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alochona@yahoogroup s.com, Isha Khan <bd_mailer@.. .> wrote:
A Horrendous Discovery
Investigators have learnt that a team of 25 trained foreign commandos
entered Bangladesh illegally from India through various bordering areas
on or within January 11, 2009
By Delwar Mazumder
There are some dangerous clues about recent BDR horror killing.All that
being part of history now, one wonders how it all happened, who did it,
and why? While that is precisely the undertaking of the investigators
who will unearth the real intent of the carnage and identify the
culprits, the incident demonstrates a serious lapse in military
intelligence. The following facts, gathered from over a dozen of
reliable sources, further corroborate that fact.
One: Investigators have learnt that a team of 25 trained foreign
commandos entered Bangladesh illegally from India through various
bordering areas on or within January 11, 2009. They were received and
sheltered in Dhaka by individuals working under cover as diplomats.
Two: At the same time, a small group of 10-12 BDR members, including two
Deputy Assistant Directors (DADs), were recruited as the internal moles
and coordinators to provide precise information to the foreign team via
three senior political leaders of the country until the hours of the
carnage.
Three: The occasion for the operation was chosen carefully to ensure
availability of all senior BDR officers who had gathered in Pilkhana for
the annual BDR day celebration.. . Over 3,000 extra troops also came to
Pilkhana for various administrative duties as well as to launch a tattoo
show for which the BDR has been historically famous.
Four: The mutiny was slated for February 24, while the PM was in
Pilkhana to take salute in the BDR day parade. In consideration of
likely collateral harm to the political personalities and other
dignitaries who accompanied the PM, the date was changed. However, final
coordination and reconnaissance were done that day by some guests who
attended the parade, masquerading as VIPs.
Five: Upon conclusion of final reconnaissance, at about 10.30 PM, on
February 24, a segment of the foreign killing squad and over 25 BDR
soldiers - plus three young - leading politicians of the country - met
in a briefing in one of suburban Dhaka residences. The precise timing of
the operation and the responsibilities of each small group were decided
in that meeting...
Six: As per plan, one of the DADs ensured that members of the BDR cell
would be posted on duty on gate number 4 that morning when the DG would
sit for the slated Darbar in the Darbar hall.
Seven: On February 25, the D-day, the foreign commando team entered the
Pilkhana compound through gate number 4, at 8.10 AM, using a BDR vehicle
(Bedford) which the designated DAD had arranged to send for them about
an hour ago. Dressed in sports gear (long camouflage trouser, vest, and
PT shoe) - in order to be able to quickly change into civil clothes
while fleeing after the massacre - the killers entered the Pilkhana
compound undetected.
Eight: The BDR vehicle that carried the killers was followed by an
ash-colour pick up van which carried initially used arms and ammunition
from outside. In order to begin the massacre, one of the Bengali
speaking commandos, armed, was ordered to enter the Darbar hall without
permission to engage the DG into a provoking altercation.
Nine: Once the DG was shot, other officers, all unarmed, tried to
obstruct the lone killer. Within seconds, the action group of the killer
team entered the Darbar hall and started killing other officers while
the cover up group cordoned the area.
Ten: In the following hours, part B of the mission began by inducting
other troops into the team under gun point and the armoury - as well as
the intelligence equipments - was looted. The foreign killers and their
local henchmen used BDR soldiers on gunpoint to show the locations of
other officers, their families, and the offices where vital national
security documents remained preserved. Highly classified border security
maps, troop deployment plan and initial action plan, etc. were taken
away by the foreign commandos.
Eleven: Eyewitnesses say, two of the last foreign commandos - one male
and one female - left the BDR compound in the afternoon on February 26,
following the surrendering of arms by BDR members who knew nothing about
the mutiny even a minute before. These two are presumed to be the
leaders of the foreign commando team.
None of the above could have been materialized if the two main national
intelligence outfits of the country (DGFI and NSI) have had prior clues
about what was being conspired to destroy the armed forces of the
country. The foreign commandos took control of BDR's own intelligence
outfit, RSU, at the initial stage and used RSU equipments to communicate
among themselves during the mutiny.
The commanding officer of RSU too was assassinated during the carnage.
That aside, there were other intelligence lapses during the mutiny. In
the more than 30 hours while the mutiny prolonged, neither the NSI, nor
the DGFI, had any clue about who were being shot at and what exactly
went on inside. They also ignored SMS messages from fellow officers, on
ground that there was no order from the government to do anything. In
reality, these two agencies were too busy, as they often are, in
ensuring security to the VVIPs and VIPs; not the country and its vital
institutions that they are oath-bound and mandated to serve and protect.
http://groups. yahoo.com/ group/khabor/ message/18375 --- End forwarded message ---