Dhaka-Delhi military nexus poses danger to regional peace
M. Shahidul Islam
Recent statesmanship of our leaders resonates exactly what the wise poet-philosopher Khalil Gibran had decried so passionately in the wake of the First World War. And, not surprisingly, the Lebanese-descent poet had found his prophesies so justified that the poor statesmanship of his country's leaders had landed Lebanon into a series of civil wars from which it is yet to fully recuperate.
It is unfortunate that despite being a homogenous nation, we too now stand at the twilight of a dreaded destiny. The ongoing debate over the content of the Indo-Bangladesh joint communique January 12, 2010 is creating such an uproar positively from the government side and dismissively from the opposition that its architects in Delhi are bemused by the success a communique as begun to wrought in for them.
Despite the debate?s political undercurrents being healthy and essential due to Bangladesh getting embroiled, perhaps unwittingly, into Indian geopolitical adventurism as a war ally, much of the perceived ramifications of ongoing Indo-Bangladesh entente remain amiss in the frenzied whiz, due mainly to the controversial nature in which the communiqe as been prepared.
Non-binding instrument
Non-binding instrument
That notwithstanding, our people should know few facts for certain. First, our PM and her team had inked three agreements and two MoU, which do have requisite locus standi in international law and diplomacy. Secondly, it is the joint communique January 12 which seems to have compelled the BNP leader, Khaleda Zia, to state publicly that ?the BNP government would not honour those commitments, once in power.?
From a legal perspective, the three agreements do have the stature of international treaty and impose mandatory obligations on the signing parties. The two MoUs, however, have semi-binding legal implications.On the other hand, a joint communique mere laying out of a vision for the future, a tentative road map of some sort to fashion mutual relationship, and, it does not impose serious legal or diplomatic obligations on the signatories unless formal agreements are signed subsequently on the basis of those commitments.
Yet, people have become wary of some specific contents of the joint communique for obvious reason. Those ?contents of concerns? are outlined in section 22 through 26, expressing agreed stands of both countries to (1) declare Ashuganj in Bangladesh and Silghat in India as ports of call; (2) allow by Bangladesh to India the use of Mongla and Chittagong sea ports for movement of goods to and from India through Bangladesh?s road and rail; (3) give Nepal and Bhutan (by Bangladesh) access to Mongla and Chittagong ports; (4) construct the proposed Akhaura - Agartala railway link with Indian finance; (5) allow Nepal a transit through Rohanpur-Singabad broad gauge railway link; (6) convert Radhikapur - Birol railway line (by Bangladesh) into a broad gauge one, and (7) to offer (by Bangladesh) railway transit link to Bhutan.
Legal implications
Legal implications
All of the above, coming in the form of expressed intent in a joint communique do not make the parties obligated unless detailed agreements are signed subsequently, outlining in specificity the terms and conditions for the usage of one nation?s sea ports by the other, for instance. Even when agreements are signed, they need to be ratified by respective parliaments to accrue the statutory and obligatory status of binding international treaty.
The International Law Commission decided conclusively not to accord binding legal status to joint communique between nations in its 1959 report to the General Assembly (1959, 2 Y.B. Int. Law Comm ,pp 96-97), which was prepared in the wake of developing the comprehensive Vienna Convention on the law of the treaties. In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece V. Turkey), Greece alleged that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had jurisdiction on the dispute due to a joint communique issued at Brussels on May 31, 1975 ? between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey?having declared that the dispute ?should be resolved by the court.? The ICJ decided that the joint communique as not a binding agreement to warrant imposition of burden on the ICJ to establish jurisdiction on the dispute (Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ, Reports, 1978, p-3).
Geopolitical agenda
Geopolitical agenda
Why then India choose to foist upon Bangladesh these non-binding obligations that pulls our nation toward allowing ports and land transits to India via its territory? The reason is purely geopolitical. Delhi wants to show both China and Pakistan that it had overcome its embedded geopolitical handicap with respect to landlocked Northeast India and its military prowess has reached a desired stage that enables it to prosecute simultaneous wars with both the adversaries, by using the advantage it seems to have gained recently in Bangladesh, and, by making it possible to spare an entire theatre of required forces which could be put against Pakistan.
Many cynics among us might argue, why the nuclear armed India should bank on such conventional approaches to warfare? The answer is: no war starts with the aim to use nuclear arsenal as opening salvo. The nukes are mostly deterrent weaponry that ensures Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), and, the conventionally weaker party, like Pakistan, is likely to use nuke in desperation as first strike.
Another fact is: The concluded deal with Dhaka has been in Delhi?s war book for quite sometimes, and, the necessity to have Bangladesh on India?s manageable turf has much to do with the bringing to power of a friendly regime in Dhaka in early 2009. It all started in late 2005 when the Indian military adopted a new strategy called ?cold start?, which its army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, said in December 2009 to be entailing (1) simultaneous capability to wage wars against China and India, and, (2) projection of power from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Strait that connects Indian ocean with the Pacific. The cold start doctrine has been tested and war gamed with the USA as an ally.
That is why, almost coinciding with Bangladesh PM?s Delhi visit, Indian defence ministry allocated another $10 billion to its defence budget, making the defence expenditure 34 per cent higher than what was spent in 2009-10 financial year. And, bristled by this deadly Indian move, Pakistan?s army chief, General Parvez Kayani, reacted angrily during a recent meeting with his General Staff officers. ?Proponents of conventional application of military forces, in a nuclear overhang, are chartering an adventurous and dangerous path, the consequences of which could be both unintended and uncontrollable.? Meanwhile, aware of what India has been doing, Pakistan too has embarked on beefing up its conventional wherewithal and received in early January the first of four Swedish-made airborne early warning aircraft, at a cost of $900 million, which can detect all aircraft taking off and landing at all forward Indian air force bases. Besides, Islamabad is spending another $250 million to buy four more early warning aircrafts from China.
China-Pakistan alliance
China-Pakistan alliance
All these developments have contributed greatly in producing a highly controversial and over-ambitious joint communique ollowing the recently concluded Indo-Bangladesh summit. The communique as designed more to showcase a cemented military alliance between the two neighbours than being a blueprint for regional connectivity and economic development, as is touted.
The summit also took place at a time when Delhi was determined to display such an alliance-like posture with Dhaka, due to other geopolitical developments in the region.For example, on Nov. 27, 2009, Indian Defence Minister, A.K. Antony, said, Growing military ties between China and Pakistan are a serious concern to India?. He added, The increasing nexus between China and Pakistan in military sphere remains an area of serious concern, which we must address. Meanwhile, India's air force chief has gone on record saying, China was a bigger threat than Pakistan to India.
Delhi's sabre rattling with such intensity also helped ignite further radicalism in Pakistan?s internal politics. On January 2, Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami Ameer, Syed Munawwar Hasan, called for a defence pact between Pakistan and China to ensure that an attack on either is interpreted an attack on both.He also called for forming a bloc comprising Pakistan, China, Iran and Central Asian states to checkmate what he termed US-Indian aggressive advances in the region.
Dhaka's next move should factor in such realities in letter and spirit. More so, if it wishes to pursue balanced foreign and defence policies that aim at furthering regional peace and security by being equidistant in an emerging new Cold War that now sweeps the continent of Asia. In this new madness, the scramble for Bangladesh has become epicentre, and, like Lebanon, it too has attained a notorious potential of becoming a regional pawn among the contending powers.
The Author is a Justice of the Peace (JP) and a member in good standing of the International Bar Association (IBA) and the American Society of International Law (ASIL).
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