TIME on Zardari:The Central Front Pakistan is in crisis. Islamic extremism has metastasized from the lawless tribal areas on the border with Afghanistan to Pakistan's cities. Terrorists tried, and failed, to assassinate the Prime Minister in the capital, Islamabad, on Sept. 3. The nation's economy is a shambles. And Asif Ali Zardari, the man who has just taken the helm of this nuclear-armed country, is a onetime playboy who has spent more time in prison than in government and who wriggled out of a 2006 corruption trial in Britain by pleading mental instability. The assassination last December of Benazir Bhutto, a former Prime Minister who was likely to win parliamentary elections in February, capped a year of devastating bloodshed. Some 3,600 people died in terrorism-related violence in 2007, according to the organization South Asia Terrorism Portal, and this year will be worse, as militant groups have joined together to wage war on the central government. The February elections brought Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party, headed by her widower, Zardari, to power and a brief hiatus in the violence. But the new governing coalition collapsed over petty power struggles, and the militancy resumed. Twenty-nine suicide bombings have claimed more than 400 lives so far this year. Yet though Pakistan has been a victim of terrorism, it has also been its enabler. As the focus of the U.S.'s war on terrorism has moved from Afghanistan to Iraq and back again, there is a widely dawning realization that its central front is actually Pakistan. Here in the mountainous northwestern fringes of the nation, where a fierce tribal code values honor and the protection of guests, that Osama bin Laden and his key lieutenants are thought to be hiding. From these tribal areas, al-Qaeda and remnants of the Afghan Taliban, protected by their Pakistani friends, have launched attacks into Afghanistan, dragging the U.S. and its allies into a shadow war on some of the least hospitable terrain on earth. On Sept. 3, U.S.-led helicopter and ground troops made a raid into Pakistan from across the border. At least 17 Pakistanis were killed, and so far there has been no concrete explanation of what happened and why. U.S. forces have previously fired from Afghanistan in pursuit of militants crossing the border, and Predator drones have launched Hellfire missiles on suspected al-Qaeda targets within Pakistani borders (as they did again on Sept. 8), but this was the first reported ground incursion. The raid inflamed anti-American sentiment across the nation, and in retaliation, a vital fuel-supply route to U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan was temporarily blocked. Pakistan, a country of 173 million people that encompasses dusty plains, sublime mountain peaks and some of the world's most densely populated cities, has rarely been a placid place since it became an independent nation in 1947. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Islamabad, with U.S. and Saudi funding, sent thousands of men across the border to join Afghans in fighting the Soviets. The Pakistani military used religious schools in the borderland to train and equip Afghan mujahedin and to heal them when they returned. More than 3 million Afghan refugees took shelter in Pakistan's cities and in makeshift camps. But after the Soviets withdrew in 1989, the U.S. lost interest in the region. Afghanistan's war of liberation turned into a civil war, and the Pakistani government--led by Bhutto and her political rival Nawaz Sharif, who alternated in power--backed the Taliban, student warriors committed to a fundamentalist Islamic state. When it ran Afghanistan, the Taliban provided a safe haven for al-Qaeda--which had its origins among those who had gone to the region to fight Soviet forces. Pakistani government support for the Taliban officially ended after 9/11, when Pervez Musharraf, an army general who had seized power in a 1999 coup, pledged to assist the U.S. war on terrorism. But not everyone was on board. Some in Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence spy agency (ISI) played a double game, turning a blind eye when members of the Taliban leadership and al-Qaeda escaped to Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the border with Afghanistan. FATA's ungoverned spaces provided the ideal sanctuary for militant groups on the run. Musharraf made a halfhearted attempt, at Washington's behest, to stop the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda from waging insurgency across the border. But that only inflamed tensions; the Afghan militants turned their rage on his government, winning to their cause local Pakistanis with whom they have close ties. (The Pashtun ethnic group straddles the border.) All this has combined to make the governability of Pakistan and the character of its latest leader matters of intense concern far from the mountains of the Hindu Kush. Al-Qaeda has "hundreds of training camps" scattered throughout the region, says a Western official in Pakistan. CIA director Michael Hayden has called FATA an al-Qaeda "safe haven" that presents a "clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan and to the West in general, and to the United States in particular." So the question becomes: How dangerous is Pakistan now--and does Zardari have what it takes to make it safer? Playboy to President Zardari's rise to Pakistan's Presidency reads like a Cinderella tale turned Mafia thriller. The son of a feudal landlord and cinema-house owner, Zardari married Bhutto, Pakistan's political princess, in 1987, when she was about to launch her political career. In time, Zardari became Bhutto's political partner, taking posts in her Cabinet and smoothing the ruffled egos the sometimes haughty Prime Minister left in her wake. "He was the fence mender," says Aftab Khan Sherpao, a veteran politician. "If someone [in parliament] had grievances, she sent Zardari in. He was the back channel. He knew how to build relationships." Zardari always had a reputation for wheeling and dealing. When he was Investment Minister during Bhutto's second term, his alleged involvement in kickback scandals earned him the sobriquet "Mr. 10%." He spent 11 years in prison on charges of corruption, extortion and the murder of Bhutto's brother (a political rival), although he has never been convicted. In April he was finally acquitted of the murder charge. Pakistani governments led by both Bhutto's rival, Sharif, and Musharraf pursued money-laundering and corruption cases against Zardari in Britain, Spain and Switzerland. All charges were dropped last fall after a controversial amnesty deal brokered by Musharraf. Zardari maintains that the charges were politically motivated. Yet unease over his credibility lingers. A text-message joke making the rounds in Pakistan says there is no fear that as President, he will be on the take: "He has already stolen everything." Zardari not only has to overcome suspicions about his past but also will have to unify his fractured nation at a time of great trauma. Other than party loyalists, few believe he can. "The jury is out on redemption," says political analyst Nasim Zehra. "But I don't think Zardari can stand up and rally the people behind him." Zardari has to balance U.S. demands for firm military action against the distrust of a public alienated by American adventures in the region. In a country where most blame the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan for Pakistan's problems, he will have to convince Pakistanis that the war on terrorism is their war too. That will not be easy. Zardari became President without ever having to face a popular vote (the President is chosen by parliament, which is currently dominated by his party), and he assumes an office bloated with powers bequeathed by his dictatorial predecessor. The constitution, as amended by Musharraf, grants Zardari immunity from prosecution and enables him to choose--and dismiss--the Chief of Army Staff, personally select Supreme Court judges and dissolve parliament. Under Pakistan's original constitution, these powers belonged to the elected members of parliament; the President was supposed to be a neutral national leader. With few democratic credentials, Zardari, like Musharraf, has absolute power with no mandate. He has said that "parliament is sovereign, and the President would be subservient to the house of the people's representatives," but the relief that announcement brought will count for little if he gets tagged as Washington's man, particularly if he retains powers that many believe are unconstitutional. "Musharraf was seen as America's puppet, and now with Zardari, people think it's the same continuation of policies," says Sherpao. "It would be better for him, and for America, if he just stands in the background and gives advice to the Prime Minister." In the process of consolidating power, Zardari burned bridges, including a valuable alliance with Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League--N, that promised, for once, a functioning national government unhindered by destabilizing rivalries. Zardari's reversal of a promise to reinstate judges dismissed by Musharraf last fall led Sharif's party to drop out of the coalition government, taking with it the highly regarded Finance Minister, Ishaq Dar. The economy, already burdened by skyrocketing food and oil prices, collapsed, and there was a run on the stock market, which had been one of the best-performing in Asia. The rift over the judges may be only a precursor. Many fear that Zardari's and Sharif's parties will revert to the vicious infighting that plagued Pakistan in the late 1980s and '90s. That was bad enough, but Pakistan has nuclear weapons now, and al-Qaeda is still picnicking in its backyard. The military, headed by General Ashfaq Kayani, has promised to stay out of politics, but if the situation deteriorates, it may be forced to intervene. "I don't think [Kayani] will let the country come apart," says Anthony Zinni, a retired four-star Marine general who from 1997 to 2000 headed the U.S. Central Command. "He and the army are watching the Sharif-Zardari business with a lot of worry." Careful What You Wish For Pakistan's troubles may not be solvable by the men in uniform. "With the insurgency in the tribal areas, the situation has become much more complex," says career diplomat Humayun Khan. "The military may try to step in, but it may not succeed." Pakistan today, he says, "has all the ingredients of a revolution: poverty, injustice, instability, alienation, religious fervor and an incompetent government. If the parties don't work together to solve these problems, there is a real danger that the government fails completely." Though Pakistan has lost several thousand soldiers in the war against the Islamic insurgency, many U.S. lawmakers believe it is not doing enough. Western military leaders in Afghanistan have accused the ISI of actively supporting the terrorist groups that are behind attacks on foreign forces and civilian targets, such as a suicide blast at the Indian embassy in Kabul that killed 54. Zardari will have to rein in the ISI and work with the Americans to minimize collateral damage from attacks on militants inside Pakistan. Most difficult of all, he will have to convince his populace that such attacks benefit Pakistan as much as the U.S. Whatever the military challenges, the U.S. Administration has continued its quiet cultivation of Kayani, who has acted more aggressively against insurgents in recent months, with full-scale aerial assaults. On Aug. 6 he launched a massive operation in Bajaur tribal agency, an insurgent-ridden area along the border. But the exercise was a lesson in being careful what you wish for. Pakistan's army was built to fight a conventional war with India and is ill equipped to handle violence at home. Three weeks of air strikes forced more than 260,000 residents to flee the region; many ended up in squalid camps. They have turned their wrath on the government, not on the militants who are fighting it. "We are sandwiched between security forces and the Taliban," says Fazl Sadiq, 30, who is staying in a camp. He claims that the air strikes have killed more civilians than militants. "If the government does not halt its indiscriminate killing, then one day I will also join the Taliban to take revenge." Will anything work? "The military has pursued two bad policies in the tribal areas--appeasement and excessive use of force," says Samina Ahmed, South Asia project director for the International Crisis Group. "Either way, all they have achieved is empowering the militants, helping them in recruitment and in obtaining funding." She laments the lack of a coherent strategy. "Militaries are blunt instruments; they are not good at counterinsurgency," she says. "The police would be a far more effective instrument, but there is no coordination between the military and the civilian government, so political reform and economic development--essential elements to any counterinsurgency--are not part of the equation." A long-term effort to quell extremism in the tribal areas will require even more. Pakistan needs to bring schools, jobs, roads, health care, courts and the rule of law to a populace that has rarely seen government attention. Unemployment among the population of 3.5 million hovers around 70%. Two-thirds live in poverty. Only 6% of its people can read, and for women, the figure is less than 1%. Yet neither Pakistan nor the U.S. appears to have a comprehensive strategy for the area. A top expert on Pakistan recently visited a colleague at the White House who, the expert says, was embarrassed to admit that "no matter who wins the election, I don't have a U.S. policy toward Pakistan to give them." That will not be easy. Zardari became President without ever having to face a popular vote (the President is chosen by parliament, which is currently dominated by his party), and he assumes an office bloated with powers bequeathed by his dictatorial predecessor. The constitution, as amended by Musharraf, grants Zardari immunity from prosecution and enables him to choose--and dismiss--the Chief of Army Staff, personally select Supreme Court judges and dissolve parliament. Under Pakistan's original constitution, these powers belonged to the elected members of parliament; the President was supposed to be a neutral national leader. With few democratic credentials, Zardari, like Musharraf, has absolute power with no mandate. He has said that "parliament is sovereign, and the President would be subservient to the house of the people's representatives," but the relief that announcement brought will count for little if he gets tagged as Washington's man, particularly if he retains powers that many believe are unconstitutional. "Musharraf was seen as America's puppet, and now with Zardari, people think it's the same continuation of policies," says Sherpao. "It would be better for him, and for America, if he just stands in the background and gives advice to the Prime Minister." In the process of consolidating power, Zardari burned bridges, including a valuable alliance with Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League--N, that promised, for once, a functioning national government unhindered by destabilizing rivalries. Zardari's reversal of a promise to reinstate judges dismissed by Musharraf last fall led Sharif's party to drop out of the coalition government, taking with it the highly regarded Finance Minister, Ishaq Dar. The economy, already burdened by skyrocketing food and oil prices, collapsed, and there was a run on the stock market, which had been one of the best-performing in Asia. The rift over the judges may be only a precursor. Many fear that Zardari's and Sharif's parties will revert to the vicious infighting that plagued Pakistan in the late 1980s and '90s. That was bad enough, but Pakistan has nuclear weapons now, and al-Qaeda is still picnicking in its backyard. The military, headed by General Ashfaq Kayani, has promised to stay out of politics, but if the situation deteriorates, it may be forced to intervene. "I don't think [Kayani] will let the country come apart," says Anthony Zinni, a retired four-star Marine general who from 1997 to 2000 headed the U.S. Central Command. "He and the army are watching the Sharif-Zardari business with a lot of worry." Careful What You Wish For Pakistan's troubles may not be solvable by the men in uniform. "With the insurgency in the tribal areas, the situation has become much more complex," says career diplomat Humayun Khan. "The military may try to step in, but it may not succeed." Pakistan today, he says, "has all the ingredients of a revolution: poverty, injustice, instability, alienation, religious fervor and an incompetent government. If the parties don't work together to solve these problems, there is a real danger that the government fails completely." Though Pakistan has lost several thousand soldiers in the war against the Islamic insurgency, many U.S. lawmakers believe it is not doing enough. Western military leaders in Afghanistan have accused the ISI of actively supporting the terrorist groups that are behind attacks on foreign forces and civilian targets, such as a suicide blast at the Indian embassy in Kabul that killed 54. Zardari will have to rein in the ISI and work with the Americans to minimize collateral damage from attacks on militants inside Pakistan. Most difficult of all, he will have to convince his populace that such attacks benefit Pakistan as much as the U.S. Whatever the military challenges, the U.S. Administration has continued its quiet cultivation of Kayani, who has acted more aggressively against insurgents in recent months, with full-scale aerial assaults. On Aug. 6 he launched a massive operation in Bajaur tribal agency, an insurgent-ridden area along the border. But the exercise was a lesson in being careful what you wish for. Pakistan's army was built to fight a conventional war with India and is ill equipped to handle violence at home. Three weeks of air strikes forced more than 260,000 residents to flee the region; many ended up in squalid camps. They have turned their wrath on the government, not on the militants who are fighting it. "We are sandwiched between security forces and the Taliban," says Fazl Sadiq, 30, who is staying in a camp. He claims that the air strikes have killed more civilians than militants. "If the government does not halt its indiscriminate killing, then one day I will also join the Taliban to take revenge." Will anything work? "The military has pursued two bad policies in the tribal areas--appeasement and excessive use of force," says Samina Ahmed, South Asia project director for the International Crisis Group. "Either way, all they have achieved is empowering the militants, helping them in recruitment and in obtaining funding." She laments the lack of a coherent strategy. "Militaries are blunt instruments; they are not good at counterinsurgency," she says. "The police would be a far more effective instrument, but there is no coordination between the military and the civilian government, so political reform and economic development--essential elements to any counterinsurgency--are not part of the equation." A long-term effort to quell extremism in the tribal areas will require even more. Pakistan needs to bring schools, jobs, roads, health care, courts and the rule of law to a populace that has rarely seen government attention. Unemployment among the population of 3.5 million hovers around 70%. Two-thirds live in poverty. Only 6% of its people can read, and for women, the figure is less than 1%. Yet neither Pakistan nor the U.S. appears to have a comprehensive strategy for the area. A top expert on Pakistan recently visited a colleague at the White House who, the expert says, was embarrassed to admit that "no matter who wins the election, I don't have a U.S. policy toward Pakistan to give them." Sounds great. But who will get the development money that all of Washington now seems keen to send east? Christine Fair, a Pakistan expert with the Rand Corp. in Washington, argues that without a reformer in charge in Islamabad, programs such as Biden-Lugar will be "throwing good money after bad." The problems, she says, are systemic. Improving training for police officers won't help until their wages are boosted to make them less vulnerable to bribes--but that would require reforming police pay, which in turn would call for extensive civil-service reform. "That's the problem with Pakistan," says Fair. "It's like a string in a carpet that you pull, and pretty soon you find yourself unraveling the whole carpet." The key insight is that no one policy--and no one leader--can save Pakistan. For too long, even as he became increasingly loathed at home, the U.S. relied on Musharraf to deliver its security goals. It can't make the same mistake with Zardari. Now is the time to identify other partners and focus on Pakistan's real needs--not just security but also economic development, education and health care--as its politicians and people seek a way out of the morass into which their nation has sunk. All that, and patience. Next year marks the 30th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which had the unwitting effect of yoking Pakistan's fortunes to those of the U.S. Do not be surprised if--even with skillful diplomacy, generous aid and appropriate military assistance--it takes another generation for that strange partnership to become one from which both partners believe they benefit. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/...40560-3,00.html |
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