| To all the armchair generals: A rejoinder Courtesy Daily Star 19/3/09 Mumtaz Iqbal | 
| | Could Pilkhana have been stormed? Photo: Shafiqul Islam Kajol/ Drik News | MUHIT Rahman's indignation (DS Mar 12) would have been more effective had his language been more judicious and his examples more relevant.
He writes: "All you armchair generals, can you cite one instance … in history where an armed force of thousands had taken over a barricaded area with a large trapped civilian population in a dense urban setting and another armed immediately (within two to other hours) and successfully rescued hostages and/or disarmed the hostages."
First, there was no "armed force of thousands." There were nearly 5,000 riflemen. But only a small number were armed, and amongst them a smaller number of cowards did the killing, molesting, and looting.
When riflemen found that officers were being killed from around 10 a.m., that's when the first desertions also started and swelled throughout that day and next (DS Mar 10). Most riflemen had not bargained for a cold-blooded massacre of innocents, but money and benefits
Pilkhana is not barricaded but walled, a big difference. There is little evidence to suggest that the mutineers erected barricades, established strong points, dug trenches, or placed machine guns or mortars in defensive positions to repel an attack.
The trapped civilians inside Pilkhana were mostly dependents of riflemen. It's unlikely other riflemen would harm them. Civilians targeted and harmed were the wives of officers. The area inside Pilkhana has open spaces. The dense urban setting is outside the Pilkhana perimeter.
Rahman's question about "immediately" attacking is a red herring. The timing of any attack is determined by circumstances that vary from place to place. A proper assault would take reconnaissance, planning, organisation, and execution, and probably could have been launched by early afternoon (say 3 pm) of February 25.
However, against this point is late Col. Gulzar's request to his Rab colleagues at 9:30 a.m. on February 25 to send two platoons (sixty soldiers) as the killers "don't seem to be organised." (DS Mar 12).
As an experienced anti-terrorism fighter, Gulzar's observation cannot be brushed aside. This suggests that an operation involving between two companies (300 soldiers) to two battalions (all within the local infantry brigade's capability) assisted by commandos likely would have had a high probability of success.
Another red herring are the words "successfully rescued." Any assault carries risks. The writer is asking for certainty in a situation where certainty is inherently impossible. No battle plan survives the first contact with the enemy (Moltke the Elder). But certainly successful assaults have been achieved against terrorists, e.g. the successful Entebbe rescue.
The examples of Moscow, Beslan, Waco, and Munich are inapt. In these cases, the militants were prepared to die for their beliefs, political and religious.
This was not the case with the BDR mutineers whose demands were entirely self-centred and monetary. This was why the cowardly perpetrators fled. They were not prepared to die for their cause that was neither noble nor just.
The DS of March 11 has this headline: 450 BDR men found involved so far. That means about 10% of those present. This figure per se makes sense. It suggests most BDR riflemen were not involved.
Rahman cites that the first action in a hostage situation -- and Pilkhana certainly had this characteristic among others -- is ICER (isolate, contain, evaluate, and report). This wasn't done. If not, why not? Rahman fails to comment on this elementary but fatal lapse.
Rahman really goes overboard in when he writes: "The reality is that the world's most highly trained forces could not have secured Pilkhana by force without massive loss of innocent lives ranging from innocent BDR personnel and their families who may have been coerced or were swept up in the mutiny, to the very hostages that they were going to save."
This is surely incorrect. UK's SAS, US Delta Force, and Germany's GSG9 would have made mincemeat of the cowardly riflemen in a short time, say two hours including mopping up, from the time the actual assault was launched.
So would Pakistan's SSG (Red Mosque), India's NSG (Mumbai), and our commando battalion.
An army assault carried the risk of casualties. The question is: how many?
We really don't know. But taking account of Gulzar's comment; the lack of purity of the mutineers' cause; their poor motivation as judged by massive desertions; their unwillingness to die and their lack of defensive preparations (see above) suggest that casualties would have been small rather than large.
On February 16, 1972, a revolt by BDR in Pilkhana was put down by troops of S (Shafiullah) Force, on Bangabandhu's prompt orders without loss of civilians.
Similarly, the Pakistani assault on Pilkhana on March 25, 1971, the various mutinies in our army since 1975, and India's Operation Blue Star (attack on Amritsar's Golden Temple in which Sikh troops loyally fought their co-religionists) in 1984 also saw relatively little or no civilian loss or property damage.
To concentrate on whether or not an assault should have been mounted is to focus on a tree and miss the forest.
The real question is the process followed and decisions taken by the high civilian and military authorities including the intelligence leadership since 9:30 a.m. when by all accounts they became aware of the mutiny. An assault was one option on the table.
The totality of response by the authorities reveals some puzzling episodes. For example, the dispatch of odd and untrained intermediaries at the mutiny's outset; meeting with the mutineers; declaration of amnesty; and announcement that consideration would be given to implementing their demands are well documented.
These actions may have been well-intentioned, but amounted to giving away the bank, imperiled the security of the nation, and set a dangerous precedent.
It is standard operating procedure that authorities don't negotiate with mutineers -- certainly not face to face at the highest level -- nor concede to their demands without knowing the fate of the hostages, especially where they are employees of the state.
Thus, to give an A to the civilian government for its handling of the crisis is to be exceedingly generous. The writer also gives the army an A for restraint. Restraint is irrelevant to judge military efficiency.
The proof of a pudding is in the eating. We may debate endlessly whether an assault would have caused big or small losses. Either military action or inaction carried risks. But, in my opinion, on balance, action carried the lesser risk.
The author is an ex-banker and freelancer. | |