Foreign and defence policies lose traction M. Shahidul Islam The most painful issue in Indo-Bangladesh relations has been not how India tried to get from Bangladesh everything it wanted, but why Bangladesh has had to behave in the manner it did so far. In the process, much of what is achieved by a particular regime has gotten lost at certain points of history, resulting in the loosing of the very tractions needed to pursue a cohesive policy framework that is most conducive to the greater interest of the people. With the AL's coming to office, the nation is faced with such a dilemma once again. The most detrimental aspect of such 'shifting of gears' in foreign and defence policies is the abandonment of the very fundamental principles which should serve as the indispensable yardsticks to ensure preservation of vital national interests. That not being the case, and the Indo-Bangladesh relations having often traversed such a perilous path due to constant Indian pressures to extract everything from Dhaka in return for some superficial and cosmetic quid pro quo, our power to bargain better has diminished by the day. Added to the seemingly chronic abstention from the parliament of the opposition MPs - and the abrupt resignation of the so called 'Guru of Digital Bangladesh', Maj. Gen. Monzurul Alam (retd), from the post of BTRC chairman (for allegedly imposing on him decisions that could undo all that he's done so far) - something seems not quite well within the body politic of the nation. An unpredictable face off Foremost among the troubling signs is an unpredictable face off that had occurred last week between various agencies of the government in the wake of the Indian foreign minister's visit to Dhaka. The 'behind the scene' tug of war relates to the slated discussions on fashioning a regional task force, something the Prime Minister had made a pre-election agenda to implement, if voted to power. Sources say the higher echelon of the military objected to the formation of such a force, resulting in the Prime Minister asking the army chief himself to explain out the nuances of it before the Indian foreign minister, personally. Thus came the declaration from Pranob Mukherjee that a bilateral task force, as opposed to the regional one wanted by the Prime Minister- was more realistic. This declaration fell in line with the bilateral defence collaborations already in place, especially the evolving military to military ties that are slated to kick off from February 22 when the two armies join in a war game in the Indian state of Assam, for the first time. The exercise continues until March 7. Sources also say the army chief had to debrief the Prime Minister later on the content of his discussions with Mr. Mukherjee. If that seems like a text book version of classic crisis management with respect to defence policies, the foreign office too also seemed stuck in a limbo while it tried to uphold, on one hand, the pre-election promise of the party in power to stitch together a regional task force - in which no other countries showed any willingness so far - and the ground realities, on the other. Meanwhile, the idea of cobbling such a hybrid force having emanated from Washington, only the US's Assistant Secretary for the region, Richard Boucher, termed the idea as 'positive' during his recent Dhaka visit. Two deals & a smile That does not mean the Indian foreign minister left Dhaka empty-handed and grumpy. Two deals were signed on February 9; one a brand new 'Bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement (Bipa), and the other a renewal of the 1980 trade agreement. The suave top diplomat of India thus managed to leave Dhaka smiling, albeit concerned. And, viewed from the vantage of past experiences, Mukherjee's successes in Dhaka far outweighed the bottlenecks seen strewn on his way.For example, the first deal has smoothen ways and means for intrusion into Bangladesh of the previously abandoned TATA like projects, while the second one has started the ball rolling toward signing of a new deal on transit and trans-shipment in coming months. Although Article 8 of the 1980 bilateral trade agreement stipulates that both countries will facilitate land, air and water transits of goods, the prospect of allowing land corridor to India always predicated upon Delhi first allowing Bangladesh the similar facilities with Nepal and Bhutan; to allow the two landlocked small neighbours the much wanted privilege of using our port facilities in Mongla and Chittagong, and thus help establish regional connectivity. Curiously, that prospect - which was wrapped in an approach to resolve the connectivity issues of all neighbours - has never received any serious attention from Delhi, despite Bangladesh having allowed India inland water transit facilities pursuant to the IWT&T Protocol of 1972 - at Narayanganj, Sirajganj, Khulana and Mongla - and the last CG having signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in mid-February 2008 with respect to mutual air services. Military needs met The 2008 MoU relating to air transportation allowed India to transport by air not only commercial goods, but all types of military hardware to the troubled North Eastern Indian states without Dhaka being granted an opportunity to raise question about the contents of the consignments being transported over its sky. Prepared in total secrecy, the MoU also agreed to allow Indian military cargo aircrafts to land and take off inside Bangladesh soil, without any prior notification, according to sources. Why then the need of forming a joint task force arises, and, India having procured from the USA about two squadrons of transport aircrafts that can land and take off surreptitiously on any terrain, did not that deal already serve India's military aim more than any desired commercial gains expected out of it? Is transit a done deal? We know the CG has done much of what India wanted although it got stuck with the land transit issue which the Commerce Minister Faroque Khan said would be concluded as a separate agreement in the future. Sources however say the transit deal's draft version has already been gathering dust for quite a while, and, we have no reason not to believe. For, on March 13, 2008, Sudhakar Dalela, the councillor for trade and commerce at the Indian High Commission in Dhaka, was quoted by an Indian media outlet as having said the 'Bangladesh government was actively considering the Indian proposal to allow Chittagong port for use by India' to transport goods to Tripura's border town of Sobrom, which is only 75 km from Chittagong port. Prior to that, officials from both governments visited the proposed transit zone and prepared reports. The proposed deal, which may be signed any time, contains permission for India to connect Kolkata and Agartala by using Bangladesh land to reduce distance between West Bengal and Tripura from 1,500 km to 350 km. Undiplomatic verbiage The geopolitical health of the region being what it is, all these are vital foreign policy matters with serious military and economic implications. That is why both parties must conduct comprehensive research and look eye ball to eye ball before more inks are spent on signing any more of such agreements. Unfortunately, until now, Delhi seems to have preferred talking C when the issues in concern were A & B. That fact has come to light anew when the Indian High Commissioner in Dhaka accused the BNP of talking 'oul foul' (literally meaning bullshitting around) due to BNP's objection to the formation of a task force to combat extremism. Unsurprisingly, the High Commissioner's undiplomatic verbiages are in sync with how Delhi has been trying to convince Dhaka over the years of the economic gains to be derived from transit to offset the virtually Himalayan trade imbalance that has piled up in India's favour, despite the two issues not being mutually inclusive. Trade Vs. transit Bilateral trade is something where a label playing field is needed to balance the book. That India's export to Bangladesh overshot $3.6 billion mark in FY 2007-08 alone (which was just $1 billion in FY2001-02) - against Bangladesh's export to India reaching only $350 million - is not indicative of the prevalence of any positive ground for Bangladesh, let alone a label playing field. Besides, revenue earned from bilateral trade is always distinct from what can be expected as tolls from Indian transports once they are allowed to cruise through our territory, although, such revenues will constitute an integral part of the overall trade basket. Question also remains, in terms of raw cash, how much they could be and are they nearly enough to make any significant difference to propel the trade relationship toward a viable label playing field? Studies show Bangladesh is likely to receive, in distant future, $500 million revenue if the prospective toll from a regional connectivity scheme-comprising of transports from Nepal & Bhutan too- is added together. Until Nepal and Bhutan are added to the scheme in a regional approach to connectivity, Bangladesh's annual earning from Indian transport alone can not be more than $100-$150 million at the most, annually. Now look from a different angle. In return for signing the air transport deal in February 2008, Bangladesh received a promise of only US$150 million line of credit from India for railways development in bordering areas. The stipulated allocation indicates the money has to be spent to shore up India's interests, and, it was a credit. Yet, this measly offer has created so much of hypes among the CG stalwarts that the army chief rushed to India to upstart the Dhaka-Kolkata train service which has now become a venture lost in the wilderness. A security nightmare That is why we term such exercises as political slam- dunking. Reality is: Not only Bangladesh lacks infrastructure to accommodate Indian transports from Chittagong port to Tripura, an extra vigilance is required at the Tripura border points to guard against cross border arms smuggling of Indian North Eastern insurgents. There is also a genuine fear of North-Eastern insurgents ambushing Indian convoys inside Bangladesh, something that might end up in India blaming Bangladesh for its failure to safeguard Indian interests, or in abrupt suspension of such a facility by Bangladesh. Under such a scenario, bilateral ties could become very inimical and the dream of regional economic connectivity for multilateral benefits could face serious jolts. Surveillance is also needed to ensure that goods imported for Indian North East via Chittagong port do not end up in Bangladesh markets to inflate the fortunes of Indian importers by inspiring random smuggling - or illegal dumping- inside Bangladesh. We also find it tedious that our government has to be reminded time and again that these moves are mere geopolitical agendas aimed at regional hegemony. By obtaining facilities to use Chittagong port to connect Tripura - and the Dhaka-Kolkata rail link having already established transportation of Indian goods between Kolkata and the Northeast States of Assam, Meghalaya, and Arunachal Pradesh - Delhi has obtained much of what it needed to connect with the landlocked North East while our economic future further eclipsed and the tentacle of razor sharp barbed wire continued to chain us from all directions. |
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