| Opportune time for Delhi-Dhaka ties Wasbir Hussain
YEAR 2009 is not 1971. If India should not take Bangladesh for granted just because it helped the nation attain independence some forty years ago, Dhaka also cannot afford to ignore the facts of history and say today that New Delhi has done precious little for it. We cannot do away with either history or geography in so far as India and Bangladesh are concerned, and, therefore, the best way to move forward is to take pragmatic steps, taking into account the geo-politics and market forces. The question to ask at this juncture is whether the two prime ministers, Manmohan Singh and Sheikh Hasina, can manage to remove the trust deficit between the two South Asian neighbours and take Indo-Bangladesh relations to a real high. This question is more than valid because trust deficit between New Delhi and Dhaka is the main reason for the blow-hot-blow-cold relationship between these two most populous neighbours.
Today, as Bangladesh premier Hasina is set to embark on a visit to India, one cannot but monitor more closely the signals emanating from Dhaka, and, I must say, these signals are encouraging. After all, if economic concerns top Bangladesh's agenda in so far as India is concerned, it is the issue of security that bothers New Delhi the most. During the past six weeks, India has seen things that it has been waiting to see for a decade now. Yes, one is talking about action (although not openly admitted) taken by authorities in Bangladesh to corner Northeast Indian separatist leaders. The manner in which Sasadhar Choudhury, the self-styled foreign secretary of the outlawed United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), and the group's finance secretary Chitrabon Hazarika, have landed in the hands of Indian authorities on the border with Bangladesh in November clearly indicates a helping hand lent by Dhaka. Again, the dramatic manner in which ULFA's topmost leader, Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa, surfaced in India on December 3, right on the border with Bangladesh, along with the rebel group's deputy commander-in-chief Raju Baruah, also points to close assistance from Dhaka.
For us in India, it is only natural to expect the Awami League regime to clamp down on terror. After all, immediately after she led her party to a landslide victory in December 2008, even before she took over as prime minister, Sheikh Hasina had talked of not allowing any anti-India activity from Bangladeshi soil. She had also spoken of setting up a regional task force to combat terrorism in South Asia. And her government demonstrated that it meant business when it put the 2004 Chittagong arms haul case on fast track, leading to the arrest of two former chiefs of Bangladesh's premier intelligence agency, and the naming of ULFA's elusive military chief Paresh Baruah in the case. It is said that the ten truck loads of arms and ammunition that were offloaded at the jetty in Chittagong was meant for the ULFA in Assam and the size of the consignment was large enough to arm an army brigade. If Dhaka, today, is acting against the ULFA or other Northeast Indian rebels it is an extension of its clampdown on terror in general. That includes both homegrown and global Islamist terror and left-wing extremism.
What puzzles many in India is Dhaka's reluctance to admit its role in helping New Delhi get custody of rebel leaders like Rajkhowa and others who have been on the run for nearly two decades now. It is clear that Dhaka has been cooperating with New Delhi by launching a crackdown on the ULFA and other Northeast Indian insurgents, but why cooperate in secret is the question being asked. I have just returned from a visit to Bangladesh, having taken part in a Bangladesh-India Dialogue initiated by a leading think-tank in Dhaka, the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI). One of Bangladesh's former Ambassadors had this to tell me: "India has embarrassed us by flashing the news of Arabinda Rajkhowa's arrest. You want our help and when we help you, you disclose things to the media…" This remark perhaps is in sync with Dhaka's strategy of cooperating with India but not openly acknowledging it.
This is only part of the story thoughthere has been a perceptible change in the policy towards the issue of Northeast Indian rebels after the advent of the Awami League in the corridors of power in Dhaka. Contrary to the government's position under the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the Awami League government does not flatly deny that ULFA leaders are present or were present in Bangladesh. But Sheikh Hasina's party or government is just not ready to go to the people on this perhaps because the party could run the risk of being projected as a 'stooge of India.' Anti-India rhetoric still cuts ice among vast sections of people in Bangladesh's murky political landscape, and, therefore, the Awami League is treading cautiously although the party seems set on improving ties with India.
I heard a very interesting coinage this time used by some members of the Bangladeshi strategic community: they are talking about 'regime compatibility', referring to the equations between the Awami League and the ruling Congress in India. One has to wait and see if the Awami League is willing to admit any 'regime compatibility' with the Congress party and prepare the ground for an improved or lasting relationship between the two nations. This is an opportune time for the Awami League to be open about its equations with India considering the massive mandate the party has got at the last elections. The mandate can only be seen as a verdict against terror or fundamentalism and a verdict in favour of peace and development. The voters' behaviour has lots in common with the behaviour of the electorate in Indiaa vote against communalism, fundamentalism and a vote for peace, security and progress.
In this whole expectation of an improved Indo-Bangladesh relation, New Delhi has a key role to play. India must address Bangladesh's concern over the issue of trade deficit and non-tariff barriers. But issues like trade or tariff as well as the enclave issue can only be resolved if there is a strong political will. In fact I would argue that the issue of enclaves should not be allowed to be confused with the issue of illegal migration. Border guards on both sides must actually resort to firing at people only as a last resort. Both nations must jointly clamp down on terror; there should be an extradition treaty in place and if this turns out to be too complicated, the two nations must gather the courage to use the option of deporting unwanted non-nationals. As Bangladesh's Foreign Minister Dr Dipu Moni said in Dhaka recently, "India and Bangladesh today stand at a moment of opportunity. We are aware of our secular and pluralist heritage and we are confident of resolving our problems." This is the mood that is required to improve ties between the two countries.
I got a sense of just that mood, one of hope while in Dhaka. Over dinner at the Gulshan Club, Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Mohamed Mijarul Quayes regaled some thirty of us by singing not one, but two Tagore songs. Quayes just needed a mild prodding from one of his predecessors Farooq Sobhan to break into song. An eloquent speaker, Quayes I was told is a 1982 batch Foreign Service officer and is just about 49, quite young to hold the coveted job in any country. Bangladesh is young, its democracy is young and there is no reason why the two neighbours cannot work out a win-win relationship.
The author is Director, Centre for Development & Peace Studies, Guwahati, India. | |