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Monday, November 1, 2010

[ALOCHONA] Book Review: The Betrayal of East Pakistan : -Lt. Gen. A. A. K. Niazi



 
The Betrayal of East Pakistan : -Lt. Gen. A. A. K. Niazi
 
 
  • Paperback: 354 pages
  • Publisher: OUP Pakistan (February 24, 2000)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0195792750
  • ISBN-13: 978-0195792751
  • Product Dimensions: 8.3 x 5.4 x 0.8 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 12.8 ounces

  •  
    Ahmad Faruqui reviews the book
            
    by Ahmad Faruqui
    On December 16, 1971, under clear skies, and in front of a restless crowd of nearly a million Bengalis, Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi, Commander, Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army, surrendered �first his pistol, then his sword, and then half his country� to Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora of the Indian Army.
     
    In West Pakistan, the President of Pakistan, its Chief of Army Staff, and its Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Yahya came on the radio to reassure his shocked nation that even though fighting had ceased on the eastern front �due to an arrangement between the local commanders,� the war with India would continue.  However, on the very next day, realizing that his chances of surviving a full-scale war with India on the western front without US or Chinese support were nil, he agreed to a ceasefire.  An exultant Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and daughter of India�s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, declared that �we have avenged the Muslim capture of Somnath and our history of a thousand years.�
     
    General Yahya had boasted earlier in the year that if India choose to declare war on Pakistan �I will shoot my way out of it.� He had also boasted about how he had escaped from a prisoner of war camp in Italy during the Second World War, while Sam Manekshaw, now the Indian Chief of Staff, was one of many fellow prisoners who had been unable to escape. 
     
    Now, in vastly different circumstances, a chastened General Yahya sought to justify the ceasefire by stating that �I have always maintained that war solves no problem.� However, as Oxford historian Robert Jackson noted in South Asian Crisis, �the victors in Dacca knew otherwise.� East Pakistan had passed into the history books, and with it some argued the �two nation theory� that had led to Pakistan�s independence.
    How did things come to such a sorry pass for Pakistan?  A nation as proud of its martial traditions as Pakistan has still not to come with this sad legacy.  Heir to the glorious traditions of the Arab, Turkish and Moghul armies of Muslim history, the Pakistani army was expected to fight to the �last man, last round� in East Pakistan, and to do anything but surrender itself to the Indian Army.  Several years later, a Pakistani general officer summed up the nation�s feelings when he said that �Never before had a Muslim sword been turned over to a Hindu.  In Islam, surrender is taboo; you either return with the land, or you bathe it in your blood.�
    What went wrong?  Pakistanis may well find an answer to this troubling question in General Niazi�s book, even though it is not the disingenuous answer that presented by the author. 
     
    Soon after the war ended, Indian authors, gloating over their victory, produced a plethora of books with jingoistic titles such as The Lightning Campaign,  Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan and The Liberation of Bangladesh. A few month�s prior to the surrender,  the Chairman of the Pakistan People�s Party, and soon to be the new president and first civilian martial law administrator of truncated Pakistan,  penned his version of events.  It blamed the inept Army leadership and the intransigent Awami League for The Great Tragedy. There was no mention of Bhutto�s own intransigence in accepting the right of the Awami League to form the government, which was its constitutional right given its absolute majority in parliament.  Nor was there any mention of his collusion with the ruling junta in launching Operation SEARCHLIGHT on March 25.   Unable to hide his relief at the military crackdown, he had ranted prematurely on the following day that �Thank God Pakistan has been saved.�
     
    When he took over the presidency in Islamabad, he asked Major General Fazal Muqueem Khan who had earlier written �A Story of the Pakistani Army� during the presidency of Ayub Khan to write a �military history� of last year�s events.  Pakistan�s Crisis in Leadership conveniently placed the blame squarely on Pakistan�s erstwhile military junta. To deal with any potential public outcry for justice, Mr. Bhutto appointed a judicial commission of inquiry headed by then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hamood-ur-Rehman. The Commission laboured over several months to interview serving and retired generals, air marshals, admirals, civil servants and politicians.  However, there was one surprising exception: Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, who had launched the ill-fated Operation SEARCHLIGHT, and who would later become Chief of Army Staff.  The Commission�s report was completed but never saw the light of the day.  It remains �Top Secret� to this day, because its release may compromise �national security.�
     
    As the years went by, Major Siddiq Salik, Public Relations Officer to General Niazi in Eastern Command, produced a lucid and compelling first-hand narrative called �Witness To Surrender�.  This placed the blame largely on General Niazi�s shoulders.  More recently, Lieutenant General Gul Hasan, then Chief of General Staff, produced his Memoirs.  Accepting responsibility for his portion of the blame, he stated that �we lost half of the country due to our mistakes.�  He also stated that General Niazi should never have been appointed to this command because he had an undistinguished military record and that his �professional ceiling was that of a company commander.�  However, he does not explain how then Brigadier Niazi was one of only eight officers to be awarded the Hilal-e-Jurat in the 1965 war.
     
    General Niazi�s Version
    In his book, Niazi reproduces a letter of recommendation from Lieutenant General Tikka Khan where the latter expresses complete confidence in Niazi and says that �I will have him on my side in war.� As the war began, Niazi notes that �I had vast experience of commanding troops.  The troops under my command were probably the best in the world.�  And five months later, General Abdul Hamid Khan, de facto C-in-C during the 1971 war, called him �the highest decorated officer of our Army, and one of our best field commanders.�  General Niazi says that 24 medals �adorned� his chest, including � for some unexplained reason � the Hilal-e-Jurat and Sitara-e-Pakistan for his performance in the 1971 war.
     
    After being released as a prisoner of war, he states that he �volunteered for Court Martial� because the truth would come out and the real culprits would be exposed.  However, no one took him up on the offer.  Niazi puts the blame for the military debacle on the GHQ and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.  He alleges they conspired to surrender the Eastern wing of the country to India, so that they could hang on to power in the Western wing. 
    He simply dismisses all other books that critique his role in the debacle, such as those by Salik and Gul Hassan, as a �pack of lies�.  Nowhere does he find any fault with himself.  If anything, he states that he never abandoned his soldiers, and proudly states that both Hannibal and Napoleon had done so at least once.
     
    Niazi comes across as a general officer eager to follow orders.  Three such orders led to disaster.  The first order was to command the Eastern Garrison.  Several generals senior to him had declined the opportunity.  He knew the mission assigned to him was not achievable with the resources given to him, but he accepted that order even though �I had been given a rudderless ship with a broken mast to take across the stormy seas, with no lighthouse to me in any direction.� 
     
    The second order was to not take the war into India, even though he had planned to �capture Agartala and a big chunk of Assam, and develop multiple thrusts into Indian Bengal.  We would cripple the economy of Calcutta by blowing up bridges and sinking boats and ships in the Hoogly River and create panic amongst the civilians.�  But this proposal was rejected by General Hamid who said that the Pakistan government �was not prepared to fight an open war with India...You will neither enter Indian territory nor send raiding parties into India, and you will not fire into Indian territory either.�
     
    And the third order was to surrender the Eastern garrison to India, �to save West Pakistan, our base, from disintegration and Western Garrison from further repulses.�   Thus, the defence of West Pakistan had now become contingent on the surrender of East Pakistan, in an ironic reversal of Pakistan�s strategic doctrine that �the defence of the East lay in the West.�
     
    He states that he had 32,000 men and the wherewithal to continue the war and �were nowhere near defeat.�  The number of men cited seems implausible since he had started the war with 45,000 troops.  It is highly unlikely, given his deployment of forces, that he could have concentrated 32,000 for the Battle of Dacca.  In fact, others have argued that he only had 5,000 men available for the defence of Dacca, since the troops had been deployed in penny packets around the entire border with India, and were instructed to fall back only when they had experienced 75% casualties.
     
    Regardless of the number of troops available to him, it is not clear how long he could have survived, since there was no hope for reinforcements of any kind from any source. Notes Brian Cloughley, �the concept of operations was faulty: all brigades were forward, with nothing in reserve...The outcome of the Indian advance was inevitable.� 
     
    General Niazi requires an unusual amount of gullibility from his readers when he states that he was forced to surrender by his Commander-in-Chief.  It is the very opposite of what typically happens in such situations.  Informed that Paulus had surrendered the Sixth Army to the Soviet Union, an infuriated Hitler said: �This hurts me so much because the heroism of so many soldiers is nullified by one single characterless weakling...What is Life?  Life is the Nation.  The individual must die anyway...What hurts me most, personally, is that I still promoted him to Field Marshal.  I wanted to give him this final satisfaction.  He could have freed himself from all sorrow and ascended into eternity and national immortality, but he prefers to go to Moscow.�
     
    Valid Insights
    He contends correctly that General Yahya disappeared from East Pakistan after March 25, 1971. This was inexcusable behaviour on the part of the Supreme Commander and President. To make matters worse, when asked about East Pakistan, Yahya would say that �all I can do about East Pakistan is pray.�  General Abdul Hamid Khan, the acting C-in-C, visited the troops in the East just twice.  General Gul Hassan, the Chief of General Staff, would not answer Niazi�s phone calls.  The top brass of the Pakistan Army had abandoned their �most decorated officer� to his own devices.
     
    General Niazi excoriates General Yahya and the GHQ for waging a lack lustre campaign on the Western front, where they had a near parity of forces with India and could choose the time and place of attack.  He states that the Western Garrison lost 5,500 square miles of territory in ten days, and failed to launch their much awaited counter offensive into India.  He calls this �a setback militarily unbelievable, unacceptable and unforgivable.�  Lieutenant General Attiqur Rahman states that the counter offensive was not launched for reasons that remain a mystery, but lack of morale was not one of them.  Without any success being achieved in the West, the fate of the garrison in East Pakistan was sealed.  As noted by Sisson-Rose, �the war was planned and pursued with a lack of coordination and foresight not dissimilar to that of 1965.�
    Niazi boldly and correctly calls for �a computer model of the conduct of operations by the Armed Forces in the whole of Pakistan, as well as separately for East and West Pakistan, keeping in view the political and military environment at that time.  This is the modern method for assessing performance...  If this were done, I and my generals would be shown to be among the most successful generals of this century.�  By prejudging the outcome of such a computer simulation, he erodes the credibility of this useful suggestion.
     
    The Engima of Surrender
    General Niazi is not inclined to accept any blame for himself. Having prided himself on his superiority to Hannibal and Napoleon, he states elsewhere that he �did more for the good of the country and its armed forces than anyone else.�  As mentioned earlier, he says he challenged the Pakistan Army to Court Martial him, but they refused. It is likely that much would have come out of such proceedings that would have implicated not only the top Army brass but also General Niazi himself.  It is very likely that he would have been subjected to intense cross examination on his conduct of war.  Perhaps the following questions would have been put to him.
     
    (1) Did you think that East Pakistan could be defended with the troops that were likely to be made available to you?  I.e.,  three divisions without much supporting armour or artillery, and only one squadron of subsonic Sabre fighter bombers.  War with India was coming on the heels of a gruelling civil war, and your �troops were not only tired and exhausted but had swollen feet, ravaged chests, and bare legs, because clothing and footwear were not available in the required quantity.�
    (2) Did you not anticipate that you would be required to simultaneously fight a conventional war and a guerilla war?  The Mukti Bahini was fighting a war of liberation, supported by a local population of 75 million up in arms against the Pakistan Army which it viewed as an occupation force.
    (3) What stroke of generalship led you to believe that India would merely conduct a minor incursion into East Pakistan to set up a puppet regime?  Is that why you deployed your troops in penny packets?  Niazi told his captors that they �always seemed to come round behind us.�  Pran Chopra argues that the credit for this goes very largely to the Mukti Bahini.  �Jointly, the IAF and the Mukti Bahini destroyed the logic of Niazi�s strategy.�
    (4) Why did you expect Pakistan would succeed in pulling off its well-known but untested strategy that the �Defence of the East lies in the West.�  Was this not a case of putting �all your eggs in one basket?�
    (5) What caused you to expect the Chinese would intervene through the Himalayan passes which the winter snows had rendered impassable in December? Were you not aware of India�s treaty with the Soviet Union, and the decision of the Soviet Union to deploy scores of additional divisions along the Manchurian border with China.  Did you not recall that China had issued an ultimatum to India during the September 1965 war, but then never delivered on it?
    (6) Given his poor track record, what caused you to think that General Hamid would indeed send your beleaguered garrison supplies from the West  through the �hump back� trade route that traverses Tibet, thereby circumventing the Indian blockade of the sea routes?  He states that when he asked General Hamid to send him supplies through this route, Hamid dismissed the request politely by simply saying that it was infeasible.
    (7) Did you honestly think the US government was in a position to intervene on Pakistan�s side, in the face of significant domestic opposition to the well-publicized brutalities of Tikka Khan�s military crack-down?  You surely had seen first hand how the US had abandoned its military ally, Pakistan, during the 1965 War with non-aligned India.  That �equal� embargo on both India and Pakistan had significantly affected import-dependent Pakistan without making any dent in India war-making capabilities.
    (8) When hostilities broke out, why did you succumb to a �bunker mentality� and did not dare to venture out of Dacca.  On reaching Calcutta after the surrender, he stated to reporters that the IAF bombing �had kept him awake for 12 nights, and he just could not continue any more.10�  There were times when he would break down during military briefings.  Once he did that in the presence of Bengali servants, who were immediately ordered outside where they gleefully reported that the �Sahibs are crying inside.�
     
    Post Script
    This book is a failed attempt by General Niazi to clear his name, and its tone is entirely self-serving. Ironically, the book provides unique insights into the workings of his mind.  Such insights could not have been obtained through other means.  That alone makes it essential reading for students of military history.  Sums up Brian Cloughley: �Yahya bore overall responsibility for what befell his country; but General Niazi was the commander who lost the war in the East.�  Perhaps the book should have been entitled General Niazi�s Betrayal of Pakistan.
     
    The book makes it very clear why the Pakistan Army surrendered in 13 days with more than 45,000 soldiers still in fighting condition.  As General Gul Hasan notes, �with Niazi at the helm, they had no chance.�  Of course that begs the question of who put Niazi there.  The most strategic command in the Army was turned over to a �hastily promoted Major General.� The list of culprits begins with Generals Yahya and Hamid, but it cannot exclude General Gul Hasan either, who was then Chief of the General Staff. 
     
    There is then the bigger question of why did Pakistan get involved in a war with India under such adverse circumstances.  Can India be blamed for assisting the Mukti Bahini guerillas in seeking the liberation of Bangladesh?  In one year, India implemented successfully what Pakistan had been trying unsuccessfully for two decades to implement in Kashmir.
     
    And then of course there is the role of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, unwilling to take a back seat to Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman.  He insidiously ingratiated himself with leading personalities of the military junta, including Generals Peerzada, Mitha, and Umar, and blocked the National Assembly from meeting in Dacca.  That essentially sealed the fate of United Pakistan.  Later on, he tore up the Polish resolution which would have preserved the honour of the Pakistan Army from being considered by the United Nations Security Council.
     
    Writes Robert Jackson, now a British Member of Parliament, �Looking back on it all, the sad story of the demise of East Pakistan does seem to have been a miasma of personal ambition.�
     
    Notes:
    1. James P. Sterba, Wall Street   Journal, November 6, 1984.
    2. Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan:  Leadership Challenges, OUP,  1999.
    3. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press, 1990.
    4. Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army, OUP, 1999.
    5. Brian Cloughley, op. cit.
    6. Antony Beevor, Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943,  Penguin Books, 1998.
    7. Sisson-Rose,  op. cit.
    8. Pran Chopra, India�s Second Liberation, MIT Press, 1974.
    9. Pran Chopra, op. cit.
    10. Brigadier A. A. K. Chaudhry, September 1965, Ferozesons, 1977.
    11. Sisson-Rose, op. cit.
    12. Personal correspondence, January 20, 2000.
    The author is an economist in Palo Alto, California.  He lived in Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars.  He has written on Pakistan�s Strategic Myopia in the RUSI Journal, and reviewed Mazari�s book, Journey to  Disillusionment for International Affairs.
    Source:
    by courtesy & � 2001 Defence Journal & Ahmad Faruqui
     
     
    ==============================================================================================================================================================
    Excerpt from  The Betrayal of East Pakistan : -Lt. Gen. A. A. K. Niazi
     
    General Tikka Khan was sent as Yaqub's replacement on 7 March 1971. Tikka arrived in Dhaka by air and took over the duties of Commander, Eastern Command, MLA, and Governor of East Pakistan. He was not welcomed; in fact he was presented with a garland of shoes at the airport. To top it all, the Chief Justice refused to swear him in as Governor. Tikka was a straightforward, hard?working, and unassuming person. He lacked Yaqub's slick and suave manner; in fact he was not the sort of person to inspire confidence in others. He lacked strategic insight and tactical flair, yet a halo of grandeur and vicarious heroism had been woven around him.
    On taking over the command of Eastern Garrison, Gen. Tikka tried to meet Sheikh Mujib. Although Mujib had met Yaqub, he refused to meet Tikka. Gen. Tikka issued a directive to the troops, based on the mission spelled out to him; this included: disarming of the East Bengal Regiment, battalions of the East Pakistan Rifles, and the police; security of Chittagong naval base; control of airfields including Lal Munir Hut and Ishurdi; security of towns.
    Page # 44

    On 25 March General Tikka Khan had available to him for military action only 14 Infantry Division, under the command of Major?General Khadim Hussain Raja. It consisted of four brigades, located in different cantonments and camps all over East Pakistan. In the division there were twelve infantry battalions (all West Pakistan), seven infantry battalions (all East Pakistan) and one commando battalion (mixed). These battalions had officers from both West and East Pakistan. In supporting arms he had one light tank regiment, five regiments of field artillery, one regiment of light anti?aircraft artillery, and two mortar batteries. Troops in these units were mixed West and East Pakistanis. There were sixteen wings of the East Pakistan Rifles, about sixteen thousand strong these were all East Pakistanis except a few officers and junior commissioned officers from West Pakistan. There were also naval and air force troops, some of which could be used in a ground role in Chittagong and Dhaka.
    It should be borne in mind that the Bengali troops had not yet mutinied. General Tikka had enough strength available to complete his task. The requirements were proper planning, intelligent conduct of operations, and patience, because facing him was not a regular army but dissident armed civilians. More tact than tactics was the order of the day
    On the night between 25/26 March 1971, General Tikka struck. Peaceful night was turned into a time of wailing, crying, and burning. General Tikka let loose everything at his disposal as if raiding an enemy, not dealing with his own misguided and misled people. The military action was a display of stark cruelty, more merciless than the massacres at Bukhara and Baghdad by Changez Khan and Halaku Khan, or at Jallianwala Bagh by the British General Dyer.
    General Tikka, instead of carrying out the tasks given to him, i.e., to disarm armed Bengali units and persons and to take into custody the Bengali leaders, resorted to the killing of civilians and a scorched?earth policy. His orders to his troops were: `I want the land and not the people.' These orders were carried out in letter and spirit by Major?General Farman and Brigadier (later Lt. Gen.) Jahanzeb Arbab in Dhaka. Major?General Rao Farman had written in his table diary, `Green land of East Pakistan will be painted red.' It was painted red by Bengali blood. This diary was found by the Bengalis when they occupied Government House on 14 December 1971. Mujib showed the diary to Bhutto during his visit to Bangladesh. Bhutto inquired from me about this diary during my meeting with him.
    Page # 44, 46

    On the night between 25/26 March 1971 Yahya sneaked out of Dhaka before the start of military action. He told Tikka before leaving Dhaka, `Sort them out.' Bhutto had remained behind to see what Tikka did. Bhutto saw Dhaka burning and heard the cries of the people, the crackle of burning material, the roar of tanks, the boom of guns and rockets, and the rattle of machine guns. In the morning, it is alleged, Bhutto patted Tikka, Farman, and Arbab on the back, congratulated them for doing exactly what was needed, and assured them that their future was secured. Bhutto kept his promise. Tikka secured the coveted post of COAS. Farman was made Chairman, Fauji Foundation, and Brigadier Arbab, despite the corruption charge proved against him, was promoted as Major General and later Lieutenant General. On reaching Karachi on 26 March, he told the people, `Thank God Pakistan has been saved.'
    Page # 46,47

    Major?General Rao Farman Ali was Military Adviser to the Governor, and Brigadier Faqir Muhammad was Brigadier Martial Law. Brigadier Jilani (Later Lt. Gen. and Governor) was my COS (Chief of Staff), replacing Brigadier E1?Edroos. Major?General Shaukat Riza was Commanding 9 Division. Major?General Rahim had replaced Major?General Khadim Raja as GOC 14 Division. Major?General Nazar Hussain Shah was GOC 16 Division, and Major?General Jamshad was head of CAF (Civil Armed Forces), replacing Brigadier Nisar. Rear Admiral Sharif and Air Commodore Inam were commanding the navel and air force contigents.
    Page # 49

    The tasks were to be completed by 15 May 1971 at the latest. It was emphasized that speed and multiple thrusts would pay dividends.
    16 Division under Major?General Nazar Hussain Shah was responsible for Rajshahi Civil Division. Dinajpur, Rangpur, Bogra, and Rajshahi were to be held. Due to the closeness of Indian cantonments, and the area being flat and suitable for tanks in dry weather, the only tank regiment in East Pakistan was given to this Division.
    9 Division under Major?General Shaukat Riza was responsible for Dhaka and Khulna Divisions. Dhaka, being the provincial capital and an international airport, was vital.
    There were no obstacles on the northern side of Dhaka, but there were good covering positions in area Madhupur Forest and around Tangil City. Mymensingh was to be held in strength. Khulna Division was the next priority after Rajshahi Division, again due to the proximity of Indian cantonments?it was comparatively easy for the Indian Army to concentrate troops in front of this position. Jessore was to be held in strength; Faridpur was also to be held as it gave depth to Jessore and assured protection to Dhaka as well.
    The waterlogged areas of Chalna, Barisal, and the Sunderbans were given to CAF.
    14 Division under Major?General Rahim Khan was responsible for Chittagong Division. Sylhet, Brahmanbaria, Comilla, and Chittagong were to be held. Chittagong was vital. Commandos were deployed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
    Page # 60

    The new deployment was as under:
    16 Division of three Brigades and an armoured regiment under Major?General Nazar Hussain Shah in area Dinajpur, Rangpur, Rajshahi, Palma, and Bogra.
    9 Division of two Brigades under Major?General M. H. Ansari to be responsible for area Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal, Bhola Island, Patuakhali, Khulna, Jessore, Chauhadanga, and Mehrabpur. Paksey Bridge was included in the area of 9 Division.
    The waterlogged areas of Chalna, Barisal, and Sunderbans remained with the CAF.
    14 Division of three Brigades under Major Gerieral Ralim Khan became responsible for Mymensingh, Sylhet, Comilla up to and including River Feni, Noakhali, and Dhaka. Bhairab Bridge was included in the area of 14 Division. Chittagong and the Chittagong Hill Tracts were made the responsibility of an independent brigade and commandos under Eastern Command.
    In the new deployment the following changes were made:
    Major-General Shaukat Riza was removed from the command of 9 Division for inefficiency and buckling under stress of war conditions, and Brigadier M. H. Ansari was promoted and given the command of 9 Division. This Division was originally responsible for the civil divisions of Dhaka and Khulna. Now a Division less one brigade was made responsible for Khulna Division only.
    Page # 61,62
    The reorganization was as under, and completed by the end of October 1971:
    14 Division, previously at Dhaka, was assigned Mymensingh?Sylhet? Chittagong sector, i.e., the whole area east of the Rivers Brahmaputra and Padma/Ganges. This was allocated as under:
    1. 14 Division (ten battalions) was made responsible for the entire area east of Meghna River.
    2. A new ad hoc 202 Brigade with one battalion plus CAF was created in area Sylhet under Brigadier Salimullah. 313 Brigade under Brigadier Rana moved down to Maulvi Bazar.
    3. 27 Brigade (Brigadier Saadullah) ex?Mymensingh (two battalions) was moved to area Akhora?Brahmanbaria to protect the most threatened approach.
    4. 17 Brigade at Comilla?Mainamati under Brigadier Manzoor Hussain Atif.
    16 Division: No change in their ten battalions. Rangpur?Bogra?Rajshahi sector.
    9 Division less one brigade (7 battalions): Jessore?Kushtia? Faridpur Sector.
    Page # 85

    A new ad hoc 314 Brigade under Colonel Fazal Hamid with EPCAF was created for Khulna sector.
    A new ad hoc 91 Independent Brigade (Brigadier Ata Malik) was created in Chittagong with one battalion, two companies, local garrison troops, and naval troops.
    53 Brigade (Brigadier Aslam Niazi) on relief was moved to Dhaka as command reserve.
    A new ad hoc 36 Division under Director?General EPCAF (Major?General jamshed) was created at Dhaka with a new ad hoc 93 Brigade (Brigadier Qadir Niazi) at Mymensingh with two battalions and CAF in the area.
    Later an ad hoc 39 Division under Major?General M. Rahim Khan with 53 Brigade was raised to defend Chandpur under GHQ orders. GHQ did not send the promised replacement for Dhaka.
    Page # 86

    For instance, Major?General Jamshed, Commander, East Pakistan Civil Armed Forces (EPCAF), was located in Dhaka, so when I went out to visit troops I took him along with me. All mistook him for the Divisional Commander of the Fourth Division.
    Page # 88, 89

    I got General Jamshed posted in his place. General Jamshed was commanding our fourth Division, which was an ad hoc Division and had only one ad hoc brigade of only two battalions of regular troops fighting in area Mymensingh.' He looked a bit perplexed.
    Page # 89

    In compliance with GHQ orders I sent my Chief of Staff, Brigadier Baqir Siddiqui, and Major?General Jamshed, my Second?in?Command, to GHQ to give detailed briefings on past and likely future enemy actions, deployment of troops including Mujahids, EPGAF, and all other forces, and to present my appreciation of courses open for counter?insurgency and meeting the external threat.
    Page # 103

    On 26 November 1 visited Nator to discuss operational plans with GOC 16 Division. I was not happy with the way 23 Brigade had fought in Panchagarh. However, the brigade commander, Brig. Ansari, was relieved of command by the GOC. I was fully satisfied with the Hilli operation by 205 Brigade and with the deployment of 107 Brigade in the south. My visits to 14 Division around Sylhet, Comilla, and Chittagong resulted in some adjustments of their positions. I was fully satisfied with the way they were fighting the battles.
    Page # 127

    53 Brigade was command reserve. As mentioned earlier, it was moved to Ghandpur?Laxam sector under orders from GHQ. The eight battalions promised in November would have given me flexibility.
    I tried to recreate the reserves and Col. Fazal Hamid's Khulna ad hoc Brigade was called back to Dhaka. A battalion from 14 Division and some ex 9 Division troops had arrived by 3 December, and General Rahim's ad hoc Division was withdrawn to Dhaka and deployed in Narayanganj. 93 ad hoc Brigade was also ordered to Dhaka and they took up inch of the ground in Dhaka and established communications in
    Government quarters to fight in built?up areas.
    Page # 129

    This sector was defended by 16 Division with its headquarters at Nator. Maj.?Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah, a fearless and intelligent divisional commander, commanded this Division, which comprised 23, 107, and 205 Brigades. Commanded by Brigadier Saeed Akhtar Ansari, 23 Brigade was responsible for the defence of DinaJpur Rangpur. Ansari was later relieved of the command of 23 Brigade due to his inept performance, which lacked the spark of a fighting commander. The Divisional Commander was completely dissatisfied with his handling of the military operation. He was replaced by Brigadier Shafi, Dhaka Logistic Area Commander. 205 Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Tajammul Hussain, whose task was to defend Hilli complex. After causing attrition on the enemy, he had to withdraw to Bogra according to the predetermined plans. The third Brigade, 107, was commanded by Brigadier Naeem. It was located in the depth and was holding Panitola, Nawabganj, and Inshurdi with one battalion each.
    Page # 137
     
    Brigadier Shafi had been specially selected by me to command 23 Brigade, which was to hold Dinajpur?Rangpur and not alloy Indian troops to advance further.
    With Brigadier Shafi taking over command, the fighting pattern took a dramatic turn. An aggressive stance replaced the defensive posture.
    Page # 138

    It was also being used to protect the flanks of 205 Brigade in the south in area Hilli, blocking the approach to Bogra and Dhaka, where a fierce battle was being fought.
    Brigadier Tajammul Hussain, Commander 205 Brigade Group, had organized the Hilli defences with tactical finesse. He had placed screens along the railway line at Noapara, at Basudpura check?post, and at the Railway Station complex. The main compact defended localities were sited in depth to cover all routes leading into East Pakistan. They were effectively covered by 4FF s and elements of 13FF Battalions. The positions were supported by a field regiment, a mortar battery, a squadron of tanks, and elements of recce and support battalion. The depth of the positional defence was about two thousand five hundred yards.
    Page # 139

    It was in this sector that Major Akram, one of the compam commanders of 4FF, was awarded a posthumous Vishan?e?Haidei for his gallantry in Mapara area. The complete 205 Brigade Group fought extremely well. Lt.?Col. Abbasi of 4FF was wounded and evacuated. As 4FF was holding Hilli, a very important position, I could not afford to leave it without a good CO, so I took my General Staff Officer, Lt.?Col. Mumtaz, GSO?I (Intelligence), to Hilli when I visited the area on 26 November 1971. He put up a magnificent show. He also officiated as Brigade Commander during Tajammal's absence when the latter was ambushed. For his extraordinary bravery he was awarded Sitara?eJurat. It was a model battle against the enemy's four brigades.
    Page # 144
    Brigadier Tajammal Hussain Malik had volunteered to fight in East Pakistan. I wanted to keep him for the defence of Dhaka but he insisted on going to a front?line brigade. He was sent to 205 Brigade under General Nazar. I had full faith in him as a good commander and a brave leader. He had proved his mettle in the 1965 war. He displayed the qualities of a true soldier of Islam and gave the toughest battle to the Indians. I recommended him for the award of Nishan?e?Hailer, but GHQ ignored him and his heroic deeds as many chairbound soldiers and sycophants had to be catered for. I insisted on his promotion to Major General, as some people were afraid of him because of his unflinching faith in Islam. He was promoted and became the only Brigadier from East Pakistan to attain this rank.
    Our troops also successfully transfixed the Indian army in Dinajpur, Rangpur, Saidpur, Bogra, and Rajshahi, so that the enemy could not transfer troops to West Pakistan. In fact, with the arrival of Brigadier Manzoor's brigade from 9 Division into 16 Division's area, the enemy was sandwiched in the north and south.
    Page # 145

    Major?General M. H. Ansari was my Logistics Area Commandc.)Dhaka. I got him promoted because of his brave action again,( the rebels. He took over the command of 9 Division from Major General Shaukat Raza. Ansari had two brigades in his division, and he established 9 Division Headquarters at jessore. On the commencement of hostilities, he moved to Faridpur. He fought his battle according to the formulated plan. At times he was out of communication with his subordinate formations. I provided guidance to them during the intervening period.
    9 Division was to hold Kustia, Jhenida Jessore and Khulna line. Troops had also to fall back to Faridpur to prevent the eneim from reaching Dhaka. 57 Brigade, under Brigadier Manzool Ahmad, was responsible for Jhenida?Kushtia. 107 Brigade under Brigadier Hayat, SJ, was to defend by rajessore. After delayi))g and causing attrition to the enemy, the brigade was to fall back to Magura?Faridpur. One battalion was to look after Satkhira, Khulna area. I had an ad hoc brigade of CAF in Khulna, which I moved to Dhaka later.
    Page # 146

    Hayat was finally ready to face the enemy at Daulatpur, a town a few kilometres short of Khulna. This position had extensive marsh on one flank, and the Bhairab River flanking the other side. He converted this area into a strong defensive position, deriving maximum strength from the terrain. The existing obstacles were used to best advantage.
    Page # 147

    Hayat's performance was extraordinary. With a small force, he played around with a superior enemy force. He blunted tlic enemy armour, consisting of T?55 and PT?i6 tanks outwitted the opposition with his quick decisions and bold actions, acid eliminated the enemy by his courage, fortitude, and initiative. Hayat was a brave commander.
    Page #148
    Brigadier Manzoor, Commander 57 Brigade, was allowed to move to 16 Division area with most of his equipment, crossing the Ganges over the Harding Bridge, which had been roughly decked. The brigade thereafter came under the command of 16 Infantry Division. When Manzoor initially withdrew from the forward delaying positions, his brigade HQ with one Rifle Company got detached and reached Jhenida, while Manzoor with the rest of his Brigade and Tactical HQ, firmed in Kushtia. When he crossed over to 16 Division area with his troops, Major?General Ansari, using the leftover troops of Manzoor's brigade (Main Brigade HQ and one Rifle Company) and two newly arrived battalions from Dhaka, raised an ad hoc Brigade. He gave the command of this Brigade to Col. K. K. Afridi, his Col. Staff. Afridi was responsible for looking after the approaches to Faridpur and Golando. Ansari himself took over the command of the troops defending the Faridpur Fortress and Golando strong point. Col. Afridi fought magnificently.
    Page # 149

    Faridpur and Golando were held fairly strongly under the personal command of General Ansari. The approaches to these fortresses were being guarded by the ad hoc Brigade of Col. K. K. Afridi, a brave and experienced officer.
    Chittagong was defended by our naval troops and an ad hoc Brigade under Brigadier Ata Muhammad Malik, a tough Brigadier with a flair for meticulous planning and personal leadership. He foiled the enemy's attempts to capture Chittagong and held up their troops. He did not give up till the end. Another ad hoc Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Taskeen. The Commandos, local Chakma tribesmen, and Mezos from Indian Assam were part of this brigade. They kept the Indians away from the sensitive objectives and towns in Chittagong Hill Tract area and inflicted considerable losses on the Indian Kilo Force.
    Page # 151

    The raising of 39 ad hoc Division for the defence of Laxam/ Feni was not a part of the original plan. I had wanted to hold Dhaka and Chittagong as fortresses, with Chandpur as a covering position, not Laxam or Feni, but Gul Hassan, our armchair strategist at GHQ, was adamant in ordering me to hold Laxam/ Feni on the border.
    The ad hoc 39 Division was raised under General Rahim Khan, HJ, on 21 November 1971. General Rahim had done extremely well as General Officer Commanding 14 Division in the insurgency operations. He was a bold and dashing general who, on account of his bravery, sharp intellect, and practical generalship, was given command of the Chandpur sector. It had two brigades, 53 and 117. 117 were holding the borders from north of Comilla to Chaudogram, while 53 were responsible for area further south, up to Feni.
    53 Brigade was commanded by Brigadier Aslam Niazi. He was Command Reserve for Dhaka. The brigade was to defend Chandpur and then fall back to Dhaka on orders. This brigade was placed under the command of 39 (A) Division and was deployed in Laxam.
    Page # 152

    Brigadier Aslam, Commander 53 Brigade, made frantic efforts to reach Chandpur. A fierce battle took place at Hajiganj. Both sides suffered casualties. Hajiganj fell on 8 December 1971, after halting the advance of the enemy for thirteen days. Aslam withdrew to Lalmai position to join 117 Brigade under Brigadier Atif.
    I sent Major?General Rahim to West Pakistan with important papers. Brigadier Mian Mansoor Muhammad took over command of Rahim's troops, who were deployed in Narayangonj area.
    By then we had placed enough troops in Narayanganj and Mirpur.
    Page # 153

    Comilla was not to be held permanently. After initial battles, 177 Brigade was to fall back to Mainamati Fortress which had b~ organized into three layers behiqd artificial obstacles to f enemy attacks from all directions. The enemy, despite their concerted efforts, could not penetrate the Mainamati defences.
    Brigadier M. H. Atif, Commander 117 Brigade, had repeatedlo.. refused the Indian demand to surrender. He made this fortress impregnable and, like his victory as hockey captain in the 196?E Olympics, he fought hard and was still fighting when hostilities ended on 16 December. After the withdrawal of 53 Infantry from Laxam, Atifs troops, plus 53 Brigade's troops, swelled to four thousand regular troops, with four Chafee tanks and a batten' of artillery. The Indians could not capture or penetrate our strong defensive positions. The attacks proved expensive for the Indians. both in life and in material. The enemy therefore decided to invest the fortress, but it held till the ceasefire was announced. Thus Atif succeeded in pinning down two enemy brigades, leaving only one division plus to General Sagat Singh for the capture of Dhaka. He had also to tackle Bhairab Bazar and Narayanganj Fortresses with his small force. His area of responsibility included even Chittagong.
    Qazi Abdul Majid, General Officer Commanding 14 Division, had organized his defences in Sylhet?Akhaura?Brahmanbaria. After fighting the Indians in the delaying positions, strong points, and fortresses, he was to withdraw and fall back to Dhaka. Sylhet, was defended by 313 Pakistani Brigade, commanded by Brig. Rana.
    Our troops, consisting of one company each of 22 Baluch and Tochi Scouts in Shamshernagar and Kalaura, fought back heroically and held the enemy brigade advance for a long period.
    Page # 154

    Our 202 ad hoc Brigade, under Brigadier Salimullah, had occupied the town. He had converted it into a fortress with the remnants of units falling back from the front. Our 313 Brigade, now commanded by Brigadier Asghar Hassan, who had relieved Brig. Rana, also pulled back to Sylhet from Maulvi Bazar where it had been sent.
    The credit for putting up such a strong resistance goes to Brigadiers Salimullah and Asghar Hassan in their respective areas. Their valiant efforts had nullified an entire enemy infantry division which had been earmarked for the capture of Dhaka.
    Brigadier Saadullah, Commander 27 Brigade, was defending Bhairab Bazar sector with his brigade. Saadullah was a brave officer, an inspiring leader who was always in the forefront of brigade troops during attacks. He evicted the enemy from a few places by personally joining the bayonet?charging counter?attacks. He was recommended for a Nishan?e?Haider but was awarded HilaleJurat instead. It is unfortunate that such an excellent officer was not promoted. He was considered a fundamentalist.
    Saadullah's brigade was deployed in Akhaura?Brahmanbaria near Agartala. Our defences were mainly based on the Tista River. It was flanked by many jheels (lakes). The other important town, about five kilometres north of Akhaura, was Ganga Sagar. Both places were held by us with a battalion each.
    Page # 155

    For fifteen days 27 Brigade repulsed their attacks, until we ourselves decided to withdraw to our next defensive position of Ashuganj and then to Brahmanbaria.
    Our 27 Brigade was well dug in at Ashuganj by the time the leading elements of 311 Indian Brigade reached the area on 9 December 1971.
    Page # 156

    A strong counterattack led by Brig. Saadullah forced them to fall back. At this stage, General Officer Commanding 14 Division, Qazi Majid, ordered the blowing up of Ashuganj Bridge while 27 Brigade was still on the east bank of the Meghna River and when there was no immediate danger to the bridge. The brigade managed to cross over and reach Bhairab Bazar.
    The Indians started crossing the Meghna by using helicopters south?west of Bhairab Bazar. The Indian build?up at Narsingdi was slow, in spite of the fact there was no interference from our side. Ferrying tanks and artillery across the Meghna was a difficult task. I lacked the long-range capability to disrupt their landing plans because we did not have medium and heavy artillery guns. Similarly, if I had had my Recce Regiment (tank) and long range artillery, the enemy would have resisted the temptation to resort to aerial bridging or landing para-troops at Tangail. Also, if 'I had had a few squadron of modern aircraft, 1 could have successfully interfered with enemy tank movements, para drops, heli landings, and river crossing operations.
    Within the overall defensive plan of the sector, 14 Division had been entrusted with the task of defending Narsingdi?Narayan ganj sector. They were to fall back when ordered from Sylhet and Ashuganj. Sylhet brigade had come down to Maulvi Bazar. Majid was ordered to send the troops to Dhaka; instead, for unknown reasons, he pushed them back to Sylhet. Majid had been given the mission to fall back on Dhaka after the destruction of the Bhairab Bazar bridge. I ordered him to fall back to Narsingdi. He regretted his inability to do so. He was specially given six ferries for the move to Dhaka, and the railway line was also available to him?it was later used by the Indians, and his troops watched the spectacle. He could easily have reached Dhaka, but he never even made the attempt. It appears his disobedience was part of the plan to let East Pakistan Garrison face ignominy. He knew that the defence of Dhaka was vital. Still he failed to obey. I therefore removed him from the command of his Division and put his troops under the command of 36(A) Division. Sylhet?Ghittagong and Comilla Garrison were placed under Eastern Command. After the failure. of 14 Division to reach their allotted positions in Dhaka perimeter I had to re?adjust the positions, which fortunately could be done without much difficulty.
    I had no time to take disciplinary action against Majid, as the war was at its peak. Saadullah had fought very well throughout the war. He should have been allowed to fall back to Dhaka. Hai his troops reached the allocated area in Dhaka perimeter, the enemy would not have successfully landed heli?borne troops in the Narsingdi. The fact that Maulvi Bazar brigade and Saadullah', brigade here not sent to bolster Dhaka's defence created a firm suspicion in my mind about Majid's links with the coterie at GHQ led by Gul Hassan that intended to let down Eastern Garrison.
    Page # 157,158

    Fazal Muqeem was subsequently hired by GHQ to write their version of events. Qazi Majid was a brother of Lt.?Gen. Hamid (Bhopali), the General who was later detailed by Tikka to call officers in Lahore and tell them to testify against Eastern Command and myself. This was a deliberate attempt to absolve Majid and throw the blame on Eastern Command.
    Majid's order to blow up the bridge when Saadullah's brigade was still on the other side of the Meghna River, when there was no immediate threat to the bridge, is indeed baffling. Furthermore, no general needs permission to attack in his area of responsibility. Majid had been given orders to fall back on Dhaka, so why did he need permission to come to his allotted area of responsibility? I fail to understand where Muqeem got this information from, because when he completed his book we were POWs in India, including Qazi Majid. Furthermore, Majid's masterly inactivity in dealing with the heli?borne troops does not speak well of his intentions.
    Page # 158,159

    This was all due to Qazi Majid's treacherous role in keeping the troops passive and inactive. These were the same troops who had held an enemy division at bay for fifteen days, and who had evicted an enemy supported by tanks from Ashuganj with their bayonets. The troops were full of zest, eager to perform any task assigned to them by their commanders. It was all due to Majid's bloody?mindedness and cowardice that Indian heli?landed troops escaped their destruction.
    This sector was under the command of General Jamshed, GOC 36 ad hoc Division. It was defended by 93 ad hoc Brigade of two battalions, under the command of Brigadier Qadir Niazi. A war veteran, full of zeal, this valiant commander can be credited with performing miracles with only two battalions on divergent axes. It was due to his superior leadership that he encouraged Capt. Ahsan, one of his ad hoc company commanders, to hold on to his position.
    Page # 159

    Qadir had organized the main defensive positions behind the Brahmaputra obstacle at Jarnalpur and Mymensingh with approximately one battalion strength. He had placed screen.,and delaying positions north of the river on the expected approaches of Hatibara?Sherpur jamalpur axis. The Mukti Bahini forces were very active in this area, continually harassing our posts at Kamalpur and Hatibanda. This axis was the responsibilit\ of 31 Baluch, under Lt.?Col. Sultan, SJ, while Dalu?Haluaghat Mytnensingh axis was the operational responsibility of 33 Punjab under Col. Razaq, another brave officer.
    Page # 160

    On 9 December I was informed by Major?General Ansari that enemy Para Brigade had been relieved from its ground role. I made a quick appreciation as to where the para drops could take place. Tangail and Tungi seemed appropriate because from these places the enemy could block the withdrawal of 93 Brigade from Mymensingh. Tungi being closer to Dhaka, the para drops could be intercepted by Pakistani troops, so Tangail was the most likely place for the para drops. So I allowed Major?General Jamshed to pull back his 93 Brigade from area Mymensingh. I also told other Divisional Commanders to fall back on to their main positions. Enemy paratroops landed on the afternoon of the 10th at Tangail.
    Brigadier Qadir was ordered to withdraw to Dhaka on the night 9/10 December. 31 Baluch, which was holding Jamalpur and Kamalpur, was successful in containing the enemy advance for twenty?one days. They were besieged but they bayoneted their way through the enemy encirclement. 33 Punjab, under Lt.?Col. Razzak, also fought extremely well and kept the enemy at bay in this sector. They had engaged in some tough battles, and survived poison gas, which was used against them. They too successfully carried out the withdrawal to Dhaka.
    Page # 162-163

    93 Brigade reached Dhaka in good shape but the Brigade HQ and its escort got entangled with the enemy paratroops in area Kaluarkar. This small force under Brigadier Qadir delayed the advance of enemy paratroops for four days. Later, when they were exhausted due to hunger and lack of rest, and their ammunition was completely finished, Brigadier Qadir was taken POW.
    Brigadier Saadullah's brigade reached Bhairab Bazar from Ashuganj before the arrival of the Indians and firmed in. The aerial bridging capability was Arora's trump card. By withdrawing 93 Brigade from mymensingh to Dhaka and Saadullah's brigade from Ashuganj to Bhairab Bazar, we blunted the enemy move. We beat them to the draw. The enemy failed to block the move of both brigades.
    Page # 163

    Naik Sarwar of 24 Cavalry in Bogra Sector of 16 Division.
    Page # 166

    The Navy contingent consisted of only four gunboats under the command of Admiral Mohammad Sharif. In spite of the enemy's superiority both at sea and in the rivers, our naval personnel showed guts, initiative, and efficiency in the movement of troops. They helped the army in some operations as well. In Belonia operations, their contribution was praiseworthy. They were ably led by Captain Zamir, a brave, capable, and conscientious naval officer who was always willing and ready to do the job and was never afraid of taking risks.
    The air contingent in East Pakistan consisted only of one squadron of old F?86 aircraft, located at Dhaka. The way Air Commodore Inam?ul?Haq handled his brave and excellent team was admirable. Every day they flew out and took a heavy toll o£ the numerically superior enemy aircraft.
    Page # 167

    The news of the air bridging of the Meghna River was given to me by Air Commodore Inam, who had spotted it on his shortrange radar. On receipt of this timely news we moved Saadullah's brigade from Ashuganj to Bhairab Bazar, behind the enemy helilanded troops, who were thus sandwiched between Dhaka position and the forward position. It is a pity that Dhaka airfield got damaged so badly that our aircraft could not take off after 6 December, for this meant that the Indian aircraft had a free run over the whole of East Pakistan. We sent our pilots to West Pakistan before the surrender, and the remaining Air Force personnel were deployed for the ground defence of Dhaka.
    Page # 167-168

    The armoured troops under Col. Bukhari proved their mettle bN their mobile offensive actions against enemy tanks and in support of our own infantry. Though always out?numbered and outgunned, they faced the enemy's far superior tanks courageously and by superior tactics kept the enemy armour at bay.
    Artillery Brigadier S.S.A. Q,asim was my Artillery Commander. He was a capable gunner who always accompanied me to the forward troops. Although we did not have complete artillery formations or units because the troops were brought in by air, he made the best possible use of the available guns. The divisions and brigades were almost independent, but he co?ordinated and finalized their fire plans. Their accuracy and effectiveness was proved during the war.
    This regiment was commanded by Lt.?Col. Mohammad Afzal, a brave and courageous officer. Qasim was always around whenever the Indians air?attacked Dhaka. The regiment remained under constant enemy air?attacks throughout the war but our brave gunners engaged the enemy aircraft with undaunted spirit.
    I was in one of the gun pits during the air raids. There were six enemy aircraft which attacked our three gunposts. The gunners put up a bold and determined fight. The fight lasted for about ten minutes. The enemy lost two aircraft, then vanished.
    The regiment brought down its last Indian aircraft, a bomber, on 16 December. This regiment performed splendidly, bringing down more than thirty enemy aircraft. The credit for all this goes to Afzal and Qasim who set a personal example and kept the enemy away from Dhaka Cantonment.
    Page # 168
    Our engineers did a magnificent job throughout the East Pakistan crisis.
    Brigadier Iqbal Sharif, was a brave and willing worker who handled his troops efficiently at the most difficult places and under enemy attack. He repaired the airfield in the shortest possible time with no thought for the risk to his life. He personally supervised engineer operations and was an extraordinary example of gallantry, resourcefulness, and improvisation. His efficiency in the most difficult task of restoring communications, bridges, and roads was simply superb. He was given a sector in Dhaka defences to command, and he organized its defences most satisfactorily.
    Our signals performance was very good throughout. They kept us in communication with forward units as well as GHQ, till the end. The credit goes to Brigadier Arif Raza, whose job was very difficult and whose resources were inadequate, but who solved the knotty problems of communications very efficiently, particularly by providing signals equipment, facilities, and manpower for newly?raised ad hoc formations. It is to his credit that all units, formations, and GHQ, remained in communication until we shut down when the Indians came.
    Page # 169

    Our helicopters were under the command of Lt. Col. Liaquat Bukhari. He was efficient, intelligent, and a courageous commander. The helicopters were used for reconnaissance, supplies, and evacuation of casualties. There were no night vision or night navigation devices fixed in our helicopters.
    Page # 169-170
     
    Bhutto had also promised Tikka that he would be made the Chief, and Maj.?Gen. Farman had been assured of a reward for his services. Farman was the cleverest behind?the?scenes manipulator. Lt.?Gen. Tikka was senior to Lt. Gen. GUI Hassan, who was nevertheless appointed COAS. All the generals senior to Gul Hassan refused to serve under a junior and went on pension except Tikka, who continued serving under his junior?which is normally not done during peacetime.
    Page # 174

    Nazar of 16 Division was very much active, a fierce battle was still raging in Hilli on the borders, and the enemy's 6 Division was contained in Dinajpur, Saidpur, and Rangpur. In 9 Division's area, Brigadier Manzoor was withdrawing towards Kushtia and heavily involving an Indian division.
    Page # 176

    GOC 16 Division Maj.?Gen. Nazar Hassan and Brigadier Tajammul Hussain were ambushed on 7 December in area Plasbari but miraculously escaped. Nazar was given protection by a civilian.
    Page # 179

    General Jamshed was in overall charge of Dhaka Fortress. Work on the construction of defences had started in October 1971. On 7 December a conference under General Jamshed was held to review the defences of Dhaka. The immediate threat was expected to come from the eastern side. It was estimated that the enemy would take about two weeks to build up for an attack on Dhaka. General Jamshed gave out new areas of responsibility and command and control: 93(A) Brigade of 36(A) Division on the area of Mirpur bridge; Narsingdi approach was given to 14 Division; Narayanganj to 39 (A) Division; and Manikganj approach to 314(A) Brigade under Col. Fazal?e?Hamid; Cantt, including Tongi, was to be under the command of Brig. Qasim. The city was to remain with Brig. Bashir. In the original plan, Dhaka was to be defended by 53 Brigade, other troops in the area, and the EPCAF. On orders from GHQ, when 53 Brigade moved out of Dhaka for counterinsurgency I earmarked troops from the holding formations for the defence of Dhaka.
    I had planned the defence of Dhaka in four layers (see, map no. 12). The final battle was to be fought in the built?up areas.
    Page # 203

    Dhaka defences was re?organized in four echelons as under:
    Outer defences:
    (1) Bera?Pabna line by 16 Division.
    (2) Madhumati River Line by 9 Division.
    (3) Old Brahmaputra line by 93 Brigade.
    (4) Ashuganj?Daudkundi?Chandpur line by 14/39 Divisions.
    Dhaka Triangle on Mirzapur Jaydebpur-Narsingdi and Manikganj line.
    Page # 206

    Outer defences of Dhaka city?Sawar, Mirpur, Tangi Derma-Narayanganj line.
    The following troops were available for the defences of Dhaka during the second week of December:
    Ad hoc squadron of tanks -------------------------------------------------------------------50
    Artillery (6 LAA Regiment, all guns intact with plenty of ammunition,
    HQ Artillery, reinforcement, etc.)---------------------------------------------------------- 700
    Engineers (rear parties of various units, HQ Engineers as one battalion) --500
    Signals (3 battalion and various static units as 3 battalions) ------------------2000
    Infantry (31 Baluch, 33 Punjab, ex?93(A) Bde, Commando Battalion
    Less two Coys and reinforcements) -----------------------------------------------------4500
    Troops for Magura Sector --------------------------------------------------------------------900
    Services (ordnance and supply installation workshops)------------------------- 1000
    Navy (marines)------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 500
    Air Commandos (PAF) -------------------------------------------------------------------------500
    EPCAF ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4500
    Mujahids -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1500
    Razakars---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------700
    West Pakistan Police -------------------------------------------------------------------------2500
    Industrial Security Force ---------------------------------------------------------------------1500
    HQ, Eastern Comd. and HQ 36 Division -----------------------------------------------9000
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------30,350
    Dhaka sector was under Major?General Jamshed, a brave General who had earned two Military Crosses and a Sitara?e-Jurat. Each axis was looked after by a Brigadier, sub?units commanded by Lieutenant Colonels and platoons by Majors and Captains.
    Page # 207
     


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    RE: [ALOCHONA] Bangladesh Fooled By Indian Tansit Deal--Says who?



    Bangladesh gains from Transit Facility ...

    Posted by: "Shamim Huq"  shamimmhuq

    Sun Oct 31, 2010 6:27 pm (PDT)


    Dhaka stands to gain from transit facility

    Publish Date: Monday,1 November, 2010, at 12:31 PM Doha Time

    Bangladesh could reap a profit of $2.3bn in a period of 30 years by giving transit facilities to India, Nepal and Bhutan, a think tank has said.

    To earn that profit, Bangladesh would, however, have to invest $1.17bn in capital expenditure, operation and maintenance costs for over 30 years to develop corridors for transit traffic, says the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD).
    Of the amount, $53.74mn and $769mn would be required to set up road and rail links, $79mn and $129mn to upgrade the Chittagong and Mongla ports, and $99mn to operate and maintain them.
    Bangladesh and India signed a joint communique in January 2010 creating scope for introducing multi-modal transit and transhipment between the two nations.

    After years of nursing reservations that India could gain at its expense, Bangladesh is now preparing the UN-sponsored trans-Asian road and rail network that will link major points in the region.
    Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's pacts with India that allow the trans-Asian linkages have, however, been opposed by the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party.

    The CPD study says the transit revenue for Bangladesh would be low in the first five years since many constructions and arrangements would be done during the period. Bangladesh would be able to reap about 10% of the full potential benefit at that time.

    "From the sixth year onward, full potential benefits are assumed to be realised," the Daily Star said yesterday.
    A team of experts from Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Bhutan prepared the study report. Rahmatullah, former director of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, led the team.

    Bangladesh could gain at least three benefits from transit services, says the study.
    Freight charges within Bangladesh's transport network would go down and the country would receive revenue in port charges from international cargo at the Chittagong and Mongla ports. Besides, transit fees to be earned by Bangladesh will be equivalent to 70% of India's transport cost saving, it says.

    The study covered 14 corridors - eight road routes, five rail routes and a waterway - for transit traffic between Bhutan, India and Nepal through
    Bangladesh. IANS

     

    From: bdmailer@gmail.com
    Date: Thu, 28 Oct 2010 07:46:21 +0600
    Subject: [ALOCHONA] Bangladesh Fooled By Indian Tansit Deal

     
    Bangladesh Fooled By Indian Tansit Deal


    Read what Bangla Weeky "Shapathic Budbar" has to say on the whole issue



    How Bangladesh is not getting "Transit Tariffs" from Indian goods shipped through Bangladesh roads into India's North east region .The whole arguments presented to the people of Bangladesh by the present Government and section of civil society -like Center For Policy Dialog ( CPD ) was that Bangladesh will earn US $ 800 million to 1 billion annually by allowing Transit Facilities to India , this was to be earned by way tariff on Indian goods shipped through Bangladesh territories into Indian Seven states in North East .

    This however is not the case anymore , some key advisors in Prime Minister's office under intense pressure and lobby from Indian high Commission in Dhaka has given in and asked relevant authorities to suspend collecting transit fees on Indian goods shipments through it's territories . The question is ? when even Bangladesh transport vehicles has to pay roads and transport tax to use the country's infrastructure , how in the hell Indian Transports gets away without paying any tariff or fees ,while using Bangladesh infrastructure. The strange and ironic thing is that very few Newspapers and Govt official are protesting or debating this critical & impotent issue .

    Read what Bangla Weeky "Shapathic Budbar" has to say on the whole issue ( text is in Bangla )

    Here is the Link to the story : http://budhbar.com/?p=3222

    http://newsfrombangladesh.net/view.php?hidRecord=339488




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    [ALOCHONA] Why should the army feel accountable for what they do?



    Why should the army feel accountable for what they do?
     
    Afsan Chowdhury October 31, 2010
     
     Angry people set fire to an army camp at Rupganj on October 23 during a clash over land acquisition.
    Angry people set fire to an army camp at Rupganj on October 23 during a clash over land acquisition.
     
    The ongoing problem between the people of Rupganj and the armed forces with a camp being torched by a mob is significant showing that the interacting spaces between the army and the people have become nonexistent. We should be able to recognise that the army is not only autonomous of standard rules and laws that apply to the people but have no reason to believe that they are accountable to anyone.
     
    *In 1971, several army officers of Bangladeshi origin broke the rigid loyalty code and took up arms against the Pakistani rulers. They fought a political war which was an unprecedented task where the politicians on behalf of the people decided the path of action and not the intelligence agencies or senior brass. When the war ended, just about everyone became very senior officers, whether military or bureaucrat. It was part of the process of creating a new ruling class, the Brahmins and kshatriyas of a new land. After all, the shudras, Bangladesh's ordinary people, were already there.
     
    *The present army — style and substance — was germinated between 1972 and 1975. According to various interviews on the institutionalisation of the army, there were several factors which produced the mental frame of Bangladesh army which saw itself as an autonomous force within the state. Firstly, the army felt slighted by the treatment they received at Indian hands during the war and this made them think poorly of politicians whom they blamed for this. As it is, they had been taught to think lowly of them, a standard Pakistani army culture. It increased after 1971 with the raising of the Rakkhi Bahini, Sheikh Mujib's paramilitary which was supposed to be personally loyal to him and the party. The military feared a competitor, a contestant. Indian help in raising this paramilitary increased military's resentment even more of the people in power symbolised by Shekh Mujib.
     
    *But this period also saw retarding of civil institutions as the rule became increasingly autocratic. The famine of 1974 became an image of an administration not caring about the people or too inept to manage a crisis. It also saw a rapid decline of rule of law in governance and erosion of judiciary's power and a general free-for-us attitude of the cronies of the powerful. BKSAL or one-party rule was the apex of this process, not because it was plain undemocratic but also because it was non-consensual. Nobody cared about what the people wanted or thought. They were deliverers from the above coming to rescue the people, whether they liked it or not.The culture of consensus and consent was killed very early on.
     
    *At least four groups tried taking over in 1975. The Faruk–Rashid group took over first in August to be dislodged by Khaled Musharraf for a few moments in November to be overtaken by Col. Taher overnight for a few hours and finally ending up with Zia in the morning for a few years after that. It wasn't about who succeeded but that each group felt they had the right to takeover and acted accordingly. It was their state.
     
    *Once power was taken over by the military, the path was inevitable as the process of endorsement follows an inevitable pattern. That there are no records of a successful military rule is not an accident yet militaries in disabled or dysfunctional states do take over. The only model the-Pakistan-trained-Bangladeshi-soldiers had was the Pakistani model so that became the ideal they copied. There was no political moral force to temper the ambition to rule with the power of gun because there was no civil institution in society to challenge such ambitions.
    The military has developed into an autonomous province within the state. The army today is largely a product of its own imagination, not an imagination of the wider ideology of a nation-state or its people. Since no other state institution is accountable, the army has not felt any pressure to unlearn the Pakistani way.
     
    *The army is convinced that it is the saviour of last resort, effectively copying the Pakistani model as the "the guarantor of the state" . Bangladesh's DGFI is modelled after the ISI and the system of perks, benefits and building of a financial empire is another common trait. Taking over the state becomes a natural continuation of a culture where power has nothing to do either with public participation or legal consent.
     
    However, it's not a full Pakistan copy because that state is overrun by external threats whether India or the Taliban but Bangladesh has no such threats. The arguments are therefore weaker to act arbitrarily though many army ideologues think that the politicians of Bangladesh are like India is to Pakistan.
     
    *No institution that can check the power of extra-constitutionality or establish rule of law has been allowed to grow in the last 40 years largely because the governance process has violated the very principles they are supposed to uphold. So if no one feels they are answerable to the people, why should the army be?
     
    *During the last caretaker regime, the army tried to establish control over the political parties once more but failed. In consequence, a politician-armed forces partnership has been set up which allows continues unhindered rule for both. This kind of brahmin-kashtrya alliance is common in South Asia and Bengal.
     
    In that scheme of things, the shudras or ordinary can't expect senior politicians, bureaucrats or the tycoons to be punished for any offence, no matter how high their crime is. So why should they expect the army persons to be responsible?
     
    Shouldn't such situations demand that we analyse the nature of the state? Are we a tribalised state? A caste-based state? Or a fragmented state?
     
    ———————–
    Afsan Chowdhury is a journalist and researcher
     


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