Islamist Movements and the Political Challenge: An
Alternate Perspective
By Yoginder Sikand
Introduction
While on a recent visit to Delhi, I chanced upon an
Urdu book whose title, Tehrik-i-Islami Ko Darpesh
Siyasi Challenge ('The Political Challenges Before
the Islamic Movement'), immediately attracted my
attention. Written originally in Arabic by a leading
Arab Islamist ideologue, Mustafa Muhammad Tahan, it
is, as I discovered as I leafed through it, an
interesting appeal for redefining and reappraising
Islamist politics. Given the ongoing debates about
Islamist politics, I felt that Tahan's views on the
subject needed to be more widely known. Hence, I
undertook to summarise the basic arguments of the book
in the form of this article.
Born in Lebanon in 1938, Tahan is a post-graduate in
chemical engineering from the University of Istanbul,
Turkey, where he played an important role in the
Turkish Islamic students' movement. He was also one
of the founders of the International Islamic
Federation of Students' Organisations (IIFSO), set up
in 1969, being appointed as its General-Secretary in
1980. Editor of a bi-lingual English and Arabic
magazine, Tahan has authored numerous books on the
Islamic movements in Arabic, many of which have been
translated into other languages.
The Urdu version of Tahan's Arabic text
on Islamist politics, translated by Dr. Muhammad Sami
Akhtar of the Department of Arabic, Aligarh Muslim
University, and published in 1998 by Hilal
Publications, Aligarh, extends to almost two hundred
pages. Tahan sees the Islamist movement as a global
phenomenon, speaking of it in the singular. This, of
course, is not quite the case. Yet, he is not
unmindful of the diversity of perspectives and
policies within the broader Islamist camp itself, and
it is precisely to these inner divergences that much
of his attention is devoted.
Although Islamist groups share common ideological
moorings, basing themselves on the Quran and the
Traditions or Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, and, for
the most part, advocate the cause of an Islamic state
based on the Islamic law (shariat), differences have
emerged among them over various issues related to
policies and 'methods of working. Of particular
importance here are matters related to the use of
violence, the question of women and the rights of
minorities. The chief merit of Tahan's book is that
rather than ignoring these contentious issues or
glossing them away, it deals with them head-on, not
hesitating to critique certain groups for what are
seen as serious lapses on their part.
I am aware of the considerable differences of views
within what Tahan calls the global Islamic movement,
and would perhaps not agree with him on referring to
it as one. However, since the intention here is to
present Tahan's views rather than to critique them, I
have chosen to describe the phenomenon as he does.
*
In his close involvement with the Islamic movement,
first in Turkey, and then as a functionary of the
International Islamic Federation of Students'
Organisations, Tahan, he tells us in the introductory
chapter of his book, was confronted with several
questions of crucial import, which, he felt, had not
been given the attention they deserve by Islamist
ideologues. His book, he says, was written with the
primary purpose of addressing some of these issues, to
bring about more clarity in Islamist circles. The
questions that this book deals with are as follows:
1. Does Islam allow for the existence of political
parties?
2. Is preaching (dawat-o-irshad) the only path that
can lead to
peace for the Muslim community (ummah)?
3. Is it that the political path, on the other hand,
can lead only to division and strife and cause the
ummah to stray away from God?
4. Does Islam allow for Muslims to adopt the
parliamentary path, given that those who adopt this
path have to take an oath on the Constitution and law
of their country, which are considered by some to be
'un-Islamic'?
5. Is it possible to co-operate with secular forces
and systems that do not abide by the Islamic law?
6. Is it possible to participate in the governance of
a country in cooperation with secular political
parties?
In this regard, Tahan mentions that certain leading
Islamist ideologues are of the opinion that setting up
of political parties is not an appropriate means for
Islamic groups to strive to acquire political control.
In their view, the path that the Holy Prophet Muhammad
had adopted was that of 'invitation' (dawat),
'preaching' (irshad) and 'revolution' (inqilab).
However, Tahan notes, there are many other opinions on
the subject. Some assert that Islam forbids the
setting up of political parties. Others believe that
the entire world today is an 'abode of war' (dar-ul
harb). Yet others insist that violence can have no
place. Each group accuses the other of misinterpreting
Islam, and so engages in a war of fatwas against the
rest.
Tahan laments this sorry state of affairs, and points
to the futility of the dissensions among the various
Muslim groups. He says that the early Muslims had
adopted the path of 'invitation' and 'preaching', of
'oneness' and 'unity', but today the community is torn
by mutual recriminations and internecine conflict. In
this context, he pleads for a renewal in and
reawakening of the community as a task that urgently
needs to be undertaken.
Tahan locates the growing inner conflict in Muslim
activist ranks to the 1950s and '60s in the context of
the growth of other competing ideologies such as
Secularism, Liberalism, Marxism and Nationalism, on
the one hand, and what he calls the 'intellectual
stagnation' in Muslim ranks, on the other. To begin
with, he says, these various ideologies competed with
each other and with Islam in a 'free, civilised and
progressive' manner, but the situation drastically
changed when military coups occurred in many Arab and
Muslim countries and harsh dictatorships replaced the
earlier regimes. Political parties were banned and all
democratic rights were seriously curtailed. This
situation created a wave of fear and terror among the
masses. At this time, says Tahan, it was only the
Islamist groups which mobilized popular opposition to
the regimes in power. As more people began being
attracted to Islamist groups, Tahan writes, other
forces began an earnest attempt to discredit them. He
says that it is in this context that the growth of
'extremism' (intiha pasandi) among certain Islamist
groups must be understood. He sees this development as
a 'conspiracy' hatched by forces inimical to the
Islamic cause.
The aim of his book, says Tahan, is to discuss the
many challenges that contemporary Islamist movements
are face-to-face with. He divides these into the
following categories:
1. The Political Challenge
Tahan cautions Islamic activists that this challenge
is immense and must be clearly and seriously
considered. 'Without fully understanding the political
context', Tahan says, 'Islamic groups cannot attain
their goals'.
2. The Democratic Challenge
This centres on issues such as human rights, freedom,
political factionalism, democratic elections,
political parties, political alliances and the role of
women in political affairs. Tahan notes that these
issues have not been properly thought out by Islamic
scholars, who, he says, have little acquaintance with
social realities. Such important issues, he writes,
need to be carefully understood in the light of
'wisdom' (hikmat), the teachings of religion and
knowledge of the affairs of the contemporary world.
This requires 'knowledge' as well as awareness of
'truth', 'pragmatism' and understanding of the
dictates of the shariat. Unfortunately, he says, many
Islamists have failed to appreciate this and so have
'fallen victim to extremism', so much so that 'this
has given force to the argument of the anti-Islamic
forces that Islam and terrorism are synonymous'.
3. The Extremist Challenge
Tahan bitterly critiques those who 'claim to be lovers
of Islam' but who at the same time insist that
'violent extremism' is an integral part of the Islamic
Call, arguing that Islam allows for the spilling of
innocent blood, which they label a jihad. He says that
this argument is completely 'false', and that it has
'rendered irreparable damage' to the Islamist
movements, more so, in fact, than the efforts of the
'anti-Islamic' forces.
Tahan also mentions in passing the other challenges
that he sees Islamist groups today having to contend
with, including Western imperialism, growing
regionalism and racial, sectarian and ethnic conflicts
and the problem of ethnic and religious minorities.
Islamist movements are active today in many countries,
notes Tahan. Some of them are local or regional in
their scope, while others are global. Despite their
common agenda, there appears to be a lack of
understanding among many of them. While some do work
in tandem with similar groups, others believe that
they alone are on the 'true path' and go to the extent
of branding others as 'disbelievers' (kafir).
At the outset, Tahan clearly says that he does not
wish to get involved in this controversy, for, he
says, he believes that the 'global Islamic movement'
is broad enough to include 'all individuals and groups
working for the cause of Islam'. He describes it as
encompassing all groups which are local, regional as
well as international, every government agency working
for spreading Islamic awareness, organisations
involved in providing social services to Muslims,
Islamic political parties, Islamic students' movements
and Sufi groups engaged in Islamic missionary work. It
is not linked to any particular school of thought
(maslak), nor is it the 'monopoly' of any particular
community, sect or group.
In this context, Tahan forcefully rebuts the claims of
some Islamic groups that they alone are true followers
of Islam and are thus the only true representatives of
the Muslims. He notes with dismay the fact that 'by
and large' the mutual relations between different
Islamic groups are characterised by conflict and
suspicion. Tahan pleads for these groups to 'open
their hearts wide to one another'. He sees the root
cause of this conflict in 'groupism' (asabiyyat) and
'prejudice', which can only be overcome through
good-will and fear of God. He points out that
differences between different groups on minor matters
of the interpretation of Islam (furui masail) are but
natural, while they all agree on the basic elements of
the faith. Differences on minor matters, he argues,
should in no way come in the way of reaching a broader
unity and understanding between different Muslim
groups, for all Muslims are united by a common faith
in Islam. When differences arise they need to be
sorted out through discussion and dialogue in an
environment of 'sincerity, brotherhood and love'. The
various Islamic groups should try to sort out their
differences, not magnify them, and should not let
divergences on matters of jurisprudence (fiqh) and
sect lead to internecine conflict.
Tahan says that divergences on jurisprudential
affairs are 'natural', but these should not be used as
a pretext to spread hatred and conflict or spawn new
sects on this basis. Islam, he says, allows for
freedom of thought and 'holds knowledge and those who
possess it in the highest esteem'. Hence, he argues,
all differences should be settled on the basis of a
free exchange of ideas. He says that differences may
continue to exist even after that, but, despite this,
the various Islamic groups should remain united on the
basis of their common aims.
In this regard, Tahan warns Islamic activists that
they must desist from hurling accusations and false
allegations against each other. Issuing fatwas of
disbelief against each other must be strongly
resisted, for, Tahan says, Islamic activists are
'missionaries' (dais), not judges (qazis)'. Islamic
groups must reform their attitudes and policies
vis-a-vis each other and appreciate the fact that all
groups and individuals working for the progress and
spread of Islam have their legitimate space. They must
also begin to cooperate with one another on maters of
mutual concern. For this purpose, they must form a
common platform and a common advisory body (shura),
through which important issues concerning Muslims can
be debated, after which common policies can be adopted
by them all. In the absence of such consensual means,
says Tahan, it is impossible for the Islamic groups to
attend the objectives that they are working for.
The Aims of the Islamist Movement
Most contemporary Islamist movements, notes Tahan,
came into existence in the early twentieth century,
particularly after the abolition of the Ottoman
Caliphate in 1924, in place of which a secular,
Westernising regime came to power in Turkey. At this
time, Western imperialist powers were effectively in
control of almost all Muslim and Arab lands, and in
order to consolidate their rule, they aggressively
promoted a process of Westernisation, particularly
through the educational system. Students from these
countries went for their higher education to Western
countries, where deeply influenced by such ideologies
as Secularism, Liberalism and Socialism. On their
return home, they ardently propagated the view that
the development of their countries was possible only
through a complete adoption of Western culture and by
abandoning Islam. It was in this context and as a
response to this challenge that the contemporary
Islamic movement emerged, Tahan writes.
One of the basic aims of Islamist movements, Tahan
says, is to restore to the Muslims their lost
confidence and to instill in them a love for and pride
in Islam and a spirit of activist dedication to the
Islamic cause, for which they would be ready to
sacrifice their all. Another principal objective of
the Islamist movements, as they emerged in the 1950s,
was to liberate Muslim lands from Western imperialism.
Such groups thus played an important role in
liberation struggles against European colonial powers
in Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Nigeria, Palestine, Syria,
Iraq, Indonesia, etc..
The Political Challenge
Tahan notes that among the various Islamic groups
active in the world today, there are some which
completely shun political involvement as 'the snare of
the devil', and focus, instead, simply on personal
piety. He sees this as a form of escapism which has no
sanction in Islam, and as only helping strengthen
those forces that stand to gain from the status quo,
such as ruling elites in Muslim countries and their
Western masters. Islam, says Tahan, covers every
aspect of a believer's personal as well as social
life, and this includes politics as well. There is no
contradiction between worship (ibadat) and politics
(siyasat)' in Islam, so he argues.
Given this understanding of Islam as a comprehensive
or total way of life, it was but natural that Islamist
movements would
face fierce opposition from ruling regimes as well as
conservative religious elements. While the former
tried to
suppress them by force, the latter, says Tahan,
attempted to
counter their growing influence by hurling accusations
against
and fuelling suspicions about them. In this way, the
conservative religious establishment was used by the
ruling regimes to
at bolster their authority and to stave off the
challenge that the
Islamist movements posed at the political level.
To be actively involved in political affairs, as
Islamist movements
are, says Tahan, in no way means that the cultural
intellectual and spiritual dimensions of the Islam are
ignored. Rather, he says, all these are to be found in
right measure in what he calls a 'balanced Islamic
movement activist'. In other
words, the Islamic agenda is not, as some allege,
simply a means
to grab political power in the name of religion. A
true Muslim
is necessarily political, says Tahan, for he must have
a clear
understanding of the problems of the Muslim community
and
must constantly be concerned with solving them.
Many books have been written on the issue of Islam and
politics, but, Tahan notes, some basic issues of
contemporary concern are yet to be explored in these
writings. He says that one reason for this is that
Muslim scholars have committed the' mistake of 'going
beyond the limit' in searching for parallels in Muslim
history, and have failed to mould those past parallels
and principles in the light of the present-day
context. 'So sacrosanct have they considered past
thinking that they want to recreate that in its
entirety today", without attempting to refashion that
thought in the light of the contemporary situation. In
this way, he says, many Islamist ideologues have
failed to present the Islam as a political system
capable of meeting the challenges of changing times
and conditions. What is needed, he says, is to draw'
inspiration from the past, but, at the same time, to
view the models of the past in their own specific
historical contexts. The inspiration from the past
must be 'balanced with a realistic understanding of
present-day realities' in order to fashion a political
system that can respond to changing conditions 'on the
basis of debate, research, renewal and reform', he
stresses.
The Islamic political system that Tahan proposes is
based
on freedom, equality, justice and respect for the rule
of law. The
responsibility of the ruler is to implement the laws
of Allah. He
is answerable to the Muslim community, which has the
right to
guide him if he goes astray or even to remove or
replace him if
he fails to fulfill his responsibilities. The ruler is
assisted by a
council of advisors. Political parties, including
organised
opposition parties, would be allowed to exist and
function,
freedom of expression and political rights for all
would be
guaranteed and the state's attitude towards issues
like women's
rights, the distribution of wealth, economic policies,
etc., would be
clearly spelled out.
In this regard, Tahan says that there are some crucial
questions that Islamic scholars must urgently seek to
grapple with:
1. What is the definite structure of the Islamic
political
system?
2. What are its unique characteristics that set it
apart from
other political systems?
3. To what degree do other political systems share
features
in common with that of Islam?
4. Can the Islamic political system
take advantage of human experience?
5. What is the role of the consultative body in
the-Islamic political system?
6. What role does shura play in the election of the
ruler and in solving the problems of the Muslim
community?
7. What conditions apply to the ruler of the Islamic
state?
8. How is he chosen?
9. Will he be elected for life or can he also be
removed from office?
10. What are his rights and responsibilities?
11. What are the foundations of governance and
political activity in the Islamic state?
12. What is the relation between the judiciary,
executive and the ruler in the Islamic state?
13. How can a political culture be developed that will
enable
people to be 'politically trained' so as to develop a
comprehensive understanding of social and political
affairs?
14. How can a climate of freedom of expression,
constructive criticism
and dialogue be developed in order to bring into being
this
political culture?
The Islamic political system is based on 'politically
conscious' Muslims nurtured in an ideal political
culture, Tahan says. Islamic political consciousness,
he opines, is based on a deep understanding of
historical and contemporary events and situations,
critical insight and a passionate commitment to change
conditions, win freedom and solve the many problems
that afflict society.
The Challenge of Democracy
Democracy, notes Tahan, has been denigrated and
condemned in much Islamist literature in recent times.
It is presented as a system wherein it is the people
themselves who make their own laws, while in Islam the
actual law-maker is God. Hence, several Islamist
activists forcefully argue that democracy is a 'kafir
system'.
Tahan seeks to critically examine this position,
without, he says, attempting to 'distort Islam' or to
promote Western thought or to project what others have
called as 'Islamic Democracy' or 'Islamic Liberalism'.
He writes that there are only two systems of
governance in the contemporary world: democracy and
dictatorship. In the former, human beings and
protection of their rights occupy a place of central
importance, while in dictatorships there is no such
consideration for the individual's rights. In such a
context, asks Tahan, what should the position of
Islamist activists be?
.
Tahan sees democracy, insofar as it champions basic
human rights, human freedom, parliamentary elections,
existence of opposition parties, freedom of dissent,
political participation of women, protection of and
equal rights and opportunities for religious and
ethnic minorities, the possibility of peaceful change
of governments and peaceful coexistence between
different political parties and communities, as
similar in many respects to Islam. Tahan's conception
of democracy sharply contrasts with the sort of
'democracy' that the West has sought to impose in
Muslim and other 'third-world countries. He bitterly
critiques the West for its hypocrisy on the issue of
democracy and human rights, seeing these as mere
slogans used to bolster Western hegemony over the rest
of the world. What happened to the West's claims to
championing democracy and freedom, he asks, when it
conquered lands in Asia and Africa and shed the blood
of millions in the name of its 'civilising mission'?
Can the West's protestations about democracy be at all
taken seriously when it spares no efforts to bolster
pro-Western dictatorial regimes in the Muslim world,
to crush all attempts at challenging such regimes, and
to defend Israel, which has forced an entire people
out of their own homeland? Where, he questions, were
the Western champions of Democracy when the election
results in Algeria, which brought the Islamic
opposition to power with a thumping majority, were
suddenly annulled by the country's military dictators?
Did not the West whole-heartedly support this, and
then go on to assist the Algerian authorities to crush
the Islamist movement with brutal force, resulting in
the tragic death of thousands of innocent people?
Tahan sees no contradiction between his understanding
of Islam and the basics of 'true democracy', as he
defines it. He sees the confusion about the relation
between the two as having much to do with the West's
apprehensions of its control over the Muslim world
being increasingly challenged through political
participation by Islamic groups. He writes that as
Islamic political parties began participating in
elections, as in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan,
Turkey and Tunisia, and rapidly grew in popularity and
strength, the West, fearful of its loosening
stranglehold on Muslim countries, began a propaganda
crusade against Islam, branding it as an enemy of
democracy, and, at the same time, promoted wrong,
world-renouncing interpretations of Islam that see
Islam as prohibiting Muslims from participating in
elections or even to 'think about politics'. How can
Islamic groups be seen as challenges to democracy in
the Muslim world, asks Tahan, when almost all the
governments in these countries which they are
struggling against are themselves brutal
anti-democratic dictatorships bolstered up by an
equally anti-democratic West? Most Islamist groups, he
notes, are themselves fighting for human rights and
political freedoms, which are the cornerstones of
democracy.
Since many Muslims want to be governed by Islam, says
Tahan, democracy demands that they be allowed to do so
and that Islamic political systems be established in
Muslim-majority countries where the majority of the
populace wants to live under an Islamic political
dispensation. In the light of this, he says there is
no contradiction between the Islamic movement and the
majoritarian rule principle that is the foundation of
democracy as it is generally defined. The concept of
shura or consultation is a central one in Islam, he
says, and it is a mechanism that allows for people's
participation in governance. The Quran, he notes,
enjoins upon Muslims to settle their affairs through
mutual consultation. The principle of shura is binding
on all, including even the head of the state and the
leaders of the Islamist movements. For this it is
essential that political parties, including the
opposition, be allowed to freely function.
Tahan then discusses in detail certain basic
principles of democracy and Islam to see where they
differ and where they
agree. Basic human rights, a cornerstone of democracy,
Tahan
says, are clearly spelled out in the Quran and the
Hadith,
the sayings of and reports about the Prophet Muhammad.
Islam upholds the dignity of Man as a creature of God.
The Quran repeatedly stresses that Muslims should
abide by the rules
of justice and piety, and refrain from evil and
oppression. Every
human being, irrespective of religion or ethnicity,
Tahan says, is
dear to God. God has granted all people the same basic
faculties
so that they can all play their role in the
construction and
development of society. Likewise, God has also given
all people
certain basic human rights, which are not a favour
bestowed on
them by any worldly ruler that can be snatched away at
will. Rather, these rights are inherent to human
beings and have been clearly laid
down in the Islamic shariat.
Tahan here reminds his readers that Quran insists
'There is no compulsion in religion'. This lays the
foundation for religious freedom, and in this way,
says Tahan, the religion and religious
susceptibilities of non-Muslims are protected. 'No
Muslim has the right to mock the religious beliefs or
laws of non-Muslims', he declares, adding that 'In
Islam every person qua human being is worthy of
respect'. A non-Muslim living in an 'Islamic system'
is 'under the protection of Islam', and so 'must be
given equal protection' unless he commits such a
heinous crime that merits the withdrawal of such
protection. As creatures of the one God and as
children of the same primordial parents, Adam and Eve,
all people, Tahan writes, deserve respect as human
beings, whichever religion they might happen to
follow. This principle of respect for life should
inspires Muslims to crusade 'against every oppression'
and to protect life, for to save one human life from
wanton killing is like saving the entire, humankind.
As the Quran says, the wrongful killing of just one
person is tantamount to killing the whole human race.
Islam calls for freedom of thought and for education
for all. On the economic front it calls for the
protection of the rights of the poor. In this regard,
the large-scale violations of human rights in many
Muslim countries, says Tahan, has nothing to do with
what he sees as normative Islam. To the contrary, it
owes itself to wrong interpretations of Islam or to
ignoring the commandments of Islam altogether.
Human Rights and the Islamic Movement
Given the centrality of human rights in Islam, Tahan
says that it is of 'urgent importance' that Islamist
groups clearly spell out their stand on the subject
and then act on those principles. Islamists, Tahan
insists, must extend freedom of thought and freedom to
enjoy human rights to all. No person, says Tahan, can
be denied his basic human rights simply because of his
beliefs or views or because he is a political
opponent. Islamic groups must under no circumstances
support dictatorial regimes that heap oppression on
the masses and resort to slaughtering their opponents.
An important question in this regard is the proper
attitude of the Islamic groups vis-a-vis other forces
who are also in the forefront of the struggle for the
promotion of human rights. Tahan mentions in this
context the instance of the. Prophet Muhammad, who
instructed some of the early Muslims of Mecca to seek
refuge from the persecution of the Quraish by
migrating to Christian Ethiopia, because the king of
Ethiopia, although not a Muslim, was a just ruler.
This suggests, he notes, that Muslims can indeed
cooperate with other people of goodwill in crusading
against oppression.
One of the most complex issues in the human rights
debate relating to Islam is the position of
non-Muslims in an 'Islamic state'. Tahan says that
there are clear instructions about the issue in the
Quran and in the Traditions of the Prophet. He refers
here to the pact that the Prophet signed with the
non-Muslims of Medina which formed an integral part of
the constitution of the first ever Islamic polity.
Under the terms of the pact, the non-Muslims were
entitled to full protection and were assured that they
would not face any harm. 'In the light of this', Tahan
writes, in an ideal 'Islamic state' non-Muslims and
Muslims both would 'enjoy the same citizens' rights'.
There would be no discrimination on the basis of
religion in social and political affairs. For, Tahan
says, the Quran itself explicitly lays down that
Muslims are to deal with justice with all, except for
the oppressors and tyrants. Allah, the Quran says,
'loves those who are just'.
Islam and freedom go together, Tahan asserts. Islam,
he goes on to add, supports religious and political
freedom, including freedom of thought.
Religious freedom in Islam is based on the Quranic
commandment,
There is no compulsion in religion'. Individual and
communities can only be really free, Tahan' says, when
they are free from external, military, political or
economic oppression. Islam calls for a fine balance
between personal freedoms and the rights of social
groups. Since freedom is so central to Islam, says
Tahan, no true Muslim can ever support a despot or a
dictator who has no concern for human rights.
Significantly, in this regard he laments the fact that
some Islamist groups have actually done that. Tahan
sternly warns Islamists against allying with dictators
who wish to use them to bolster their own fragile
legitimacy. Tahan considers the issue of people's
participation in governance to be a vital one, and one
which, he says, Islamist movements must seriously
examine and clarify their position on. They must, he
says, make it clear that they cannot under any
condition support dictatorial and repressive regimes.
Islamist groups must be concerned about the freedoms
of not just Muslims alone but of all people, says
Tahan. Writing at a time when apartheid was still
official policy in South Africa, he appeals to the
Muslims to support the struggle of the blacks there
for a just society, even though, as he notes, most
South African blacks
are non-Muslims. Muslims, he says, must speak out and
struggle against oppression irrespective of the
religion or ethnicity of the victims, for that is a
duty binding on them by Islam. This is why, he says,
that while the Jews were for centuries persecuted in
Christian Europe, they found peace and security in
Muslim lands.
Tahan contrasts the normative teachings of Islam on
human rights and freedom with the pathetic state of
affairs in much of the Muslim world today, where, he
notes, the masses are, for the most part, cruelly
denied many basic rights by regimes that are supported
by the West. Likewise, he regrets that some Islamist
groups do not believe that their opponents, too,
should be able to enjoy rights and freedoms. 'No
movement can genuinely claim to be an Islamic one
until it grants personal and social rights to all
irrespective of colour or race', he insists.
The Will of the People
One of the basic underlying principles of democracy is
'live and let live', says Tahan. This means that all
citizens of the state, irrespective of religion and
race, are entitled to equal treatment. Their views
must all be taken into account, and all political,
social, cultural and other problems must be settled
through a process of dialogue. In the political
sphere, this means that people subscribing to
different views are freely allowed to express them and
mobilise public support for them, enabling them to
influence policy-making through the politics of the
ballot-box. In Islam, the people have the right to
choose their own ruler, who is considered to be a mere
deputy (naib) of the people. Citizens can oversee and,
if necessary, critique his actions. In this sense, he
Tahan writes, Islam does not oppose the basics of
democracy, provided the political system is based on
the fundamental principles of Islam and its law, the
shariat. In such a system, all human rights are fully
protected, and the fundamental duty of the state is to
'promote virtue and combat vice'.
Tahan writes that some ulema oppose such a form of
rule as, they argue, it gives rise to 'groupism' and
'factionalism' and, in the process, undermines the
unity of the Muslim community. Elections, they say,
are based on each candidate hailing his own virtues
and denigrating his opponents. Contrarily, some other
ulema hold that such a system is indeed in conformity
with Islam, and argue that the fact that although such
a system may not have been in existence in its
entirety in the past, as long as it does not entail
anything that is clearly forbidden (haram) in Islam,
it is permissible. This system, they believe, is a
suitable way to implement the decisions of
consultation (shura), keep a watch on the ruler,
uphold human rights and basic freedoms, maintain the
stability of the polity and clamp down on terrorism.
Several advocates of this view believe that the
Islamist movements must attempt to mobilise public
opinion in their favour before acquiring political
power. In this way, they admit to the possibility of
cooperation with secular forces to attain their aims.
Separation Between Religion and Politics
In the dominant Western political discourse, religion
and politics are considered to be two completely
separate domains, and religion is treated as a purely
personal affair, having no bearing on political life.
How should Islamists relate to groups and individuals
who advocate such a position? Tahan writes that an
'Islamic state' must, of necessity, be based on
Islamic law, because Islam does not accept the
division between religion and politics. The Islamic
political system does not allow for laws to be passed
in violation of the shariat, but it does give the
people the right to choose their own ruler, someone
known for his honesty, piety and wisdom, whose
responsibility shall be to rule, for a fixed term, in
accordance with Islam, and in consultation with
members of the democratically elected consultative
body. This system provides guarantees for the freedom
of all non-Muslim minorities. Political differences
within the parameters laid down by the shariat, says
Tahan, are to be accepted as 'natural', and they can
be sorted out through peaceful dialogue. Thus, the
Islamic system accepts the existence of multiple
political parties free from control by the state,
provided they all accept the Islamic law as their
constitution. The system allows for political
competition between these parties and for the peaceful
transfer of power from one party to another through
free and fair elections. After all, says Tahan,
historically, Islam has accepted the existence of
several Muslim schools of jurisprudence and so
multiple political parties may be similarly accepted.
A system that clamps down on political parties and
stifles freedom, Tahan writes, 'is an oppressive
dictatorship', which 'must be stiffly opposed'. Many
Islamist movements, he says, are veering round to the
view that multiple political parties must be accepted
and that differences among them as regards programmes
and policies 'may actually be a blessing for the
community'. Multiplicity of political parties does not
mean that Islam allows for 'groupism' to flourish, as
the basic aim of such parties should be the service of
Islam and not the pursuit of personal or parochial
worldly interests. In this context, he notes, Islamist
groups in some countries have entered into agreements
with secular democratic parties in pursuit of common
ends, principally in their struggle against oppressive
regimes.
The issue of non-Muslim political parties is also one
that
Islamist groups must contend with. The 'Islamic
state', says Tahan,
allows for non-Muslim minorities full rights and
protection,
including the right to vote, to carry on with their
political
activities and to set up their own associations,
including political
parties. Tahan writes that Islam allows for Muslims to
cooperate
with non-Muslims for the welfare of the society at
large. He
adduces as an instance, in this regard, the example of
the
Prophet Muhammad, who headed a group, the
hulf-ul fuzul along with the non-Muslims of Mecca to
help the
oppressed and the poor.
Some 'extremists', Tahan notes, have condemned
parliamentary elections as un-Islamic, but they
represent only a fringe minority. Islam actually
insists that the views of the community must be taken
into account by the ruler through their elected
representatives. The representatives of the people
should not put themselves forward for election,
however. Only such persons who are trustworthy,
learned, experienced and pious Muslims with leadership
qualities are fit to be elected as people's
representatives. The election process must be governed
by basic Islamic morals and norms, and there should be
no room for false propaganda and bribery.
Several Islamist parties have, Tahan notes,
participated in, parliamentary elections, as in Egypt,
Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Kuwait, Yemen Sudan,
Malaysia and Pakistan. By taking part in the electoral
process, Islamist parties, he writes, will be, able to
keep a check on the ruling party, struggle for a
peaceful transfer of power, present the Islamic
message and programme to the public and strive to
uphold Islamic rulings and principles inside
Parliament. For this they can join hands with other,
even non-Islamic, parties for common ends. Islamic
parties are, he says, 'a. democratic force', and thus
must address themselves to the general public, and one
way to do so is by participating in elections.
Tahan notes that several Islamist groups insist that
there is no point in participating in elections held
under the auspices of an 'un-Islamic' regime on the
grounds that this would only further entrench the
existing system. They point to the recent examples of
Algeria and Turkey, where Islamist political parties
entered the electoral fray and were poised to win
impressive victories but were forcibly prevented from
coming to power by Western-backed regimes. Tahan
recognises a certain validity in these arguments, but
says that 'there is no other political course open to
us'. Terrorism as a way out of this impasse, he says,
is a 'destructive course', harmful for all, including
the army, the people and the Muslim community as a
whole.
Political Differences
The 'Islamic state', says Tahan, allows for all
citizens to freely express their views. In such a
situation it is but natural that differences will
arise. Since freedom, equality and justice are the
pillars of the Islamic order, the Islamic political
system must accept the existence of political
differences. Differences in matters of the detailed
interpretation and application of the minor details of
the Islamic laws (furui masail) are also but to be
expected. Differences among the ulema may emerge
because, being humans after all, they differ in their
powers of understanding of various issues. Factors
such as historical context also play a role in
conditioning such differences. Given this, says Tahan,
it is understandable that consensus may not be able to
be arrived at on all matters. Hence, such differences
must be accepted and accommodated, and should not
become the cause of conflict and prejudice.
Differences among the ulema on points of law can be
sought to be overcome through debate and dialogue in a
spirit of 'love' and 'understanding'. Many Islamist
groups have come to realise the need to respect and
tolerate such differences, Tahan writes.
Several Islamist movements, Tahan laments, have
attempted to forcibly suppress or even crush
differences of opinion, some of them even having
resorted to violence for this purpose. This, Tahan
says, is because they 'have not truly appreciated the
import of differences in their true spirit'. Early
Islamic history, on the other hand, provides numerous
examples of how Muslim leaders allowed differences of
opinion to be expressed. To accept the opinions of
others when they are proved correct, says Tahan, is 'a
civilized and Islamic principle', be it within the
home and family or in politics. Rebutting the charge
that this would encourage dissent and factionalism
within the Islamist movements themselves, he says that
the actual causes of 'groupism' within the movements
are 'egoism', the 'dictatorial mentality' and the
belief that no one but oneself or one's party
represents the truth.
Islamist movements, Tahan advises, must respect the
opinions of their members, allow them to freely and
fearlessly express their views, whether supportive or
critical, and take them into consultation.
Constructive criticism and respect for the views of
others, says Tahan, is a must for the progress of
these movements and of society at large. He alludes to
several instances in the life of the Prophet Muhammad
which clearly suggest that even among the early
Muslims there were times when different opinions were
articulated. The Prophet, he says, encouraged his
followers to freely express their views, even though
some differed from the others. In Islam, this respect
for different views is given practical expression in
the form of shura or consultation, through which the
ruler takes decisions guided by the advice of others,
he points out. Dissenting opinions are allowed to be
aired and a decision is finally arrived at after
weighing all views, in a search for the truth. The
ideal Muslim ruler is not a dictator who rules
according to his whims. Rather, he is guided by shura
in his responsibility of implementing the rulings of
the shariat. Muslims are to follow their ruler only
insofar as he rules by the shariat, but not if he
transgress it.
Blind following of the leader is sternly condemned in
Islam, says Tahan. Rather, such obedience should be
based on careful analysis, understanding and critical
thinking. Obedience does not mean that the people
cannot question the actions of their ruler. Tahan
criticises those Islamist activists who, in the name
of discipline and obedience, have resorted to
'enormous crimes' and 'destructive actions'. He argues
forcefully for the need for respecting differences and
inner democracy within Islamist movements. This
tolerance for different opinions, says Tahan, extends
even to non-Islamic groups, who, in an Islamic state,
are allowed to express their position, provided this
is done peacefully and without in any way challenging
the Islamic law. By thus accommodating differences,
Islamist movements can pave the way for the
establishment of a just political system, Tahan
contends.
Acquisition of Political Power
The context for the emergence of contemporary Islamic
movements was provided by the collapse of the Ottoman
Caliphate in 1924 and Western imperialistic control
over almost the entire Muslim world. Islamic movements
emerged in various countries in Asia and Africa,
seeking to liberate them from colonial rule and
establish states ruled according to Islamic law. Some
such movements chose to adopt peaceful preaching as a
means to mould and build up public opinion in their
favour and to then acquire political power, while
others stressed that power should be immediately
acquired at all costs, even through resorting to
violent means, seeing Western-style democracy as a
hollow sham designed to protect the interests of a
small ruling class. By resorting to indiscriminate
violence, Tahan notes, these groups have not only
inflicted grave damage to the people but have also
worked against their own long-term interests. Allying
themselves with dictatorial regimes, or being inspired
by their example, some groups styling themselves as
'Islamic', he notes, 'turned to supporting the
oppression of the people in the name of Revolution'.
Armed insurrections generally cause much avoidable
loss of life and suffering on a mass scale, and in
this way, Tahan writes, 'are not much different from
military take-overs'.
Tahan is critical of some 'Islamic' groups who, in
their quest for power, have resorted to extremism and
terrorism in the name of jihad. This is no jihad,
however, says Tahan, and in no way is it a service to
Islam, either. On the contrary, it has given Islam a
bad name, with Islam being sought to be equated with
terror by those opposed to it. It has strengthened the
opponents of the Islamists, and has given ruling
regimes an excuse to clamp down on Islam in the name
of weeding out 'terrorism'. Hence, Tahan advises,
Islamic groups must clearly announce that they have no
link whatsoever with indiscriminate violence and the
targeting of innocent people. To kill one innocent
person, says the Quran, is tantamount to killing the
entire human race, he tells his readers. Violence may,
however, be resorted to, he says, in the struggle
against oppressive regimes, when other means have been
explored and have failed and if the political system
forcibly denies any space to Islamic groups to
function. Tahan here warns against the violence
descending into indiscriminate killing of innocents or
even into a war between different contending Islamic
groups attempting to settle their scores, as in the
case of Algeria, Syria and Afghanistan, where, he
says, because of the continued violence, 'the words
jihad and mujahidin have caused humanity to hang its
head in shame'. This has greatly weakened the Islamic
movements, as a result of the loss in this spate of
violence of thousands of Islamist cadres and by
discrediting the movements in the eyes of many. It has
also resulted in wide-scale destruction of property.
While Tahan insists that Islamic groups must continue
to seek to acquire political power, he argues that the
path forward is not that of armed revolt or terror and
indiscriminate killing, but of democratic means of
persuasion and preaching, which, he says, are in
harmony with the spirit and teachings of Islam. This
entails building up Muslims of 'genuine Islamic
character', he says. Change must begin with the
individual, strengthening his or her faith and
commitment to Islam, for, as the Quran says, God does
not change the conditions of a people until they begin
to change themselves. From the home the movement
progresses to society at large, and gradually the
field is prepared for it to gather such public support
as to enable it to acquire power without resort to
violence.
In the process, Islamist movements might also need to
enter into cooperation with other opposition parties,
participate in elections, or share power with other
parties in a ruling coalition. Care must be taken that
all means that are adopted are fully legal. True,
Tahan says, this path is a long one and entails great
effort, but it is the only way to reach the goal with
the least possible loss. He quotes in this regard Syed
Abul Ala Maududi of the Jamaat-i-Islami as saying, 'If
the reigns of the army were put in my hands, I would
use them to prevent an armed revolution'. Today, says
Tahan, most Islamist groups have come to the
conclusion that the path to acquiring political power
is not through indiscriminate violence or armed
insurrection or terror but through peaceful means of
education, persuasion and using democratic and legal
channels of building public support. Islamic rule
cannot be imposed by force. Rather, it must be based
on the willing consent of the people, and this can
only happen through preaching and by convincing people
about the Islamic programme. This path to political
power is, however, a demanding one, Tahan recognises.
Often, even Islamic groups who abide by legal means
and emerge victorious in elections are ruthlessly
denied power by ruling regimes backed by the West.
The issue of participating in coalition ministries is
one that has caused great debate in Islamist circles,
with widely differing opinion being expressed on the
matter. In several countries, Islamic parties have
shared power in coalition governments with secular
parties, from the both the left as well as the right,
and have also joined hands with them in the struggle
against dictatorial and oppressive regimes. Some
Islamic groups have condemned this as 'un-Islamic'.
Tahan, on the other hand, remarks that it would be
'opposed to the practical spirit of Islam' for the
Islamic movement to remain aloof from other forces and
refuse to dialogue with them. 'Extremism', he says,
'will only render the movement hollow from within and
lead it far from its goals'. Islamist groups might
actually find it in their own interests as well as
that of the Muslims at large to enter into coalitions
with other forces and groups that do not necessarily
share their goals. However, they must always keep in
mind the fact that acquisition of power for its own
sake is not their objective, and they must not
compromise on their principles and ideology, the
interests of the people and human rights and freedoms
in the process. It is not appropriate for them, says
Tahan, to adopt any means that are not democratic and
legal in their attempt to acquire power. Before
joining a coalition with other forces they must
carefully examine the prevailing situation and
convince themselves that by doing so they will be
better able to serve the cause of Islam and of the
Muslim community than by remaining in the opposition.
Tahan refers to the Prophetic example to buttress his
case for the possibility of Islamist groups to enter
into political agreements with other forces. He says a
close examination of the life of the Prophet Muhammad
clearly suggests that the early Muslims 'entered into
agreements with others, keeping in mind the prevailing
circumstances'. Thus, when in Mecca, the Prophet
entered into an agreement with his uncle, Abu Talib,
who was not a Muslim, and who granted him protection
from the unbelieving Quraish of Mecca. Faced as the
early Muslims were with fierce opposition from the
Quraish, he instructed some of his disciples to
migrate to Christian-ruled Ethiopia, because, he said,
the king of that country was just. In Medina, where
the Prophet established the first Islamic state, he
cemented a pact with the Jews and polytheists of the
town, according to which the rights of all parties,
Muslims as well as non-Muslims, were clearly spelled
out, allowing for them to live in harmony with each
other. In order to further strengthen the Islamic
state and stave off attacks on it, the Prophet signed
no-war pacts with several non-Muslim tribes living in
the vicinity of Medina, according to which they and
the Muslims were to come to the defence of each other
in case of external attack. Likewise, he entered into
an agreement with the non-Muslim Quraish of Mecca for
several years when he and his followers came to Mecca
to perform the umra. In the light of this, says Tahan,
Muslims, following the Prophet's example, can, indeed,
enter into pacts with others, provided this is in the
interests of Islam and does not go against its basic
principles and beliefs. It is in this perspective,
Tahan notes, that in several countries Islamic groups
have co-operated with other political groups, both on
the left as well as the right, because it was not
possible for them to achieve their goals on their own.
However, Tahan warns, under no circumstances should
Islamic groups ally themselves with forces of
oppression and those who 'wage war' against Islam,
because agreements with others can be entered into
only for the sake of Islam and for winning human
freedom. 'Islam and oppression', Tahan says, can never
go together, and so 'there can never be any unity
between the slaves of Allah and the worshippers of
oppression'. Agreements with others, in accordance
with the Prophetic example, can be undertaken only for
two reasons: either for the protection and promotion
of Islam or to protect Muslims from calamity. The
agreement between the Prophet and Abu Talib was
undertaken in order to enable the Prophet to carry on
with his preaching unhindered by the opposition of the
Quraish. His agreement with the Jews and polytheists
of Medina was motivated by a concern for the
protection of the rights of the inhabitants of the
city. Hence, inspired by the Prophetic example,
Islamic groups may enter into agreements with other
forces, if, after closely examining the prevailing
situation, they come to the conclusion that by doing
so they would be able to overcome certain obstacles in
the path of their achieving their goals. It is also
essential to ensure that by entering into such: an
agreement, no hurdles would be placed in the work of
preaching Islam, because that is the essential task of
the Islamic movement. For these agreements to be
successfully implemented, says Tahan, it is essential
for Muslims to be united, for the leadership of the
Islamic groups to be firm and strong and for their
activists to be well disciplined. It is the duty of
the leadership to explain to and convince the cadres
of the movement about the necessity and the conditions
of such agreements lest they begin to doubt their
Islamic validity.
Taking note of the fact that regimes in Muslim
countries allied to the West have consistently sought
to keep Islamic forces away from the citadels of
power, Tahan says that their claims to democracy are
hollow. When Islamic groups express their willingness
to enter the democratic political process by
participating in elections, the ruling elites, fearful
of power slipping out of their hands, voice the
concern that if these groups were voted to power they
would, once established, abolish democracy and
institute a dictatorship. In this way, Islamic groups
who have emerged clearly victorious in elections in
several Muslim countries, such as Algeria and Turkey,
have been brutally denied the right to assume power by
the ruling elites and their Western masters who
falsely claim to be ardent defenders of democracy.
Tahan opines that this question is one that merits
close examination by Islamic activists. He remarks
that some 'Islamic' groups have taken an unrealistic
stand in assuming that the masses are 'full Muslims'
and all that is needed is the toppling of the rulers,
'whom they brand as kafirs, through resort to
violence, which they label as a jihad'. They believe
that there is simply no possibility or scope for
reform within the other existing parties and
organisations, all of which they assume to have
deviated from Islam. In their passionate, yet
misplaced, zeal, they resort to terrorising people.
Tahan says that such acts inflict grave damage on
common people and only serve to give Islam a bad name.
The question of the transfer of power has not, says
Tahan, received the attention it deserves by
ideologues of Islamic movements. They sees themselves
as enforcing God's law and, therefore, for them to
give up power once they have acquired it would, so
they believe, be tantamount to working against their
very raison d'etre. Tahan recognises that there may
seem to be a contradiction here, between the Islamic
movements' insistence on democracy and seeking the
views of the people, on the one hand, and the refusal,
on the part of some sections of the movements, to give
up power once they attain it if the people so demand.
A way out of this seeming dilemma, he says, is the
position adopted by the Ikhwan-ul Muslimin in Egypt.
In a communique issued in March 1994, the Ikhwan
declared that, 'A logical consequence of our accepting
the existence of multiple political parties in an
Islamic society is that we affirm the possibility of a
transfer of power from one to the other, and this is
possible only through periodically-held elections'.
Tahan also quotes from a fatwa issued by the noted
Islamic scholar and activist, Shaikh Yusuf al-Qardawi,
who says that if an Islamic party is voted to power
but proves unable to keep its promises to the people
and fails to act on its party programmes, and,
consequently, loses the support of the people, it must
respect the people's opinion, admit its mistakes and
transfer power to those who enjoy the support of the
public. Thereafter, it must once again try to win the
people's support, albeit through legal means such as
preaching, so as to, once again, to come to power.
Women and Politics
The issue of the role of women in politics has
generated much debate within Islamist circles, and
Tahan devotes an entire chapter to this question. He
bitterly
critiques those who believe that Muslim women should
be restricted to
a virtual 'prison' from which they should emerge only
three times in their
entire lifetime: the first time, when they 'comes out
of the womb
of their mothers', the second time, when they 'enter
the house of
their husbands', and the third time, when they are
'taken to the
burial ground'. In this way, Tahan rues, these
'narrow-minded' people seek to
shackle women in chains, denying them the opportunity
to
meet each other, to express their views and to
participate in
political and community affairs. 'Such restrictions',
says Tahan,
'have no place in Islam'.
Tahan refers to the life of the Prophet Muhammad
to reinforce his assertion that women, too, should be
allowed to
play a role in the affairs of society at large. Thus,
he says that
when the Prophet received his first revelation from
God,
he was greatly fearful and told his wife, Hazrat
Khadijah, about
it. She comforted him, saying that God was with him.
When the
early Muslims, persecuted by the Quraish of Mecca,
migrated, first to Ethiopia and then to Medina, there
were
several women among them, and, says Tahan, they 'made
great
sacrifices'. Women, too, gave the oath of allegiance
(baiat) to the Prophet.
Muslim women at the time of the Prophet even
participated in wars, giving water and food to male
soldiers,
tending to their wounds and taking the bodies of
martyred
fighters back to Medina.
Muslim women have an important role to play in the
conduct of the consultative assembly which advises and
guides the ruler of an Islamic state, says Tahan, and
their advice must be taken into account. Women
performed this function at the time of the Prophet
himself, he argues. Women in Islam's early history
also played a part in the election of Caliphs. The
Quran clearly says that Muslim men and women are
'helpers of each other', 'enjoining the good and
forbidding the evil'. Islam, says Tahan, has provided
for an appropriate place for women and has granted her
rights. They have the right to education and, if
necessity demands, of employment and even the right to
participate in political affairs. This is why several
Islamist groups have been active among women as well,
with some of them setting up their own women's wings.
Commenting on the differences of opinion among
Islamist activists about the political rights of women
in an Islamic state, Tahan approvingly refers to a
communique issued by the Ikhwan-ul Muslimin of Egypt
in 1994, which, he says, 'has closed all doors for
doubt and debate' on the question. The communique
clearly states that Islam in no way forbids women from
participating in elections, for the Quran says:
'Believing men and believing women are helpers unto
each other. They enjoin what is good and forbid what
is evil'. Women have the right not only to vote for
electing members of the consultative committee
(majlis-i-shura) or the Parliament but also to become,
members of these bodies, and there is nothing in Islam
that prevents them from doing so. Further, Tahan
adds, 'If men and women can participate on an equal
footing in Parliamentary elections', they should
similarly 'cooperate with each other within the
Islamic movement, so that they can benefit from each
other's views'.
The Ikhwan's communique goes on to state that barring
the post of the head of state, women can be appointed
to all public posts. As far as women judges (qazis)
are concerned, Tahan notes that there is considerable
dispute among the ulema on the matter, but says that
the issue is one that requires the exercise of ijtihad
or reasoning based on Islamic principles, after taking
account the provisions of the shariat and the
interests of the community, because there is no clear
Quranic commandment on the issue. Given the rights
that Islam has provided for women in the political
domain, Tahan laments that most Islamic groups have
given hardly any representation to women in their
consultative assemblies and do not care to take their
opinions into account in administrative matters. If
women are denied their Islamic rights, Tahan warns,
the Islamic movements themselves cannot prosper.
Summing up his discussion of the various challenges
facing contemporary Islamist movements, Tahan says
that it is
not his intention to 'distort' Islam or it force it
into a 'Western'
mould. He is critical of efforts that have been made
to develop
what some have called 'Islamic liberalism' or 'Islamic
socialism',
for that, in his view, is a caricature of Islam made
to suit a
different political agenda. He notes that in the
contemporary
world there are only two systems that are in
force—democracy
and dictatorship. Democracy upholds human freedom and
rights, while dictatorship seeks to strangulate them.
In this
context, Tahan says, the Islamic movement has to make
its
position clear. He suggests that Islam shares much in
common
with democracy as he defines it. Democracy and Islam,
he says,
agree on the following: protection of human rights,
full freedom,
plebiscite, parliamentary elections, opposition
parties, protection of minorities, transfer of power
and women's
political rights.
Democracy, Tahan says, is a human invention, but it is
' a great success for the human mind'. Shura and
Democracy share much in common. He refers here to a
fatwa delivered by Shaikh Yusuf al-Qardawi in response
to a question asking whether democracy is incompatible
with Islam and is a form of disbelief (kufr) or
falsehood (munkar). Qardawi's reply was that it was
'unfortunate' that 'these issues were being mixed up',
as a result of which for many it 'becomes difficult to
distinguish between truth (haq) and falsehood
(batil)', which opens the door for the hurling of
fatwas of disbelief at others. He lamented that 'It is
simply amazing that some people outrightly condemn
democracy as kufr and batil, whereas they have no
knowledge at all about the truth of democracy'.
Tahan agrees entirely with Qardawi here, and says that
Islamic groups must have nothing whatsoever to do with
terrorism, for that is not only a violation of
democracy but is also against the against teachings
and spirit of Islam. Protecting innocent lives is a
fundamental tenet of Islam. Critiquing groups who have
resorted to terror in the name of jihad, he says that
such policies reflect a fundamental immaturity and a
poor understanding of the prevailing conditions on the
part of their leadership, which ultimately results in
a calamity for the society at large, for the Muslim
ummah as a whole and for the Islamic movements
themselves. Tahan expresses the hope that Islamic
activists would adopt a balanced policy, focus on
creating awareness of what he regards as the true
teachings of Islam, advocate justice and
righteousness, crusade against evils and play a
constructive role in the society, instead.
Tahan believes that extremism has today emerged as a
global problem, and he locates its principal cause in
the fact that its advocates believe that they possess
a monopoly over the truth and that, therefore, there
is no room for differences of opinion. They accuse all
others of being kafirs and of straying away from
Islam. Its most extreme manifestation is when usurping
the life and the wealth of others is declared to be
legal for them. Of the various forms of extremism,
says Tahan, the most dangerous is religious extremism.
In order to gain legitimacy for their stance,
religious extremists seek fatwas from 'corrupt' ulema
declaring others to be disbelievers, and then set
about killing them. It will clearly not do, Tahan
remarks, to dismiss extremism as simply a result of a
conspiracy by external forces to which the extremists
have fallen prey. There are other, internal causes
as well, including wrong beliefs and
interpretations of religion, poor training, weak and
incompetent leadership, and a lack of clearly-stated
goals.
In addition, says, Tahan, it is undeniable that the
policies of Western regimes have much to do with the
emergence of extremism in Muslim lands. The West,
mortally afraid of Islamic revivalism and the
challenge that it poses to its global hegemony, has
consistently sought to suppress Islamic movements in
the Muslim world. Yet, Tahan, says, there is scope for
constructive dialogue with the West. It is true that
historically the relations between the Islamic world
and Western Christendom have generally been hostile.
Furthermore, Islam has fundamental differences with
secularism and nationalism—the basic tenets of
contemporary Western political thought.
However, Tahan writes, Muslims must 'accept every
worthy thing, whatever its
origins'. 'Wisdom is the lost property of the
believer, wherever he may find it', Tahan says,
suggesting that Muslims must not be not averse
accepting anything worth
adopting from other cultures and peoples, including
the West. Nor does Islam forbid them from doing so.
Tahan's major complaint against the West is that it
sees the 'Third World' as its 'personal property'.
These countries are 'viewed simply as sources of raw
material and markets for its finished goods'. The
West 'loudly trumpets its claims to being the champion
of democracy and human rights, but itself denies these
rights to the people of the Third World'. The day the
West gives up its supercilious attitude towards the
rest and stops 'treating others as its slaves', Tahan
says, 'it shall face no problem at all from the
Muslims or any other community in living together with
them in harmony'.
In the context of West Asia, Tahan opines, the
combined Western and Israeli campaign against Islamic
groups, which is projected as a crusade against
'Islamic terrorism', is a cruel farce, for the
principal cause of the on-going turbulence in the
region is the Western backing for the usurper state of
Israel and support for its imperialistic designs on
Muslim lands, as well as its sponsoring of
pliant, undemocratic regimes in Muslim countries in
order to protect the West's own economic and strategic
interests. The message is clear: violence can only be
stopped when the West reverses its stand and gives the
Muslims their due. Furthermore, the attempt to equate
Islamic awakening, the struggle against oppression,
and the Islamic movement in general, with 'terrorism'
must be 'stiffly opposed', Tahan says, for, he
asserts, it is but a crude means for the West and its
allies in the Muslim world to continue their
oppressive control and stave off any challenge to
their hegemony.
The West's selective definition of what constitutes
'terrorism' must be clearly exposed, Tahan pleads. Any
challenge to Western or Israeli interests or attempts
to protest against their oppression by Muslims is
branded as 'terrorism', he notes, while Western and
Israeli acts of violence and brazen aggression are
termed as 'legitimate self-defence' against 'Islamic
fundamentalism' and as 'measures to protect peace'.
'A new of definition of terrorism is needed today',
Tahan says, one that clearly champions the cause of
the oppressed, whoever they may be.
Parallel to the external challenge from the West are
the threats to Muslims from within—sectarianism,
territorialism, racism and nationalism, Tahan rues.
Even within each Muslim country, serious divisions
have emerged between different Muslim groups. Tahan
advocates a 'realistic approach' to tackle these grave
dangers. Each community within the broad umbrella of
the Muslim ummah has its own characteristics and its
own particular cultural traits, he says, which must be
accepted and respected. These should in no way become
the cause of conflict or enmity. All Muslims are one,
Tahan declares. All humans are children of Adam and
Eve, and as the Quran says, an Arab is not superior to
a non-Arab or a white to a black. The only criterion
for judging a persons' worth in Islam is his or her
piety, not his race or wealth or country. It is
natural for one to love one's land of birth, but, he
stresses, when patriotism takes the form of
'nation-worship' it transgresses the bounds of Islam,
for in Islam worship is due only to God. Likewise,
Tahan says, it is natural, too, to identify with one's
own ethnic group', but, as a Tradition of the Prophet
puts it, when this love assumes the form of
'supporting one's community in oppression', it goes
against the teachings of Islam.
Ethnic and Religious Minorities
Islam lays down clear rules about the treatment of
religious minorities, says Tahan. They should be given
'full freedom', 'duly respected', guaranteed 'all
natural and human rights', 'protected from any
discrimination', be considered 'equal before the law'
and must be given 'equal opportunities for progress'.
Their rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis the state
are not different from that of the Muslim citizens. As
for ethnic minorities, they, too enjoy the same rights
as others. To discriminate against them is
'anti-Islamic'. In an Islamic state, all citizens,
says Tahan, 'are bound by the principle of live and
let live'. They must work together for the welfare of
the society at large, exploring areas of common
concern.
*
Analysing the manifold challenges that Islamic
movements are faced with on several fronts, Tahan
comes up with a model for an 'Islamic state', which he
sees as true to the teachings of Islam as well as
fully appropriate to meet the demands of modernity.
His scathing attack on the double standards of the
West, which poses itself as a champion of human rights
and democracy but yet is responsible for gross human
rights violations all over the globe, and his
unsparing criticism of ruling regimes in the Muslim
world allied to the West, bring in new dimension to
the debate on human rights in the 'Third World'. His
critique extends to many Islamic movements themselves,
despite him being a noted Islamist ideologue.
Highlighting the pitfalls of mindless violence, denial
of the rights of women and minorities and so on, Tahan
puts forward what he sees as the correct Islamic
position on many contentious matters. One need not
agree with everything that he says, but it is
undeniable that the perspectives he articulates on
matters that are today vigorously debated can prove
crucial in redefining the policies and perspectives of
Islamist movements, which are destined to play an
increasingly important role in the future.
Sukhia Sab Sansar Khaye Aur Soye
Dukhia Das Kabir Jagey Aur Roye
The world is 'happy', eating and sleeping
The forlorn Kabir Das is awake and weeping
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Sign the Petition : Release the Arrested University Teachers Immediately : An Appeal to the Caretaker Government of Bangladesh
http://www.mukto-mona.com/human_rights/university_teachers_arrest.htm
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Daily Star publishes an interview with Mukto-Mona
http://www.mukto-mona.com/news/daily_star/daily_star_MM.pdf
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MM site is blocked in Islamic countries such as UAE. Members of those theocratic states, kindly use any proxy (such as http://proxy.org/) to access mukto-mona.
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Mukto-Mona Celebrates 5th Anniversary
http://www.mukto-mona.com/Special_Event_/5_yrs_anniv/index.htm
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Mukto-Mona Celebrates Earth Day:
http://www.mukto-mona.com/Special_Event_/Earth_day2006/index.htm
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Kansat Uprising : A Special Page from Mukto-Mona
http://www.mukto-mona.com/human_rights/kansat2006/members/
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MM Project : Grand assembly of local freedom fighters at Raumari
http://www.mukto-mona.com/project/Roumari/freedom_fighters_union300306.htm
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German Bangla Radio Interviews Mukto-Mona Members:
http://www.mukto-mona.com/Special_Event_/Darwin_day/german_radio/
Mukto-Mona Celebrates Darwin Day:
http://www.mukto-mona.com/Special_Event_/Darwin_day/index.htm
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Some FAQ's about Mukto-Mona:
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VISIT MUKTO-MONA WEB-SITE : http://www.mukto-mona.com/
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"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it".
-Beatrice Hall [pseudonym: S.G. Tallentyre], 190
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