Improve military ties with Dhaka New Delhi will be welcoming Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina as its first State guest of this decade. Overcoming formidable hurdles, Sheikh Hasina's Awami League swept the December 2008 polls, winning 230 seats and securing a two-thirds parliamentary majority. Ever since she was sworn in, Sheikh Hasina has not only faced challenges from right-wing parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) of Khaleda Zia, but also the Pakistani-Saudi assisted fundamentalists of the Jamat- e -Islami (JeI), which unashamedly backed the occupying Pakistan Army during the 1971 freedom struggle. This grouping was reinforced by radical Islamic groups like the Jamat-ul-Mujahideen (JMB) and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami, which also enjoy Pakistani/Saudi backing. All these groups are united in undermining the efforts to improve relations with India. The greatest challenge that Sheikh Hasina overcame in her first year was the mutiny by the Bangladesh Rifles, which erupted on February 25, 2008, at its headquarters in Pikhana and soon spread across the country, to 12 other locations. The mutineers killed their chief, Major-General Shakil Ahmed, and his wife and dozens of others. Sheikh Hasina acted deftly in getting a large number of the mutineers to surrender and then permitted the army to crackdown using tanks and heavy weapons. While the mutineers had some genuine grievances, it soon became apparent that outsiders from the BNP and JeI were actively involved in fomenting the unrest. Complementing the crackdown by Sheikh Hasina's government on the mutineers was immediate and effective action by India, which sealed its borders with Bangladesh and forced back mutineers, attempting to cross over. The depth of anger felt at senior levels of the Bangladesh Army was reflected when the new Director-General of the BDR, Major-General Moinul Islam, referred to the mutiny as the "most heinous crime". He added that what transpired reminded him of "the liberation war of 1971". Referring clearly to Pakistan and its friends in the BNP and the JeI, Major-General Islam noted that "external enemies still exist" for Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina has reciprocated India's assistance, by acting to force the surrender of ULFA leader Arabindo Rajkhowa, its deputy military commander Raju Barua and others operating from safe havens in Bangladesh. It has been made clear to North-Eastern separatist groups that they could not consider Bangladesh a safe haven. She has also cracked down on the JMB and the Lashkar-e-Toiba and acted to pre-empt cross-border attacks on India and on the Indian High Commission in Dhaka. Sheikh Hasina is now facing domestic criticism spearheaded by the BNP and the JeI for allegedly having sold out to India. She was earlier the target of assassination attempts by pro-BNP/JeI Islamists during her years in the opposition. She will have to show that relations with India are producing tangible benefits to Bangladesh and that long-pending differences are moving towards resolution. Under the 1974 Indira-Mujib agreement, India is required to return around 111 enclaves to Bangladesh and in return get 51 enclaves from Bangladesh. It took us 18 years to lease a small corridor of land near Tin Bigha to Bangladesh, which we were required to do, under the 1974 agreement. Barely 6.5 kilometres out of the 4096 kilometre land border remains undemarcated. Measures need to be agreed upon that the border is expeditiously demarcated. Moreover, a political consensus needs to be built in West Bengal, to resolve the remaining pending issues of "adverse possessions" and enclaves, which have bedevilled relations through the past four decades. If New Delhi could get the assistance of then West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu in the 1990s, to resolve the vexed Farakka issue, there is no reason why we cannot take a similar initiative soon to deal with the boundary issue. There was substantial progress achieved in moving forward on a number of issues when Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dipu Muni visited India in September 2008. The most crucial issue for India is "connectivity," which would involve developing road, rail and river communication facilities in Bangladesh, for promoting access to our north-eastern states. India should express its readiness to invest in the development of Chittagong and Mongia ports in Bangladesh and agree to provide access for goods from Nepal and Bhutan to these ports. This could be coupled with approaches to Bhutan for a joint study of projects to augment river water flows. India would also be well advised to provide assistance soon for the Akhaura-Agartala rail link and undertake action to meet Bangladesh's immediate energy requirements, by sale of 300 MW of electrical power. Indian investment in the development of road, rail and port infrastructure in Bangladesh should be seen in Dhaka to be mutually beneficial. While Bangladesh has agreed to provide access to Ashuganj Port for the Palatana Power Project in Tripura, there should be a conscious effort to counter propaganda by the BNP against the construction of the Tipaimukh Dam across the Barak river in Assam. Contrary to malicious propaganda by Khaleda Zia and her cohorts, even experts in Bangladesh agree that this project will actually help in flood control, in augmenting lean season flows and assist in de-silting within Bangladesh. The BNP propaganda is motivated, considering the fact that experts in Khaleda Zia's government, who were kept informed about the project in 2003 and 2005, raised no objections when the BNP was in office. Another emotive issue in Bangladesh is sharing of waters of Teesta river. Bangladesh has shown a measure of realism by agreeing to "Joint Hydrological Observations" so that future actions are taken on the basis of realities and not unfounded fears. We should be able to agree to mechanisms to address mutual concerns on this issue, as we did in resolving the Farakka tangle. Sections of the Bangladesh Army and its intelligence apparatus have been traditionally anti-Indian and supportive of the BNP and the JeI. There appears to have been some change in this mindset in the aftermath of the BDR mutiny. New Delhi would be well advised to strengthen military ties with Bangladesh and encourage a greater participation of the Bangladesh military in international peace keeping, which will encourage them to avoid Bonapartist ambitions. Past experience shows that the political mood in Bangladesh can be volatile and one could well see a return to the BNP order if Sheikh Hasina falters and cannot fulfil the people's growing aspirations. India should demonstrate that while it will assist in the progress and welfare of the people of Bangladesh, rulers in that country who show sensitivity for Indian concerns can and will receive Indian goodwill in return. |
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