BDR REBELLION
Army inquiry court finds no militant, political link
The court of inquiry formed by the army found no link of militancy and politics to the February 25-26 soldiers' rebellion at the Bangladesh Rifles headquarters.
The court of inquiry in its report submitted to the army chief, General Moeen U Ahmed on May 10, identified a dozen reasons, including soldiers' grievances and misunderstanding, for the rebellion.
The summary of the report, a copy of which New Age obtained on Thursday, however, said no link of any civilian and political personalities to the rebellion could be found because of limitations in collecting evidence, verifying obtained information and confirming information sources.
The government inquiry committee, formed to investigate the rebellion is, however, yet to submit its report. The report is ready and is likely to be submitted on Sunday, said sources in the home ministry.
A copy of the report of the army's court of inquiry will also be submitted soon to the prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, who is also the defence minister.
Reasons behind the rebellion as identified in the report includes wrong impression about the facilities of the army, lack of transparency in establishing and running BDR shops, delay in payment of duty allowances for the 2008 national elections, misunderstanding about lease and contracts of different works in the BDR headquarters, admission to schools in the headquarters and wrong impression about the BDR's director general Shakil Ahmed, his wife Nazneen Shakil and Dhaka sector commander Mujubul Haque's alleged involvement in the irregularities, and delay made by the home and finance ministries in resolving BDR problems.
The report identified the operation 'dal bhat' as a major reason for the rebellion. It said punishment of some BDR soldiers for irregularities in the programme, getting blank or several forms signed by the soldiers for administrative requirement although they were entitled to get allowances for the programme, denial of their leaves and over-work had caused resentment among the soldiers.
Curbing financial irregularities of the BDR soldiers by their officers from the army also instigated their resentment, the report said.
As the army officers deputed to the BDR did not take any initiatives to correct the wrong impressions created among the soldiers about the officers, some of the soldiers could obtain support of others for the rebellion by distributing leaflets on February 21, the report observed.
It also said undue interference in the administration by the families, friends and staff of some officers also caused resentment among the soldiers.
The report said no evidence, information, documentary evidence and forecast of direct or indirect link of any local or external militant organisation to the rebellion could yet be found.
As for any political links to the rebellion, it said some soldiers had contacted some civil personalities and political leaders before the national elections in 2008 to press home their demands violating the rules and regulations.
It is presumable that certain civil and political personalities were naturally aggrieved by the army's role in aid of the civil administration during the immediate-past government.
As some soldiers contacted civil and political personalities hoping to have their commitment to realising their demands, the civilian and political personalities could have used the soldiers as a weapon to take revenge.
The report said local leader Torab Ali, also a former subehdar, his son Liton and former nayeb subehdar Kanchan's son Zakir were very much involved with the rebellion. As Liton is an illegal arms dealer, he could have helped the rebels to get arms of the Bangladesh Rifles.
The report recommended a high-level inquiry by the intelligence agencies to look into the link of any other organisations, institutions and personalities to the rebellion.
It observed the intelligence agencies had completely failed to inform the authorities of the meetings of the soldiers with certain civilian and political personalities.
As the members of the BDR intelligence agency, Rifles Security Unit, were directly involved with the rebellion, they did not inform their authorities of the rebellion.
On political negotiations, the report praised the home affairs minister, Sahara Khatun, state minister for LGRD and cooperatives Jahangir Kabir Nanak and other members of the teams for their highly courageous move to quell the rebellion.
It, however, observed they had failed to take any timely measure for lack of their experience in quelling such rebellions and military matters.
The report observed the scope for quelling the rebels before they could get organised could not be used as 350 Rapid Action Battalion members, who reached the three gates of the headquarters by 10:10am on February 25, were not allowed by their headquarters to conduct operations.
Although the rebellion broke out at 9:30am, the rebels were not organised and they did not set up heavy weapons at the gates of the headquarters until 11:00am.
Regarding the activities of the army, the report said the army personnel could not be deployed in time as they could not carry out any reconnaissance because of time constraint and necessary military weapons (armoured personnel carriers and tanks) were not readied in the Dhaka cantonment.
The report, moreover, added the 46 Brigade could not play its role as the political personalities sought time to resolve the matter through negotiations.
Although the army personnel were deployed around the BDR headquarters at 10:50am on February 25, they were ordered to go out of sight from the headquarters and the rebels got time to get organised.
At 12:45pm on February 26, in the presence of army, air force and battalion personnel in the army headquarters, a plan was chalked up for military operation against the rebels. An H-hour, when a military operation begins, was set at 4:00pm in accordance with directives issued by the army chief's office at 1:30pm.
As the home minister and her team were holding a meeting with the rebels in the BDR headquarters, the H-hour was changed repeatedly and finally the operation was cancelled at 5:50pm.
According to the report, a team of 30 to 35 soldiers, in several groups, killed the officers in the Durbar Hall and the residence of the director general. Killing elsewhere was carried out later. The plan for the killing was initially limited to a few soldiers.
Physical torture on the wives of the officers was planned and the list of the wives to be tortured had also been prepared before the rebellion broke out, the report said.
The report observed immediately after the national elections, politicians, intellectuals and other personalities, in the parliament and television talk-shows, started character assassination of army officers, evaluating their activities of the preceding two years and it instigated the rebellion.
The Inter Service Public Relations, public relations office of the army, failed to play any effective role in projecting correct information vis-à-vis the propaganda made by BDR soldiers who were giving wrong information, the report observed.
It said 74 people — 57 army officers, 9 soldiers and 8 civilians — were killed in the rebellion.
The report recommended exemplary punishment of the perpetrators under the Army Act and expeditious trial of the civilians, who might be found involved with the rebellion.
It also recommended formation of a high-level court of inquiry to investigate the involvement of civilian personalities and institutions with the rebellion observing that the court of inquiry could not obtain information on them because of its limitations.
It recommended that the name of the Bangladesh Rifles should be reorganised, by changing its name, uniform and infrastructure. http://www.newagebd.com/2009/may/15/front.html |