jamiaat-i-Islami, which helped create the Taliban- visited CIA at Langley in July 2001.  Why, the Village Voice queried, was Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar's emissary to Washington Rahmattulah Hashami rebuffed by the Bush State Department when he promised in summer 2001 to hold onto bin Laden until the CIA could apprehend him?  Why, Vanity Fair asked, had the CIA turned down an earlier offer from Sudan?

 

Newsweek wondered why top-ranking Pentagon officials suddenly canceled flight plans for September 10th?  The Wall Street Journal questioned the timing of Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan's canceling of a mid-September trip to Japan and wondered why Saudi Intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal - who was especially cozy with the Taliban and who met with Osama bin Laden regularly- suddenly resigned his post of 25 years on August 31, 2001?

 

While Unocal adviser and Afghan President Hamid Karzai huddled with Unocal official and Bush Afghan envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain busied herself meeting with Pakistan's Oil Minister Usman Aminuddin and her Saudi counterparts to plan the new Turkmenistan-Indian Ocean trans-Afghan pipeline.  In 2005 Unocal was bought by Chevron Texaco, assuring Four Horsemen control over the recently completed pipeline.

 

On November 28, 2001 the Bush White House quietly celebrated the official opening of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline- the Four Horsemen-owned, Bechtel-built, Mossad-guarded pipeline through Turkey to the Black Sea.  Bush stated, "The CPC project also advances my Administration's energy policy by developing a network of pipelines that includes Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Supsa and Baku-Novorossiysk."

 

Bush's closest confidant at the White House was said to be Condaleeza Rice, who sat on Chevron's board before becoming a Stanford University expert on Central Asia and Kazakhstan.  Did Bush bring Rice on board knowing US troops would soon headed to Central Asia?  Was it mere coincidence that Uzbekistan- which Trilateral Commission founder and BP Amoco board member Brzezinski identified as the key country in his global chess game- was suddenly receiving US bases?  Why did US military exercises begin in the region months before 911?

 

The Guardian of London reported that US Army Rangers were training in Afghan neighbor Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2001.  There were Montana media reports of Uzbek and Tajik troops training in Alaska and Montana prior to 911.  In early September 2001 the British deployed thousands of troops to Oman under the guise of Operation Swift Sword, while the US sent 17,000 troops to Egypt, ostensibly to take part in Operation Bright Star.  Were these forward troops deployed in anticipation of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq?

 

A July 2001 meeting in Berlin attended by former US Ambassador to Pakistan Tom Simmons, former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth and former State Department South Asian expert Lee Coldren included Russian and Pakistani intelligence officials.  The US delegation informed their Pakistani and Russian counterparts of US plans to bomb Afghanistan come October 2001. [9]

 

Canadian Vision Television discussed the US Central Asian agenda on its January 28, 2002 program Insight Media File, which suggested CIA involvement in the 911 attacks.  US Naval Intelligence Officer Lt. Delmart Vreeland had alerted Canadian authorities to the possibility of terror attacks on the US and Canada.  Vreeland was en route to Russia and China to retrieve documents relating to Russian and Chinese responses to the US missile defense program.

 

Vreeland was detained by Canadian authorities and jailed.  His 8-11-01 prison letter specifically mentions the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the White House, the Sears Tower, the Royal Bank of Canada and the Ottawa Parliament as possible terrorist targets in the "days ahead".  His letter said the plan was to, "Let one happen.  Stop the rest."  The letter was admitted as evidence for the defense by a Canadian court.  The US Defense Department has confirmed Vreeland's rank. [10]

 

Despite Vreeland's warning and those of numerous governments around the world, on 911 the Air Force National Guard was ordered to stand down from standard procedure of intercepting any plane that strays from its designed flight path, much less jumbo jets flying towards the World Trade Center and Pentagon.  While much political hay was made by Bush cronies about last-ditch failed attempts to scramble fighters to shoot down the planes, the fact is that fighters should have automatically intercepted those planes.

 

Someone in the Executive Branch had to have ordered those planes to stand down.  Even when token jets were scrambled, they flew from Otis Air National Guard Base in Falmouth, MA and Langley Air Base in Hampton, VA.  Meanwhile two combat-ready squadrons- the 121st Fighter Squadron of the 113th Fighter Wing and the 321st Marine Fighter Attack Squadron- sat grounded at Andrews Air Force Base, a mere fifteen miles from the Pentagon.

 

According to an August 22, 2002 AP story a "top US intelligence agency was planning an exercise last September 11th in which an errant aircraft would crash into one of its buildings".  The Washington Post reported on September 16, 2001 that American Flight 77, which allegedly crashed into the Pentagon, was piloted by Charles Burlingame, whose previous job was as F-4 fighter pilot for the US Navy.  In this capacity Burlingame drafted an emergency response plan to the crashing of a plane into the Pentagon.  The morning Burlingame's plane apparently did just that, Pentagon medic Matt Rosenberg was studying Burlingame's draft in Corridor 8 of the building.

 

Dick Cheney would have been in charge of the planned 911 "exercise", since on May 8, 2001 he was named to head the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), which would identify US vulnerabilities to domestic terrorism.  Cheney's ODP was running four different exercises on 911: Operation Northern Guardian, Operation Vigilant Guardian, Operation Vigilant Warrior and Operation Northern Vigilance.

 

The latter removed most fighter jets from the East Coast and sent them to Canada and Alaska.  The first two simulated hijackings of commercial airliners in the Northeast.  The third may have been the strike component.  NORAD was briefed to expect these exercises.  That morning their radars showed twenty-two hijacked planes. [11]  They didn't know which ones were hijacked and which ones were part of the "exercise".

 

On September 10, 2001 members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees leaked a memo alleged lead hijacker Mohammed Atta sent to the man US intelligence deems the mastermind of 911- Khalid Sheikh Mohammad.  The memo used language which one would associate with a military exercise, stating that "the match is about to begin.  Tomorrow is 'zero hour'."  Cheney was outraged that the memo was leaked and ordered the FBI to investigate members of the Congressional committees.  All information regarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammad remains classified.

 

The End of the American Empire

 

There has been a well-founded notion since America's inception that the European Rothschild-led Illuminati bankers have sought to bring America to its knees, overturn the American Revolution and return it to the fold of the Crown of England- whose power is derived from oligarchical remnants of the Roman Empire 

 

This medieval rollback could be easily accomplished through the mere withdrawal of Eight Families funding of America's $14 trillion debt, which has mostly accrued owing to the US military's role as mercenary praetorian guard of the Illuminati global empire.  Coupled with a devastating US military defeat, America could be brought to its knees.

 

On August 15, 1871 Sovereign Grand Commander of the Ancient & Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry General Albert Pike wrote a letter to Italian P-1 33rd Degree Grand Commander and Mafia founder Guiseppe Mazzini.  In the letter Pike talked of a Brotherhood plan for three World Wars.  The first, he said, would destroy czarist Russia and create a Communist "bogeyman" which the bankers could employ to justify their foreign interventions around the world.  The second, Pike said, would be used to create Israel, which would become a mercenary force for the international bankers, protecting oil interests for Rothschild and Rockefeller combines.

 

The Third World War, stated Pike's letter, would pit Arabs against Zionists, and would culminate in a New World Order completely controlled by the international bankers and their secret societies.  Pike described the events that would unfold as pretext for WWIII, "We must provoke a social cataclysm which in all its horror...everywhere, the citizens obliged to defend themselves against the world minority of revolutionaries...will receive the true light through...the pure doctrine of Lucifer, brought finally out into public view."[12]

 

A group of commercial airline pilots, many of them Vietnam veterans, met in the aftermath of 911 to discuss the logistical aspects of the tragedy.  They concluded overwhelmingly that the three Arabs who supposedly flew the jumbo jets into the WTC and the Pentagon could absolutely not have done so with the limited flight simulator experience they received at US flight schools.  The group found it odd that the transponders on the planes had all been turned off, since this would serve no purpose if the Arabs were in control of the planes.  The group came to believe that the planes' flight paths were programmed by AWAC surveillance planes flying off the Atlantic coast. 

 

This fly by wire technology has existed for decades and is employed on drone CIA Predator spy planes.  During WWII the US used the technology to fly unmanned drones into Japanese tunnels in the Pacific to destroy arms caches.  The openings of these tunnels were only 20-30 feet in diameter.  Modern fly by wire systems such as Global Hawk, Home Run Tech and Black Star are much more advanced. 

 

The commercial pilots said this accounts for the transponders being turned off, since this is necessary to hand over manual control of an aircraft to computerized AWACS, which then fly the plane by remote control.  This would also account for the pinpoint accuracy of the attacks, which had to have been calibrated using engineering specifications to have brought down the WTC towers, in tandem with pre-set explosives attached to the elevator shafts.

 

In this scenario, long-time CIA Islamist Assassins were put up to hijacking the planes by their Mossad handlers for deniability and anti-Arab propaganda purposes.  The hijackers would have known nothing of the plans to crash the planes into the Pentagon and Twin Towers.  This was where the AWACS took control of the operation.  To this day there has been no evidence presented that the Arabs were actually in the cockpits of those jets. 

 

The only countries- other than the US- who possess this remote electronic capability are Israel, Russia, China and the UK.  Did Israeli Mossad and British MI6 perpetrate 911 as part of an ongoing counter-revolutionary master plan to bring down the US?  Did the orders come from Buckingham Palace?

 

Could a new global financial/military alliance- organized by the Eight Families- be emerging?  Were Deutsche Bank and Standard Chartered paymasters for this alliance?  Deutsche Bank founder Dr. Hermann Josef Abs was a leading banker to the Nazis and remained the bank's Honorary Chairman until his 1994 death. [13]  When Deutsche Bank bought Banker's Trust ownership of the Four Horsemen shifted to the Bohn Warburg combine that financed Hitler.  Deutsche Bank quickly became the world's largest bank.

 

The launch of the euro a few months later represented a serious challenge to the US dollar as world reserve currency.  In 2002 the dollar began to weaken dramatically.  In August 2002 Russia and China conducted another round of joint military exercises, just as Bush was beating the drums of war over Iraq.  France increasingly backed Russian and Chinese positions in the UN Security Council.  As the US veered left and voted in President Barack Obama, a majority of European countries began voting in far-right presidents.

 

Did the Illuminati bankers bait the US into a Central Asian ring of fire surrounded by China, Russia and India- who recently formed the G-3 coalition as counterweight to US global hegemony"?  
 

In June 2001 a female Russian doctor stated in a Pravda column that the US would be subject to a massive terrorist attack in late August 2001.  She was then asked what she believed was coming next.  She suggested selling dollars and buying Russian rubles, saying that the secret group behind 911 was the most powerful force in the world, worth over $300 trillion.  She said this group would soon "strike America in the back" while it was down and that the next shoe to drop would be the decimation of the US economy, which she predicted would begin in 2002. [14]  The NASDAQ crash, a plummeting dollar and a massive housing bust proved her right again.  This "secret group" could only be the Illuminati Rothschild-led Eight Families.

 

Cecil Rhodes- the Rothschild protégé who laid the foundations for the creation of the Business Roundtable in the early 20th century- wrote his last will and testament in 1877.  Rhodes' will was implemented through the establishment of the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London.  Its sister group in the US is the Council on Foreign Relations.  Rhodes founded the Standard Chartered Bank, whose UAE Dubai branch allegedly supplied the 911 hijackers with the funds needed to carry out the attack. 

 

Rhodes last will and testament aspired, "to establish a trust, to and for the establishment and promotion and development of a secret society, the true aim and object whereof shall be the extension of British rule throughout the world...and the ultimate recovery of the United States of America as an integral part of the British Empire."[15]

 

Notes

[1] Dope Inc: The Book that Drove Kissinger Crazy. The Editors of Executive Intelligence Review.
Washington, DC. 1992.

[2] "Ex-Agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists for Indonesia". Kitty Kadane. San Francisco Examiner. 5-20-90

[3] "Islamic Terrorists: Creature of the US Taxpayer?" John K. Cooley. International Herald Tribune. 3-13-96

[4] Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Ahmed Rashid. Yale Publishing. New Haven, CT. 2000

[5] Dude, Where's My Country. Michael Moore WarnerBooks New York 2003

[7] "A Tribute to William Cooper". David Icke. www.davidicke.com 11-01

[8] "Is Netanyahu Plotting Terror Inside US?" Jeffrey Steinberg. Executive Intelligence Review. 5-24-02

[9] "Lucy, You gotta lot a 'Splainin to Do". Michael Rupert. www.copvcia 2-02

[10] "Canadian Court Case Reveals US Naval Officer had Advance Knowledge of 911 Attacks". Michael Rupert. www.rense.com 1-25-02

[11] "Paranotes: War Games Drills Confuse NORAD on 911". Al Hidell. Paranoia. Issue 37. Winter 2005

[12] Descent Into Slavery. Des Griffin. Emissary Publications. Pasadena 1991

[13] Rule by Secrecy: The Hidden History that Connects the Trilateral Commission, the Freemasons and the Great Pyramids. Jim Marrs. HarperCollins Publishers. New York. 2000. p.182

[14] www.newsmax.com October 2001

[15] Dope Inc: The Book that Drove Kissinger Crazy. The Editors of Executive Intelligence Review. Washington, DC. 1992.

 

 

Dean Henderson is the author of Big Oil & Their Bankers in the Persian Gulf: Four Horsemen, Eight Families & Their Global Intelligence, Narcotics & Terror Network and The Grateful Unrich: Revolution in 50 Countries.  His Left Hook blog is at  www.deanhenderson.wordpress.com


http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=24764
 


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[ALOCHONA] CIA created own Taliban to wreak terror havoc on Pakistan



CIA has created own Taliban to wreak terror havoc on Pakistan, claims Pak paper

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives have infiltrated the Taliban and Al-Qaeda networks, and have created their own Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) force in order to destabilise Pakistan, a Pakistani newspaper has claimed.

Much of the information-gathering network of Pakistan's supreme security service was curtailed in the country's tribal areas during former military ruler Pervez Musharraf's era, consequently giving an edge to America's CIA, The Nation reported.

The CIA was given direct access to the entire territory of North and South Waziristan, which has since developed its stronghold in the belt, it added.

According to sources, the CIA's operations, which were suspended in Balochistan, Punjab, Islamabad and other areas of the country after the Raymond Allen Davis (RAD) incident, have also been restored.

Responding to a query, the sources said that the CIA operatives have infiltrated the Taliban and Al-Qaeda networks, and have created their own TTP force, the paper said.

This force has been recruited, trained and equipped by these CIA operatives to target the Pakistan Army personnel, armed forces' installations, markets, hospitals, schools and public places to destabilise Pakistan, the paper added.

The paper quoted the sources, as claiming that the Soviet Intelligence Agency had already disclosed that CIA contractor Raymond Davis and his network had provided Al-Qaeda operatives with chemical, nuclear and biological weapons, so that US installations may be targeted and Pakistan be blamed, and pressed to do more in areas such as conducting operations in North Waziristan.

"After the civil government justified the CIA operation in Abbottabad all of them have again indulged in their original nefarious activities," the sources added.

Former ISI Punjab Regional Commander, Brigadier (retired) Aslam Ghuman, was quoted as saying: "During my visit to the US, I learnt Israeli spy agency Mossad, in connivance with Indian agency RAW, under the direct supervision of CIA, planned to destabilise Pakistan at any cost".

The paper also quoted former Punjab Military Intelligence (MI) chief, Brigadier (retired) Mohammad Yousuf, as saying that over 7,000 CIA operatives have been conducting warfare within Pakistan.

"Days after the mystery of 9/11, the CIA operatives landed in Pakistan in order to train Pakistani troops and authorities concerned for counter terrorism, but with the passage of time, their demands increased, and now the CIA network has a strong grip," said another ex- ISI Punjab Regional Commander, Brigadier (retired) Ghazanfar. (ANI)

http://my.news.yahoo.com/cia-created-own-taliban-wreak-terror-havoc-pakistan-091621821.html


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[ALOCHONA] Ershad's military regime illegal: SC



Ershad's military regime illegal: SC

Dhaka, May 15 (bdnews24.com)—The Supreme Court has upheld the High Court (HC) order declaring illegal the Seventh Amendment to the constitution that had legimatised the autocratic regime of military strongman Hussein Muhammad Ershad.

The Appellate Division (AD) on Sunday, however, cancelled a portion of the HC order upholding the military court verdict against Siddique Ahmed, a resident of Chittagong upon whose petition the HC order came in August last year.

A six-member AD bench, headed by outgoing chief justice A B M Khairul Haque, also declared the military court verdict against Ahmed illegal. Ahmed was convicted of murder during Ershad's martial law period.

The AD gave the orders following a petition filed by Ahmed against part of the HC order. He filed the petition on Apr 11 and the chamber judge later sent it to the Appellate Division.

The apex court selected four senior lawyers as amici curiae for the hearing of the appeal. Of them, Rafiq-ul Haque, Mahmudul Islam and Mohammad Amir-Ul Islam gave their onions to the court, but Ajmalul Hossain could not as he was abroad.

The High Court verdict said the military rule imposed by Hussein Muhammad Ershad on Mar 24, 1982, all the military ordinances passed since then to Nov 11, 1986, chief military law administrator's orders, martial law order and directions were illegal.

It also had declared illegal the regimes of Khondker Moshtaq Ahmed, Abu Sa'adat Mohammad Sayem and Ziaur Rahman between Aug 15, 1975 and 1979.

The court, though, pardoned the activities of Ershad that may come under the verdict on the Fifth Amendment to avoid chaos.

It, however, let off those decisions that were taken in people's interest. The verdict added that, in the future, parliament can fix the punishment for the power usurpers.

The BNP-led coalition government had appealed for a stay order on the verdict, but the ruling Awami League-led government withdrew the appeal.

On Feb 2 last year, the Appellate Division also dismissed an appeal challenging the Aug 29, 2005 High Court verdict that had declared the Fifth Amendment illegal.



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[ALOCHONA] Geopolitics of Israel: Biblical and Modern



The Geopolitics of Israel: Biblical and Modern

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics_israel_biblical_and_modern

The founding principle of geopolitics is that place — geography — plays a significant role in determining how nations will behave. If that theory is true, then there ought to be a deep continuity in a nation's foreign policy. Israel is a laboratory for this theory, since it has existed in three different manifestations in roughly the same place, twice in antiquity and once in modernity. If geopolitics is correct, then Israeli foreign policy, independent of policymakers, technology or the identity of neighbors, ought to have important common features. This is, therefore, a discussion of common principles in Israeli foreign policy over nearly 3,000 years.

For convenience, we will use the term "Israel" to connote all of the Hebrew and Jewish entities that have existed in the Levant since the invasion of the region as chronicled in the Book of Joshua. As always, geopolitics requires a consideration of three dimensions: the internal geopolitics of Israel, the interaction of Israel and the immediate neighbors who share borders with it, and Israel's interaction with what we will call great powers, beyond Israel's borderlands.

Israel's first manifestation, map

Israel has manifested itself three times in history. The first manifestation began with the invasion led by Joshua and lasted through its division into two kingdoms, the Babylonian conquest of the Kingdom of Judah and the deportation to Babylon early in the sixth century B.C. The second manifestation began when Israel was recreated in 540 B.C. by the Persians, who had defeated the Babylonians. The nature of this second manifestation changed in the fourth century B.C., when Greece overran the Persian Empire and Israel, and again in the first century B.C., when the Romans conquered the region.

The second manifestation saw Israel as a small actor within the framework of larger imperial powers, a situation that lasted until the destruction of the Jewish vassal state by the Romans.

Israel's third manifestation began in 1948, following (as in the other cases) an ingathering of t least some of the Jews who had been dispersed after conquests. Israel's founding takes place in the context of the decline and fall of the British Empire and must, at least in part, be understood as part of British imperial history.

During its first 50 years, Israel plays a pivotal role in the confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union and, in some senses, is hostage to the dynamics of these two countries. In other words, like the first two manifestations of Israel, the third finds Israel continually struggling among independence, internal tension and imperial ambition.
Israel's second manifestation, map

Israeli Geography and Borderlands

At its height, under King David, Israel extended from the Sinai to the Euphrates, encompassing Damascus. It occupied some, but relatively little, of the coastal region, an area beginning at what today is Haifa and running south to Jaffa, just north of today's Tel Aviv. The coastal area to the north was held by Phoenicia, the area to the south by Philistines. It is essential to understand that Israel's size and shape shifted over time. For example, Judah under the Hasmoneans did not include the Negev but did include the Golan. The general locale of Israel is fixed. Its precise borders have never been.

Israel's third manifestation, map

Thus, it is perhaps better to begin with what never was part of Israel. Israel never included the Sinai Peninsula. Along the coast, it never stretched much farther north than the Litani River in today's Lebanon. Apart from David's extreme extension (and fairly tenuous control) to the north, Israel's territory never stretched as far as Damascus, although it frequently held the Golan Heights. Israel extended many times to both sides of the Jordan but never deep into the Jordanian Desert. It never extended southeast into the Arabian Peninsula.

Israel consists generally of three parts. First, it always has had the northern hill region, stretching from the foothills of Mount Hermon south to Jerusalem. Second, it always contains some of the coastal plain from today's Tel Aviv north to Haifa. Third, it occupies area between Jerusalem and the Jordan River — today's West Bank. At times, it controls all or part of the Negev, including the coastal region between the Sinai to the Tel Aviv area. It may be larger than this at various times in history, and sometimes smaller, but it normally holds all or part of these three regions.

Israel's geography and borderlands, map

Israel is well-buffered in three directions. The Sinai Desert protects it against the Egyptians. In general, the Sinai has held little attraction for the Egyptians. The difficulty of deploying forces in the eastern Sinai poses severe logistical problems for them, particularly during a prolonged presence. Unless Egypt can rapidly move through the Sinai north into the coastal plain, where it can sustain its forces more readily, deploying in the Sinai is difficult and unrewarding. Therefore, so long as Israel is not so weak as to make an attack on the coastal plain a viable option, or unless Egypt is motivated by an outside imperial power, Israel does not face a threat from the southwest.

Israel is similarly protected from the southeast. The deserts southeast of Eilat-Aqaba are virtually impassable. No large force could approach from that direction, although smaller raiding parties could. The tribes of the Arabian Peninsula lack the reach or the size to pose a threat to Israel, unless massed and aligned with other forces. Even then, the approach from the southeast is not one that they are likely to take. The Negev is secure from that direction.

The eastern approaches are similarly secured by desert, which begins about 20 to 30 miles east of the Jordan River. While indigenous forces exist in the borderland east of the Jordan, they lack the numbers to be able to penetrate decisively west of the Jordan. Indeed, the normal model is that, so long as Israel controls Judea and Samaria (the modern-day West Bank), then the East Bank of the Jordan River is under the political and sometimes military domination of Israel — sometimes directly through settlement, sometimes indirectly through political influence, or economic or security leverage.

Israel's vulnerability is in the north. There is no natural buffer between Phoenicia and its successor entities (today's Lebanon) to the direct north. The best defense line for Israel in the north is the Litani River, but this is not an insurmountable boundary under any circumstance. However, the area along the coast north of Israel does not present a serious threat. The coastal area prospers through trade in the Mediterranean basin. It is oriented toward the sea and to the trade routes to the east, not to the south. If it does anything, this area protects those trade routes and has no appetite for a conflict that might disrupt trade. It stays out of Israel's way, for the most part.

Moreover, as a commercial area, this region is generally wealthy, a factor that increases predators around it and social conflict within. It is an area prone to instability. Israel frequently tries to extend its influence northward for commercial reasons, as one of the predators, and this can entangle Israel in its regional politics. But barring this self-induced problem, the threat to Israel from the north is minimal, despite the absence of natural boundaries and the large population. On occasion, there is spillover of conflicts from the north, but not to a degree that might threaten regime survival in Israel.

The neighbor that is always a threat lies to the northeast. Syria — or, more precisely, the area governed by Damascus at any time — is populous and frequently has no direct outlet to the sea. It is, therefore, generally poor. The area to its north, Asia Minor, is heavily mountainous. Syria cannot project power to the north except with great difficulty, but powers in Asia Minor can move south. Syria's eastern flank is buffered by a desert that stretches to the Euphrates. Therefore, when there is no threat from the north, Syria's interest — after securing itself internally — is to gain access to the coast. Its primary channel is directly westward, toward the rich cities of the northern Levantine coast, with which it trades heavily. An alternative interest is southwestward, toward the southern Levantine coast controlled by Israel.

As can be seen, Syria can be interested in Israel only selectively. When it is interested, it has a serious battle problem. To attack Israel, it would have to strike between Mount Hermon and the Sea of Galilee, an area about 25 miles wide. The Syrians potentially can attack south of the sea, but only if they are prepared to fight through this region and then attack on extended supply lines. If an attack is mounted along the main route, Syrian forces must descend the Golan Heights and then fight through the hilly Galilee before reaching the coastal plain — sometimes with guerrillas holding out in the Galilean hills. The Galilee is an area that is relatively easy to defend and difficult to attack. Therefore, it is only once Syria takes the Galilee, and can control its lines of supply against guerrilla attack, that its real battle begins.

To reach the coast or move toward Jerusalem, Syria must fight through a plain in front of a line of low hills. This is the decisive battleground where massed Israeli forces, close to lines of supply, can defend against dispersed Syrian forces on extended lines of supply. It is no accident that Megiddo — or Armageddon, as the plain is sometimes referred to — has apocalyptic meaning. This is the point at which any move from Syria would be decided. But a Syrian offensive would have a tough fight to reach Megiddo, and a tougher one as it deploys on the plain.

On the surface, Israel lacks strategic depth, but this is true only on the surface. It faces limited threats from southern neighbors. To its east, it faces only a narrow strip of populated area east of the Jordan. To the north, there is a maritime commercial entity. Syria operating alone, forced through the narrow gap of the Mount Hermon-Galilee line and operating on extended supply lines, can be dealt with readily.

There is a risk of simultaneous attacks from multiple directions. Depending on the forces deployed and the degree of coordination between them, this can pose a problem for Israel. However, even here the Israelis have the tremendous advantage of fighting on interior lines. Egypt and Syria, fighting on external lines (and widely separated fronts), would have enormous difficulty transferring forces from one front to another. Israel, on interior lines (fronts close to each other with good transportation), would be able to move its forces from front to front rapidly, allowing for sequential engagement and thereby the defeat of enemies. Unless enemies are carefully coordinated and initiate war simultaneously — and deploy substantially superior force on at least one front — Israel can initiate war at a time of its choosing or else move its forces rapidly between fronts, negating much of the advantage of size that the attackers might have.

There is another aspect to the problem of multifront war. Egypt usually has minimal interests along the Levant, having its own coast and an orientation to the south toward the headwaters of the Nile. On the rare occasions when Egypt does move through the Sinai and attacks to the north and northeast, it is in an expansionary mode. By the time it consolidates and exploits the coastal plain, it would be powerful enough to threaten Syria. From Syria's point of view, the only thing more dangerous than Israel is an Egypt in control of Israel. Therefore, the probability of a coordinated north-south strike at Israel is rare, is rarely coordinated and usually is not designed to be a mortal blow. It is defeated by Israel's strategic advantage of interior lines.

Israeli Geography and the Convergence Zone

Therefore, it is not surprising that Israel's first incarnation lasted as long as it did — some five centuries. What is interesting and what must be considered is why Israel (now considered as the northern kingdom) was defeated by the Assyrians and Judea, then defeated by Babylon. To understand this, we need to consider the broader geography of Israel's location.

Israel is located on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, on the Levant. As we have seen, when Israel is intact, it will tend to be the dominant power in the Levant. Therefore, Israeli resources must generally be dedicated for land warfare, leaving little over for naval warfare. In general, although Israel had excellent harbors and access to wood for shipbuilding, it never was a major Mediterranean naval power. It never projected power into the sea. The area to the north of Israel has always been a maritime power, but Israel, the area south of Mount Hermon, was always forced to be a land power.

The Levant in general and Israel in particular has always been a magnet for great powers. No Mediterranean empire could be fully secure unless it controlled the Levant. Whether it was Rome or Carthage, a Mediterranean empire that wanted to control both the northern and southern littorals needed to anchor its eastern flank on the Levant. For one thing, without the Levant, a Mediterranean power would be entirely dependent on sea lanes for controlling the other shore. Moving troops solely by sea creates transport limitations and logistical problems. It also leaves imperial lines vulnerable to interdiction — sometimes merely from pirates, a problem that plagued Rome's sea transport. A land bridge, or a land bridge with minimal water crossings that can be easily defended, is a vital supplement to the sea for the movement of large numbers of troops. Once the Hellespont is crossed, the coastal route through southern Turkey, down the Levant and along the Mediterranean's southern shore, provides such an alternative.

There is an additional consideration. If a Mediterranean empire leaves the Levant unoccupied, it opens the door to the possibility of a great power originating to the east seizing the ports of the Levant and challenging the Mediterranean power for maritime domination. In short, control of the Levant binds a Mediterranean empire together while denying a challenger from the east the opportunity to enter the Mediterranean. Holding the Levant, and controlling Israel, is a necessary preventive measure for a Mediterranean empire.

Israel is also important to any empire originating to the east of Israel, either in the Tigris-Euphrates basin or in Persia. For either, security could be assured only once it had an anchor on the Levant. Macedonian expansion under Alexander demonstrated that a power controlling Levantine and Turkish ports could support aggressive operations far to the east, to the Hindu Kush and beyond. While Turkish ports might have sufficed for offensive operations, simply securing the Bosporus still left the southern flank exposed. Therefore, by holding the Levant, an eastern power protected itself against attacks from Mediterranean powers.

The Levant was also important to any empire originating to the north or south of Israel. If Egypt decided to move beyond the Nile Basin and North Africa eastward, it would move first through the Sinai and then northward along the coastal plain, securing sea lanes to Egypt. When Asia Minor powers such as the Ottoman Empire developed, there was a natural tendency to move southward to control the eastern Mediterranean. The Levant is the crossroads of continents, and Israel lies in the path of many imperial ambitions.

Israel therefore occupies what might be called the convergence zone of the Eastern Hemisphere. A European power trying to dominate the Mediterranean or expand eastward, an eastern power trying to dominate the space between the Hindu Kush and the Mediterranean, a North African power moving toward the east, or a northern power moving south — all must converge on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean and therefore on Israel. Of these, the European power and the eastern power must be the most concerned with Israel. For either, there is no choice but to secure it as an anchor.

Internal Geopolitics

Israel is geographically divided into three regions, which traditionally have produced three different types of people. Its coastal plain facilitates commerce, serving as the interface between eastern trade routes and the sea. It is the home of merchants and manufacturers, cosmopolitans — not as cosmopolitan as Phoenicia or Lebanon, but cosmopolitan for Israel. The northeast is hill country, closest to the unruliness north of the Litani River and to the Syrian threat. It breeds farmers and warriors. The area south of Jerusalem is hard desert country, more conducive to herdsman and warriors than anything else. Jerusalem is where these three regions are balanced and governed.

There are obviously deep differences built into Israel's geography and inhabitants, particularly between the herdsmen of the southern deserts and the northern hill dwellers. The coastal dwellers, rich but less warlike than the others, hold the balance or are the prize to be pursued. In the division of the original kingdom between Israel and Judea, we saw the alliance of the coast with the Galilee, while Jerusalem was held by the desert dwellers. The consequence of the division was that Israel in the north ultimately was conquered by Assyrians from the northeast, while Babylon was able to swallow Judea.

Social divisions in Israel obviously do not have to follow geographical lines. However, over time, these divisions must manifest themselves. For example, the coastal plain is inherently more cosmopolitan than the rest of the country. The interests of its inhabitants lie more with trading partners in the Mediterranean and the rest of the world than with their countrymen. Their standard of living is higher, and their commitment to traditions is lower. Therefore, there is an inherent tension between their immediate interests and those of the Galileans, who live more precarious, warlike lives. Countries can be divided over lesser issues — and when Israel is divided, it is vulnerable even to regional threats.

We say "even" because geography dictates that regional threats are less menacing than might be expected. The fact that Israel would be outnumbered demographically should all its neighbors turn on it is less important than the fact that it has adequate buffers in most directions, that the ability of neighbors to coordinate an attack is minimal and that their appetite for such an attack is even less. The single threat that Israel faces from the northeast can readily be managed if the Israelis create a united front there. When Israel was overrun by a Damascus-based power, it was deeply divided internally.

It is important to add one consideration to our discussion of buffers, which is diplomacy. The main neighbors of Israel are Egyptians, Syrians and those who live on the east bank of Jordan. This last group is a negligible force demographically, and the interests of the Syrians and Egyptians are widely divergent. Egypt's interests are to the south and west of its territory; the Sinai holds no attraction. Syria is always threatened from multiple directions, and alliance with Egypt adds little to its security. Therefore, under the worst of circumstances, Egypt and Syria have difficulty supporting each other. Under the best of circumstances, from Israel's point of view, it can reach a political accommodation with Egypt, securing its southwestern frontier politically as well as by geography, thus freeing Israel to concentrate on the northern threats and opportunities.

Israel and the Great Powers

The threat to Israel rarely comes from the region, except when the Israelis are divided internally. The conquests of Israel occur when powers not adjacent to it begin forming empires. Babylon, Persia, Macedonia, Rome, Turkey and Britain all controlled Israel politically, sometimes for worse and sometimes for better. Each dominated it militarily, but none was a neighbor of Israel. This is a consistent pattern. Israel can resist its neighbors; danger arises when more distant powers begin playing imperial games. Empires can bring force to bear that Israel cannot resist.

Israel therefore has this problem: It would be secure if it could confine itself to protecting its interests from neighbors, but it cannot confine itself because its geographic location invariably draws larger, more distant powers toward Israel. Therefore, while Israel's military can focus only on immediate interests, its diplomatic interests must look much further. Israel is constantly entangled with global interests (as the globe is defined at any point), seeking to deflect and align with broader global powers. When it fails in this diplomacy, the consequences can be catastrophic.

Israel exists in three conditions. First, it can be a completely independent state. This condition occurs when there are no major imperial powers external to the region. We might call this the David model. Second, it can live as part of an imperial system — either as a subordinate ally, as a moderately autonomous entity or as a satrapy. In any case, it maintains its identity but loses room for independent maneuvering in foreign policy and potentially in domestic policy. We might call this the Persian model in its most beneficent form. Finally, Israel can be completely crushed — with mass deportations and migrations, with a complete loss of autonomy and minimal residual autonomy. We might call this the Babylonian model.

The Davidic model exists primarily when there is no external imperial power needing control of the Levant that is in a position either to send direct force or to support surrogates in the immediate region. The Persian model exists when Israel aligns itself with the foreign policy interests of such an imperial power, to its own benefit. The Babylonian model exists when Israel miscalculates on the broader balance of power and attempts to resist an emerging hegemon. When we look at Israeli behavior over time, the periods when Israel does not confront hegemonic powers outside the region are not rare, but are far less common than when it is confronting them.

Given the period of the first iteration of Israel, it would be too much to say that the Davidic model rarely comes into play, but certainly since that time, variations of the Persian and Babylonian models have dominated. The reason is geographic. Israel is normally of interest to outside powers because of its strategic position. While Israel can deal with local challenges effectively, it cannot deal with broader challenges. It lacks the economic or military weight to resist. Therefore, it is normally in the process of managing broader threats or collapsing because of them.

The Geopolitics of Contemporary Israel

Let us then turn to the contemporary manifestation of Israel. Israel was recreated because of the interaction between a regional great power, the Ottoman Empire, and a global power, Great Britain. During its expansionary phase, the Ottoman Empire sought to dominate the eastern Mediterranean as well as both its northern and southern coasts. One thrust went through the Balkans toward central Europe. The other was toward Egypt. Inevitably, this required that the Ottomans secure the Levant.

For the British, the focus on the eastern Mediterranean was as the primary sea lane to India. As such, Gibraltar and the Suez were crucial. The importance of the Suez was such that the presence of a hostile, major naval force in the eastern Mediterranean represented a direct threat to British interests. It followed that defeating the Ottoman Empire during World War I and breaking its residual naval power was critical. The British, as was shown at Gallipoli, lacked the resources to break the Ottoman Empire by main force. They resorted to a series of alliances with local forces to undermine the Ottomans. One was an alliance with Bedouin tribes in the Arabian Peninsula; others involved covert agreements with anti-Turkish, Arab interests from the Levant to the Persian Gulf. A third, minor thrust was aligning with Jewish interests globally, particularly those interested in the refounding of Israel. Britain had little interest in this goal, but saw such discussions as part of the process of destabilizing the Ottomans.

The strategy worked. Under an agreement with France, the Ottoman province of Syria was divided into two parts on a line roughly running east-west between the sea and Mount Hermon. The northern part was given to France and divided into Lebanon and a rump Syria entity. The southern part was given to Britain and was called Palestine, after the Ottoman administrative district Filistina. Given the complex politics of the Arabian Peninsula, the British had to find a home for a group of Hashemites, which they located on the east bank of the Jordan River and designated, for want of a better name, the Trans-Jordan — the other side of the Jordan. Palestine looked very much like traditional Israel.

The ideological foundations of Zionism are not our concern here, nor are the pre- and post-World War II migrations of Jews, although those are certainly critical. What is important for purposes of this analysis are two things: First, the British emerged economically and militarily crippled from World War II and unable to retain their global empire, Palestine included. Second, the two global powers that emerged after World War II — the United States and the Soviet Union — were engaged in an intense struggle for the eastern Mediterranean after World War II, as can be seen in the Greek and Turkish issues at that time. Neither wanted to see the British Empire survive, each wanted the Levant, and neither was prepared to make a decisive move to take it.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union saw the re-creation of Israel as an opportunity to introduce their power to the Levant. The Soviets thought they might have some influence over Israel due to ideology. The Americans thought they might have some influence given the role of American Jews in the founding. Neither was thinking particularly clearly about the matter, because neither had truly found its balance after World War II. Both knew the Levant was important, but neither saw the Levant as a central battleground at that moment. Israel slipped through the cracks.

Once the question of Jewish unity was settled through ruthless action by David Ben Gurion's government, Israel faced a simultaneous threat from all of its immediate neighbors. However, as we have seen, the threat in 1948 was more apparent than real. The northern Levant, Lebanon, was fundamentally disunited — far more interested in regional maritime trade and concerned about control from Damascus. It posed no real threat to Israel. Jordan, settling the eastern bank of the Jordan River, was an outside power that had been transplanted into the region and was more concerned about native Arabs — the Palestinians — than about Israel. The Jordanians secretly collaborated with Israel. Egypt did pose a threat, but its ability to maintain lines of supply across the Sinai was severely limited and its genuine interest in engaging and destroying Israel was more rhetorical than real. As usual, the Egyptians could not afford the level of effort needed to move into the Levant. Syria by itself had a very real interest in Israel's defeat, but by itself was incapable of decisive action.

The exterior lines of Israel's neighbors prevented effective, concerted action. Israel's interior lines permitted efficient deployment and redeployment of force. It was not obvious at the time, but in retrospect we can see that once Israel existed, was united and had even limited military force, its survival was guaranteed. That is, so long as no great power was opposed to its existence.

From its founding until the Camp David Accords re-established the Sinai as a buffer with Egypt, Israel's strategic problem was this: So long as Egypt was in the Sinai, Israel's national security requirements outstripped its military capabilities. It could not simultaneously field an army, maintain its civilian economy and produce all the weapons and supplies needed for war. Israel had to align itself with great powers who saw an opportunity to pursue other interests by arming Israel.

Israel's first patron was the Soviet Union — through Czechoslovakia — which supplied weapons before and after 1948 in the hopes of using Israel to gain a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. Israel, aware of the risks of losing autonomy, also moved into a relationship with a declining great power that was fighting to retain its empire: France. Struggling to hold onto Algeria and in constant tension with Arabs, France saw Israel as a natural ally. And apart from the operation against Suez in 1956, Israel saw in France a patron that was not in a position to reduce Israeli autonomy. However, with the end of the Algerian war and the realignment of France in the Arab world, Israel became a liability to France and, after 1967, Israel lost French patronage.

Israel did not become a serious ally of the Americans until after 1967. Such an alliance was in the American interest. The United States had, as a strategic imperative, the goal of keeping the Soviet navy out of the Mediterranean or, at least, blocking its unfettered access. That meant that Turkey, controlling the Bosporus, had to be kept in the American bloc. Syria and Iraq shifted policies in the late 1950s and by the mid-1960s had been armed by the Soviets. This made Turkey's position precarious: If the Soviets pressed from the north while Syria and Iraq pressed from the south, the outcome would be uncertain, to say the least, and the global balance of power was at stake.

The United States used Iran to divert Iraq's attention. Israel was equally useful in diverting Syria's attention. So long as Israel threatened Syria from the south, it could not divert its forces to the north. That helped secure Turkey at a relatively low cost in aid and risk. By aligning itself with the interests of a great power, Israel lost some of its room for maneuver: For example, in 1973, it was limited by the United States in what it could do to Egypt. But those limitations aside, it remained autonomous internally and generally free to pursue its strategic interests.

The end of hostilities with Egypt, guaranteed by the Sinai buffer zone, created a new era for Israel. Egypt was restored to its traditional position, Jordan was a marginal power on the east bank, Lebanon was in its normal, unstable mode, and only Syria was a threat. However, it was a threat that Israel could easily deal with. Syria by itself could not threaten the survival of Israel.

Following Camp David (an ironic name), Israel was in its Davidic model, in a somewhat modified sense. Its survival was not at stake. Its problems — the domination of a large, hostile population and managing events in the northern Levant — were subcritical (meaning that, though these were not easy tasks, they did not represent fundamental threats to national survival, so long as Israel retained national unity). When unified, Israel has never been threatened by its neighbors. Geography dictates against it.

Israel's danger will come only if a great power seeks to dominate the Mediterranean Basin or to occupy the region between Afghanistan and the Mediterranean. In the short period since the fall of the Soviet Union, this has been impossible. There has been no great power with the appetite and the will for such an adventure. But 15 years is not even a generation, and Israel must measure its history in centuries.

It is the nature of the international system to seek balance. The primary reality of the world today is the overwhelming power of the United States. The United States makes few demands on Israel that matter. However, it is the nature of things that the United States threatens the interests of other great powers who, individually weak, will try to form coalitions against it. Inevitably, such coalitions will arise. That will be the next point of danger for Israel.

In the event of a global rivalry, the United States might place onerous requirements on Israel. Alternatively, great powers might move into the Jordan River valley or ally with Syria, move into Lebanon or ally with Israel. The historical attraction of the eastern shore of the Mediterranean would focus the attention of such a power and lead to attempts to assert control over the Mediterranean or create a secure Middle Eastern empire. In either event, or some of the others discussed, it would create a circumstance in which Israel might face a Babylonian catastrophe or be forced into some variation of a Persian or Roman subjugation.

Israel's danger is not a Palestinian rising. Palestinian agitation is an irritant that Israel can manage so long as it does not undermine Israeli unity. Whether it is managed by domination or by granting the Palestinians a vassal state matters little. Nor can Israel be threatened by its neighbors. Even a unified attack by Syria and Egypt would fail, for the reasons discussed. Israel's real threat, as can be seen in history, lies in the event of internal division and/or a great power, coveting Israel's geographical position, marshalling force that is beyond its capacity to resist. Even that can be managed if Israel has a patron whose interests involve denying the coast to another power.

Israel's reality is this. It is a small country, yet must manage threats arising far outside of its region. It can survive only if it maneuvers with great powers commanding enormously greater resources. Israel cannot match the resources and, therefore, it must be constantly clever. There are periods when it is relatively safe because of great power alignments, but its normal condition is one of global unease. No nation can be clever forever, and Israel's history shows that some form of subordination is inevitable. Indeed, it is to a very limited extent subordinate to the United States now.

For Israel, the retention of a Davidic independence is difficult. Israel's strategy must be to manage its subordination effectively by dealing with its patron cleverly, as it did with Persia. But cleverness is not a geopolitical concept. It is not permanent, and it is not assured. And that is the perpetual crisis of Jerusalem.

http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics_israel_biblical_and_modern


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