SAN-Feature Service SOUTH ASIAN NEWS-FEATURE SERVICE Reviewing Najmuddin A Shaikh There are sound reasons to be sceptical of the success of the new Afghan policy. But the one element in which we should and must cooperate is to recognise that the Afghan Taliban have ties with our own extremists SAN-Feature Service: Reports in the American press indicate that President Barack Obama's administration is finalising its Afghanistan-Pakistan policy. The new policy is expected to be unveiled on the eve of the UN-sponsored meeting on The "Afpak" policy's basic premises appear to be firstly a surge in the military effort. This means more Of the few countries — the UK, Canada and the Netherlands — that are engaged in combat against the Taliban it is known that at least two, Netherlands and Canada, will end the military part of their mission in a couple of years. The 17,000 US troops that are to be deployed in the next couple of months will bring US troop levels in Afghanistan to about 50,000, far short of the 160,000 deployed in Iraq at the height of the surge. This force will have a formidable list of tasks to perform: provide additional security needed for conducting the Afghan Presidential elections in August, fill the gaps left by the withdrawal of Canadian and Dutch troops and provide security in provinces that border on Kabul and have seen a surge of Taliban activity in recent months, provide the trainers needed for the expanded Afghan army which, some analysts are suggesting, has to be expanded well beyond the currently planned figure of 134,000 to about 250,000.. This last item is not as far as one can tell a recommendation made by any of the reviews but it appears to be part of the wish list of commanders on the ground who believe that this sort of strength would be required if the Afghan National Army is to be the key to the US exit strategy. Theoretically these additional troops will make it possible to not only clear areas now under Taliban thrall but to hold them and thus create the security conditions in which economic development and political reconciliation can move forward. Even as most analysts involved in the review recognise the differences between largely urbanised The second premise is that there has to be a new focus on political reconciliation and economic development. Biden's assertion that only 5% of the Taliban are hardcore and 70% are those who are with the Taliban because they provide employment is a clear indication that the new policy will aim to provide employment opportunities in the insurgency affected areas that will rival the financial inducements the Taliban are currently offering. The key element will be the expansion of the PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams). Despite the objections of the Karzai government, these PRTs will work with local representatives rather than with the Central government both in term of economic development and in giving the people the wherewithal to defend themselves against the Taliban. The premise is that the success of these efforts would lay the ground work for winning over the 70% reconcilable Taliban and for negotiations with the 20% or so who could be persuaded with the right political inducements to join the peace process. Several hundred new positions have been created in the American embassy in The third premise is that the Karzai government can be cleansed of corrupt elements and can win the confidence of the Afghan people sufficiently for The Americans would be happy to accept that in these negotiations Karzai agrees that there will be a large measure of autonomy for the provinces and that so long as the Taliban undertake not to allow Al Qaeda or other terrorist organisations to operate in the areas that are under their control they could enforce their own system of government in these areas and enjoy a share of power in the central government. The fourth and possibly the most important premise is what can be done in At a recent Congressional hearing questions on this subject elicited the response that the Pakistani authorities were concerned about local repercussions if they took action. Two days ago the New York Times reported that the Obama administration was considering the use of drones to attack the Taliban leadership in the areas around This was, however, contradicted in a Washington Post story a day later which said that the American military was reluctant to extend the drone attacks beyond the tribal areas and expected that the "Pakistan military must recognise the threat and organise themselves to deal with it". The activities of the Taliban in the border areas of Balochistan therefore will now figure more prominently in American military and political calculations, the more so now that alongside the attack on the container terminal for NATO cargo in Peshawar there has also been an attack on trucks carrying NATO goods into Afghanistan from Chaman. The jeopardy this causes for the logistic support for NATO forces will not be easy to countenance. In all likelihood, at the conferences scheduled on The There are sound reasons for being sceptical about the success of the new Afghan policy. But the one element which we should recognise and must cooperate on is the fact that the Afghan Taliban, their protestations notwithstanding, have ties with our own extremists and that their presence on our soil represents as much of a danger to us as it does to the NATO forces in Afghanistan.-- SAN-Feature Service The writer is a former foreign secretary of |
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