Look Nearer Home
KANTI BAJPAI,
15 January 2010, 12:00am
Times of India
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Look-Nearer-Home/articleshow/5445698.cms
Professor Kanti Bajpai is Professor in the Politics and International Relations of South Asia, Oxford University
Now that the climate talks in Copenhagen are behind us, it is time to turn once again to India's policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. A region-led policy, rather than a US-led policy towards Afghanistan, and the resumption of talks with Pakistan, rather than the stalling of negotiations, should be Indian policy.
New Delhi should start with five assumptions. The first is that the United States will quit Afghanistan by 2012 at the latest. When US troops leave, they will leave Afghanistan neither stable nor democratic. Second, the Taliban will remain a military and political force, supported by Pakistan or by elements within the Pakistani government. Third, India-Pakistan tensions over Afghanistan and Kashmir will continue, with both sides claiming legitimate interests in both places. Fourth, Pakistan will be a violent and turbulent place. US presence in Afghanistan will on balance exacerbate, not reduce, extremism in Pakistan which in turn will hinder India-Pakistan relations further. Fifth, terrorists will strike Indian targets again, even as New Delhi improves its counterterrorism, tempting India to hit back at Pakistan - with unpredictable consequences.
Indian policy must therefore change. New Delhi's insistence that the US should stay in Afghanistan, that it must discipline Pakistan, that there is no such thing as good and bad Taliban, and that the resumption of talks with Pakistan must await stern action against the perpetrators of 26/11 and the dismantling of the terror apparatus is not wise policy. The US and its allies do not seem to have the will to stay in Afghanistan much beyond 2012. Washington's ability to discipline Pakistan historically has been intermittent at best and ineffective at worst, principally because Islamabad is important to the US for a number of geopolitical reasons including, at present, military operations in Afghanistan.
New Delhi's contention that there is no difference between elements of the Taliban is unconvincing. All our experience within India shows that there is always a more extreme and a less extreme faction of insurgents. If there was no relatively good Taliban, the hijacking of IC-814 in 1999 would have ended very differently - in tragedy for the passengers. In any case, to say there are no moderates is to suggest that there is no possibility of negotiating an end to Afghanistan's troubles. Logically, then, the only option is to exterminate the Taliban. Postponing talks with Pakistan until terror has been more or less dismantled and full action taken on 26/11 is like waiting for Godot, in Beckett's famous play by that name.
What is the alternative? Indian policy on Afghanistan must move towards a regional understanding that includes in the first instance Pakistan and perhaps Iran. The fundamental compact between India and Pakistan must be of a simple, robust nature: that both countries have legitimate interests in Afghanistan. India has an interest in overall stability and the protection of northern, non-Pashtun Afghans as well as various other minorities including Sikhs and Hindus. Pakistan also has an interest in the country's stability and in the Pashtuns finding their rightful place in any future government of Afghanistan. India and Pakistan could agree therefore that India will continue to provide developmental aid and that Pakistan will have influence on political developments, the goal of both countries being to help evolve a lasting, just and inclusive political system. Iran, Russia, China and the nearby Central Asian states should be part of a conclave on Afghanistan as they are all affected by events in that troubled country and wield influence in it. A beginning towards a conclave would be for Afghanistan, India and Pakistan to meet on the future of Afghanistan.
In addition, India must resume talks with Pakistan. The absence of talks is music to the ears of extremists in Pakistan. Composite dialogue between the two countries goes back to the Narasimha Rao government and the so-called "non-papers" of the early 1990s which culminated in the "six plus two" talks (Kashmir and security being the "two"). Progress can be made on the two principal issues as also other outstanding bilateral matters. There is broad convergence on a Kashmir deal. New Delhi has rightly reopened talks with Kashmiris; it must also reopen talks with Islamabad on the future of Kashmir, whether in a 'back' or more public channel. The two countries should in the meantime pluck the low-hanging fruit: Siachen, Sir Creek and Tulbul/Wular. The late J N Dixit recorded that in 1993 the two countries were ready to sign agreements on all three disputes. Agreements here will strengthen Islamabad domestically and have a positive impact on Pakistani opinion.
The prime minister has shown that his instincts are right on many aspects of domestic and foreign policy and that he has the tactical acumen and will to carry the day. Under his leadership, New Delhi must take the initiative on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The policy articulated here is not without risk and danger, but it is a more realistic policy than the present US, Pakistani and Indian course on the region.
A comment: Would you co-operate with a mere regional power if you feel you have beaten two superpowers?
http://acorn.nationalinterest.in/
Kanti Bajpai is one of India's best academic experts on international relations—and one who this blog holds in high regard. His op-ed in the Times of India today (linkthanks Raja Karthikeya Gundu), however, overlooks something big.
Arguing that India must stop relying on the United States to stabilise Afghanistan and "discipline Pakistan" he calls for "Indian policy on Afghanistan must move towards a regional understanding that includes in the first instance Pakistan and perhaps Iran."
The fundamental compact between India and Pakistan must be of a simple, robust nature: that both countries have legitimate interests in Afghanistan. India has an interest in overall stability and the protection of northern, non-Pashtun Afghans as well as various other minorities including Sikhs and Hindus. Pakistan also has an interest in the country's stability and in the Pashtuns finding their rightful place in any future government of Afghanistan. India and Pakistan could agree therefore that India will continue to provide developmental aid and that Pakistan will have influence on political developments, the goal of both countries being to help evolve a lasting, just and inclusive political system…In addition, India must resume talks with Pakistan. [TOI]
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that either the Pakistani military-jihadi establishment will either play along or that it will cease to exist. And that is a big assumption. Moreover, the assumption is all the more unlikely to hold specifically in the event Dr Bajpai's prediction of a US pullout by 2012 comes about.
Why so? First, the Pakistani military-jihadi complex will perceive a US withdrawal as its second victory over a superpower. This will strengthen its hand in Pakistan's domestic politics and further encourage it to escalate the proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir. Indeed, triumph in Afghanistan will make the military-jihadi complex less likely to engage in meaningful dialogue with India over bilateral issues.
Second, once Western troops leave, and a pro-Pakistan regime gains control, why would the Pakistani military establishment want to permit Indian developmental aid? Isn't it far more likely that it will approach China and Saudi Arabia for financial assistance, which the latter would readily provide?
If the Indian government goes ahead with Dr Bajpai's recommendations before dismantling the Pakistani military-jihadi complex, it is likely to 'lose' Afghanistan to Pakistan & China.
The idea of India attempting to reach a regional understanding with Pakistan and Iran is a good one. It is exactly what the Indian government ought to do—right after the military-jihadi complex has been destroyed.
Update: Dr Bajpai responds:
Thank you for your thoughts on my piece.
I think Churchill said that democracy was the worst system except for all the others. A regional compact on Afghanistan is the worst alternative except for all the others.
The Vietnamese beat two superpowers as well—the French and the US. But it has not exactly got them very far.
The real issue is: what is most likely to give us a shot at stability and a long-term solution? The US cannot be part of a long-term solution because it is not in the region.
The reason that Pakistan might come to terms with India on it is that New Delhi is not likely this time to just pull out of Afghanistan in terms of its diplomatic and developmental presence. Pakistan cannot therefore count on having its way in Afghanistan. Also, a new Afghanistan, at some point, even if it dominated by the Taliban, will be a problem for Islamabad—on territory, on Islam.
The Islamic-jehadi complex in Pakistan has to be wrestled to the ground by the Pakistanis. The US will not be able to degrade it. As long as the Americans are in Afghanistan, there is not much chance that more moderate Pakistanis–in the ISI, in the rest of the Army, in civil society, in the political parties–will be able to root out the jehadis.
The Chinese are going to muscle in on Afghanistan sooner or later anyway. They are already putting in money. The Chinese are the next superpower, and they certainly cannot be kept out of Afghanistan if they don't want to stay out. This is something we in India will have to accept. The Chinese are going to be everywhere—from Bhutan and Nepal to Bangladesh and Burma, from the Maldives to Sri Lanka. Their power is going to outstrip ours by some degrees for the next 35 years. They will find Afghanistan a difficult place to operate but given their fears about Xinjiang they will keep their involvement fairly limited, hoping that Pakistan will do the job.
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