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Thursday, May 20, 2010

[ALOCHONA] Water war



Water war
 
 
 
 


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[ALOCHONA] Extra-judicial Killings and Custodial Torture : From ‘Cross-fire’ to ‘Death-squad’



Extra-judicial Killings and Custodial Torture : From 'Cross-fire' to 'Death-squad'

 

By Dr. K. M. A. Malik (UK)

 

Introduction

 

Bangladesh started its journey as an independent country with constitutional and political commitment to safeguard the human rights for all its citizens. Unfortunately, what we have been witnessing over the years is a serious disregard for this commitment without any exception whether the country was ruled by a 'democratic', 'military' or 'civilian-military' government. Lack of respect for democratic norms and values, denial of space for opposing political views, and marginalising the weaker sections of the society (religious and ethnic minorities, extreme poor such as slum dwellers, etc) have created the conditions that allow different state organs and powerful sections of the society to violate human rights more or less on a routine basis, without any accountability. There are laws against all kinds of human rights violations but the policing and justice systems are weak and often subservient to the government of the day. The 'violators' in most cases go scot-free because they either belong to the ruling party/clique or have enough money and influence to escape the net of justice.

 

Present Situation

 

The present Awami League (AL)-led government came into power through the controversial general elections held at the end of December 2008. During the previous Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led government (2001-2006), the AL and its allies (at home and abroad) were highly critical about the then human rights violations in the country. They waged a relentless national and international campaign against the BNP-led government, especially for the alleged state-sponsored atrocities against the religious minorities and women. They were also highly vocal against the lawlessness, and arbitrary detention and torture of political opponents. Unlawful killings of alleged criminals by the law enforcers such as the police and Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) were particularly criticised.

 

An important aspect of the pre-election campaign of AL and its allies was to uphold the principles of universal human rights. They promised to strengthen democratic governance, to respect opposing political views, to allow freedom of media, to stop unlawful practices by the law enforcers and various government agencies ('cross-fires', 'encounters', etc), to fight against corruption, not to interfere with judicial and electoral process, not to 'politicise' the government machineries, and to ensure a society based on equal rights and justice for all. These steps, among many others, were supposed to fulfil their electoral slogan of 'Din Bodol' or a qualitative change in the political and social culture of the country.

 

But what are the realities after 1 year and 5 months of rule by the current AL-led government? Has the government been successful, even sincere, in adopting and implementing the necessary political, legal and administrative measures required to fulfil its electoral promises in the area of human rights in Bangladesh?

 

The questions that are often raised in discussing the human rights issues in Bangladesh involve several areas. The most common topics are political and intellectual freedom for individuals and groups, media freedom, rule of law, fight against corruption, custodial deaths and torture, BSF killings of Bangladesh nationals in the border regions, violence in academic institutions by the ruling party 'cadres', rights of workers, equal opportunity and justice for all citizens, etc. It is not possible to comment on all the above issues in a limited time and scope; I shall therefore, highlight, in this essay, only the issue of extra judicial killings and custodial torture by the state organs, and the callous attitude of government leaders towards this issue.

 

Extra-judicial killings

 

[Extrajudicial killings: the illegal killing of leading political, trades union, dissidents, and social figures by either the state government, state authorities like the armed forces and police or criminal outfits such as the Italian Mafia Wikipedia]

 

The barbaric practices of extra-judicial killings and custodial torture have existed and still exit in many countries of the world. In Bangladesh, these practices started right after the country's independence and have continued till today, with different intensities at different times. The elite 'RAB' was formed by the last BNP government in 2004 to fight serious crimes along with the police forces. They were successful to some extent in their stated missions including the arrests of some notorious militants and criminals, but in many cases they were alleged to have tortured detainees and killed many suspected criminals and extreme 'left-wing' activists without any trial ('cross-fire', 'encounter', 'shootout', or 'gunfight'). This unlawful practice reached a new height during the Moinuddin-Fakhruddin semi-military regime (2007-2008), and this has also continued during the present AL government.

 

According to the human rights forum 'Law and Salish Centre', during the first year of AL rule (January December, 2009), total 229 persons were killed by crossfire. The other organization 'Odhikar' puts the number of extra-judicial killings by law enforcers at 154 for the same period. Of these people, "41 were reportedly killed by RAB, 75 by police, 25 jointly by the RAB-Police, 3 by Army, 2 by Ansar, 1 by Jail Police and 1 by Forest Guards, 5 were under the custody of BDR and 1 was a coast guard. Of the 154 killed, 35 were killed while they were in custody of the law enforcement agencies." The number given by 'Odhikar' is lower than that cited by the 'Law and Salish Centre', but the exact figure, probably much higher than those reported in the media, may never be known. A large number of detainees and prisoners die due to torture during interrogations, but the official version for such death is 'heart attack', 'suicide' or similar causes!

 

The large number of 'unnatural' deaths of prisoners accused of BDR rebellion is a case in point. The number of deaths cited in the above paragraph does not include the custodial deaths of BDR prisoners. According to Odhikar documentation, a total of 51 BDR members have died since the February 2009 mutiny till 31 December 2009. Among them, 26 BDR members died while in custody, of which 6 have allegedly died due to torture. Some sources suggest that the 'unnatural deaths' of BDR members in custody are close to 100 up to the present time (the investigations and trial process are still in progress). We do not know how many of the thousands of detainees were illegally tortured, but considering the culture of our 'crime investigators' one may presume that the number would run into hundreds, if not thousands.

 

A report in The Bangladesh Today on May 16, 2010, says, "Two more outlawed party leaders were killed in 'gunfight' with RAB in Pabna and Kushtia on Saturday taking the total of such extra judicial killings to 124 in over nine months from August 1, 2009 to May 15, 2010. With this 32 extra judicial killings took placed in the year of 2010." The report also quoted the RAB DG as saying recently that "as many as 622 people were killed in 'crossfire' since the formation of RAB on March 26, 2004."

 

Torture on prisoners

 

National and international laws prohibit the use of intimidation, mental and physical torture of any detainee or prisoner by the state agencies. The whole world has condemned, quite rightly, such practices by the US authorities pursued especially to extract information from the Iraqi, Afghan and other prisoners in different open and secret detention centres and prisons. Unfortunately, these practices are followed by most governments of the world including those considered as democratic and civilized. Client states of the imperialist powers are 'especially notorious' in violating the fundamental human rights of political prisoners and other persons detained under various pretexts.

 

In Bangladesh, like other third world countries, inflicting different kinds of mental and physical torture is a routine procedure to extract information from the accused persons in detention. The practice started in the country during the first AL regime (1972-75) and has continued unabated till today. It reached a tragic stage during the army-led emergency regime (2007-2008), when hundreds of top political leaders and businessmen were mentally and physically tortured in detention. Serious physical injuries were inflicted by torture on many leading politicians, including Tareq Rahman, former prime minister Khaleda Zia's son and BNP's Senior Joint Secretary General. More than 70,000 political workers at grass-root levels were thrown into prison without any concrete charges. Due process of law was also denied to them.

 

We had wished that the culture of arbitrary detention and torture of detainees and prisoners would stop after the AL and allies came to power in January 2009. Unfortunately, this has not happened and the practice continues with greater ferocity. DGFI and other security forces including police and RAB have been entrusted to the party loyalists and some of the members are seen to be enthusiastic more in arresting and torturing suspected criminals, activists of opposition political parties and journalists who write reports critical of AL and its youth organisations than in assisting the government to run according to the principles of democracy, justice and universal human rights.

 

Odhikar has compiled a report (from print media) with 68 proven cases of custodial torture during 2009. Three of such cases included here do suggest that those who are supposed to uphold the law are often themselves the violators.

 

(1) On 28 April, 2009, a leader of BNP's youth wing named Ziaul Haq of Sreenagar under Munshiganj district was blindfolded, tied up and tortured by police over a over a land dispute.

(2) On June 11, 2009, standing in Court, Former MP Nasir Uddin Ahmed Pintu, who was arrested in connection with the Pilkhana killings case, stated that the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) had severely tortured him after taking him into remand and told him that if he did not provide a confessional statement during remand, he would end up being killed in 'crossfire'.

(3) On October 22, 2009, a Staff Reporter of the New Age, F M Masum was arrested by plain-clothed RAB officers from his rented house at Jatrabari and tortured. Officers of RAB-10 in plain clothes went to Masum's residence called on him to open the main collapsible gate. They beat Masum because there was a delay in opening the gate. When Masum told them that he was a journalist, the RAB officers tied up his hands and legs and beat him even more. Later on, the RAB officers took the injured Masum to the RAB-10 office where they locked him up in a small room and tortured him further.

 

Custodial torture on women

 

Treatment of women prisoners are even worse than that meted out to male prisoners. There is no reliable statistics on the number of women prisoners and the number abused while in custody. They are probably supposed not to exist in our society. However, it is widely known that common abuses to women prisoners involve the denial of food and bed, and on many occasions, rape, especially to women from poor sections of the society. Many are held in prison without any concrete charges or trial for months and years, under sub-human conditions. In recent years, high profile women prisoners including the family members of some leading political figures were ill-treated in prison and many were denied bails pending trial.

 

A ghastly incident happened last year when a young mother (the daughter of one person sent to death for involvement in the Sheikh Mujib murder case) was taken into custody on fabricated charges. Lurid stories about her personal and family life involving a former DGFI officer (sacked by the new AL government) were released to some 'yellow' media outlets (by some rogue elements within the security forces) in order to humiliate and disgrace her socially. She and her baby child were mishandled in the presence of media photographers. She was tortured and allegedly gang-raped while in custody. And this happened under the supervision of some beastly elements within the security forces. I am not aware of any print media publishing this barbaric act of gang-rape for fear of reprisals, but I heard the story from a very reliable source. The story may or may not be true, but it is utterly believable considering the revenge-seeking mindset of the AL government.

 

Ghosts of Death Squads?

 

[Death squads are often, but not exclusively, associated with the violent political repression under dictatorships, totalitarian states and similar regimes. They typically have the tacit or express support of the state, as a whole or in part. Death squads may comprise a secret police force, paramilitary group or official government units with members drawn from the military or the police. They may also be organized as vigilante groups. Wikipedia]

 

During 1960s and 1970s, many countries in South and Latin America witnessed the operation of right wing 'Death squads' to create havoc and mayhem in those countries. The main targets were political opponents of the government in power, left-wing dissidents and rebels, trade unionists, homeless street children, student activists and human rights defenders. Even some liberal-minded church leaders who opposed the US hegemony and US-sponsored/supported military/semi-fascist regimes in the region were targeted for physical elimination. Thousands of innocent people were abducted, tortured, murdered or 'disappeared' by these 'faceless' squads, mostly under state sponsorship and/or with of connivance of rulers in power, particularly in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and Honduras. The full extent of these crimes came into light only after democratic governments were restored to power in these countries and the US changed its policy of unconditional support to its puppets in the regions.

 

The countries of South Asia have also witnessed the practice of extra-judicial killings and operation of secret assassination squads at different times. This happened mostly in war-torn regions in Sri Lanka, India-administered Kashmir, India's north east, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattishgarh and several other states, Nepal, and N.W. Pakistan. Both the government security agencies and their violent opponents/dissidents/rebels have resorted to these practices, but at a much lower scale than in the South and Latin American countries.

 

In Bangladesh we have witnessed random violence and unlawful killings from the beginning, but systematic abduction and murder by 'unknown' groups has never been a national security problem. But things appear to be changing now.

 

The nature of some recent incidents of mysterious abduction and murder is of great concern to us. In these incidents, 'unknown' group of people, without disclosing their identity, take away people from their houses or other places. After a few days, the corpses of the victims are found in different remote places under the soil or on water bodies. Three bodies of such victims were recently found buried under soil near the river bank about 2 miles west of Mohammadpur, Dhaka. One of the dead persons was later identified as a local activist of BNP. Commenting on this and other incidents, the BNP Chairperson, Khaleda Zia, alleged that "secret killings are going on in the country as prevailed during the 1972-75 rule of Awami League." She also alleged that are local leaders and workers of her party are particular target of secret killings.

 

The police and RAB deny their involvement in such incidents of abduction and killings. But the question remains: who are these 'unknown' people who abduct and kill people and then dispose of the dead bodies in remote areas? Is there any vigilante or terrorist group within the ruling party's unruly and violence-prone student/youth 'cadres' who have started this ugly game or some rogue elements within police or army are responsible for these crimes? Are there any foreign hands trying to introduce a new dimension of terrorism to destabilize the country further?

 

It is perhaps too early to draw any serious conclusions regarding the matter. But it may be fatal if we ignore the symptoms of this new kind of terrorism.

 

Dubious role of the government

 

The government position on the issue seems to be dubious, to say the least. The home minister Ms Sahara Khatum denies about the existence of extra-judicial killings and custodial torture, whilst some other ministers have condoned the law enforcers' actions as 'acts of self-defence'.

 

Obviously the government has come under severe criticism because of its denial mode and inaction to prevent the incidents of unlawful torture and killings. A front page report in the New Age last week (May 13, 2010), said that four suspected criminals were killed by the Rapid Action Battalion and the police in 'crossfire' at Gandaria and Mirpur in the capital Dhaka and in the Kushtia Town the day before. An editorial in the same newspaper the following day (May 14) commented, "The official account of these deaths was, needless to say, the same cock-and-bull story: the law enforcers raided a hideout of criminals, came under fire and retaliated; after the gunfight had ended, the suspects were found riddled with bullet, taken to hospital and declared dead by on-duty doctors."

 

On December 4, 2009, the High Court issued an order on the authorities not to kill any more people in 'crossfire' or 'encounter' until it hears a rule it issued suo motto on the government in connection with extrajudicial killings on November 17, 2009. But the government has not yet stopped this practice. The New Age also reported that 27 killings happened since the High Court had passed its order.

 

I shall conclude this essay with an extract from the New Age editorial (May 14, 2010). It says, "While the government continues to condone extrajudicial killings on one pretext or the other, thereby reinforcing the pervasive sense of impunity among members of the law enforcement agencies, the blatant disregard for law by the law enforcers seems to have assumed a new dimension. According to another report ….., the additional chief judicial magistrate of Natore issued warrants of arrest for 12 policemen and seven others for killing a 32-year old man and then trying to pass it on as a death in crossfire. The victim was arrested on July 23 last year and killed three days later. The police tried to portray him as a victim of crossfire and even filed a case along this line four days after the killing. However, a judicial inquiry confirmed that the man 'was not killed in crossfire' but 'was tortured to death at the police station in a planned way.' What is apparent is that the police seem to have started believing they can remain above and beyond the law for any killing so long as they can pass it on as having taken place in 'crossfire'."

 

The editorial comments continues, "The frightful development can very well be attributed to the sustained government inaction, a result of either inability or unwillingness, with regard to putting an end to extrajudicial killings, although it is one of the ruling party's electoral pledges. The incumbents have not only failed to rein in the trigger-happy law enforcers but also virtually shielded them from the highest court of law by delaying response to one rule after another. The highest judiciary, on the other hand, seems to have lost the zeal, allowing the government to carry on with its foot-dragging over the issue. It could very well be that the government's obvious indulgence and the highest judiciary's apparent indifference may have further emboldened the marauding law enforcers to continue with extrajudicial killings."

 

We thank the New Age Editor for highlighting a very serious aspect of human rights violation in Bangladesh, although he himself (as well as the editor of Amar Desh) was targets of physical attack by some unknown thugs. We urge upon all the democratic forces in the country to unite and oppose the human rights violations whatever may be the form.

 

Notes:

 

(1) The essay is based on the author's key-note speech in a conference on 'The Human Rights Situation in Bangladesh" organised by Bangladesh Centre Social Development for at Ibrahim College Auditorium (London) on May 19, 2010.

 

(2) The author is a former Professor of Dhaka University (BD) and Lecturer, Cardiff University (UK). He lives in Cardiff, UK, and may be contacted by e-mail: kmamalik@aol.com]

 



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Re: [ALOCHONA] MI5 faces allegations over torture of British man in Bangladesh



I see no reason to object to the government participate in foreign torture. It is only a small extension to the domestic torture wreaked on the country every day.

Perhaps this could be (or already is) a new money earner for our glorious leaders.

For those arguing for some form of prevention - exactly what steps are there to be taken when a Bangladeshi minister or civil servant can be bought and sold 10 times a day!

Long live BAL....literally.


Emanur Rahman | m. +447734567561 | e. emanur@rahman.com


From: Isha Khan <bdmailer@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 13 May 2010 15:28:19 +0600
Subject: [ALOCHONA] MI5 faces allegations over torture of British man in Bangladesh

MI5 faces allegations over torture of British man in Bangladesh

Security service accused of involvement in abuse of Birmingham businessman

Ian Cobain and Fariha Karim in Dhaka
 

The Security service is facing fresh accusations of involvement in the abuse of terrorism suspects after a British man was detained in Bangladesh and allegedly tortured while being questioned about his activities and associates in both countries.Lawyers representing Gulam Mustafa, a 48-year-old Birmingham businessman, say there is evidence he has been severely mistreated since being arrested in the Bangladeshi capital, Dhaka, in mid-April.

The case appears to present an immediate challenge to a new government, and will give some insight into the manner in which it will deal with the growing number of allegations of collusion in foreign torture.At their last party conference, the Liberal Democrats passed a resolution calling for a judicial inquiry into the UK's role in torture and rendition.

The Conservatives, however, have said only that they will not rule out an inquiry. Labour ministers have issued blanket denials of collusion in torture, but have declined to address specific allegations.Mustafa appeared to have a swollen face when he was paraded before television cameras shortly after his arrest, according to his family.

When he appeared in court 11 days later, a journalist working for the Guardian could see that he was unable to stand throughout the proceedings, at one point sinking to his knees.The businessman told a British consular official he had been forced to assume stressful positions for long periods during questioning at a detention centre known as the Taskforce for Interrogation Cell, where the use of torture is alleged to be common.

Lawyers for Mustafa's family said there were strong grounds to believe that British officials had been complicit in his mistreatment and they were considering bringing legal action against the government.They were angry that the UK High Commission in Dhaka had failed to secure consular access to Mustafa for more than two weeks after his arrest or arrange for him to be seen by a doctor.

The family's solicitor, Gareth Peirce, said in a letter to the foreign secretary, David Miliband: "It is already well known that MI5 has been co-operating with the Bangladeshi authorities and providing and exchanging information with them about Mr Mustafa."

She said a number of Mustafa's associates in the UK had been questioned about him, adding: "There is serious reason to believe that the security services have therefore been mixed up in the ill-treatment carried out by the Bangladeshi authorities and this is still ongoing."In his reply, Miliband said Mustafa's welfare was the "primary objective" of the Foreign Office, but he did not address the allegations of MI5 complicity in the mistreatment.

Asked about the allegations, a Foreign Office spokesperson said: "The government's position on torture is clear. We condemn it wholeheartedly."We do not torture people, and we do not ask others to do so on our behalf. We take all allegations of torture and mistreatment very seriously. With an individual's permission, we can take up any justified complaint about ill-treatment with the relevant authorities."

The Foreign Office told the Guardian it had made repeated requests to see Mustafa before finally being allowed access to him on 2 May.The Bangladeshi foreign ministry rejected this statement, saying it had received only one such request – the day after Mustafa's lawyers wrote to Miliband – and that the request had been promptly granted.

Mustafa has been of interest to MI5 for several years. In April 2007, a month after he travelled to Bangladesh, leaving his wife and six children at the family home in the Sparkhill area of Birmingham, the Bank of England employed counter-terrorism powers to impose financial sanctions upon him, freezing his assets and prohibiting others from making funds available to him.

Mustafa's family said he was frightened to return to the UK after this happened.After his departure, a number of his associates in Britain were questioned by MI5 officers, close relatives said.Shortly afterwards, Mustafa moved into a flat in an upmarket suburb of Dhaka and told his family the rent was being paid by one of the country's intelligence agencies, the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI).

His wife repeatedly asked him to return to Birmingham, and he told relatives, in a telephone call in November that year, that he was planning to do so. Five days later, he was arrested and charged with a firearm offence.

Mustafa's defence was that he watched police officers plant the weapon during a search of the flat and, when he demanded to know why they were doing it, he was told it was at the instigation of British authorities.He was convicted and sentenced to 17 years in prison, but was released on bail in January pending an appeal.He was re-arrested on 16 April and accused of distributing funds to Harakat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, a militant Islamist organisation banned in both Bangladesh and the UK.

Twelve months ago, Jamil Rahman, another British terrorism suspect who had been detained and allegedly tortured in Bangladesh, told the Guardian British intelligence officers had threatened him with reprisals if he did not give evidence against Mustafa in an English court.

"They told me that they would arrange for somebody to give evidence against me in court if I didn't agree," he said.Rahman, 32, a former civil servant from south Wales, said that, after being tortured by DGFI officers, he was repeatedly interrogated by men who identified themselves as MI5 officers.

He was never charged with any offence and eventually returned to the UK, where he began civil proceedings against the government.The next government will inherit this case and a number of others lodged by British citizens and residents who were victims of rendition or who allege they were tortured before being questioned by British intelligence officers.

One of the litigants has been convicted of terrorism offences. None of the others has been charged with any offence.The government is expected to offer out-of-court settlements to a number of the men after the court of appeal earlier this month dismissed an attempt by MI5 and MI6 to suppress evidence of alleged complicity in torture.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/may/11/mi5-torture-allegations-briton-bangladesh



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[ALOCHONA] EXCELLENT:On Thinking Pakistan—Rambles and Recollections of an… upon Intezar Husain’s ‘Chiraghon ka Dhuvan’



A fine piece of writing by Mahmood Farooqui!! I want to read Chiraghon Ka Dhuvan. I wonder if there is an English Translation.

 

 

On Thinking Pakistan—Rambles and Recollections of an… upon Intezar Husain's 'Chiraghon ka Dhuvan'

Mahmood Farooqui

August 21, 2009

KAFILA

http://kafila.org/2009/08/21/on-thinking-pakistan%e2%80%94rambles-and-recollections-of-an%e2%80%a6-upon-intezar-husain%e2%80%99s-chiraghon-ka-dhuvan/

 

Author of this Article: Mahmood Farooqui studied history In India and at the university of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. Over the last four years he has worked to revive Dastangoi, the lost art of storytelling in Urdu. He has been helped and guided by S. R. Faruqi, Urdu's pre-eminent critic and writer. Farooqui also contributes opinion pieces to India's leading newspapers and magazines. His first book on the uprising of 1857 in Delhi is due out from Penguin India next year.

 

Intizar Hussain, SI, is eminent living Urdu fiction writer. He was born on December 7, 1923 in Dibai, Bulandshahr India but migrated to Pakistan in 1947. He did his masters (M.A.) in Urdu and later on in English literature. He writes short stories and novels in Urdu, and also columns for newspapers in English. His few prominent writings are "Hindustan Se Aakhri Khat" , "Agay Samander hai", "Shehr-e-Afsos" & "Wo Jo Kho Gaye".

 

Once it is granted that in India we practise a different kind of secularism, a secularism which is unique to us, it becomes very difficult not to grant the same status to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. This may seem bizarre given the fact that religion seems to pervade life in all these places, and a struggle over the definition of the state continues everywhere. However, defining oneself is different from the way one may be read. Many an avowed Muslim appears highly heretic to others. In fact the contemporary state, given the kinds of tasks of enumeration, surveillance, discipline and welfare that it is asked to command can only ever be secular, a fact that the Emory based legal scholar Abdullah Bin Naimi has been trying to hammer home to different kinds of Muslims over the last decade. For more of his works one can go to here and here.

 

The reason I bring this up in particular relates to the case of Pakistan. An avowed Islamic state, it has found it difficult to satisfy the urgings of different kinds of Islamists. And indeed it never can do so simply because protecting its citizens and assuring them equality is also one of its declared goals. The clash between the principle of treating each citizen as an individual, equal before the state, and the demands of different kinds of communities which may be ethnic, linguistic, regional or religious is precisely the playground of struggle that all South Asian, and now some European, states grapple with in their pursuit of secular goals.

 

In the particular case of Pakistan, it was declared an Islamic republic only in 1956. But it took over twenty five years of pressure, and two wars with India, before the secular socialist Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims and appointed Friday as the national holiday. It took Zia ul Haq's regime to instil the importance of reading Namaz in offices, playgrounds, assemblies and official meetings as an important Islamic and state-sanctioned practice. The blasphemy and Hudood laws in Pakistan continue to be entangled in practices of jurisprudence and precedence that are secular and in many cases, Indian and/or Hindu.

 

Intizar Husain's enthralling literary memoir Chiraghon ka Dhuvan, brings a lot of these issues into the open without ever underlining them. Classical music in Pakistan, with all its bandishes ostensibly dealing with pagan Hindu gods, continued to prosper up until the seventies. State television and radio would patronise the musicians, the All Pakistan Music Conferences continued to attract large crowds and the Arts Council in Lahore conducted kathak and other dance lessons even under Zia. Urdu writers continued to publish, not in clandestine magazines but in journals with above ground circulations and government registrations, poetry inspired from and in praise of Mirabai.

 

Here is a particular conversation with the poet Salahuddin Mahmood, a self proclaimed Sufi who wrote highly emotionally charged letters from Madina, and aspired to relive the physical moment when the Prophet breathed upon this earth. But one day he called all his friends, put out the light and began to play M. S. Subbahlakhsmi singing Mirabai's bhajans. When Husain queried him on this apparent contradiction, Salahuddin Mahmood's response was, 'my Islam is incomplete without Mirabai. The thing is Intezar Saheb that I was not born in a vacuum, I am a progeny of those Muslims who have been seeped in this habitat for over nine hundred years. Once the date tree is transplanted to this land from Arabic, perforce the fruit would taste different.'

 

Husain's memoirs also highlight the now forgotten the fact that it was in fact the condemnatory and dismissive attitude of the leftists that dealt as much of a body blow to classical music in Pakistan as the intransigence of the Islamists. Here is a note from Iftekhar Jalib, a noteworthy leftist and a great friend and acolyte of Faiz who wrote in response to one of Husain's newspaper columns-

 

'the days of Raag Darbari are now well and truly over, only Qawwali will prevail. Pure classical music cannot escape its elite origins, keeping it alive is akin to keeping the old feudal power structure alive.'

 

In a rebuttal to that the writer Hayat Ahmad Khan described a meeting with Maulana Maudoodi the godfather of Jamat-e Islami and in many ways the leading ideologue of political Islam in South Asia. Hayat queried him about the legitimacy of singing, he responded by saying it is all right to sing with a daf (a kind of dafli, prevalent particularly in Iran) but not with a Tabla because of the curious reason that the daf is open from one side whereas the Tabla is closed from both sides! Caught between the Islamicists' disapproval and the condemnation of the leftists, the decline of classical music in Pakistan can hardly be equated with the nature of the state.

 

Husain narrates anecdotes relating to Ustad Amanat Ali Khan who complains about the fact that PTV authorities have been asking him to sing Ghazals and light songs rather than the classical Ragas like Bageshwari that he truly enjoyed singing. A letter from Roshanara Begum narrates the fate of a television lecture demonstration in 1972 which was badly truncated because some sections, remnants really, of the erstwhile Pakistan Communist party, then fervent supporters of Bhutto, looked deeply askance at Classical music. They saw in it a perpetuation of the elite hegemony and preferred to propagate popular music forms such as Qawwali.

 

It was the leftist Anwar Sajjad, otherwise a radical pioneer in the new Urdu short story movement, who eased out stalwart artists like Nazamat Ali, Salamat Ali and Amanat Ali Khan from space and prominence at the Alhamra Arts Council Lahore. The point that I am stressing is that an Islamic state is not a finished form which droppeth like a gentle rain from heaven. The struggle before an Islamic state, as much as a secular one, is to negotiate paths of legitimacy amidst conflicting claims and options. Approval for state action eventually lies in the realm of public opinion whether it is ratified in direct elections or is guessed by demagogues who want to manipulate public opinion.

 

Husain writes movingly of the times of war between India and Pakistan, the sell out of 1965, as it was imagined there as well as the 'Crush India' days of the 1971 war. During the former he chanced upon an encounter with the great Pakistani painter Shakir Ali. He asked the painter what he was up to during these epochal times. Shakir's reply was-

 

'Intezar Saheb, these days I read Rilke and try to paint the moon, which rises on both sides of the border.'

 

Take the case of Cinema. Films continue to be made in Pakistan, although their quality and popularity has steadily plummeted. During the seventies and eighties, under Zia ul Haq's Islamic regime, Husain was one of the three members of the censor board of Pakistani films. The Pakistani state therefore not only officially permits the production of films but also attempts to regulate it. Husain writes of how, during all his years of watching them he actually ended up watching, essentially, only one film in Urdu and one is Punjabi. However one particular film got him into trouble with Zia's regime when he allowed uncut a scene of a heroine bathing in the river. This was, for him, one of the few aesthetic portrayals of female nudity and his arguments had prevailed over the other board members which included the feminist poet Kishwar Naheed. Yet, the newspaper war cries of rising nudity and vulgarity that he mentions sound strikingly similar to the periodic bouts of concern we experience here in India. These are concerns that need to be negotiated with, in practice, regardless of the nature of the state. Therefore the practice of the Pakistani state is, in many ways, a struggle with impositions of forms of secularism over a conservative society.

 

The point is not that the Indian society or that part of it which is civil is the same as it is in Pakistan or Bangladesh. Obviously education, social values, perceived religious sanction and the experience of elective democracy have furthered the differences that already existed between Western India and the rest even in colonial times. The point to remember is that the state, when it comes to negotiating with its people, is often faced with a similar set of dilemmas. Nowhere is this clearer, or more similar, than in the case of adult independence choice of partners amidst community preferences and in the incendiary issue of the female attire. Women's apparel and dating arouses as much angst among Hindu nationalists in India, for example the Shri Ram Sene of Pramod Muthalik in Bangalore, as does female education in NWFP. The biradari and Panchayat injunctions of western UP and Haryana, for instance on Dalit-non Dalit matrimony or romantic friendship, that periodically arouse grave concern in the media are issues that the Taliban has a lot to say on. In all such cases however, across borders, the state finds itself treading ground that is all too common. It cannot be seen to be passive, yet it cannot unilaterally and high-handedly uphold simple liberal values that you and I may espouse. All states, democratic, authoritarian or military-Islamist must engage different communities at the same time and seeking rationale amongst simultaneously irreconcilable demands of identity politics is precisely the plaything that secularism is made up of.

 

While a smug sense of superiority over our neighbors is sometimes useful in upholding social pride, a more discerning eye may develop more useful long-term lessons from the way our neighbors deal with problems that are common to us and them. A proper history of Pakistan would be able to teach us at least a few things about how the state has negotiated not just with its different minorities and ethnicities but also how it has engaged with exclusionary demand from within the mainstream, dominant Sunni Muslims. After all Pakistan too has a minority welfare ministry, at the federal and state measures, it also has so called sops and special measures for the upliftment of minorities. From time to time its universities, government departments and special boards also organise seminars, conferences and think tank sessions to improve the lot of minorities. The media periodically expresses concern over the treatment and or the plight of minorities. From time to time Pakistan has produced the odd non-Muslim in its cricket teams or, certainly in the early years of independence, in its business and official delegations. Parsis and Christians continue to occasionally sprout in its public sphere. Beer continues to be officially manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

 

Very like the Indian state, the Pakistani state has constantly encouraged family planning and has instituted schemes to control the rate of increase of population. It propagates programs encouraging female literacy and the participation of women in public, civic institutions. Newspapers and wider civil society in Pakistan consistently set up aspirational models where a scientific/rational attitude to life and social organisation is highly valorised and sometimes the State is an active participant in those goals. Religious practices, shrines, peculiar customs of tribes and other ethnic groups often clash with the avowed rationalistic and economistic goals of the state. While the gun-toting militants in and around Pakistani mosques may give an impression of religion let loose, the reality is that the state consistently intervenes in the conduct and running of religious institutions. It patrols disciplinary and institutional boundaries wherever powerful religious shrines clash with state imprimatur and purview. Religion definitely intrudes into official Pakistan, sometimes more formally and institutionally than is the case in India but in practice the commonalities may surprise many of us. Special Ramadan prayers may not seem such an anomaly when one actually casts a sideways glance at the almost mandatory calendar idols and little shrines that exist in virtually all Indian offices. The state desires to and often succeeds in imprinting its dominant, secular authority over many forms of religious power centres that sprout in all South Asian countries. In theory at least everybody, religious leaders included, is equal before the law. Indeed the salience of law, colonial legal norms and the clout of lawyers, as remarkable a phenomenon as the spread of Jihadis in one sense, should ipso facto caution us from exercising blanket judgments about the nature of the state. The state has intervened in and attempted to streamline the so called Personal laws with greater efficacy than in India, it attempts to regulate the functioning of Madarsas and other voluntary religious organisations. Again, the point is that secularism or a secular state is not a formal attire that one can simply wear and be done with it. It acquires shape in practice, through everyday negotiation, regardless of the label it gives itself.

 

More crucially, where it really matters, the Islamic Republic has shown no signs of allowing any moral or religious compunctions stand in the way of its singular pursuit of the market and of the encouragement of interest-based private profit and financial capitalism. One may argue that Islam was after all a traders' religion therefore the pursuit of free market should be consistent with its ethics. And indeed it largely is, regardless of scores of state supported institutions that continue to search for sharia-nomics.

 

Interrogating my response to Husain's memoirs immediately brings into salience my Indian Muslim compulsions. I would obviously like to tease out strands of syncreticism and even, the obvious word, secularism from the conduct and cultural practice of Muslims past and present, Indian and Pakistani. Even more so I would, I suspect sometimes, alongside many of my compatriots, like to hear notes of regret and repentance from all who migrated at partition or from those who had once wanted Pakistan. However, Husain's broadminded and ecumenical appeal to traditions and mythologies should not be collapsed into facile political positions. It is possible to be a staunch Pakistani and still speak about the Budhha and Mirabai.

 

Sixty years after the event it is only we Indians who have the bravado to reduce decisions buried hard and deep in past lives into a simple question of 'why did you migrate?' I had asked Husain this question when I interviewed him some years ago, indeed he himself begins his memoir by raising this very question. The question is utterly and completely meaningless. Those who understand the Urdu word tabir, should instead ask questions about dreams turning sour and tabirs producing counter results. People went for all sorts of reasons and those who did have quite possibly thought about and turned the question over so many thousands of times in their own minds and have perhaps interrogated the what ifs and the counterfactual with such intensity that asking simply why they went is not merely trivial but even fatal in its stupidity. Indeed it should be possible now to see how the demand for Pakistan may actually have had some idealistic strands behind it, however abhorrent they may be to us secular liberals. Exactly in the same manner as it should be possible for us to understand a real and acute sense of angst behind strands of militant Hindu nationalism. Dreams, even religious and communal ones, are not without their own utopias and only a very literal reading can dismiss them out of hand.

 

For all these reasons it may be rather useful for us to actually study Pakistan, in our schools, colleges and universities rather than simply dismiss it as an aberration. The argument for developing Pakistan study programs in our schools and Colleges can actually be mounted from an ultra nationalist, imperialist position as well. To know is to control, is to inscribe, to discursively control a social formation, after all the whole academic field of post-colonial studies is engaged in knowing how the West 'knows us.' The terms of knowledge are sometimes more crucial even in a hostile engagement than mere martial superiority. The more widespread the historical knowledge about our neighbors the more inputs we may have in dealing with them, as well as in learning from them. Looking at the state of racial relations in Western Europe and in the US, after a full thirty years of a politically correct, multicultural pedagogy may sometimes compel a sceptical glance at the efficacy of school pedagogy in producing better citizens. However, the only way to learn is to try. Therefore I propose that we have a paper dealing with Pakistan and possibly also with all our immediate neighbors as a compulsory course in historical studies, at schools as well as at higher levels.

 

These arguments, impressionistic as they are, should not be read as an endorsement of the current state of Pakistan, nor of all the policies it has followed since its creation. Asking for study and analysis does not mean that is in any sense 'better.' There are deep fundamentalist strains and tendencies within the militant-military strain of the melange that is the Pakistani state. I am only trying to draw attention to characteristics that are often ignored in the broad brush. While the history of the freedom movement and the machiavellian, even devilish, division of the country stops in 1947, life in the subcontinent does not. While the fate of Pakistan may always be bedevilled by its origins, and that is not always a historical guarantee—rotten apples also thrive—for as long as it continues to survive we need to understand it better. At this present juncture when it seems to be unravelling under its own sins the need is greater not lesser. For what is happening in Swat and in the NWFP is nothing else but a struggle for the kind of secularism that the Pakistani state would like to, or is able to, practice. For the state to be a state, in the modern sense of the term, it cannot but transgress norms that Islamists do not even fully understand. That is why each and every so-called Islamic state in practice has always faced condemnation from one or the other variety of Islamists. It can be argued that the very formation of a state in the early Islamic period, whether under Umar Farooq, or the Umayyads or the Abbasids, the so called pristine era of Islam, often faced such turbulent opposition that political assassination became a norm from very early on.

 

A true Islamic state is an oxymoron, it can only function at the level of a small tribe. The rest is a negotiation with power. In order to fully fathom those struggles and negotiations we need a much wider engagement and a much greater dissemination and assessment of knowledge than is currently available to us. Pakistan is too important to be left merely to journalists and security experts.



 



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RE: [ALOCHONA] Jadu



Simply awesome!








 


To: alochona@yahoogroups.com
From: shorna.sharmin@yahoo.com
Date: Tue, 18 May 2010 05:43:14 +0000
Subject: [ALOCHONA] Jadu

 
Jadu dekbe bhai,jadu?
Ki bollay, ichay korche na?
Mon kharap?
Paani nai?
Current nai?
Gash nai?

Aray dhur, ki hoyeche taatay?
Shuno, tomra dui bhagay bhag hou toh.
Ebar ordhek jonogoshthi chokh bondho koray chinta koro tomader Khaleda achay, Zia achay;
Aar baki ordhek chinta koro tomader Hasina achay, Mujib achay...

Ki, bhalo lagchay na!
Furfura lagchay na!…
Jadu dekhecho bhai, jadu!
Naam niley shob shomosh sha kabu!




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[ALOCHONA] Women and veils : Running for cover



Women and veils : Running for cover

Both in Western Europe and the Muslim world (see article) the covering of female heads and faces is stirring passion—and posing a dilemma for governments

May 13th 2010 | PARIS | From The Economist print edition

STRIKING a balance between personal and religious freedom, and the ideals of common citizenship, is proving to be an enormous test for all European countries with large Muslim populations—especially when some seem determined to assert, or even caricature, the practices of their homelands.

Certain things are easily settled: virtually everybody in Europe agrees in abhorring female genital mutilation, as practised in bits of Africa; or the harsh punishment of children in Koranic schools, which has occurred in Britain. But in recent months a third controversy has shown up contrasts between European countries and within them. This is over female headgear—and in particular, forms of dress in which all, or virtually all, the face is hidden. These include the head-covering burqa; and the commoner niqab, in which only a slit is left for the eyes. The burqa, imposed on Afghan women by the Taliban, has become a catchall term for headgear in which the face is wholly or mainly concealed.

Last month 136 of Belgium's 138 lower-house legislators (who agree on little else, leaving their country near paralysis) voted to outlaw the burqa. Belgian police already have the right to stop people masking their faces, under an old security law; and in some cities this right is invoked to issue warnings to burqa-wearers, who number only a few dozen in the country. So it is hard to see what need the law serves. But a parliamentarian in Brussels said it created a rare moment of "pride in being Belgian" by "smashing the lock that has left quite a lot of women in slavery." He hoped at least four European countries would follow.

This week France's parliament approved a resolution deploring full-face cover, and legislation is due shortly. In Switzerland one of the 26 cantons has voted to work for a nationwide ban; the justice minister, Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, backs a ban, at least in cantons that want it. The Dutch authorities considered outlawing the burqa, then stepped back. But in Europe as a whole, the idea of making people show their faces is no longer a xenophobic fantasy, but a mainstream political project.

With a fresh election due in June, Belgium's law is on hold; but it may be the first of many European bans on "all clothing hiding the face totally, or mostly." Belgian women who wear the burqa in public will risk a modest fine or even seven days' jail. In Italy a woman was fined €500 ($630) last week for wearing the burqa in a town where the Northern League mayor had barred clothing that hinders police checks.

The resolution passed by French legislators has no legal force but it has huge symbolic impact. Recalling the 1789 Declaration of Human Rights, it says the all-over veil "puts women in a relationship of subordination to men". On grounds of "dignity" and "equality between men and women", it judges the garment "contrary to the values of the republic". A law to ban the burqa will go to cabinet on May 19th.

In some places such moves have been promoted by the far right. Italy's Northern League, which wants a national burqa ban, is xenophobic. In Britain the anti-European United Kingdom Independence Party is the only party to agitate for a burqa ban. Ed Balls, a minister in the outgoing Labour government, said it was "not British" to tell people what to wear in the street. Jack Straw, a senior Labour figure who once voiced dismay over women who hid their face when meeting him, is still "fundamentally opposed" to a ban. And Barack Obama said in Cairo last year that Western countries should not be "dictating what clothes a Muslim woman should wear".

In France, by contrast, the backers of a ban are neither extremists nor fringe feminists. It was first mooted by Nicolas Sarkozy, the centre-right president, who said last year that the burqa was "not welcome" on French soil. The first to call for a parliamentary motion was André Gerin, a Communist. This week's resolution won broad support, including from the Socialists.

In many ways, the French move is the most intriguing test. France is home to Europe's biggest Muslim minority, numbering 5m to 6m. It expects immigrants, or their offspring, of all faiths to adapt to French ways, not the other way round. France holds dear the ideal of laïcité, a strict ban on religion in the public arena that emerged from anticlerical struggles in the 19th century. It was in the name of laïcité that France banned the Muslim headscarf (and other "conspicuous" religious symbols) in state schools in 2004.

But France's leaders do not cite laïcité as a reason for the burqa ban; to do so, they note, would mean accepting that hiding female faces is mandated by Islam. Most influential Muslims in France, including the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM), an official body, and Fadela Amara, a female Muslim minister, reject that reading. Mohammed Moussaoui, head of the CFCM, says "no Koranic text prescribes the wearing of the burqa or niqab."

So the upcoming law—stating that "nobody may wear clothing that masks the face in any public place"—has been justified on two other grounds. One is security, and the need to be identifiable. (There was consternation earlier this year when two men clad in burqas robbed a post office near Paris.) The other is human dignity and equality between the sexes. "This is not a religious question," argues Jean-François Copé, parliamentary leader of the ruling UMP party. Most French people view the burqa as a clear token of oppression; if libertarians defend it, this is seen as implying softness on ills such as domestic violence.

Recent news has reinforced that view. This week, in a town west of Paris, police arrested a man suspected of forcing his wife to wear the burqa, and of raping and beating her. (With such cases in mind, the upcoming French law would reserve the harshest penalties for a man found to have made his wife wear the burqa.) Mr Copé firmly rejects the idea that France is unjustifiably curbing liberty. He notes that: "On Fifth Avenue, you do not have the liberty to walk down the street completely nude."

The motives of young French Muslim women—sometimes more inclined to hide their faces than their mothers were—are hotly contested. Many French analysts say a "re-veiling" trend among young girls reflects manipulation by zealots. Although no more than 2,000 women in France cover their face, the phenomenon is growing. Dounia Bouzar, a French Muslim anthropologist, told a parliamentary inquiry that many of the women were young. Intelligence sources say two-thirds are French nationals, and nearly a quarter converts. Many come from North Africa, where there is no face-covering tradition.

So France's leaders are determined to press ahead. Two risks stand out. First, the ban, which some see as a ruse by Mr Sarkozy to woo far-right voters, may stigmatise Islam and create a defensive reaction. (This is why Mr Moussaoui, who dislikes the burqa, opposes a ban.) As the debate took off, a mosque in south-east France was sprayed with gunfire.

Second, it is unclear how the ban would work in practice. The Conseil d'Etat, the highest administrative court, has questioned the legal basis for the ban. And what about foreigners? Mr Copé says that the ban would apply to visitors too: but would women from the Gulf states be hauled away from smart boutiques?

And then there are other problems: how could one prove that a woman wore a burqa under orders from her menfolk? And isn't there a risk of such women facing further isolation in the home? That would be an odd result for a law designed in part to ensure sexual equality.
 
 


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